



Rai Technology University

ENGINEERING MINDS

Modern World



SYLLABUS

Theories of the Modern World

Renaissance and the Idea of the Individual, The Enlightenment, Critiques of Enlightenment

Modern World: Essential Components

Theories of the State, Capitalist Economy and its Critique, The Social Structure

The Modern State and Politics

Bureaucratization, Democratic Politics, Modern State and Welfare, Nationalism

Capitalism and Industrialization

Commercial Capitalism, Capitalist Industrialization, Socialist Industrialization, Underdevelopment

Expansion of Europe

Conquest and Appropriation, Migrations and Settlements, Imperialism, Colonialism, Decolonization

International Relations

Nation-state System, International Rivalries of Twentieth Century, Unipolar World and Counter-currents

Revolutions

Political Revolution: France, Political Revolution: Russia, Knowledge Revolution: Printing And Informatics, Technological Revolution: Communications and Medical

Violence and Repression

Modern Warfare, Total War, Violence by Non-state Actors

Dilemmas of Development

Demography, Ecology, Consumerism

Suggested Reading:

1. Mastering Modern World History : Norman Lowe
2. Histoyr Freedom of movement india : Tara Chand
3. The Wealth of Nations: An Inquiry into the Nature & Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith

CHAPTER 1

Theories of the Modern World

STRUCTURE

- Learning Objectives
- Renaissance and the idea of the individual
- The enlightenment
- Critiques of enlightenment
- Review Questions

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After reading this chapter you will be able to:

- Explain to you the different ways in which the Renaissance created the condition for the making of a new world
- Understand the ideas of the Enlightenment.
- Understand the relationship between science and religion.

RENAISSANCE AND THE IDEA OF THE INDIVIDUAL

The Invention of the Idea

It is interesting to know that, prior to the 19th century, the biggest socio-cultural growths in Europe throughout the 13th- 15th centuries were not understood and codified *since* renaissance. In this part you will become well-known with the procedure in which renaissance became a section of our knowledge. In 1860, Jakob Burckhardt formulated the influential concepts of 'Renaissance' and 'humanism', in his pioneering masterpiece of cultural history, *The Culture of the Renaissance in Italy*. Burckhardt's book was a "subtle synthesis of opinions in relation to the Renaissance that had grown powerful throughout the Age of the Enlightenment".

He seemed to be confirming a story told through secular, liberal intellectuals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries who were searching for the origins of their own beliefs and values that after the collapse of classical culture an era of darkness and barbarism had set in, dominated through the church and the humdrum of rural life. Eventually, however, a revival of commerce and urban life laid the foundations for a secular and even anti-religious vision of life. The new vision, which glorified the individual and the attractions of earthly life were strongly reinforced through the rediscovery of the pagan literature of the Antiquity.

The new secular and individualistic values, which were somewhat incompatible with Christian beliefs, constituted a new worldly philosophy of life recognized since 'humanism', drawing its largest thoughts and inspiration from ancient times. Humanism subsequently became the inspiration

for questioning the moral foundation of the feudal and Christian inheritances in Europe. Burckhardt's job, which dominated the 19th century perception in relation to the Renaissance, came to be subjected to criticisms later.

For a time in the late 1940s and the 1950s, the extremely idea of a Renaissance came under attack, when the rich development of scholarship on medieval history made the inherited view of a dark and uncivilized Transitional Ages seem untenable, "since medievalists exposed squarely in the Transitional Ages all the essential traits supposedly typical of the later era, and also exposed within the Renaissance several traditional elements which seemed to prove that the Transitional Ages existed on into the Renaissance". Medievalists establish renaissances in the sense of periods of classical revival in Carolingian France, Anglo-Saxon England and Ottonian Germany.

One of these medieval revivals, the 'twelfth-century Renaissance', became a subject of biggest historical enquiries, as the coinage of the word through Charles Homer Haskins in his *the renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (1927). Haskins maintained that the word 'renaissance', in the sense of an enthusiasm for classical literature, was a significant characteristic of the twelfth century and that this cultural renewal was the ancestor of subsequent civilization progress in early contemporary Europe. Yet historians have not discarded fully the concept and the word 'Renaissance' in the sense Burckhardt had used it. For historical realities, which Burckhardt had called, cannot be dismissed with quibbles in relation to the terminology.

Burckhardt rightly saw the emergence of a new civilization and also situated one of its largest sources in Italian humanism through linking it to a unique set of social, political, and economic circumstances. This new civilization might look to be the product of the development of commerce and municipalities in northern Italy from the late eleventh century. But urban development and commercial expansion as the 11th century, does not explain why the new civilization flowered approximately at the end of the 14th century even since it is true that Italy throughout the 12th and 13th centuries had become the mainly highly urbanized, the wealthiest and the mainly developed area of Europe.

The urban and commercial development of Italy stands in contrast to other sections of Europe in the north of the Alps, where the scholastic philosophy, Gothic art, and vernacular literature of these centuries were clearly associated with the clergy and the feudal aristocracy of the medieval age.

Growths in Italy

Italy too was not completely free of this older aristocratic and clerical civilization. Yet the dynamic section of Italy, the north, was dominated not through clerics and feudal nobles but through prosperous urban merchants, 'and throughout the 12th and 13th centuries, the municipalities of northern Italy in alliance with the popes broke the military and political authority of the German kings, who described themselves Roman emperors and attempted to assert manage in excess of northern Italy'.

Strong, centralizing monarchy of the types that urbanized in France and England did not emerge in Italy. Northern Italy was dotted with virtually independent urban republics. Although the people of these urban societies were deeply religious people, the location of the clergy in Italian municipality life was marginal. The municipalities were governed through prosperous merchants and the dependent petty traders and artisans, however from the 13th century, more and more of them came under management of military despots who offered defense from internal disorder and external invasion. Mainly of these Italian cities lived since markets for regional societies, since links flanked by the nearby country and the far markets, generally purchasing its cereals from the vicinity. Some big urban formations, like Genoa or Florence, were centers of international deal, which had expanded therefore enormously throughout the 12th and 13th centuries that the urban societies in such sprawling cities became superior to the usual little societies in the municipality republics.

The management of these cities came to depend increasingly on a professional civil service with legal training. Since the action of the cities became more intricate, they came to gradually acquire permanent civic institutions including a class of magistrates. This was the time when the societies came to display characteristics of a municipality-state. The municipality-states in practice were republican oligarchies where crucial decisions were taken through a little minority of office-holding prosperous merchants; even however a considerable section of the male population was recruited in the citizen's militia.

In excess of time however, the subsistence of the municipality republic in several examples became precarious. The townsmen were fighting each other, a characteristic that Machiavelli, the great Florentine thinker of renaissance Italy explained since a result of enmity flanked by the prosperous and the poor. The situation was further complicated through factional rivalries within the ruling clusters. The municipality councils became therefore divided beside factional rows that in mainly municipalities before the end of the 14th century the regime of a single individual began to be increasingly preferred.

To escape the problem of civic strife, mainly municipalities turned from republicanism to *signoria* (the rule of one man), who could either be a member of the urban aristocracy or a military captain who had been hired through the municipality councils for organizing the municipality's defense from external enemies. Republican survivals were exceptions; the rule of the signor became universal.

With the exception of Venice, mainly Italian municipalities experienced this transformation. The signori in mainly cases chose to rule by existing republican institutions combining the hitherto antagonistic principles of municipalize and feudalism. The advent of signori resulted from the fragility of republican institutions, yet the triumph of the signori did not eliminate require for scholar officers.

The city-states with enlarged functions including diplomacy, warfare, taxation and governance in an expanding and intricate urban habitation were an ideal breeding ground for a sure consciousness of

citizenship. The type of manage that the municipal authorities imposed on traders and artisans fell distant short of free private enterprise, yet it is possible to argue that the growth of private wealth against the background of an expanding commerce and a measure of involvement of the municipalities' elites in the actual governance of the municipality were capable of reinforcing the individualist self consciousness in few of the municipality's leading men.

New Clusters: Lawyers and Notaries

In a community where commerce dominated the scene the mainly significant educated clusters were the lawyers and the notaries (a combination of solicitor and record keeper) who drew up and interpreted the rules and written agreements without which deal on a big level was not possible. With the growing level of commerce there was an acute require for men skilled in drafting, recording, and authenticating contracts and letters.

These were the notaries, specialists who did not require the extensive and costly education provided through law schools but who did receive training in Latin grammar and rhetoric. Such training in letter-script and drafting legal documents was often given through apprenticeship, but at biggest centers of legal revise such since Padua and Bologna, there were full-time professional teachers who taught not only the conventional legal shapes of drafting several types of business documents and the correct kind of handwriting for documents of public record but also provided few instruction in Roman law.

Unlike in the transitional ages when virtually all intellectual behaviors were accepted on through churchmen, in the Italian municipalities this was pursued through members of the new professions. In more than one sense they were the real forerunners to renaissance humanism. Padua, a university city especially noted for the revise of law and medicine, produced enthusiasts for the language and literature of ancient Rome. A significant figure in this movement was Lovato Lovati (c. 1240-1309) a judge who showed several aspects of humanism. His younger modern Albertino Mussato (1261-1325), who was a notary through profession, became widely recognized during Italy. Throughout this early stage of the development of humanism, Florence, the municipality associated with the later flowering of humanistic civilization, played a marginal role.

The great Florentine literary and intellectual figure of this age, Dante Alighieri (1265-1321), is connected more with medieval rather than Renaissance civilization whose generation in Florence, despite the persistence of old cultural beliefs, still idea in relation to the a sure conception of cultural renewal by reinterpretation of classical literature and a conscious repudiation of the values of medieval culture. The arrival of Petrarch, a century later, brought in relation to the transform in Florentine civilization, more decisively. Petrarch realized that antiquity was a distinctive culture which could be understood bigger by the terms and the words of the ancients. Petrarch's stress, so, was on grammar, which included the secure reading of ancient authors from a linguistic point of

view. With language, eloquence and the revise of rhetoric, the ultimate purpose of this educational program was to project a sure idea of good life that was suffused with secular meanings.

Humanism

As the nineteenth century, historians have labeled this new civilization since ‘humanism’, however it seems nowhere in the scripts of the Renaissance era itself. The word that did exist was ‘humanistic studies’, implying academic subjects favored through humanists. Through the first half of the fifteenth century, the word ‘humanist’ designated masters who taught academic subjects like grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history, and moral philosophy.

They were members of a scrupulous professional cluster who taught humanities and liberal arts – humanities, a classical term earlier used through Cicero since a substitute for the Greek Paideia, or civilization. Cicero was trying to create the point that it was only human beings who were capable of this knowledge in relation to the own selves. Renaissance humanism, conceived since ‘a new philosophy of life’ or a glorification of human nature in secular words, eludes precise definition. Indeed there is no definable set of general beliefs.

More than a heightened sense of individualism, the primary feature, was the new pattern of historical consciousness that appeared first in the idea of leading 14th century poet. Petrarch. The sense of being deeply occupied in the restoration of true culture after several centuries of barbarian darkness – an unfair location at that—discovers its first clear report in the jobs of Petrarch, and few such claim is general to virtually all of those writers—like Salutati, Poggio, Valla and Ficino to name a some—whom historians identify since the leading personalities in the history of Italian humanism.

The humanist self-image since free mediators of culture was sharpened through such historical consciousness which enabled them to distinguish their time since an age of light from the preceding one of darkness. They whispered that a dark age had set in after the decline of the Roman Empire since a result of the invasion of the barbarians. The humanists belonging to dissimilar generations returned to this theme of belonging to a new time, inventing the concept of the transitional ages flanked by the collapse of Rome and the cultural renewal in the age of renaissance. Leonardo Bruni, for sometime the chancellor of Florence, in his history of Florence or Flavio Biondo in a job covering the era from the sack of Rome through Alaric in 410 A.D. to the writer’s own time betrayed this new sense of modernity.

The sense of the novelty of their age was entwined with a conscious imitation of the jobs of the ancient Greek and Roman writers. A sure consciousness of the newness of their time turned the great figures of renaissance into believers in progress. Without doubt, the poet Petrarch (Francesco Petrarca, 1304-74) was its first great figure, the real founder of the new civilization, who tried to bring back to life the inner spirit of ancient Roman culture. His love for ancient Latin literature was dovetailed with a repudiation of the inherited medieval civilization. He transformed classicism into a

weapon in a thrash about to regenerate the world and to make a distinctive new civilization built on the solid basis of a lost but retrievable antiquity.

New Education

Petrarch's dream of a cultural and moral regeneration of Christian community, based on the union of eloquence and philosophy, had significant implications for education. In late medieval and renaissance Italy, there were three kinds of schools other than the universities and schools mannered through religious orders exclusively for their own members. Mainly of the teaching at all three stages was done through self-employed schoolmasters who took tuition-paying pupils and, working either alone or with one assistant, taught them whatever subjects their parents paid for. But several cities in northern Italy also organized society schools, in which the regional government selected and hired a schoolmaster, who was bound through an extremely specific contract to teach sure subjects up to a sure stage. Collective schools began to seem in the 13th century.

Collective schools in little cities ensured that competent preparation for university revise would be accessible for the sons of the ruling elites. Despite the development of humanism, in the 14th century the curriculum of these schools did not transform much. The textbooks used were predominantly medieval and Christian in origin, and several of them had been deliberately compiled for classroom exploit in teaching correct Latin and sound moral principles.

This medieval curriculum aroused the contempt of Petrarch and virtually all later humanists, who attacked this curriculum on the ground that mainly of its intellectual content, was inadequate and that its moral indoctrination had no relevance in the lives of the citizens of Italian municipalities. Leonardo Bruni acknowledged that it was Petrarch who had outlined a program of revise through which the classical thoughts would be achieved. It included grammar, rhetoric, poetry, moral philosophy and history.

The humanists also insisted upon the mastery of classical Latin and Greek, therefore that the ancient authors could be studied directly to the exclusion of medieval commentaries. The humanists taught in a variety of methods. Few founded their own schools where students could revise the new curriculum at both elementary and advance stages; few humanists supervised to discover their method into universities where teaching sustained to be dominated through law, medicine and theology and the humanist curriculum had a peripheral attendance.

The majority achieved their mission through teaching in numerous grammar schools. But formal education was not the only method by which they formed the minds of their age; literature, art and drama were the other vehicles of transmission of humanist thoughts.

Print

The growing power of humanist schoolmasters in the Latin grammar schools in the Italian cities did much to set up humanism since the biggest force in Italian civilization. Yet another source of humanism's growing dominance was the new art of printing. Through 1500, several classical texts

had been printed in Italy, mostly in Latin. Printing, separately from standardizing the new editions of the classics also helped in their dissemination. Before printing, mainly books lived only in some copies; printing increased their numbers. Since a result, the cost of books also fell exposing the students to a new type of studying instead of depending solely on lectures.

A printed book promoting new thoughts, could quickly reach hundreds of readers. Thoughts, opinions, and fact moved more widely and more rapidly than ever before. Surely one cause why the humanistic civilization of Italy spread more rapidly crossways the Alps toward the end of the 15th century is that books were circulating in print.

Secular Openings

One of the mainly significant characteristics of the renaissance is a beginning of a loosening manage of religion in excess of human life. In this sense it may be said that renaissance created circumstances for the emergence of a secular ideology.

A new focus on humanism also fed into this secular opening. But it is significant to understand exactly how, and to what extent, this secular opening was created. Although humanism may have challenged the conventional authorities of the academic world, including scholastic theologians, it was not necessarily meant to be a challenge to Christian faith or to Catholic orthodoxy. Petrarch, for instance, expressed doubts in relation to his own spiritual beliefs, but he never doubted the truth of Christianity.

He also objected to the Italian scholasticism of his time not on the ground that it was too religious but that it was materialistic and at times subversive of the teachings of the church. Salutati did endorse the active secular life for mainly people and followed that course in his own life, but he still respected the monastic ideals. In the 1390s he and his family were attached to a revivalist movement that was based on traditional shapes of devotion. The inherent and common religiosity of Renaissance humanism is to a big extent a making of 19th century historiography.

This is not to imply that men were not interested in worldly items, even when the educated classes since well since plain folk were deeply moved through religious revivalism and devotionals. Certainly renaissance Italians was strongly attracted to material wealth, to authority, and to glory. Yet those who preferred to live a happy and successful life were not necessarily irreligious, even however humanism since a civilization of the talented urban people in the prosperous Italian city was giving rise to a secular morality.

Fransceco Barbaro, a Venetian humanist of the first generation, wrote a tract regarding marriage which repudiated the traditional thoughts of poverty and defended acquisition of wealth since a virtue. Bracciolini Poggio (1380-1459), who was the mainly celebrated excavator of lost manuscript in Florence, in a tract *On Avarice* defended acquisition of wealth, going to the extent of justifying usury which had always been condemned through orthodox Christianity since an unchristian act, since a legitimate shape of business. In addition numerous humanist treatises like for instance *On*

Civil Life written through Matteo Palmiry upheld the superiority of an active life in excess of one of contemplation. Such opinions did express values of the wealthy classes. This set of values was secular; it regarded marriage, wealth and politics since natural and worthy of pursuit. Yet they were not fundamentally anti-Christian.

Their authors were practical moralists who presented a moral code suitable for the ambitious people, rather than monks, while accepting that there could be a spiritual life beyond one's worldly subsistence. The glorification of secular life, however, was more a literary reflection of changing social attitudes than an aspect of classical studies. The classical studies nonetheless contributed to the glorification of human nature, even however humanists were also conscious of its frailties. Lorenzo Valla (1406-1457), who whispered that revise of history, led man to live a life of perfection, in his job, *On Pleasure*, condemned within a profoundly Christian mentality the conventional Christian injunction against pleasure.

In few other scripts, there was a rejection of the view that wise men should suppress passion, on the ground that such suppression was thoroughly unnatural. The theme of human dignity occupies a central lay in such jobs to the degree that in a number of spaces, since the one written through Marsilio Ficino, a neo-Platonist thinker of Florence, human nature was endowed with super natural authority.

Human beings occupying a crucial transitional location in the great chain of being was the point of get in touch with flanked by the material world and the world of god? Such sentiments had already informed the script of the 13th century humanists like Leonardo Da Vinci. Ficino's glorification of human nature takes the pursuit of the human glory beyond the everyday life of the transitional class Florentines. Ficino, despite his knowledge in platonic philosophy on which he frequently lectured before students in his platonic academy, was a believer in magic and astrology. Ficino belonged to a circle of few prominent intellectual figures, which included a young prince of Medici family whose name was Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola. Mirandola's mainly well-known job, '*Oration on the dignity of man*', published in 1496 trades with the theme of human dignity through suggesting that of all God's making man received complete freedom to choose his own lay in the Great chain of being.

Through his own free choice man creates himself either in a spiritual fashion or in the manner of a beast. His view of human nature did not seem towards divine grace but celebrated worldly attainment. The secular morality of the humanists so was grounded in a belief in man's intellectual and moral capability, a new sense of history, and a highly sophisticated mode of studying. Faith in human capability came shape the realization that the educated could attain wisdom without the help of priests or intellectuals. The conception was strengthened through a renewed acceptance of the ancient proposition that virtue was knowledge.

Behind this place a belief that knowledge could elevate human beings. These attitudes constituted an idea not presently of individualism but also a dissimilar ideal of public man, setting out not presently

some new assumptions in relation to the humanity but also a normative process for assessing human actions. In the 15th and 16th centuries, the scholars, the artists, the architects, the musicians and the writers, all those who formed the civilization of Humanism, began to experience a more common sense that their community had entered upon a new age, an age which has removed the 'darkness' of the preceding centuries: the 'Renaissance'.

While this interpretation of history was an exaggeration of what they were professing, it was yet undeniable that a new vision of man was being created. The 'new man' was measured sovereign in the world and, with his cause and creative powers, was able to refashion the world in accordance with his will. Increasingly, the *studium humanitatis* and the common cultural climate of the Renaissance produced texts which showed this deepening interest in the essence of what made man more civilized, humane being and which were so described *humanist literature*. Texts written on a variety of subjects sought to expose what man was and could do both since an individual and since a member of community. The autobiography, in which a person tells his own, unique story of his life, was born in humanist circles.

A fine instance of this type of script was the one written through the well-known goldsmith and sculptor, Benvenuto Cellini (1500-71), it was a secular and realistic job which told the story of his life. His readers were persuaded to see the world approximately him by his eyes, not according to all sorts of idealizations which the Church had earlier imposed on Christian societies. Therefore, Cellini writes of the must to record one's deeds, and in the procedure informs the posterity in relation to the experience and engagement with reality.

He writes in relation to the ancient monuments that inspired him, giving an idea of the sense of life and movement in Michelangelo's job, often graphically describing Michelangelo's quarrels with his competitors. Another example of this genre of scripts is Vasari's *Lives of the Artists*, in which the author, who was himself an artist, reflected on the attainments of few of his contemporaries in relation to their personalities, in short describing the lay of the creative individual in community. His job, since those of other great names of the renaissance like Niccolo Machiavelli was informed through the sentiments that all men were capable of achieving wisdom and glory – a feeling which merged into the new humanist thoughts in the intellectual circles.

This enabled them to understand afresh the history of texts, in the procedure laying out the groundwork for classical scholarship of contemporary times. A consequence of such intellectual interest enabled the humanists to develop a new understanding of man in community. The moral foundation of this ideal was derived from the belief in man's capability to understand truth on the strength of his cause and worldly sense – an idea that the intellectuals of the renaissance had inherited from classical studying. At one stage this human capability was looked upon since a divine gift; at another stage human attainment depended on free choice which implicitly acknowledged a

sure self definition of goals and responsibilities through an individual, who was since much capable of sound decisions since of faulty strategies.

The account of man included both virtue and vice. The historian Buckhardt wrote in relation to the growth of the individual since an aspect of this new consciousness, attributing this to the material life and political civilization of the Italian municipality states. This new consciousness created the ideal of the universal man in the sense of a sure recognition of the individual personality and private attainments. To men like Machiavelli pursuit of glory was a perfectly human virtue.

Realism vs. Moralism

Separately from the pursuit of glory, the self-growth of an individual personality by farming of 'arts and sciences' appeared since another social ideal allowing a great flowering of creative action. The cult of artistic personality was the other face of the similar coin – an ideal which figures prominently in Vasari's *Lives* who connected artistic quality to a psychology of attainment.

To little extent Vasari had followed the process which had been adopted through the celebrated Roman biographer Plutarch. Plutarch had presented before the humanists a vision of man in community whose attainments were results of their pursuit of glory and entwined with a sure conception of virtue. The idea was attractive and powerful because of its intense realism. Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), a Florentine scholar, who, in his well-known 1513 tract *The Prince*, defines the role of man in that segment of community which is, described politics. Machiavelli, too, was secular and a realist; he showed that the will to authority was a dominant motive in human activity however often coated with nice terms of religious and ethical nature. Upon a closer seem it revealed itself since pure self-interest; and more importantly there was nothing wrong in relation to it. Machiavelli's political idea is often interpreted since "the activation, in one sense or another, of a pagan morality, without being contaminated through Christian asceticism".

It is also argued that being a realist he suggested a dual morality. What was moral in the public sphere might have been immoral in one's private life. Machiavelli's condo nation of cunning on the section of a ruler in the superior interest of the realm is the familiar instance of the dual morality. Machiavelli apparently was interested more in what men did in the public sphere than what they preached. Scholars like Quentin Skinner have painstakingly argued that this was essentially a pre-Christian pagan morality where success was worshiped since virtue.

Even however Machiavelli had a gloomy opinion in relation to the method life was governed through fortune, he placed a big premium on the suitable initiatives through men to overpower fortune. In a sense this was a celebration of man since a self determining being. Such a dynamic concept of man which seems with the renaissance, like humanism, cannot be precisely defined. It certainly implied an individualistic outlook and has often been called since 'renaissance individualism'. In a method it fell distant short of the individualism of a mature bourgeois community, yet it was bourgeois individualism in its embryo. Almost certainly the ideal of the self-made man which renaissance

humanism proclaimed was suggestive of the method the individuals were capable of shaping their own lives rather than the more mundane pursuit of authority and money.

This ideal was closely tied with sure versatility or several-sidedness of human nature going against the ordered subsistence that was imposed on man through Christianity and feudalism. The Christian concept of man was founded on the idea that man necessarily had a depraved subsistence and could be delivered only through the grace of god. At another stage he was a member of a feudal order or an estate. The status of an individual either since a member of a feudal order or since a member of the Christian society allowed him a very narrow range of freedom. One could of course rebel against the church and could be condemned since a heretic.

But even that rebellion was staged in the name of the Christ, always weighed down through the belief in man's essential sinfulness derived from the Biblical notion of the original sin. The renaissance view of man replaced this with the dynamic view in which "the two extreme poles were the greatness of man and also his littleness". Whether great or little, man began to be looked upon since a relatively autonomous being, 'creating his own destiny, struggling with fate, creation himself'. This was no more than an idealized image of actual man, backed up adequately through a pluralism of moral values reversing a value organization based on the seven cardinal sins and seven cardinal virtues of medieval Christianity.

The pluralism of moral values seems boldly in the method the renaissance intellectuals began to respond extremely differently to dissimilar human propensities. If the striving for authority was perfectly acceptable to Machiavelli, too few others, like Thomas More, it was a source of much mischief. To put it basically the renaissance experienced the growth of what may be labeled since realistic ethics, suggesting a situation where values became comparative and contradictory calling upon man to seem for the suitable measure to distinguish flanked by good and bad against the backdrop of a significant transformation of social life.

The new ideal of man presumes a superior amount of freedom of activity which the medieval Christian society did not allow. The municipality state was one sphere in which it became increasingly apparent that man is the maker of his own world jointly with others instead of being determined through either Christian or feudal rules of conduct. One of the consequences was the gradual fading absent of the old notion of sin. The man of the age began to measure his activity through their success or the lack of it.

The emergence of such practical atheism was a significant aspect of renaissance thinking in relation to the man. It also lived since the foundation of the rational Christianity or a tolerant religion of cause taking its location against dogmatism and allowing a sure freedom of individuality and choice. Ficino, for instance, made a significant effort to reconcile few of his platonic philosophical thoughts with Christian considerations imbued with the awareness of the creative authority of man.

The great renaissance figures exposed that the attributes of god in information were the attributes of man since well. One can possibly think of an effort towards the deification of man since one of the wonders of the world. There are several illustrations from renaissance sculptures where human heroes seem since divine figures. Michelangelo's David seems like a Greek god. A man like Ficino not only argued that god created man, but also stressed that once created, man created he in excess of and in excess of again. Ficino also spoke of the eternal restlessness and dissatisfaction of human mind returning to the similar dynamic concept of man which refused to acknowledge any limits like an early contemporary merchant motivated through boundless opportunities for profits. This vision of the greatness of man dovetailed with man's essential frailties.

Machiavelli himself whispered that 'all men are bad and ever ready to display their vicious nature partly because of the information that human desires are insatiable'. The mainly powerful motive Machiavelli sees since the stimulus for every human activity is self-interest. The vileness of human nature so had nothing to do with any deliberate design for evil and what Machiavelli called since human nature is synonymous with the common ethical belief of the emerging bourgeois community in which reliance was placed largely on the unbiased observation of information's and activities.

This precisely was the ethic of experience which occupies a central lay in Machiavelli's definition of human nature when he writes that 'the desire to acquire possession is an extremely natural and ordinary item, and when those men do it that can do it successfully they are always praised and not blamed'. Artists presented this new vision of man since well. For the material remnants of classical civilization were now sought since assiduously since the surviving ancient texts: the 15th and 16th centuries saw the birth of archaeology.

Numerous jobs of art were exposed in the ruins of ancient Rome, and discover reinforced the new view of man that had been developing in the previous century. A multitude of paintings and sculptures of 'perfectly' proportioned men and women was the result. A new, ideal-kind human being was created, which has captured our imagination by the ages. Early in the 14th century life like frescos of Giotto di Baondone, had brought in relation to the significant transforms in the artistic visualization of human figure breaking absent from the mechanical approach of the transitional ages.

In 1416, the Italian sculptor Donatelo broke new ground with figures like his nude David, anticipating the better recognized job on the similar subject through Michelangelo in 1503. Leonardo da Vinci painted Mona Lisa, which has remained since one of the representations of female beauty in contemporary times. Besides incorporating the secularist and individualist characteristics of humanism, the reborn age or Renaissance should be described realistic since well. In painting, efforts were made to symbolize everything since it emerged. However not completely away in the previous ages, one can certainly uphold that for several centuries realism had been relatively unimportant.

Already in the 14th and 15th centuries, throughout the first stages of humanist civilization, painters increasingly attempted to reproduce reality, casting off preconceived thoughts in relation to the

morally or religiously acceptable. Increasingly, what the eye could measure or observe was painted incorporating aloofness, depth and color in order to create the painting more realistic. In sculpture too people were individualized, with recognizable sides, whereas the art of the preceding centuries had been a component of an architectural backdrop—relief's more than freestanding figures; in the changed context sculpted images presented man according to his newly-won vision of himself since an independent and free personality, displaying a sure pride in the beauty of the body, both the male and, in view of the conventions of the preceding age, the female too.

Whereas woman for a extensive time had been 'stereotyped due to the limits imposed upon her role through the community, she now seemed to regain few stature since an individual person, in whose body the perfection of God's making was made since visible since in the male'. This was the case even when paintings and sculptures served religious purposes, and were collected in such a method that they aroused a suitable devotional reaction in the viewers, like the Madonna and her child through the Italian painter Raphael or the massive frescos, mosaics and statues that adorned walls and ceilings and cupolas in the Church. Inevitably, deal and travel, military conquest and diplomatic contacts connected the new civilization of the Italian cities and courts with the world beyond.

The new civilization was admired and imitated all in excess of Europe although, of course, through the bigger educated and the prosperous, only. For both south and north of the Alps, Humanism and the Renaissance were elite phenomena. Only extremely some of the new thoughts and considerations filtered down to the ordinary man who, after all, could not read or write the polite language, lacking, since the cultivated mind of the age saw it, the skill to acquire virtue and wisdom.

Yet in the 15th and early 16th centuries, the educational institutions in northern Europe produced several humanists. Like their Italian colleagues, they too, began to focus on the classical Greek and Roman texts beside with the holy books of the Christians. Desiderius Erasmus, one of the mainly well-known of these north European humanists, in a series of treatises, tried to place down the rules for an educational organization that despite its Christian basis came to be animated through the critical spirit of Humanism. Indeed, one should not forget that, contrary to what often has been suggested, mainly people livelihood the civilization of Renaissance and humanism did not display a 'heathenish', pagan spirit but remained firmly tied to a view of man and the world since, essentially, redeemable only through a Christian God.

Through the beginning of the 16th century humanist values had begun to refashion the intellectual life of northern Europe. John Colet and Sir Thomas More popularized them in England, Jacques Lefevre's Etaples and Guillaume Bude in France, Conrad Celtis and Hohann Reuchlin in Germany and Erasmus in Holland were the leading humanists in early 16th century Europe. But unlike Italy, where professionals dominated the humanist movement and gave it a secular character—even atheist in few cases—in European humanism the leading protagonists were mostly members of the clerical order.

Their reassessment of Christian theology set the level for the Reformation through calling upon Christians to practice religion in the method it had been stated in the ancient texts of the Christian religion, through discarding unnecessary and unpalatable rituals, condemned since later accretions to an easy religion. With the advent of the Reformation, the humanist 'Self Congratulation on livelihood in a golden age' was eclipsed through theological battles of the time. 'The waning of the Renaissance' had begun. Yet the new view of man since a free rational agent was a principle to which the post-Renaissance philosophy returned in excess of and in excess of again, inspired through the belief in a far god who created man but allowed him complete freedom to live his life freely, in pursuit of happiness 'here and now'.

THE ENLIGHTENMENT

The Idea of Progress

The idea that is constitutive of the Enlightenment and central to this historical epoch is the idea of progress. By it the Enlightenment expressed the twin belief that – a) the present was bigger and more advanced than the past and b) this advancement has resulted in the happiness of man. Both these claims in relation to the progress in history were based on the assessment of the transforms that were taking lay approximately them.

The scientific discoveries of Copernicus, Kepler and Newton and their applications through Galileo led them to consider that human beings could fully understand the functioning of the universe and gain an unprecedented degree of manage in excess of their natural and physical habitation. This sentiment was further reinforced through the transforms that were taking lay in the traditional institution of life.

The incorporation of new technologies in the field of agriculture and in the manufacturing of goods had meant significant increase in the sphere of manufacture. Coupled with improved discourses, growth of roads, canals, and the development in internal and foreign deal, they whispered they were standing on the threshold of a new period: a period that would be marked through abundance, perfectibility of man and the institutions of community. At the mainly common stage there was a feeling that we are now moving towards a condition in which, to quote Gibbons, 'all occupants of the planet would enjoy a perfectly happy subsistence'.

Theorists of the Enlightenment were influenced of the attainments and superiority of their age. They saw in history a movement from the dark ages to the civilized present. This did not mean that human history was gradually but steadily moving in one direction or that every level marked an improvement in excess of the previous one. While pointing to progress in history they were primarily saying that there was a marked improvement in the excellence of life in the present period. More specifically, the *Philosophers* were claiming that there has been a tangible and undeniable advancement in every sphere of life as the Reformation. For Chastellux, flourishing agriculture, deal

and industry, the rise in population and the development in knowledge were all indicators of the increase in felicity.

The latter meant that their age was a much happier one. It was marked through peace, liberty and abundance. It was, to exploit Kant's terms, the best of all possible worlds. Unlike several of his contemporaries Kant was however of the view that happiness was not the largest issue. It was not basically a question of increase or decrease in the stages of happiness because culture, even in its mainly perfect shape, could not bring in relation to the happiness of men. Hence it was not to be judged in those words. Culture provided a setting in which men can test and prove their freedom. The present merited a special lay in therefore distant since it had created circumstances in which men can encounter the mainly significant category of cause, namely, freedom.

The belief that man had advanced from the 'barbarous rusticity' to the 'politeness of our age' was feature of the Enlightenment. Indeed, this reading of the past and the present marked a sharp break from the earlier conceptions of history. The Greeks, for example, saw history since a cyclical procedure comprising of periods of glory followed through periods of decline and degeneration. The Transitional Ages, under the power of Christianity, had small lay for mundane history. Nothing in real history mattered because hope and happiness place in the other-world. Man's fall from grace had meant the loss of idyllic subsistence. Consequently, for them, it was only by redemption that men could hope to improve their present condition.

The Renaissance broke absent from this Christian reading of history but it had a pessimistic view of human nature. The Renaissance men whispered that the attainments of antiquity, in scrupulous, of Greek and Roman culture, were unreachable. They embodied the highest attainments of humankind that could not be surpassed. The Enlightenment, in sharp contrast to all this, focused on the 'here' and 'now' and saw in it unprecedented development, accompanied through moral and intellectual liberation of man. Johnson is accounted to have said, "I am always angry when I hear ancient times being praised at the expense of contemporary times.

There is now a great trade more studying in the world than there was formerly; for it is universally diffused". The Scottish philosopher Dugald Stewart was even more unequivocal in affirming the progress in the present world. He argued that the increase in commerce had "led to the diffusion of wealth and 'a more equal diffusion of freedom and happiness', than had ever lived before". Technical innovations that accompanied capitalism meant that men were "released from the bondage of mechanical labour and...free to cultivate the mind". The present was therefore seen since the age of progress where there was unprecedented advance in every sphere of life. It was, in its view, riddled with superstition and dogma, and guided through religion and blind obedience to power.

It was marked through the absence of individual freedom. The present, through comparison, was designated since 'civilized' and 'enlightened': a period in which cause was expected to prevail. The theorists of Enlightenment whispered that there were primarily two obstacles to progress – wars and

religion. Both these could be, indeed they needed to be, destroyed through cause. Once that was done then the world would be a bigger lay. It would, in the terms of Condorcet, move from bondage to ultimate perfection of freedom and cause.

Cause was, in a sense, the key to the earthly utopia. It was an instrument that individuals could exploit not only to interrogate all received shapes of knowledge but also to lead a virtuous, rational and happy life. For the *Philosophers*, cause was an ally of experience. It embodied a non-authoritarian source of knowledge that can be tested and proved. In the Preface to *The Organization of Nature*, Holbach wrote: “[R]eason with its faithful guide experience necessity attack in their entrenchments those prejudices of which the human race has been too extensive the victim.... Let us attempt to inspire man with courage, with respect for his cause, with an indistinguishable love for truth, to the end that he may learn to consult his experience, and no longer be the dupe of an imagination led astray through power...”

Theorists, such since Holbach, whispered that cause could liberate men from the oppressive authority exercised through religion and, at the similar time, give them knowledge of the truth. Men had so to be taught to exploit cause and to act in accordance with its potentialities. This was the largest Enlightenment project.

Science and Knowledge

The development in scientific knowledge had given the Enlightenment grounds for being optimistic in relation to the present and the future. Its spokesmen asserted with conviction that culture was moving in the right direction and that it necessity continue to move in that direction. The evident progress in material and social life also gave them a sense of grandeur.

They felt that there were no limits on what human beings could know and accomplish. The growth of human faculties and the advance that had been made through the sciences and through culture since an entire, gave them sufficient cause to assert that nature had placed no limits on our hopes. The belief that human beings could achieve whatever they set out to do was closely connected to the Enlightenment idea of progress. Progress indicated the rising skill of individuals to manage their natural and social habitation.

According to the thinkers, the visible improvement in human life was the result of active and effective application of cause for controlling physical and social habitation. *Vice-versa*, the success that their generation had in controlling their habitation and harnessing the forces of nature for the betterment of humankind affirmed the belief that scientific application of cause would lead to the liberation of man.

It could make an ideal world in which individuals could strive to combine the virtues of knowledge with liberty. Three points require to be accentuated here. First, the Enlightenment thinkers connected knowledge with the natural sciences. The way of systematic observation, experimentation and critical inquiry used in the physical sciences was, in their view, the only viable foundation of arriving

at the truth. Knowledge necessity is demonstrable. It necessity be backed through evidence that is available by cause and the faculties of the human mind. Based on this conception of knowledge, the Enlightenment posited a dichotomy flanked by metaphysical speculation and knowledge.

The Transitional ages, under the power of Christianity, had assumed that the world created through God could not be recognized through human beings. It was, through definition, inaccessible to human cause. The truth in relation to the man and the universe could only be 'revealed', and hence, recognized by the Holy Scriptures. "Where the light of cause does not shine, the lamp of faith supplies illumination". This was the avowed belief of the Transitional Ages.

The Enlightenment rejected this view and maintained that items that could not be recognized through the application of cause and systematic observation were chimerical. What could not be recognized necessity not even be sought for it constitutes the realm of the metaphysical, if not the nonsensical. Second, the Enlightenment began with the view shared through the leading scientists of their times: namely, that the secrets of the universe could be apprehended totally through man. These theorists were influenced both of the intelligibility of the universe and of the skill of individuals to understand it totally.

They whispered that while discussing nature we ought to begin not with the power of the scriptures but with sensible experiments and demonstrations. In *Les Bijoux Indiscrete*, Diderot compared the way of experimentation to a giant who could in one blow destroy the grand organizations created through metaphysics and idle speculation. The latter were basically structures without foundations therefore they could easily be knocked down through the authority of scientific cause. Third, science had provided a new and fairly dissimilar picture of man and the universe. Instead of positing a world of items that are ordered through their ideal nature or through little prior purpose, it presented nature since a self-regulating organization of laws.

The Enlightenment theorists embraced this world-view and like their counterparts in the natural sciences they aimed to find laws that govern community and human nature. Identifying laws and establishing patterns entailed the revise of reason and effect connections. It required the search for an antecedent event that is necessary and enough for explaining an occurrence. The *Philosophers* abandoned the search for final reasons and focused instead on the examination of an efficient reason; that is, they tried to specify an antecedent event whose attendance is necessary for the occurrence of a given phenomenon and whose absence would imply the nonoccurrence of that phenomenon.

The revise of reason-and-effect connections was central to the Enlightenment conception of science. According to the thinker, "items are concealed from us since however through a heavy fog especially those items that are mainly often before our eyes. Nature has hidden from us the primary and elementary effects approximately since thoroughly, I should say, since she has hidden the reasons themselves.

Therefore, if we cannot discover the order of mutual dependence of all sections of the universe, nor find first reasons, possibly...you will think it no little attainment to illustrate the connection in the middle of effects that seem to be extremely dissimilar, reducing them to a general principle, and to extract through observation from scrupulous phenomenon the common laws which nature follows through which she governs the universe”.

This conception of scientific enquiry marked a sharp departure from the Aristotelian world-view that had dominated the revise of nature before this. In lay of by observation since a tool for categorizing and classifying items, it now urged the detection of reasons in an effort to explain `why` sure items occur and also to predict the occurrence of such measures in the future. Detection of reasons, in other terms, was a means of rising man's manage in excess of his habitation – both natural and social. While endorsing this conception of science the *Philosophers* were nonetheless aware that knowledge would have to be built from little foundations.

Yet, they were firm in their belief that the small that we had learnt through way of observation and causal analysis had vastly extended our knowledge; and, that it alone could reveal to us the truth in relation to the world. “[T]hanks to observations with the microscope our vision has penetrated into the deepest recesses of bodies, and that through observations with the telescope it has scanned the breadth of the heavens to enrich natural history and astronomy with a thousand wonderful discoveries. Only by the revise of observations has Chemistry been perfected therefore that it is now succeeding in analyzing bodies into their component elements and is on the verge of being able to put them jointly again. Only in this method has nautical sciences made such progress that now we can speed from one hemisphere to the other in great safety. It is undeniable ...that in Medicine, where hypothetical organizations are dangerous, only sober cause and ... passionate observation can bring improvement and growth. What then remnants for us? Working with this conception of knowledge the Enlightenment thinkers attempted to observe and systematically explain the world approximately them and the community in which they existed.

They focused on the observable and attempted to understand the complexities of individual and national character through relating them to other physical and social elements that are given to empirical investigation. Montesquieu examined the relationships flanked by political and civil laws of a country and its physical character – the climate, temperature and other demographic configurations. Adam Ferguson and David Hume undertook a scientific analysis of the mind through examining empirically the procedure of socialization.

The manner through which individuals internalize moral, social and intellectual thoughts and approach to acquire a notion of virtue and propriety was a subject that received their attention. Even since they studied the procedure of ‘moral education’ they whispered that men of cause could only accept data that is given in observation. Hence, approximately all of them focused on the empirical manifestations of substances and in their job they tried to build connections flanked by observable

dimensions of dissimilar phenomena. By systematic observation of concrete particulars, these philosophers sought to arrive at the common principles and laws through which nature and community are governed.

Theorists of Enlightenment whispered that the world was like a machine, controlled through and functioning in accordance with sure common laws. Consequently, through discovering these underlying laws they hoped to understand the mysteries of the universe and gains manage in excess of them. Knowledge was designed to serve, what Habermas calls, a technological interest. Its purpose was to enable individuals to gain greater manage in excess of their habitation therefore that they can protect themselves against the ravages of natural forces and, at the similar time, harness the energies of nature in a method that is advantageous to humankind. To the Enlightenment mind, rising degree of manage in excess of physical and social world, and the success of technical applications indicated progress and truth. Indeed, they signified scientific knowledge and validated its claim to truth.

It was whispered that the skill to explain and manage natural and social habitation would enable individuals to construct a world in which these twin goals can be realized. To quote Hume, “happiness was the end to which all human life was directed and since community gives men with these thoughts which made life intelligible and happiness possible, men can discover happiness in community”. Hume was not alone in claiming this. Mainly of his contemporaries maintained that expanding knowledge of the laws of the universe would enable humankind to fashion their lives and make a perfect community.

At the extremely least, it will give men the satisfaction of knowing that they have the correct ways of enquiry, consequently they will never ‘relapse into barbarism’. What requires to be reiterated here is that the Enlightenment thinkers did not basically associate knowledge with science; they wanted to apply the “experimental way” used in the physical sciences to the revise of community. Like the natural scientists they searched for laws of human nature and laws of social growth.

Montesquieu maintained that “[E]verything which exists has its laws: the Deity has its laws, the material world its laws, the spiritual beings of a higher order than man their laws, the beasts their laws, and man his own laws.... Since a physical being, man is governed through invariable laws in the similar method since other bodies”.

However, since an intelligent being he continuously violates those laws and creates new ones. With this vital understanding he analyzed two types of laws: those that are general to all men and all communities, and those that are peculiar to a community. While both were to be analyzed and exposed, the former was regarded to be particularly significant. In information, through identifying and enumerating the qualities that are general to all men they hoped to determine those traditions and institutions which were in harmony with the universal natural order and sort those that did not have a lay in that order.

Discovering the consistent and universal principles of human nature was therefore of the utmost importance, especially for the task of reconstructing a bigger and more perfect world.

Science versus Religion

Science was, for the Enlightenment, more than a way of enquiry. It was synonymous with a rationalist orientation. In the effort to make circumstances in which men would be free to explore their potentialities to the fullest, the theorists of Enlightenment launched a thorough critique of the institutions of Christianity and, with it, of existing religions and sects. Approximately all of them, from Voltaire to Holbach, wrote in relation to the harmful effects of religion in excess of individual and social life. Voltaire pointed to the violence engendered in the name of religion. “It is asked why, out of the five hundred sects, there have scarcely been any who have not spilled blood?”

And why “there is scarce any municipality or borough in Europe, where blood has not been spilled for religious quarrels’. He noted further, “I say that the human species has been perceptibly diminished because women and girls were massacred since well since men.... In fine, I say, that therefore distant from forgetting these abominable times, we should frequently take a view of them, to inspire an eternal horror for them; and that it is for our age to create reparation through toleration, for this extensive collection of crimes, which has taken lay by the want of toleration, throughout sixteen barbarous centuries”.

The Enlightenment critique of religion stemmed from the understanding that religion has been a source of oppression in history. It was the foundation of intolerance and hatred in the middle of men. It promoted in excellence and ‘unfreedom’ of man. “It is since a citizen that I attack religion, because it looks to me harmful to the happiness of the state, hostile to the mind of man, and contrary to sound morality’, wrote an Enlightenment thinker. What was possibly equally significant for the Enlightenment was the role that religion played in the Medieval Ages.

Under the hegemony of the Recognized and Unified Roman Catholic Church men were expected to renounce cause and lay their faith instead in revealed truth. Religious authorities spoke of the limits of human cause and asked individuals to listen passively to the voice of custom since communicated through the Church. Theorists of Enlightenment were particularly critical of this world-view. The effort to propound a doctrine that could not be questioned through men and that gave men a fixed view of the world and their role in it was, in their view, inimical to cause. “Instead of morality the Christian is taught the miraculous fables and inconceivable dogmas of a religion thoroughly hostile to right cause.

From his extremely step in his studies he is taught to distrust the proof of his senses, to subdue his cause...and to rely blindly on the power of his master”. The Enlightenment thinkers attacked the Church for promoting superstition and ignorance. On the one hand, its doctrine was anchored in miracles and mysteries that were irreconcilable with cause, and, on the other, it was intolerant of true

knowledge. This perception of religious institutions and religion was reinforced through the hostile attitude of the Church towards the new thinking that came with the Copernican Revolution.

The persecution of the scientists and the philosophers for their beliefs led Voltaire to comment that “those who persecute a philosopher under the pretext that his opinions may be dangerous to the public are since absurd since those who are afraid that the revise of algebra will raise the price of bread in the market; one necessity pity a thinking being who errs”. It is to break free of a “frantic and horrible” persecutor that the Enlightenment thinkers derided the Church and all existing religion. Anti-clericalism and rejection of existing religions does not however imply that the *Philosophes* were atheists. Indeed several of them provided rational grounds for accepting the attendance of a supreme creator. Diderot went a step forward.

He rejected atheism. To quote him: “Atheism leaves honesty unsupported; it does worse, indirectly it leads to depravity”. Therefore, while their critique of Christianity led them to question the belief that the world was created in seven days, they nevertheless whispered that the world was a “beautifully crafted machine” and it necessity have been intended through a Supreme Being according to few rational plan.

Belief in a creator did not however imply an acceptance of a religious orientation or the faith that a religion embodies. Voltaire wrote, “He who recognizes only a creating God, he who views in God only a Being infinitely powerful, and who sees in His creatures only beautiful machines, is not religious towards Him any more than a European, admiring the King of China, would thereby profess allegiance to that prince. But he who thinks that God had deigned to lay a relation flanked by Himself and mankind; that He has made him free, capable of good and evil; that He has given all of them the good sense which is the instinct of man, and on which the law of nature is founded; such a one undoubtedly has a religion, and a much bigger religion than all those sects....”.

While pointing to the injustices perpetrated through existing religions, theorists of the Enlightenment presented a new ‘natural religion’ – Deism – that did absent with rituals and supernatural elements and anchored itself in the principles of tolerance and excellence of all persons. Explaining the distinctiveness of a person who affirms this new faith Voltaire writes, “It is he who says to God: ‘I adore and serve you’; it is he who says to the Turk, to the Chinese, the Indian, and the Russian: ‘I love you’. He doubts, possibly, that Mahomet [Mohammad] made a journey to the moon and put half of it in his pocket; he does not wish that after his death his wife should burn herself from devotion; he is sometimes tempted not to consider in the story of the eleven thousand virgins, and that of St. Amable, whose hat and gloves were accepted through a ray of the sun from Auvergne since distant since Rome. But for all that he is a presently man. Noah would have placed him in his ark, Numa Pompilius in his councils; he would have ascended the car of Zoroaster; he would have talked philosophy with the Platos, the Aristippuses, the Ciceros....”

Philosophers like Voltaire cast the true believer of this new religion in their own image. Deism expressed the beliefs and the vision of the *Philosophers*, and by it they articulated their belief that there is a Supreme Being, that all creatures in the world were His creations and they deserve to be treated with kindness and without cruelty. The natural religion was therefore a religion of humanity. It was expected not to be a source of derision and hatred in the middle of men; instead it was to incorporate true principles of human nature and a universal organization of morality that arises from the latter.

Although tolerance was central to the new religion, the *Philosophers* denounced all those creeds of Christianity that claimed a right to destroy all those that differed from them. These theorists showed no signs of tolerance towards those who perpetuated religious intolerance. Indeed their largest aim was to destroy all traces of religious fanaticism that were visible in their world.

Man and Community

The Enlightenment demolished the Heavenly Municipality of St. Augustine but they never lost faith in the skill of human beings to construct a new community in which peace, liberty and abundance would prevail. While they denied the possibility of miracles happening, they sustained to consider in the perfectibility of the human species. With complete confidence in rationalist will and a humanist pride in the capability of human beings to overcome all hurdles they hoped to construct a world in which there will be a steady increase in felicity. They were aware that this was a hard task. “To prolong life, clear the roads of assassins, stay men from starving and give them hope of enjoying the fruits of their labour” would, they knew, need more than presently political continuity.

It would require a moral and intellectual revolution and it was this that the *Philosophers* hoped to accomplish by their scripts. Their belief in scientific rationality and the accompanying critique of the institutions of the Church and existing shapes of religion were essential components of this better agenda of social and Cultural Revolution. The *Philosophers* saw scientific knowledge since authority; consequently, those who tried to challenge it were recognized since men who wished to stay everyone in ignorance. They were seen since the ‘enemies’ of humankind.

However, the Enlightenment did not merely target religious institutions. Anti-clericalism may have been the predominant sentiment but it was blind obedience to power *per se* that they were mainly critical of. Whether the power was that of the priest or the ruler, custom or tradition, each was subject to the similar critical gaze. To put it in another method, fighting the dogmatism of religion and its institutional buildings was a significant pillar in their thrash about for freedom but it was through no means the only one. Challenge to religious power was complemented through a similarity attack on the absolutist monarchies that lived all in excess of Europe in the post-reformation era. Script in protection of the liberty of the individual, Diderot asserted that “no man has received from nature the right to command others.... Liberty is a gift from heaven, and every person of the similar species has the right to enjoy since much liberty since he enjoys cause”.

Theorists of Enlightenment cherished liberty and freedom. For them, these were the highest and the mainly cherished values, and they were critical of despotism for not sufficiently safeguarding these values. Liberty required, on the one hand, a government in which one has the freedom to depose a tyrannical ruler and, on the other, the option to elect people whom one is expected to obey and be governed through. A democratic regime based on the principle of popular sovereignty followed from their defense of liberty.

Although several of them were skeptical of the possibility of establishing a popular, democratic government, they maintained that authority that comes from the “consent of the people” alone is legitimate, and advantageous to community. Montesquieu added another dimension to the discussion on political liberty. He maintained that liberty entails two elements: 1) a moderate government and 2) not being compelled to do anything other than what one should do.

Experience illustrates that individuals are easily tempted to misuse their authority for personal ends. It is so essential to lay limitations upon the exercise of authority. Montesquieu spoke of require to curb the authority of each wing of the government. “When legislative authority is united with the executive authority in a single person, or in a single body of the magistracy, there is no liberty, because one can fear that the similar monarch or senate that makes tyrannical laws will enforce them tyrannically. Nor is there liberty if the authority of judging is not separated from the legislative and from executive authority.

If it were joined to legislative authority, the authority in excess of the life and liberty of the citizens would be arbitrary, for the judge would be legislator. If it were joined to executive authority, the judge could have the force of an oppressor. All would be lost if the similar man, or the similar body of leading men or of the nobility or of the people, exercised all these powers, to create the laws, to carry out public decisions and to judge crimes or disputes in the middle of individuals....”.

A government in which the three characteristics of government – namely, formulation of laws, execution of laws and arbitration or interpretation of laws – are separated and each wing checks the powers of the other is only one dimension of an organization committed to protecting the liberty of its citizens. It had to be complemented through the privilege of being governed through one’s own laws or through people of one’s choice.

A democratic government was regarded to be significant for giving authority to the individual. Mainly Enlightenment theorists established that authority to the people may not translate into freedom of the people. The latter entailed “doing what one should want to, and in not being compelled to do what one should not want to”. Liberty did not however imply the freedom to follow one’s whims or to do that which is not permitted through law. Approximately all of them carried the importance of law. For them, obeying laws was a necessary condition of protecting liberty. If individuals were to follow their own impulse through infringing the law then there would only be anarchy in community.

Political liberty could exist only when individual citizens acknowledge the centrality of law and subject them to its command. Indeed, the attendance of political and civil laws was seen since a continuous reminder to the individual of his duty to his fellow citizens. Few theorists of Enlightenment even represented law since an embodiment of cause. For them laws lay the necessary restraint upon passions of individuals to violate the natural order and, at the similar time, they induce men to channel their sentiments in a direction that facilitates social and civil life in the world. Individuals, in their view, can enjoy liberty only when public safety is ensured and crimes of all types are reduced, if not eliminated.

It was regarded to be the task of the legislature to ensure this; in scrupulous, to ensure that crime of all types becomes less frequent, even if that means by powerful means at its disposal to prevent disorder in community. The point that requires to be accentuated here is that the Enlightenment men carried that individuals tend overwhelmingly to pursue their own interest and this can be a reason of political disorder. Laws were, for this cause, measured necessary to lay sure restraint upon unchecked pursuit of one's own private interest.

However, they felt that it was equally significant to see that punishments for defying the law are in proportion to the evil produced through the act. Marcese di Baccaria in information spoke of requires devising a universal level for measuring crime and for determining the punishment proportionate for it. If we could have a universal level of this type, Baccaria whispered, it would be possible to measure the degree of liberty and slavery, humanity and cruelty that exists in dissimilar nations. What necessity also is that the Enlightenment was concerned not only with the excesses perpetrated through despotic regimes but also through the inhumanity of man to man, and it was the latter that they hoped to minimize. Reforming the organization of government and the practices included in existing laws was but a means to realize this end.

In other terms, civility for the Enlightenment meant something more than rule of law. Obeying laws was necessary but what was equally necessary was that laws reflect the principle of common cause. Indeed, obedience was accentuated because laws were supposed to make circumstances in which individual liberty is protected and enhanced. The communication on crime and punishment shaped a section of the Enlightenment's superior concern for creating a free and enlightened community. Presently since the natural scientists hoped to achieve greater manage in excess of the physical elements by their knowledge, the social scientists whispered that their understanding of the laws of human nature and community would enable them to eliminate evil and make a bigger world.

Theorists of Enlightenment were full of optimism in this regard. They felt that all limitations could be overcome and a free world could be created. In section this optimism was fostered through the new shapes of manufacture introduced through the capitalist economy and the technical innovations spurred through the development of scientific knowledge. The Enlightenment thinkers favored freedom of enterprise. Adam Smith argued that even however individuals seek this freedom to

further their own private gain; nevertheless the pursuit of self-interest is likely to promote the interest of community since an entire. Freedom of enterprise would lead to development in manufacture, more employment opportunities, and this would benefit all citizens.

Although these philosophers defended capitalist enterprise and argued that a life of virtue did not entail forsaking commercial community, they created legroom for themselves absent from the world of business, politics and fashion. In the salons, coffee-houses and taverns of the emerging contemporary municipalities they would meet, talk about and express opinions that would be in the middle of the mainly influential thoughts of their times. More importantly, men, and sometimes even women, would meet since friends and since equals.

Addison and Steele saw coffee-house conversation since a shape of social interaction that “taught men tolerance, moderation and the pleasure of consensus. It also taught them to seem at their own activities with a critical detachment which was hard to acquire in public life”. The Enlightenment theorists placed considerable stress on the spirit of critique. Cultivating skeptical habits of mind would help to release men from the bondage of myth and prejudice which corrupts the mind and generates enthusiasm that can stand in the method of human happiness.

Education was to play a significant role in this regard. The Enlightenment had tremendous faith in the authority of human beings brought up rationally from infancy to achieve unlimited progress. They also entrusted the state with the responsibility of changing the building of laws and institutions, and undertaking the job of reform. Bounded through a world that was full of promise for a bigger tomorrow, the Enlightenment thinkers wished to instill the spirit of tolerance and minimize crime and torture.

They were of course aware that knowledge in relation to the human nature and community would not automatically make virtue, but they whispered that it could certainly shed light upon ignorance and warn us against the misuse of authority.

CRITIQUES OF ENLIGHTENMENT

The Romantics

The Enlightenment understanding of man, community, history and knowledge did not however go unchallenged. Through the end of the 18th century itself the Enlightenment faced a challenge from a cluster of intellectuals who were recognized since Romantics.

They questioned approximately every aspect of the enlightenment thinking – from its conception of truth, science and cause to its belief in the idea of progress. The Enlightenment had represented the present since an advance upon the past, the Romantics, through contrast, saw in it the deterioration of the human condition. Jean Jacques Rousseau argued that the growth of arts and sciences had resulted in the social and moral degeneration of man.

Division of labour, differentiation of functions and applications of technology had, in his view, corrupted men and destroyed their idyllic subsistence. Indeed it had created a hiatus flanked by

nature and man. While man in his natural state was guided through the principle of pity – that is, “a natural aversion to seeing any other sentient being perish or suffer, especially if it is one of our type” the progress of culture had made him egoistic and self-centered. It had resulted in the loss of freedom for the self. Men led an alienated subsistence now, subordinated to the order of time and job that is imposed through industrializing capital. Romanticists like Rousseau sought salvation in the “natural order”.

For them, it was only in the natural order that man’s truest and deepest requires could be satisfied. Further, in contrast to that ideal world the present emerged since a disappointment, if not a complete failure. It was a substance of bitterness and resentment. Consequently, many romanticists idealized the past. Few even wanted to turn the clock back. These scripts, attempting to glorify the past echoed the sentiments of the disinherited aristocratic class and they were congenial to their demand for returning to feudalism. However, this was not the defining attribute of Romanticism. The Romantics rejected the present community, harked back to the pre-contemporary world and created the image of a “natural” man primarily to challenge the mechanistic and instrumental rationality of the new capitalist order.

By its symbols of the past and other cultures it sought to reveal the limitations of the contemporary world-view and the scientific rationality that underpinned it. The Romantic rebellion was, in several methods, the ‘other’, that is, the negation, of Enlightenment. It affirmed values that opposed everything that Enlightenment stood for. The Enlightenment had elevated cause to the location of sovereign power. It whispered that cause had the skill to find the absolute truth, both in relation to the meaning of history since well since the working of the universe.

The *Philosophers* assumed, on the one hand, that cause rules in excess of the universe and, on the other, that it was supremely significant to man. Cause could enable us to understand the functioning of this intricately intended machine, described nature, find its laws and apply that knowledge to manage the physical and the social world. This idea that cause either “dominates everything or could be made to do therefore” was fundamentally challenged through Romanticism. The challenge took several dissimilar shapes. At the mainly immediate stage, the Romantics pitted passions against cause.

Against the cautiously controlled and mathematically precise observations of the scientist, they placed the cause of the heart and extolled its virtues. In Enlightenment idea cause was closely connected to scientific rationality. Its applications were expected to yield truth – i.e., knowledge of universals since well since knowledge that is universally applicable. Through referring to cause of the heart, the Romanticists questioned this vital conception of universality and truth. Against the notion of objectivity of taste and permanence of the truly beautiful, Romanticism affirmed the value of the contingent. They stressed inward conviction and juxtaposed it to judgments oriented to externalized averages.

Not only did they resist conventionality to impersonal laws, they maintained that the “single narrow door to truth place within us. Through looking within ourselves, into our inner consciousness we approach to understand and know the truth”. The Scottish Enlightenment thinker, David Hume, had once suggested “If we take in our hand any volume, of divinity or school metaphysics, for example, let us inquire, Does it include any abstract reasoning regarding matter of information and subsistence? No. Commit it then to flames; for it can include nothing but sophistry and illusion”. Romanticism consciously sought to retrieve that which the Enlightenment had consigned to the flames. They focused on the magical and the mystical and exalted the strange in excess of the recognized in a bid to reject the Enlightenment conception of truth and science.

On the one hand, they challenged require to adhere to laid down processes and ways of observation and generalization, and, on the other, they focused on the “exotic, deviant or the special case, counterpoising these to the probable or standard case”. Romanticism conferred a special status on the unique, and, beside with it, defined individuality in words of departure from social norms and conventions.

Against the classical unities of time and lay, they welcomed a “melange of times, tones, moods and spaces”. The Enlightenment had viewed the world since a harmonious, integrated entire. Romanticism, on the other hand, perceived it since an “incongruous assemblage” and tension filled conjunction of sections” that could not add up to a single, coherent, unified entire. The totality was at best a mosaic, characterized through plurality and dissonance. The exploit of standardized techniques and processes through the Enlightenment was based on the assumption that the universe – both natural and social – had a patterned regularity.

It functions in accordance with sure laws that can be exposed through the application of human cause and scientific way. Through emphasizing dissonance of sections and uniqueness of measures Romanticism rejected this assumption of Enlightenment thinking. In its view the world defied neat categorization and was not amenable to the type of systematic, analytical revise that was the hallmark of science.

The scripts of these theorists were filled with imagery of twilight, blurring boundaries and absence of clear-cut distinctions. Their jobs of art depicted pictures of the natural forces and elements that defied human manage. While the Enlightenment art told a story of clear, calm skies in which man was in manage of his destiny, Romanticism presented a turbulent world in which chaos and uncertainty prevailed, reminding human being of the limits of their knowledge and the finitude of their subsistence.

Through concentrating on the singular and the unique, on the one hand, and the mystical and the strange, on the other, Romanticism drew attention to the failure of human cause. If the Enlightenment expressed optimism that the world could be recognized fully through the human mind, Romanticism pointed to that which resisted account through human cause and scientific

knowledge. Romanticism did not basically reverse the antinomies that defined the Enlightenment; they challenged the philosophy of Realism that informed the latter. Scientific rationality was anchored in the belief that truth can be arrived at by an accurate account of the external world. Romanticism challenged this notion of realism in three methods.

First, it questioned the possibility of apprehending truth by the ways employed through science; second, it retrieved categories that had no lay in a world that is experienced since information; and third, it redefined the notion of truth emphasizing the capability of the individual to make new meanings and values. The idea that truth entails an accurate account of an external reality that is recognized by sensory perception and systematic observation was the consistent substance of doubt and criticism within Romanticism. In a same vein Keats also rebelled against the reduction of the rainbow to prismatic colors. Such symbols, in his view, deprived it of its poetry and aesthetic quality, and in the procedure failed to fully experience or perceive this substance. While few Romanticists questioned the loss of truth by the analytic-synthetic way of the sciences, others, like Rousseau, gave a privileged lay to emotions and feelings.

The Enlightenment had dismissed these categories since subjective, and unable to grasp objective truth, but Rousseau held them to be crucial to the understanding of the self and community. Further, he accentuated the role of the individual and maintained that the creative originality of the artist is bigger able to capture the truth of the external world. The Enlightenment *Philosophers* attempted to find the world, i.e., to unveil the truth that was already there. In contrast to this, the Romantics stressed the capability of the individual to make new meanings and values. The idea that truth is a substance of construction and making rather than detection was subsequently urbanized through Nietzsche to give a critique of the Enlightenment and even its Romantic critics.

Nietzsche

Romanticism had lamented the loss of meaning in the contemporary world. To fill this void they turned to nature, religion and custom. Nietzsche, script in the late nineteenth century, questioned presently this. While accepting the spiritual wasteland in which the contemporary man walks alone, he maintained that neither to nature nor religion could give the *free* man with peace, joy or certainty. Speaking passionately against a return to the past, he wrote: “The barbarism of all ages possessed more happiness than we do – let us not deceive ourselves on this point – but our impulse towards knowledge is too widely urbanized to allow us to value happiness without knowledge, or the happiness of a strong and fixed delusion: it is painful to us even to imagine such a state of items! Our restless pursuit of discoveries and divinations has become for us since attractive and since indispensable since hapless love of a lover.... Knowledge within us has urbanized into a passion, which does not shrink from any sacrifice and at bottoms fears nothing but its own extinction....It may be that mankind will perish eventually from this passion for knowledge!—but even that does not daunt me....”

For Nietzsche there was another cause why man could no longer rely on tradition and custom. Custom oppresses: it appeals to a higher power, a power that is obeyed not because “it commands what is useful to us but merely because it commands”. The free man cannot so depend upon it. He is an individual, defying tradition and norms of received morality. It is his will to depend on nothing but himself.

As the free man of the contemporary age cannot discover solace either in religion or custom, there are presently two options before him; a) he may abandon the search for an ultimate meaning; and b) he may make meaning through his own will and activity. In exploring these alternatives Nietzsche did not merely reject the Enlightenment and its Romantic alternative; he questioned the whole custom of western rationalist idea, beginning with Plato. For Nietzsche all schools of idea had one item in general: they had firm belief in themselves and their knowledge. They whispered that they had arrived at the truth. In the Athenian world of ancient Greek municipality-states Plato claimed that cause could give man access to the ultimate reality – the world of shapes. Each in its own method therefore claims that it has *exposed* the truth in relation to the external world that exists independently of us.

Further, that this truth has been arrived at impersonally and objectively; i.e., in words of qualities that inhere in the substances themselves. Men have existed in this state of “theoretical innocence” for centuries believing that they possess the right way for discovering the nature of ultimate reality, and for determining what is good and precious. Working under the power of these childish presuppositions they have failed to realize that the external world is in itself devoid of all meanings and values. Whatever has value in the present world “has it not in itself through its nature”? Rather a value was “given to it, bestowed upon it, it was *we* who gave and bestowed! We only have created the world which is of any explanation to man”.

In creation this argument and suggesting that man is a “creator, a continuous poet of life”, Nietzsche was not undermining the significance of cognition. For Nietzsche knowledge remnants a supreme value, but if pure knowledge since revealed through cause or experiments is the only end then we would have to follow whatever direction these faculties take us in. We have to be prepared, for example, to follow the path that experimental cause leads us towards, be that of nuclear power or genetic engineering. However, this would be complete “madness”.

Knowledge has to be mediated through values that we regard to be worth affirming, values through which we may wish to construct the world. The role of the artist is so of the utmost importance. While men of science aim to find what is already there, the artist gives form to a world, expressing human ideals. For this cause Nietzsche maintained that poetry and myths were a precious source of knowledge for us. In Nietzsche’s jobs the artist was not presently the ‘other’ of the contemporary rational scientist. He was, first and foremost, a creator; and since a creator he embodied the skill to transcend the boundaries of the social and what is designated since the rational.

The artist since such stood alone, demanding the moralism implicit in western philosophical customs. Therefore it was by Nietzsche and the Romanticists that few of the vital tenets of the Enlightenment came to be questioned in a fundamental method. In scrupulous the view that the present was the mainly advanced and civilized period in the history of humankind became subject to scrutiny. Critiques of the idea of progress, cause and industrial rationality sought to displace the centrality accorded to science in the Enlightenment scheme of items.

The critics, through and big, carried that the new age of capitalism, scientific detection and industrialization had provided a much “softened” world for the mortals. It had offered a benign ethic of health, vitalism and welfare but the problem was that these growths challenged the existing conceptions without offering any alternative vision of the meaning of life.

Consequently, the critics searched for an alternative to the industrial community, especially to the instrumental and technological rationality that permeated the present. Romanticism of the late 19th century only marked the first step in this direction. Subsequent theorists accepted this task forward through pointing to – a) limitations of the Enlightenment project of progress; b) the exploitative nature of the capitalism; and c) the violence implicit in contemporary science.

Karl Marx

The early scripts of Karl Marx showed that capitalist mode of manufacture generates four kinds of alienation: alienation of man in the workplace; alienation of man from his product; alienation of man from his species life; and, alienation of man from man. For human beings, job is a means of self-expression and growth of one’s potential. However, in capitalism job ceases to fulfill this requirement.

The industrial stage divides the job of manufacture into little fragments; it compartmentalizes occupations such that each individual repeatedly performs the similar differentiated and narrowly dedicated task. Under these conditions, job becomes a routine, if not a drudgery. At the similar time, individual gets alienated from the end-product of their making. They can no longer relate to the product that emerges from these factories. Even however the worker by his labour creates all the products, from the simplest to the mainly intricate machines; yet, they seem to him since reified commodities in the market.

He can no longer own them since his creations. In information he confronts these substances since a stranger and is dominated through them. Job therefore becomes a mode of oppressing men. Instead of being a means of self-realization and fulfillment it is transformed into a repressive action. The instrumental rationality that governs the workplace also extends to the social legroom. The urban industrial cities in which men live also function on the principle of utility and require. Men see each other since substances of exploit value and relate to each other on that foundation primarily.

Their alienation is therefore complete: it extends from the economic domain to the social and the political.

Marcuse and the Frankfurt School

For Marx, freedom could not effectively exist in such a community. The world that Enlightenment had fantasized in relation to could not perhaps ensure liberation of men. Not even the mainly progressive expressions of that rationality—namely, science and industrialization—could give for a community in which men could realize their potential. Towards the end of the 18th century, Romanticism had spoken of the moral of the newly emerging order.

It had also hinted at the loss of freedom in the age of industrialization. These themes were revived in the second half of the 20th century through the New Left, mainly notably in the scripts of Herbert Marcuse. In his book, *One Dimensional Man*, Marcuse characterized the post-enlightenment industrial community since “irrational” and “repressive”. Despite the evident progress and increase in productivity, this community, in his view, was “destructive of the free growth of human requires and faculties”. To several it may seem that political freedom is protected in this community and there has been an expansion in the liberties enjoyed through men.

Today there is more to choose from: several dissimilar newspapers, radio stations, TV channels and an entire gamut of commodities in the market – from dissimilar diversities of potato chips to motor cars and washing machines. Yet, men have no real capability to create choices of their own. Men’s requires are constantly formed and manipulated through the media industry that furthers the interests of some. It moulds and constructs images that determine the choices we create at house, in the market lay and in social interactions. In a world where “false” requires are fashioned through the media there is no effective intellectual freedom or liberation of man. Men act and participate since “pre-conditioned receptacles of extensive standing”. Indeed by their actions they reinforce the instruments of socio-economic manage and their oppression.

The contemporary industrialized world constituted a “more progressive level of alienation”. Its seeming progress, “the means of size transportation and discourse, the commodities of lodging, food and clothing, the irresistible output of the entertainment and fact industry carry with them prescribed attitudes and habits, sure intellectual and emotional reactions which bind the consumers more or less pleasantly to the producers, and by the latter, to the entire. The products indoctrinate and manipulate; they promote a false consciousness which is immune against its falsehood. And since these beneficial products become accessible to more individuals in more social classes, the indoctrination they carry ceases to be publicity; it becomes a method of life.

It is a good method of life, it militates against qualitative transform. Therefore emerges a pattern of one-dimensional idea and activities”. More importantly, since men and women share in the similar images and thoughts there is less and less the possibility of demanding the present and seeking alternatives to it. In a world where images, presentation and appearance count more than even the content, these theorists felt there could be no real freedom, or for that matter, the possibility of “communicative rationality” asserting itself in the “life-world”.

For Marcuse since well since for other members of the Frankfurt School the Enlightenment had transformed what was once liberating cause, occupied in the fight against religious dogma and superstition, into a repressive orthodoxy. It had done this through visualizing cause since an instrument of manage; and, since a tool for gaining mastery in excess of the world rather than critical reflection and reconstruction. Instrumental cause that was concerned primarily with efficiency, economy and utility could not be expected to liberate man or to construct a bigger world.

Critics of Science

In the second half of the twentieth century, a same doubt is raised in relation to the science. Can science make a bigger world: a world in which individuals can enjoy freedom and happiness? The Enlightenment had answered this question in the affirmative. Its optimism emanated, in section, from its view that science had revealed the truth. Its way had enabled men to know the external reality, the world approximately us, while technical application had facilitated manage in excess of that reality such that it could now serve the interest of man.

Science had in this dual sense made man the master of the universe. Men may not have intended that magnificent machine but they were certainly in a location to manage and manipulate it to suit their ends. Science symbolized this faith and it was for this cause that the Enlightenment had given it a special status in the order of items. This faith in science has been challenged in the late twentieth century. In the middle of other items the critics uphold that contemporary science and technology promote violence, and cannot so be a means for improving the human condition or shaping a bigger, more peaceful, world. In India this point of view is best represented in the scripts of Ashis Nandy, Vandana Shiva and Claude Alvares.

All of them see a link flanked by science, technology, oppression and violence. For these analysts science is intrinsically violent. Both science and technology are violent methods of handling the world; hence, their “exploit for violent purposes is assured”. In collusion with colonialism and imperialism, science unleashed violence against traditional methods of life. Today, it has resulted in the massive accumulation of armaments and nuclear arsenal, all of which threaten the extremely subsistence of life on earth. In addition, it has resulted in concentration of authority in the hands of some. Science does not basically downgrade custom, it locations scientific knowledge against everyday experience and received knowledge. In the procedure it gives a special location to the technocrat, the specialists.

In the scientific worldview, it is these men of knowledge rather than ordinary citizens who are empowered. Similarly, growth and progress sanctioned through science has uprooted people from their natural surroundings and has resulted in the displacement of countless people from their land. Heavy industries and large dams have dislodged societies without any real possibility of rehabilitating them, taken in excess of their land and resulted in the destruction of precious agricultural land.

At the similar time, it has alienated societies from the possessions that are crucial to their extremely subsistence. According to the thinker, science is not merely responsible for the making of sophisticated weapons of size destruction; it is destructive even in its peaceful applications. Scientific agriculture has resulted in aggressive and “reckless pillage” of nature. While traditional manners of cultivation left time for nature to regenerate itself, today the pattern of crop farming has generated troubles at several stages. The exploit of new seeds, which promise higher yield, has destroyed bio-varieties and the richness of nature.

Excessive use of ground possessions by farming of at least three crops each year, primarily for purposes of sale in the market, has left the farmer poorer. The condition of soil has deteriorated and it has created a habitation that is “favorable for multiplication of disease”. In the region of health likewise, there is an increase in iatrogenic illness. In information “iatrogenic illness reason more deaths than road accidents”. In university hospitals in America, one out of five patients contract iatrogenic illness and one out of 30 die because of it. While rising productivity and cure for many diseases, it has created newer shapes of illnesses, upset the balance of nature and worsened the condition of life for the ordinary man. Since we observed earlier, Romanticism had contrasted the world ushered in through industrializing capital and science with the ideal subsistence of man in nature.

It had challenged the Enlightenment idea of progress through glorifying nature and seeking a return to it. If Enlightenment had credited science with advancing the happiness of man, Romanticism blamed it for rising alienation, violence, loss of peace and security. It warned humankind of the disasters that approach with science and its technical applications, and craved for the cosmic order that is supposed to be there, present in nature. It is this reliance upon custom and the natural order that distinguishes Romanticism from the postmodern critiques of Enlightenment.

Postmodernism

Each of these intellectual engagements, in its view, seeks foundations; that is, they seem for absolute and unconditional foundation of reality and claim to arrive at the truth. The only variation being that while religion locates the absolute in the world beyond, science points to the laws of nature since constituting the foundations of the world and philosophy spaces its faith in the capability of cause to unearth that absolute truth.

What remnants unaltered is that each of them seems for, and seeks to find the truth that is already there. Against this worldview, postmodernism asks us to abandon the search for foundations and universal truth. Like Nietzsche, the postmodernist thinkers assert that knowledge does not involve discovering a meaning that is already there, pre-contained in the text. For the postmodernists, the task of every inquiry is, and necessity is, to deconstruct the text: to read it in a method that allows new meanings to emerge from it.

Nietzsche had argued that the history of the west, from the time of Plato onwards, reveals a “tyranny of the mind”. Plato claimed that philosophers armed with the authority of cause would penetrate the world of appearances and arrive at the truth. He so banished the poets from the Republic. In recent times, the Enlightenment bestows the similar faith in systematic observation and experience. Both are influenced that they possess the absolute truth and the perfect way to arrive at it. Countless people have, in excess of the years, sacrificed themselves to these convictions. Believing that they knew best they imposed their methods upon others.

The idea that we know the truth, that we and we alone have access to it, has been a source of fanaticism in the world. Postmodernists add to this Nietzsche a sentiment to say that it has also been the source of totalitarianism. To protect freedom that the contemporary man therefore deeply cherishes we necessity so abandon this search for absolute truth. And realize instead that others also consider that they know the truth and are acting in accordance with it. Intellectual arrogance necessity so give method to a sense of deeper humility: that is, to a framework wherein meta-narratives give method to scrupulous histories of people livelihood in a specific time and lay, and legroom is created for the co-attendance of multiple projects and knowledge organizations.

REVIEW QUESTIONS

- How did developments in trade and commerce create conditions for the Renaissance?
- What was the essence of the idea of progress as espoused by the Enlightenment thinkers?
- Explain the renaissance and the idea of the individual.
- Explain the ideas of the Enlightenment.
- Describe the Marcuse and the Frankfurt school.
- How did Karl Marx and the Frankfurt School advance the ideas initiated by the Enlightenment thinkers?

CHAPTER 2

Modern World: Essential Components

STRUCTURE

- Learning Objectives
- Theories of the state
- Capitalist economy and its critique
- The social structure
- Review Questions

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After reading this chapter you will be able to:

- Understand the State
- Understand Welfare State
- Explain the Gandhian perspective on the state
- Explain the capitalist economy and its critique
- Describe the social structure

THEORIES OF THE STATE

Understanding the State

It was approximately the time of the Enlightenment that biggest enquiries into the vital nature and building of the State began to be made in a systematic manner. The new concerns focused on the distinctions flanked by the new, contemporary State that had approach into being and the traditional state organizations. The new concerns also focused on the connection flanked by the State and community.

The Enlightenment thinkers were particularly concerned with the question of where the State ended and the community began. It was since a result of the intellectual attempts of the Enlightenment thinkers that we are today in a location to address few key questions concerning the nature of the State. Few of these questions are: What is the State? How extensive has it been with us? What are its largest characteristics? These are all significant questions and require to be answered before we proceed to enquire into the theories of the State. State can be defined since the centralized, law creation, law enforcing, and politically sovereign institution in the community. In other terms, it is useful to understand and describe the State in words of the functions it performs. Put briefly and basically, the State

- Includes a set of institutions with ultimate manage in excess of the means of violence and coercion within a given territory;

- Monopolizes rule-creation within the territory;
- Develops the buildings for the implementation of the rules;
- Regulates market action within the territory; and
- Ensures the regulation and sharing of essential material goods and services.

However, in contemporary times, that are to say throughout the last three hundred years or therefore, an entire new set of functions have been added to this. It has been argued that a biggest task of the contemporary state organization in Europe was to enable the growth of industrialism. It was also under industrialism that the contemporary State came to enjoy tremendous powers. It also became therefore omnipotent that it became virtually impossible to think of human life outside the framework of the State. The state is all pervasive today, but was it always like this? Was there a time when people could live without a state? This leads us to the second question: how old is the State? Livelihood in contemporary times we tend to take the State for granted since if it has always been a section of human community.

Moreover, we also tend to take few of the characteristics of the contemporary State – national, representative, centralized, interventionist – for granted. We require recognizing that not only were these characteristics not always a section of the State, the State itself was not *always* there. So the question on the life of the State can be answered through suggesting that although there is nothing exclusively contemporary in relation to the State, it nonetheless does not have an extremely extensive life in human history. It is so best to seem upon State since a *contingency* and not a perennial characteristic of human life. If we were to divide the whole human history into three stages – pre-agrarian, agrarian and industrial – then the State certainly did not exist in the pre- agrarian stage of human life. In the elementary situation of the hunters and gatherers, there was no surplus and no division of labour. Since a result, there was no requiring for any political centralization. However, once humans took to agriculture and consequently to a more settled life, a division of labour and a more intricate shape of human institution began to emerge. It was then that gradually a State came into being to extract surplus, regulate the division of labour, uphold swap mechanism and settle disputes whenever required.

However not all the agrarian communities had a State? Only the big and the more intricate ones did. Little, primitive, easy and elementary agrarian communities could still control their affairs without a State. Although the State had arrived in the human world at this level, it was still an option and not inevitability. Few agrarian communities had a state and few did not. It was however in the third stage of human community, i.e., under industrialism that the State ceased to be an option and became an integral and necessary section of human community. With a limitless increase in the division of labour and a rising complexity of human life, people have established it impossible to control

without a State. Therefore it would be fair to say that in the beginning, i.e., in the pre-agrarian level of human life there was no State.

Then, under agrarian circumstances, few human communities had a State and few did not (we can even say that few *needed* a state and few did not). But under industrial condition there is no choice but to *have* a State. State under contemporary circumstances is no longer an option but a must. The range of the nature of state-organizations in human history has varied a great trade. There have been little kingdoms, municipality-states since well since big empires. However under contemporary circumstances, a new kind of State – nation-state – has appeared and pervaded the contemporary world.

We can say that the history of State in contemporary times is the history of nation-states. It is this nation-state – centralized, interventionist, representative – that has been the substance of theorizing through several scholars. We can now turn too few of the theories that have propounded in relation to the contemporary State.

Liberal Conception of the State

Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) and Jean Bodin (1530-96) were amongst the earliest writers to articulate the new concerns, although it was Thomas Hobbes (1588-1642) almost a century later who addresses the question sharply. The questions that arose were seeking answers to vital issues like, what is the State? The State's origins and foundations were examined, since also its connection with community and the mainly desirable shape of this connection, its functions and of course whose interests should the State symbolize, and then at the end of it all how would the connection flanked by States be governed?

Thomas Hobbes offers a brilliant analysis of the State and related issues. He symbolizes a point of transition, flanked by a commitment to the absolute State and the thrash about of liberalism against tyranny. Without going into too several details, liberalism can be explained since that worldview which gives central importance to the idea of choice, this choice is to be exercised crossways diverse meadows like marriage, education, enterprise, job and profession and of course political affairs.

This skill to choose is what characterizes a rational and free individual and politics is in relation to the defense of these rights and any interference whatsoever is to be limited and by the State based on a constitution. Hobbes in his book 'Leviathan' acknowledges clearly the growth of a new shape of authority, public authority characterized through permanence and sovereignty. Hobbes is a fascinating point of departure for our discussions on the contemporary theories of the State, because he combines within him several profoundly liberal and at the similar times several illiberal arguments. Hobbes opens his explanation through describing human nature that he says always seeks 'more intense delight' and hence is characterized through restlessness and a desire to maximize authority.

This famously reduces human community into a 'war of all against all'. The idea that people might approach to respect and trust each other and co-operate and honor their promises and contracts looks remote to Hobbes. This is what he defines since, the state of nature; here life becomes to quote him 'nasty, short and brutish'. What then is the method out? It is the making of the State, which in this case turns out to be an absolute State, and this is quite clearly a direct outcome of the dreadful life that Hobbes visualizes in the absence of the State.

He suggests that free and equal individuals should surrender their rights through transferring them to a powerful power that can force them to stay their promises and covenants, then an effective and legitimate private and public sphere, community and State can be shaped. This would be done by a social contract wherein consenting individuals hand in excess of their rights of self-government to a single power, authorized to act on their behalf. The sovereign therefore created would be permanent and absolute. At this point it is interesting to note the liberal in Hobbes emphasizing that this sovereign would be therefore only since a consequence of consenting individuals, who in turn are bound to fulfill their obligations to the sovereign. It would be the duty of the sovereign however, to protect the people and of course their property.

Thomas Hobbes believes the State to be pre-eminent in social and political life. According to the thinker, it is the State that gives to the individuals the chance to live in a civilized community. The miserable life in the state of nature is altered through the emergence of the State. Therefore it is the State that in Hobbes' conception constructs community and establishes its shape and codifies its forces.

Moreover the self-seeking nature of individuals leads to anarchy and violence and hence State has to be powerful and strident sufficient to resist this and uphold order, for order is a value that Hobbes cherishes greatly. And as it is all the consenting individuals who have created the State, the State is legitimate and symbolizes the sum total of all individuals enabling them to carry on with their businesses and lives in an uninterrupted manner. To do all this, a giant and powerful State is envisaged, and this vision is extraordinarily securing to the image of a contemporary all pervasive State that we are well-known with. His conception of individuals since being nothing more than self-interested is also a depressingly contemporary and well-known view. Hobbes' political conclusions emphasizing on an all powerful State does create him profoundly illiberal, and this tension in his scripts flanked by the emphatic claims on individuality on the one hand, and the require for an all powerful State on the other hand create his arguments extremely exciting. Locke is not prepared to accept the idea of an absolute sovereign, and this is a biggest point of departure from where he then establishes his theory of the State.

For Locke the State exists since an instrument to protect the life, liberty and estate of the citizens. Locke like Hobbes saw the establishment of the political world since preceded through the subsistence of individuals endowed with natural rights to property, which includes life, liberty and

estate. Locke begins with a picture of free, equal and rational men (Locke like Hobbes and in information like mainly other political theorists is not thinking of women when he writes in relation to the social and political issues) livelihood quite amicably in the state of nature governed through natural laws. In the state of nature they enjoy natural rights, but Locke points out that not all individuals would be equally respectful of the natural laws.

This creates few inconveniences, the mainly significant of these being inadequate regulation of property which for Locke is prior to both community and the State. Locke suggests that these inconveniences can be overcome only through the consenting individuals forging contracts to make first a community and then a State. The State is therefore extremely obviously a making for the purpose of the individuals and it would be they who would be the final judges in this matter. This is an extremely novel idea however today commonplace looks because it has become approximately the central idea of liberalism. Locke holds categorically that the individuals do not transfer all their rights to the State, and whatever rights are transferred is only on the condition that the State adheres to its vital purpose of preserving the individual's life, liberty and estate.

This is today one of the central thoughts of liberalism and is central to our understanding of the State. Therefore Locke paved the method for representative government although Locke himself advocated constitutional monarchy and was clearly not articulating any of the now routinely carried democratic thoughts of popular government based on universal adult franchise.

Yet there is no denying that it was his idea that the State should be for the defense of the rights of the citizens which made the transformation of liberalism into liberal democracy possible. Taking off from Locke's thoughts that there necessity be limits upon legally sanctioned political authority, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), and James Mill (1773-1836) urbanized a systematic explanation of the liberal democratic State. In their explanation the State would be expected to ensure that the circumstances necessary for individuals to pursue their interests without risk of arbitrary political interference, to participate freely in economic transactions, to swap labour and goods on the market and to suitable possessions privately. In all this the State was to be like an umpire while individuals went in relation to the business since per the rules of the free market, and periodic elections determined who would be in authority.

The idea was that such an arrangement would lead to the maximization of pleasure for the maximum numbers since per the principle of utility, to which both Bentham and Mill subscribed. This argument was clearly advocating a limited State on the grounds that the scope and authority of the State should be limited in order to ensure that the communal good be realized by individual's freely competing and pursuing utility without State interference. Yet significantly sure types of interference were allowed, any individual, cluster or class that would challenge the security of property, the working of the market or the upkeep of public good could be held through the State. Prisons became the hallmark of this age, the enactment and enforcement of law backed through the coercive powers

of the State and the making of new State institutions advocated in order to maintain the common principle of utility.

The contemporary liberal democratic State which we are well-known can be traced to the scripts of Bentham and Mill. However they stopped short of advocating universal suffrage, finding one cause or the other to deny the vote to all individuals. For the utilitarian's, democracy was not an end in itself only a means to an end. Democracy was seen since the logical requirement for the governance of a community freed from absolute authority and custom, occupied through individuals who seek to maximize their private gains, constituted since they are through endless desires. John Stuart Mill (1806-73) is possibly one of the first and strongest advocates of democracy since an end in itself that saw its primary purpose since the highest and harmonious growth of the individual. John Stuart Mill was deeply committed to the idea of individual liberty, moral growth and the rights of minorities.

He was concerned with the nature and limits of the authority that could be legitimately exercised through community in excess of the individual. Liberal democratic government was necessary not only to ensure the pursuit of individual satisfaction, but also for free growth of individuality. While he conceded require for few regulation and interference in individual's lives, but he sought obstacles to arbitrary and self-interested intervention. To ensure all of this, Mill proposed a representative democracy. However despite the firm commitment to liberty and democracy that Mill makes, he too whispered that those with the mainly knowledge and skills should have more votes than the rest; inevitably this would imply that those with mainly property and privilege would have more votes than the rest. Of course it requires to be mentioned that deep inequalities of wealth, and authority bothered Mill who whispered that these would prevent the full growth of those therefore marginalized.

Rousseau

Standing separately from the liberal and democratic custom is Rousseau (1712-1778) who might be called a champion of the 'direct' or 'participatory' model of democracy. Rousseau is uncomfortable with the idea that sovereignty can be transferred either through consent or by the ballot; actually he did not think it possible even. Rousseau justifies the require for the State through beginning his arguments in the 'Social Contract' with the account of the state of nature in which human beings were rather happy but were ultimately driven out of it because of several obstacles to their preservation (few of these obstacles that he specifies are natural disasters, individual weakness and general miseries).

Therefore human beings approach to realize that for the fullest realization of their potential and for greatest liberty it is essential for them to approach jointly and co-operate by a law creation and enforcing body. This State would be therefore a result of a contract that human beings make to set up possibilities of *self*-regulation and *self*-government. In his scheme of affairs individuals were to be

directly involved in law creation and obeying these laws would not be akin to obeying a sovereign power outside oneself but it would amount to obeying oneself and this to Rousseau constitutes freedom.

Individuals are therefore to vote in disregard of their private interest; to each individual who is an indivisible section of the sovereign what matters is only the interest of the body politic itself. Rousseau calls this common will. For Rousseau the sovereign is the people themselves in a new shape of association and the sovereign's will is the will of each person. The government is therefore the result of an agreement in the middle of the citizens and is legitimate only to the extent to which it fulfils the instructions of the common will and obviously should it fail to do therefore it can be revoked or changed.

The Marxist Perspective

The take off point for Karl Marx (1818-83) and Engels (1820-95) in their analysis of the State is unlike the preceding descriptions not the individual and his or her relation to the State. Since Marx put it extremely eloquently 'man is not an abstract being squatting outside the world...' Marx argued that individuals through themselves do not tell us much, it is the interaction flanked by individuals and institutions and the community that makes the explanation worthwhile. He contends that the State has to be seen since a dynamic institution circumscribed through social forces and always changing.

Therefore the key to understanding the dealings flanked by people is the class building. Classes they argued are created at a specific conjuncture in history, the implication is that historically there was an era characterized through the absence of classes and the future could hold a classless community. With the making of surplus produce a class of non-producers that can live off the productive action of others emerge and this is the basis of classes in community. Those who succeed in gaining manage in excess of the means of manufacture shape the ruling class both economically and politically.

This leads to intense, perpetual and irreconcilable conflicts in community. Such struggles while becoming the motor force for historical growth also become the foundation for the emergence of the State. Marx and Engels challenged the idea that the State can be neutral and symbolize the society or the public interests since however classes did not exist. When the liberals claim that the State acts neutrally it is according to Marx protecting an organization of individual rights and defending the regime of private property, therefore its actions produce results that are distant from neutral.

Marx is of the opinion that the dichotomy flanked by the private and the public which characterizes the contemporary State is itself dubious for it depoliticizes the mainly significant source of authority in contemporary community's i.e. private property. That which creates a fundamental and crucial divide in community is presented since an outcome of free private contracts and not a matter for the

State. However he argues all the institutions and buildings of the State defend the interests of private property and therefore the claims of neutrality that the State makes are untenable.

Marxist politics would so need an activity plan to overthrow the State and through implication the classes that maintain the State. Marx characterized the history of State broadly since having set out from a slave State, to feudal State and then to the contemporary State (with capitalism since its foundation). The last mentioned carries within it since a consequence of heightened class thrash about the possibility of revolutionary transformation and the making of a socialist State. This would be for the first time in history a State representative of the majority. It would be controlled through the proletariat, and unlike the earlier dictatorships controlled through the property owning classes, this State would be the dictatorship of the proletariat, the toiling classes. Eventually Marx argues that the logic of historical growth would lead this State to a communist level.

Material abundance and prosperity would distinguish this State from the earlier level of statelessness called since primitive communism through Marx. In the communist level of community's development due to the absence of classes and class thrash about, the State would become redundant and wither absent. The State according to Marx exists to defend the interests of the ruling classes and is deeply embedded in socio-economic dealings and connected to scrupulous class interests.

We can discern at least two separate strands in Marx explaining the nature of this connection flanked by classes and the State. Of the two, the more subtle location is the one that as suggested, look at first. This location holds that the State and its bureaucratic institutions may take a variety of shapes and constitute a source of authority which require not be directly connected to the interests or be under of the dominant class in the short word.

Therefore, the State seems to have a sure degree of authority independent of class forces, therefore it is called since being relatively autonomous. The other view that we discover often represented in Marx's scripts is that the State's role is to coordinate a divided community in the interests of the ruling class, therefore it sees the State since merely a 'superstructure' serving the interests of the dominant class.

Later Marxists have differed substantially with each other on the interpretations of the Marxist concept of the State. One of the mainly celebrated of such variations is the now well-known 'Miliband vs. Poulantzas' debate. Ralph Miliband begins through stressing require to distinct the governing classes from the ruling classes. The latter exercises ultimate manage whereas the former makes day-to-day decisions. Miliband is suggesting that the ruling class does not get embroiled in the everyday business of governance, for the State is an instrument that is for the power of community on behalf of this extremely class.

His contention is that in order to be politically effective the State has to distinct itself from the ruling class. And in doing this, it might even have to take actions that might not be in the interests of the ruling class, of course in the extensive run. For Poulantzas the class affiliations of those in State

locations and offices is not of any significance. He attracts attention to the structural components of the capitalist State which enable it to protect the extensive-word framework of capitalist manufacture even if it means severe clash with few segments of the capitalist class.

A fundamental point in Poulantza's argument is that the State is what holds jointly capitalism through ensuring political institution of the dominant classes that are constantly occupied in clash due to competitive pressures and short word variations. Further the State ensures 'political disorganization' of the working classes which because of several causes can threaten the hegemony of the dominant classes, the State also undertakes the task of political 'regrouping' through a intricate 'ideological procedure' of classes from the non-dominant manners of manufacture who could act against the State. Therefore in this perspective the centralized contemporary State is both a necessary result of the 'anarchic competition of civil community' and a force in the reproduction of such competition and division. The State does not basically record socio-economic reality, it enters into it's extremely construction through reinforcing its shape and codifying its elements.

Welfare State

However from within liberalism efforts at revisiting the vital assumptions came with the reversal of the account of the procedure of social causation, and the consequent effect this had on the idea of personal responsibility that had been a characteristic of nineteenth century idea. The emergence of the case for the welfare State began with the argument that instead of public welfare being the reason of dependence, loss of autonomy and capability for individual responsibility for activity and the market the source of independence and freedom, the opposite was the case.

A considerable amount of re-interpretation of sure vital concepts like liberty, society and excellence were undertaken, and the nature of community was no longer visualized since a loosely coordinating set of individuals bound jointly through general rules but lacking a general purpose rather since a more intimate shape of order. People were seen since being held jointly through social bonds that were not merely contractual and hence they could create claims on one another since citizens occupied in a general enterprise.

This made the welfare State seem less like a charity and more like a shape of entitlement. T. H. Green (1836-82) was one of the first and strongest advocates of the type of the welfare State that Europe became well-known with. It began with a redefinition of liberty and its recasting of the notions of citizenship and society, moving since it did from the earlier basis of the State based on the subjective preferences of atomized individuals. The theory of contemporary welfare State stems out of an enquiry into the alleged inadequacies of the individualistic market order rather than from a socialist or Marxist theory.

The latter theories would not argue for a welfare State without the background of socialism. In information Marxists are deeply critical of the welfare State institutions as they are merely set upon

existing capitalist buildings. On secure scrutiny of the intellectual foundations of the welfare State we would notice that it does not sanction the abolition of the market but only a correction of its defects. Hence the successful welfare State is something that would in the extensive run help the capitalist State.

Liberal-Egalitarian State

The primary concern of welfare State theories has been equality, and to realize this goal an interventionist state was advanced since an option. John Rawls on the other hand has been concerned with the justification in rational words of socially and economically necessary inequalities. Rawls's notion of State is same to that of Locke: the State is a voluntary community constituted for mutual defense. This civil association regulates the common circumstances therefore that individuals can pursue their individual interests.

In Rawls' conception individuals are viewed since rational mediators with interests and right claims, and a State can give a common framework of rules and circumstances which enable the fulfillment of these rights and claims. Rawls bestows upon the State an active role in the integration and promotion of the lives of the individual. Rawls considers that 'public cause' would be the foundation of the liberal legitimacy of the State.

This is called through him since intellectual and moral authority of citizens. In Rawls' mainly well recognized job, 'A Theory of Justice' since well since in his later jobs there is no conscious effort made to develop a theory of State. However a secure reading of his jobs suggests that he has in mind a constitutional democracy based on the principle of 'public cause' where each departure from the principle of excellence should be justified on the foundation of the well-known Rawlsian principles of justice. The State would in this framework be expected to intervene in favor of establishing the principle of justice since fairness, and set up the principle of excellence of individuals.

Libertarian-Minimal State

Robert Nozick has in his job 'Anarchy, State and Utopia' (1974) expressed his deep reservations concerning a State that is allowed to intervene and in information to the entire quest for equality. Nozick is of the view that it is only the minimal State that can be morally justified, being limited through rights bearing individuals. Nozick challenged both anarchic visions of statelessness since well since welfare oriented interventionism. Nozick repudiated the claims of any State to 'forbid capitalist acts flanked by consenting adults'.

He argues that a State that does anything more than give services will necessarily violate people's rights and therefore cannot be morally legitimate. He argues primarily against the view that a biggest function of the State is to achieve distributive justice on the foundation of few conception of the right pattern of sharing. Nozick so argues that a State which is longer than the minimal State is bound to

be non-neutral through raising the scope for manipulations. The location that Nozick took led him to become one of mainly invoked philosophers of the New Right, who were arguing by the 1980s for the rolling out of the State from the community. Nozick's prescription for a minimal State seemed to fulfill these necessities and therefore gave an intellectual foundation for the rapid withdrawal of the State from several key regions in England, Europe and America.

Gandhian Perspective on the State

We have till now looked at theories of the State that are circumscribed through the western experience. Anti-imperialist movements and the subsequent de-colonization was the context of new theories of State that questioned, re-examined and in few cases moved absent totally from the western vantage point. Of these Mahatma Gandhi's is a profound challenge to both the liberal and the Marxist views of the State. Gandhi's views on the State begin from a location of deep distrust and discomfort vis-à-vis the State.

He differed from the core commitment that liberals create to the idea of unbridled individualism. Hence he obviously does not subscribe to the notion of the State that has since its fundamental principle competing individuals pursuing an end defined through the interests of the inaccessible, atomized self. Gandhi was equally uncomfortable with the interventionist role of the State advocated through few other theories albeit in the interest of equality. Gandhi argued that rising State interference is immoral and opens up ever rising possibilities of violence and corruption. Gandhi called swarajya since the ideal State.

This would imply not only self-rule since is commonly understood but it implied governance of one's self, self-manage and self regulation. Gandhi advocated an active citizenry that would be involved in decision creation and manage of its destiny, rather than a massive and centralized, monolithic State building. For Gandhi such a building would be an embodiment of violence and would lead to alienation. This was an extension of his opinion that big level industrialization would lead to violence and alienation. Gandhi denounced the contemporary State since a soulless machine, which even while engaging in ostensibly egalitarian acts unwittingly leads to violence and in the last example a destruction of the individual. Gandhi expected the State to ensure internal peace and external security. He was however very skeptical of the contemporary State's claims to act on behalf of something called since autonomous 'national interest'.

This discussion is only a fleeting glimpse of the extremely interesting arguments Gandhi puts forth in his dialogue with the custom of western political theory that we have looked at therefore distant. Needless to add that in order to present the total picture we require laying this discussion in the superior context of Gandhi's political philosophy.

Feminist Theory and the State

Feminists of the liberal persuasion do not see any harm in engaging with the State and by the State since an ally to fight for their rights. They see the State since a neutral institution from which women had therefore extensive been excluded and into which they should create an entry. However there are several that see the above come since being rather short sighted. Malestream (which is also mainstream) political theory and politics has all beside had a method of structuring politics and political institutions that does not permit the entry, articulation and much less the realization of feminist goals.

The State from this point of view is presented since male in the feminist sense. The laws therefore see and treat women the method men treat women. Radical feminists would go on from here to urge abandonment of such a State. This is however not a extremely widely shared view, mainly feminists would argue they require to engage with this State since *women*, demanding the State's spurious claims to gender neutrality, and insisting on the validity of female voices. Marxist-feminist attitude of skepticism towards the welfare State is premised on the belief that the benign exploit of the State to give welfare for its citizens basically symbolizes the mainly cost-effective method of reproducing labour authority.

It also assumes and reinforces women's domestic responsibilities and their economic dependency on a male breadwinner within the patriarchal family. The contention is that distant from freeing women, welfare provision has helped to uphold oppressive gender roles, and has led to increased surveillance of sexual and reproductive activities and of child rearing practices. In the 1960s at the height of political radicalism, feminists argued that collaborating with the State amounted to a sell out. Today however there is a much more open-ended and less uniformly hostile attitude to the State and to conventional political action.

Post-Modernism and the Understanding of the State

Post-modernism sees the sovereign State since a Meta narrative that is section of the totalizing communication of modernity. Michel Foucault has argued that authority is exercised not only at the stage of the State but at the micro stages where it is constantly being redefined and experienced. Resistance too so to authority has to occur not presently at the spectacular stages but at these micro stages. As such a come is questioning the subsistence of a centralized organization of authority, there is no foundation within this come for either the exploit or the undermining of State authority.

CAPITALIST ECONOMY AND ITS CRITIQUE

Before 1917

Before 1917, several thinkers looked to innovative shapes of social institution, or ways of regulating capitalism, to achieve transforms in prevailing buildings. They were often inspired through

philosophical notions in relation to the intolerability of the prevailing commercialization of everyday life - which, for example, partly place at the heart of the job of writers such since Thomas More or Jean-Jaques Rousseau.

There is no difficult and fast link here, however, and it is bigger to think of socialist thoughts in the immediate context of their time.

Early Critics

In the middle of socialist critics of capitalism since an economic phenomenon, several fixed on its unjust character, and sought remedies in several shapes of social activity. Many utopian socialists fell into this category. Robert Owen (1771-1858), a leading textile manufacturer, focused on the subsistence of poverty in circumstances of abundance. He explained it since the result of competition in the middle of capitalists, which led to technological innovation, sudden falls in the demand for labour; decline in common consumption and contraction of manufacture.

The degeneration in human life and human character which this spiral caused could only be set right through a more presently link flanked by wages (and prices), where the amount of labour spent on the substance would be frequently taken into thought. Also, he advocated a more wholesome come to social institution. And he wanted the growth of idyllic societies where profit would be close to-equally shared, job-allocation proceed according to capacity and strict limits be recognized for ownership of property.

Such societies, he argued, represented a satisfying subsistence and would be a model for social institution. With this end in mind, he ran his New Lanark cotton mills on humane principles, and fostered cooperative societies such since New Harmony in Indiana (USA). The followers of Ricardo such since Charles Hall (1745- 1825), Thomas Hodgskin (1789-1869), John Gray (1794-1850) and John Francis Bray (1809-1895), expressed same preferences (for the encouragement of cooperative action). The sources of their thoughts were dissimilar from Owen's. Following David Ricardo's theories, they saw capitalism generating a rent increase spiral that would lead to impoverishment of the working class.

The solution, they argued was a brake on competitive capitalism. For this they suggested cooperative bodies for swap and manufacture, and even growth of collective property ownership. Such initiatives would balance the relentless pressures of capitalist competition. In France, the unsystematic activist Charles Fourier also advocated workers' cooperatives to stem the ascendancy of capitalism. Louis Blanc (1813-1882), wanted encouragement of producer cooperative, to replace capitalist enterprise, but demanded that such cooperatives should be shaped by state intervention and state sponsored industrialization. Prudhon (1809-1868), took a slightly dissimilar row in his *What is Property* ('it is theft'): i.e. that state activity should be encouraged to restore the right of the little proprietor, whose

location should be preserved by the imposition of serious disabilities (in the shape of taxes) on those who sought to extend their property.

Such a regulatory role for the state was also sought through Sismonde de Sismondi (1773-1842), an influenced supporter of Adam Smith in his early job (*Commercial Wealth*). After travel and lengthy research, he evolved a solid critique of capitalism, and argued that it was naturally susceptible to crises and to injustice (*New Principles of Political Economy*), arguing that the only solution was few shape of state regulation. Sismondi connected crisis, misery and injustice in capitalist community to the dispossession of the independent producer through the big capitalist enterprise, the subsequent dependence of labour on capital.

The suffering of labour, he contended, proceeded logically from the striving of capitalists to increase manufacture, since the quest for profit dictated. This led the economy into glut and depression. Competition and technological sophistication merely intensified this tendency to cyclical crises; and in the crises, even if the capitalist lost; his location was hardly since bad since that of labour. Solutions to this abominable situation did not lie in communism (which suppressed private interest). It could only lie in state intervention that restored the location of the little producer.

Christian Socialists

Christian Socialists in France, who were morally outraged through the degradation of labour in prevailing conditions, took up same arguments. Abbe Felicite Robert de Lamennais (1782-1854), advocated increased Deal Union action and diffusion of property to include the moral horror. Pierre Guillaume Frederic Le Play (1806- 1862), the leader of the Christian Socialist movement in France, who founded the Community for Social Economy in 1863, worked for social and legal reforms which would introduce an element of 'family' into the modern society. Le Play was an apostle of 'solidarism' which would link classes and diminished the violent fluctuations in income and welfare. His location, and the location of Lamennais, echoed few of the sentiments of Count Saint Simon, who measured unemployment unnatural, and spoke for Christian Humanism since a means to include untrammelled use and restore harmony to industrialization. Such a spirit, he argued, however, should manifest itself not through cooperatives, but by decisive activity through elite of engineers, philosophers and scientists.

Although targeted at the transitional classes, and seldom critical of property, Saint Simon's thoughts had a socialist ring, as he was clearly dissatisfied with capitalism and wanted a deep revise of community to set its evils right. His notions convinced a series of publicists and activists whose scripts had a social edge: Thomas Carlyle, Michael Chevalier, John Stuart Mill and Leon Walras. Saint Simonian thoughts were also popular in the middle of capitalists who had a social mission (such since the French bankers, the Pereires) and social reformers.

Critique in Germany: Marx and Engels

In Germany, Saint Simon's thoughts had followers in Young Hegelians - enthusiasts of G.W.F. Hegel's early revolutionary zeal. These included Johann Karl Rodbertus (1805-1875), who wanted state provision for the working class, and a gradual collapse of private property. Ludwig Feuerbach (another Young Hegelian and socialist sympathizer), however, was less at ease with the religious edge to Saint Simonianism, as he measured the preoccupation with religion the prime factor that prevented an out and out focus on the troubles of material prosperity.

The mainly influential socialists in Germany in the mid-19th century did not follow such locations. Significant was Ferdinand Lasalle (1825-1864), who founded several workers' cooperatives to allow workers access to profit. And yet more decisive in the German socialist movement were Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who, like the French thinkers Louis Blanc and Auguste Blanqui, and the British activist Hyndman, and unlike mainly of the advocates of cooperatives, had small respect for private property.

Marx and Engels and the biggest leaders of the Second International represented a separate and rare path in socialist idea. Here, Marx, not only associated capitalism with use but also with alienation, a shortcoming which even affected those who benefited mainly from capitalism that is the bourgeoisie. He also argued that the collapse of capitalism was inevitable, that the dominant class of the future was the proletariat (that is the urban working class), who would not only inherit the buildings provided through industrial capitalism, but would divert them from its exploitative course.

Marx's analysis provided a sense of assurance that capitalism was bound to fade absent. His socialism was, he argued, scientific, i.e. based on the laws of the history of social growth. Working out of the assumption that social dealings constitute the core of economic building and economic action, Marx argued that a scrupulous social set up created an economic dispensation with which it urbanized tensions in excess of time.

This led gradually to transform. Capitalism, like feudalism before it, was bound to transform. Marx's primary job (*Capital*), was distinguished, however, not through such broad philosophical locations, (albeit that they remained fundamental to his arguments). He was able to demonstrate use of workers within capitalism with a degree of theoretical rigor that other theoreticians seldom brought to the subject. Working out from the average notion (shared through Smith, Ricardo and others), that all value of economic action could be reduced to labour inputs, Marx fixed on the surplus that prices included, after wages and costs had been paid, and argued that the appropriation of this through the capitalist represented the level of capitalist use. Unlike 'liberals', he did not regard that entrepreneurial functions could also be judged in labour inputs. 'Surplus value', moreover came to be rendered in money and capital - an end in itself, independent of the manufacture procedure and productive of rewards.

Competition in the middle of capitalists, however, and consequent fall in rates of profit in industry led to rising use and a steep rise in 'contradictions' flanked by capital and labour. This would lead unavoidably to the breakdown of capitalism. Marx did not, it should be noted, indicate how 'contradictions' would be resolved. His 'scientific socialism' provided a critique of capitalism but did not give a forceful reference for how 'labour' should operate under capitalism - except for that it should be made more aware of its rights and interests.

This marked him off from 'utopians' - presently since he claimed that 'utopians' lacked a proper sense of what made (and would create) capitalism intolerable. This led them to half-baked palliatives. The attitude led to a break not only with 'utopians' but also with the Anarchist, Michael Bakunin. Bakunin, who stood through his own separate perspective to socialist thoughts, which argued against capitalism's concentration and its exploit of the centralized state, wanted a 'syndicalism' come to labour strategy: i.e. avoidance of participation in the behaviors of the state since it lived as it would be contaminating to labour. Marx clearly establishes such a come one more 'utopian' fixation.

Changing Assumptions

Later German socialists, (primarily Karl Kautsky and Hilferding), followed several of Marx's assumptions closely, and showed the method in which the exploitative procedure under capitalism had become refined in excess of the mid and late 19th century to set up the power of 'fund capitalism' (i.e. investors and bankers) in excess of 'industrial capitalism'.

Lenin showed the method imperial expansion reinforced capitalist manufacture in Europe. The rhetoric of such script was redolent of a strong critique of capitalism and imperialism, and focused an attack on big-level private property, jointly with the state which legitimized it, since the largest villains of the drama of use under capitalism. The largest departure from such perspectives came from Bernstein, in Germany. He carried approximately all the average analysis of capitalism and imperialism that Marxists produced.

But he measured that since capitalism urbanized, the extent of use of the working class would decrease: that a greater degree of cooperation flanked by capitalist and proletariat would emerge and capitalism acquire a robust excellence which would be resistant to collapse. Such assumptions were carried through the Fabian Socialists in Britain. This was the cluster that shaped approximately Sidney and Beatrice Webb, and its thoughts were circulated in Sidney Webb's *Information for Socialists* (1884) and *Fabian Essays on Socialism* (1889). The writer George Bernard Shaw and other leading intellectuals were members of the cluster. They advocated secure job through socialists with political parties and deal unions, and argued that socialist aims could be achieved by such political means.

Much of this argument followed from the increasingly self-apparent preoccupation, in the middle of advocates of 'capitalism', with the idea that market mechanisms were not perfect: that these mechanisms may require guidance. Such a transform implied that capitalism was not immutable and intransigent, and went against Marx's idea that it would be. Social policy (regarding hours of job and unemployment) in France, Britain and Germany in the late nineteenth century indicated this mutability in capitalism.

Therefore did the great power that Deal Unions came to demonstrate in Britain and France through 1900. At a theoretical stage, non-socialists began to seem at economic swap cautiously and question the perfection of market mechanisms. This followed from the move in the middle of few, to question the idea that economic action could be studied purely in words of its labour inputs (including the entrepreneur's) - since in the case of the liberal economist Jean Baptiste Say. Working from notions that equally significant was examination of economic action in words of the utility of manufacture and market response to manufacture (till now a subordinate focus of attention). By historical proof (from the French and German Historical Schools), since well since speculations in relation to the how consumers chose their products (through the 'marginal utility' school of William Stanley Jevons (1835-82), Carl Menger (1840-1921) Leon Walras (1834-1910) and others), a location appeared in the middle of non-socialist economists that the market could not be left alone.

Once this was carried, and once concessions were made to workers' demands, moderate 'socialism' of the non-Marxist variety did not differ excessively from the average orthodoxy in the middle of capitalist or 'liberal' economists. For the less revolutionary, the situation showed the method to reconciliation with capitalism.

After 1917

The situation seriously changed owing to the First World War, the October Revolution of 1917, the Depression of 1929 and the Second World War. The World Wars and the Depression undermined the economy of the European states therefore decisively that capitalism itself came into question.

Alternative means of economic institution became popular. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia (i.e. the seizure of authority through the Bolshevik fraction of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party in October 1917, and its success in the Civil War that followed) provided an instance that attracted attention.

Early Bolshevik Theories

For Bolshevik socialism was not only critical of capitalism, it rejected revisionism and it showed methods of going beyond capitalism by means other than cooperatives and piecemeal state regulation.

In the middle of the Bolsheviks, a serious economist, Nikolai Bukharin, dismissed liberal notions of the 'utility' school since unworthy of the attention of those concerned with more than the behaviors of the renter or leisured class. More fundamentally, the Bolshevik leader V.I. Lenin, argued, contrary to several socialists, that the state could give a means for managing the economy for the benefit of community, once and for all overcoming use and the circumstances that led all community into a state of 'alienation' from the fruits of its labour.

The state could, Lenin contended, restore socially wholesome priorities to community on a big level. Hitherto, this had not been a path socialists took, even if they supported state intervention in economic affairs. For a dominant role for the state in such matters meant handing biggest powers in excess of to great landowners and great capitalists (who exercised hegemony in governments in France, Germany and Britain until then). Lenin took the row; in his 'State and Revolution' that previous critics of big level state manage had been thinking of such cases where the state was run through the ruling class.

The situation changed when the proletariat and socialists took in excess of the state. Nationalization and abolition of private property became the cornerstones of this perspective. 'Scheduling' also became crucial to it: the notion that it was possible, statistically, to evolve a plan of the economy and its potentials, and thereafter to 'plan' targets for it. Such thoughts were evolved through several Soviet economists, and became a biggest ingredient in the socialist critique of capitalism. S. Preobrazhensky, for example, pointed out that with such enormous dominates and powers, the state could achieve capital accumulation itself, in the method capitalists had done it in the early levels of the industrial revolution. By manipulation of prices, possessions could be diverted from agriculture to other economic ends if necessary.

The rigor with which this could be followed up was stressed through the leading 'Planner' of the late 1920s and 1930s, S. Strumilin, and a great supporter of 'targets'. The 'Intended Economy' of the 1930s in the Soviet Union showed how this could job, achieving great increases in industrial manufacture and revolutionizing the country's economy. In all this, intensive averages of welfare were preserved, and strict curbs enforced regarding the accumulation of wealth. With great sophistication, and with scant respect for labour theory of value (which mainly Soviet economists carried), several economists outside the USSR argued for the prefer ability of an Intended Economy. This was true of the Polish economist Oscar Lange (1904-1959?), who, in his *On the Economic Theory of Socialism* (1938), argued that the Intended Economy could be more efficient than a capitalist economy, if adequate attention was paid to the price mechanism. His popularity was since great outside Soviet socialist circles (who regarded him with few care) since that of Michael Kalecki, another Polish economist who worked with concepts such since 'class clash' and integrated these with significant job on business cycles.

Changing Assumptions

Absorption of the underlying principles of this new socialist onslaught on capitalism into 'liberal' economic notions in post Depression Europe, and the ascendancy of J.M. Keynes' thoughts, gradually led to the decline of the importance of the new socialist perspective in post-1945 Europe. Keynes followed up the 'marginal utility' school, and its concessions regarding the imperfections of the market, to argue for a degree of administration of the economy in notions not distant off those of Lange.

In economies which were not 'socialist', so, due accommodation came to be made for the socialist challenge. Thereafter, the insights such since those of Friedrich von Hayek (1889-1992), the LSE-Freiberg-Salzburg economist, regarding the distortion that Scheduling invoked in the function of prices in the market assumed a degree of popularity in European circles.

Some Keynesians, such since Nicholas Kaldor and Joan Robinson (the 'Cambridge Keynesians') sustained to have little interest in the Soviet legacy. Otherwise, the crisis of the Eastern European economies in the 1970s and 1980s gave basis to skepticism regarding socialist thoughts. Wild uncertainties in the market in the developing world, however, and the biggest social implications of such uncertainties, have ensured a persistent interest in socialist perspectives. Deal has compelled Europeans to take explanation of the perspective. Socialism is thrust on Europe through the world, since it was, even if Europeans have small interest in it.

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The Nature of Contemporary Community

Modernity can best be approached against the backdrop of what went before. A broad distinction may be drawn flanked by agrarian and industrial; rural and urban communities. The mainly rapid transforms with regard to these distinctions took lay throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, when the hierarchical categories that had endured in the (largely) agrarian communities for millennia began to transform irrevocably.

Industrial buildings took much of their feature shape from the rejection of pre-industrial methods, and modernity derived meaning and momentum through contrast with what went before. Therefore modernization may be viewed since a procedure of *individualization*, *specialization* and *abstraction*.

Firstly, the buildings of contemporary community take since their vital part the individual rather than the cluster or society. Secondly, contemporary institutions perform specific tasks in a socio-economic organization with an intricate division of labour in contrast with the peasant family. Third, rather than attaching rights and prerogatives to scrupulous clusters and persons, or being guided through tradition or custom, contemporary institutions tend to be governed through common rules and regulations that purport to be rationally, if not scientifically conceived. Class community in the 19th century appeared from the estates hierarchy of feudalism.

Gradually at first and then more rapidly after the advent of the industrial revolution the classifications of landlord and peasant began to be complemented through that of capitalist and worker, although it would be simplistic to suggest that the older class divisions were replaced through the new ones. The socialist (especially Marxist) political custom, however, predicated its examines upon the information that capitalist dealings of manufacture were bound to subsume all social dealings within its ambit, and promote the appearance of two biggest classes, *bourgeois* (capitalist) and worker. Alongside this, contemporary industrial community saw the new emergence of strata like the professionals, intelligentsia, and the lower transitional class or *petty bourgeoisie*.

Economic and Demographic Transforms

World population had reached in relation to the 500 million through the transitional of the 17th century. Throughout this time tendencies towards population development were checked through starvation and disease.

The Industrial Revolution of the 18th century engendered sure transforms. From in relation to the 1700 there was a rapid population explosion. As then global population has increased more than eightfold, reaching 4.8 billion through the mid-1980s, and more than six billion through 2000. Therefore, not only population but its rate of increase has also accelerated as the advent of industrialization. Europe's population doubled throughout the 18th century, from roughly 100 million to approximately 200 million, and doubled again throughout the 19th century, to in relation to the 400 million. Europe was also the site for the pattern recognized since the demographic transition. Improvements in public health and food supply brought in relation to the drastic reduction in the death rate but no corresponding decline in the birth rate.

This contributed to a population explosion in the 19th century. Only later did the phenomenon emerge of developed populations voluntarily lowering their birth rates. The century of Russian and Soviet industrialization that began in the 1880s also shows the link flanked by industrialization and population. The developing communities experienced rapid population development after 1945, at rates greater than the West. Medical science reduced the high death rates, and the birth rates showed small tendency to fall. Efforts through governments to persuade non- Westerners to have smaller families failed.

One result was the persistence of youthful populations in communities - people under 15 made up more than 40 percent of the populations of the Third World, since compared with flanked by 20 and 30 percent in the industrialized world. The high birth rate in these communities was because industrialization was fragmentary, contemporary classes taken much longer to emerge, and it remained rational for the bulk of the population to continue to have big families to share in labour and give security for parents. Lower fertility would approach, it was argued, when wealth was more evenly distributed and social security organizations well recognized. Economic development became

the defining characteristic of contemporary polities, especially in the first industrializing nations, of Western Europe and North America.

This transformed the nature of community. Underlying this phenomenon were technical transform, the replacement of human and animal authority through coal and oil-driven engines; the freeing of the laborer from customary ties and the making of a free market in labour; the concentration of workers in the factory organization. A pivotal role was to be performed through the entrepreneur. Later industrializes were able to dispense with few of these - the Soviet Union industrialized on the foundation mainly of a regulated rather than free labour market and did absent with big-level entrepreneurship, and Japanese entrepreneurs were continued through strong state involvement in industrialization. Sure states - such since Denmark and New Zealand industrialized by the commercialization and mechanization of agriculture, rendering agriculture another industry.

Mechanization made a big portion of the rural labour force superfluous, and the proportion of the labour force employed in agriculture dropped steadily. This 'sectoral transformation' was one of industrialization's mainly obvious effects. Mainly workers came to be employed in the manufacture of manufactured goods and in services rather than in agriculture.

In Japan, in 1970, more than 80 percent of the employed population was in manufacturing and services, and less than 20 percent in agriculture. In pre-industrial agrarian communities, on the other hand, typically 90 percent of the adult population is peasant farmers or farm workers.

Urbanization

Industrialization brings a development in deal and manufactures. To serve these behaviors it needs centralized locations of manufacture, sharing, swap, and credit. It demands a regular organization of discourses and transport. It multiplies the demand that political authorities set up a dependable coinage, an average organization of weights and events, a reasonable degree of defense and safety on the roads, and regular enforcement of the laws.

All these growths conduce to a massive increase in urbanization. Industrialism concentrated size populations in municipalities. Contemporary urbanism differs from pre-industrial urbanism in quantitative reach and intensity; in new connections flanked by the municipality and community. Therefore, in imperial Rome, the high point of pre-industrial urbanism, only 10 to 15 percent of Romans existed in municipalities. Whereas in typical agrarian communities 90 percent or more of the population are rural, in industrial communities it is not uncommon for 90 percent or more to be urban.

Through 1851 it was 40% and if smaller cities are included, more than half the population was developed. Through 1901, the year of Queen Victoria's death, the census recorded 75% of the population since urban. In the span of a century a mainly rural community had become a mainly urban one. The pattern was repeated on a European and then a world level.

At the beginning of the 19th century, continental Europe (excluding Russia) was less than 10 percent developed, through the end of the century it was in relation to the 30 percent developed (10 percent in municipalities with 100,000 or more), and through the mid-1980s, the urban population was more than 70 percent. In the United States in 1800, only 6 percent of the population existed in cities of 2,500 or more; in 1920 the census accounted that for the first time more than half of the American people existed in municipalities.

Through the mid-1980s this had risen to almost 75 % the similar since Japan's urban population - and more than two-fifths of the population existed in metropolitan regions of one million or more. In the world since an entire, in 1800 no more than 2.5 percent of the population existed in municipalities of 20,000 or more; through 1965 this had increased to 25 percent, and through 1980 to 40 percent. It is estimated that through the year 2000 in relation to the half the world's population will be urban.

There has also been a development of extremely big municipalities. Municipalities of more than one million occupants numbered 16 in 1900, 67 in 1950, and 250 in 1985. The fastest rates of urban development were to be establishing in the underdeveloped nations. For the rapidly expanding populations of overpopulated villages, municipalities were a means of escape and opportunity. Flanked by 1900 and 1950, while the world's population since an entire grew through 50 percent, the urban population grew through 254 percent. In Asia urban development was 444 percent and in Africa 629 percent. Through the mid-1980s, Africa and Asia were in relation to the 30 percent developed, and Latin America almost 70 percent.

Municipalities such since São Paulo (15 million), Mexico Municipality (17 million), and Calcutta (10 million), had mushroomed to rival and even overtake in mass the big municipalities of the urbanized West and Japan. Urbanization in the underdeveloped nations did not carry with it the benefits of industrialization. The result has been the rapid development of slums in or on the outskirts of the large municipalities. In relation to the four or five million families in Latin America live in slums and the numbers in Asia are distant superior.

Urbanism cannot be understood basically through statistics of urban development. It is a matter, too, of a distinctive civilization and consciousness. Municipality life can detach people from their traditional collective moorings, leaving them morally stranded and therefore inclined to harbor unreal expectations and feverish dreams. In the extremely number of social contacts it necessarily generates, it may compel individuals to erect barriers to protect their privacy. At the similar time, municipalities promote varieties and creativity; they are the mediators of transform and development. The French sociologist Émile Durkheim, declared great municipalities to be 'the uncontested houses of progress', where alone minds were 'naturally oriented to the future.' Whereas pre-industrial municipalities were bounded through the countryside and dependent on the peasantry, contemporary urbanism reversed this connection.

The countryside now became dependent on a single economic organization centered on the municipalities. Political and economic authority resided in the municipality; industrial and financial corporations became the dominant landowners, replacing individual proprietors. Pastoral life no longer significantly affected the values and practices of the superior community. The municipality came to represent industrial community, dictate the approach and set the average for the community since an entire.

Transforms in Working Lives and Social Building

In pre-industrial and peasant communities families were the vital part of manufacture; and existence the aim of productive action. From weavers in 18th-century England, to coal miners in 20th century colonial India, men, women and children could all be establish performing dissimilar tasks in a coordinated job-procedure.

More often than not this labour would be remunerated in piece-rates, or by the putting-out organization, based on advances. The families might also be able to cultivate little plots of land, and have access to general lands or forests for fuel and jungle produce. In the Western world, the experience of industrialization disrupted the family economy. (It is noteworthy that these characteristics are customized substantially in the therefore-described developing countries, where casual, informal and seasonal labour is widespread, and takes into its ambit the employment of children and women since members of job-gangs).

Contemporary industrial economic procedures have done absent with the economic function of the family since manufacture locations shifted to factories. Mainly family members have become landless agricultural laborers or factory workers. Job for existence has been replaced through job in the factories, and for wages. In the less urbanized world, circumstances remain same to what they were in the early levels of industrialization in the West. Families thrash about to uphold traditional communal unity, and continue to pool their possessions, and create regular visits to houses in villages.

Their wages still contribute to a general family fund. In the absence of a comprehensive organization of social security, villages and families fulfill the role. Despite this, workers' lives, whatever their site, have become dependent upon the capitalist organization of wage labour, and the lay and functions of the family have undergone a qualitative shift. The extended families of the pre-industrial and early industrial periods, have given method to nuclear families of parents and dependent children.

Under contemporary social buildings, job has become the principal source of individual identity. This has been accompanied through a huge increase in the division of labour that went beyond artisanal specialization, what Adam Smith and Karl Marx described the 'detailed' division of labour, in the job task itself. The tasks involved in fabricating a product, are fragmented and allocated to

many individuals since a means of rising productivity. This division of labour is the foundation for the heightened productivity of contemporary capitalism. The latter is also associated with the innovations of entrepreneurs like Henry Ford who introduced the moving assembly row and the 'scientific administration' techniques of Frederick Taylor with his 'time and motion' studies. In contemporary industrial community, economic location and connections has become the key to social location. While wealth was always significant in determining social location, it was not the central determinant.

Other characteristics of social being, such since membership of this or that society, race, religion, age and gender were of great importance in determining locations in the social hierarchy. But industrial community has subordinated all these principles to the economic one. The location of the individual in the manufacture organization and the marketplace gives him or her lay in a scrupulous class. Property ownership and education stages affect market location. Karl Marx predicted that these trends (still evolving in his time) would leave two largest economic classes, the property less workers, or proletariat, and the capitalist owners, or bourgeoisie. It is a matter of debate in the middle of sociologists of contemporary community whether these procedures of class differentiation are still moving in the direction suggested through Marx.

Although it is true that economic connections have not totally eliminated non-economic determinations of social status, information that carries a great trade of political significance), it may also be argued that the subordination of human productive action to capitalist markets and the wage-labour shape is proceeding uninterrupted.

Modernization: Secularization and Rationalization

Max Weber described modernization a procedure leading to 'the disenchantment of the world.' It eliminates all the supernatural forces and representations which pre-contemporary civilizations exploit to explain natural and social phenomena; substituting for these the contemporary scientific interpretation of nature. Only laws and regularities exposed through the scientific way are admitted since valid explanations of phenomena. This procedure of secularization tends to displace religious institutions, beliefs and practices, in favor of cause and science, a procedure first observable in Europe toward the end of the 17th century.

With colonialism, secularization was exported to the non-European world. Although religion has not been driven out from community, and although the public may hold traditional religious beliefs alongside scientific ones, religious phenomena have lost their centrality in the life of community since an entire. Right-wing political movements worldwide do indeed resort to the evocation of religious symbolism since a means of mobilizing public sentiments in favor of conservative programs.

This tendency however, does not obviate the vital information that religious establishments have lost manage of political authority in the contemporary state. The procedure of rationalization touches several more regions, such since the capitalist economy, with its calculation of profit and loss. For Max Weber, it referred to the establishment of a rational organization of laws and management in contemporary community.

He saw the highest growth of the rational principle in the impersonal and impartial rule of rationally constituted laws and processes: the organization of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy was the contemporary alternative to traditional and 'irrational' thoughts of kinship or civilization, its authority, the triumph of the scientific way in social life. Although he was aware that bureaucracy could be despotic in actual operation, Weber nevertheless whispered that trained officials were 'the pillar both of the contemporary state and of the economic life of the West.' However, Weber stressed that contemporary rationalization did not lead to whole populations becoming reasonable or knowledgeable.

Modernization: Troubles of Size Community

Another characteristic of contemporary community is the emergence of the size phenomenon, which tends to merge rather than distinguish classes, and counter-balance the rise of contemporary individualism with the decline of regional societies and the acceleration of political centralization.

Political and cultural centralization and uniformity have been interpreted since pointers to the making of a 'size community'. Tocqueville a 19th C. French scholar had warned that individuals lacking identification with strong intermediate institutions would become atomized ('alienated', in Marx's language), and seek the defense of authoritarian governments. The rise of totalitarian movements in the 20th century showed that these tendencies were real and present in all contemporary communities.

These tendencies signified a new stratification of elite and size, and theories suitable to that. Even a class party like Lenin's included a belief in this stratification with its concept of 'vanguard' and 'rank and file'. Fascist sociology established only the division flanked by leader and size, Stalinist sociology that flanked by Party and People, with the latter consisting of the three 'classes' of intelligentsia, peasant, and worker in non-antagonistic connection, since a single size. Size community has brought new troubles, matching social progress with social pathology. Urbanization has meant crowding, pollution, and environmental destruction.

The decline of religion and society has removed restraints on appetite, while competitive capitalism that stimulates expectations cannot give everyone with the means for their realization. Contemporary life has seen an increase in suicide, crime and mental disorder. Since size political parties have approach to monopolize civic life, individual citizens have retreated into daily life. These phenomena have put a strain on civic loyalties and the willingness of people to participate in political life.

Political apathy and low turnouts at elections have described into question the democratic claims of contemporary liberal communities. A same concern has been raised with regard to the spread of size discourses in the 20th century.

The uniformity and conventionality bred through the press, radio and television have been seen to threaten the pluralism and varieties of contemporary liberal polities, and a reminder of the totalitarian tendencies that lie beneath the surface of modernity. Industrialism was established to have created new pockets of poverty. Despite steady economic development, flanked by 15 and 20 % of the population remained permanently below (officially defined) poverty stages during the industrial world. Did industrialism through its extremely mechanism of development make a new category of poor who could not compete according to the 'rationality' of the new order? The collective and kinship supports of the past having withered absent, there seems to have been no alternative for the failed and the rejected but to become claimants and pensioners of the state.

Few might see these since signs that modernity is fractured, that human-type will require ultimately re-thinking the utility of modernization and industrialism. Karl Marx offered the mainly systematic analysis of this 'alienation'. The industrial worker is estranged from his laboring action because of the compulsions of class: he has no managed in excess of the words and circumstances of the disposal of his product. Unlike traditional artisanship, contemporary labour procedures do not need his constructive and creative faculties. The industrial organization of manufacture is phenomenally powerful; but this authority is achieved at the cost of reducing workers, to mere labour-authority, semblances of humanity. Marx whispered that the high productivity of human labour in contemporary industrial organizations could free human beings from a greater section of the burden of job; but not until modernity severed its links with capitalism.

Contemporary Community and World Community

Western industrialization rapidly became the model for the entire world, and western modernity an instance to be followed through all nations. Colonies or clients of Western powers were 'urbanized' beside these rows before they attained independence. Apparently the only viable polity in the contemporary world was industrial community, and only industrial communities could be active global mediators.

Therefore Japan, humiliated through the West in mid-19th century, industrialized and became one of the mainly powerful communities in the world. Japan's experience confirmed that there were many circuits to modernity. Britain, Western Europe and the USA had industrialized on the foundation of individual entrepreneurship and the free market economy. In Germany and Japan, the state and political elites played a biggest role, in organizing and scheduling growth, and restricting foreign access to house markets in the interests of native industry. Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, there come the authoritarian models of modernization under the one-party state.

Several developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America industrialized according to economic plans drawn up through political elites and imposed upon their populations. Independent India, instituted formal liberal democracy, but its industrialization was guided through the Indian National Congress, recognized with the thrash about for independence. There were also the African socialisms of Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana and Julius Nyerere's Tanzania, the Chinese socialism of Mao Zedong, the Cuban socialism of Fidel Castro, and the Yugoslav socialism of Josip Broz Tito. All these became models of growth to sure Third World communities. The experiences of Japan and the Soviet Union suggested a common pattern of late growth suitable to nations that attempted to industrialize in the late 19th or early 20th centuries.

This involved protectionism, manage of unions, and centralized banking and credit. Late developers put the state at the centre of modernization. India under colonialism underwent the ironic fate of state-sponsored economic growth managed through a foreign elite committed to the Victorian economic ideology of *laissez-faire* (a policy of non-interventions in the economic affairs) at house. In Japan, the Soviet Union and China the state managed industrialization, made biggest decisions in relation to the investment, transport, discourses, and education. Size discourses became agencies of size socialization. Industrialization has taken lay within a context of world industrialization, in a world organization of states of unequal authority. Towards the end of the 20th century the ideological divisions flanked by West (the urbanized capitalist nations) and East (the socialist nations), became obsolete with the collapse of communist regimes in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Increasingly primary emphasis is being placed on stages of economic growth: the differentiation is recognized since the 'North-South' divide – a somewhat misleading word, not least because Australia in this divide is placed in the 'North' and North Korea in the 'South'. Few commentators also speak of First, Second, and Third Worlds. Immanuel Wallerstein a leading American economist argues for a single world capitalist economy, expanding outward from northwestern Europe as the 17th century. He classifies countries according to their authority within the organization. There are Core countries that include the United States and Japan; 'semi-peripheral countries' include Brazil, eastern European states and China; 'peripheral countries,' include the poor countries of Africa and Asia. Wallerstein's model recognizes the internationalization of the industrial economy.

Nation-states, whether capitalist or communist, are becoming increasingly subordinate to world economic growths. Therefore, the politics of power procurement are global in nature, presently since much since military strategy. Capital investment and development are global issues, and multinational corporations are significant actors on the world level, busy establishing a new international division of labour. Manufacturing units are shifted from lay to lay, depending on thoughts such since the attendance of cheap labour, compliant governments and tax-havens. In this sense multinational corporations embody the interdependence of core and margin nations.

New Growths in Social Building

Industrialism has unfolded since an organization of ceaseless innovation. In its core-countries, it has virtually eliminated the peasantry, and is now creating automated technologies that can increase productivity while displacing workers. Manufacturing once reported for in relation to the 50% of the employed population of industrial communities, but is now shrinking to flank by 25% to 30%.

New employment is now accessible in the service sector, which descriptions for 50% to 66% of the job force and in excess of half the GNP. These jobs - in government, health, education, fund, leisure and entertainment- are described white-collar occupations, and indicate an expansion in health, education and public welfare. The population in the core countries has become healthier and bigger educated.

The 'knowledge class' of scientific and technological workers have become the fastest-growing occupational cluster. Pure sciences and technology have become even more closely inter-connected. This is evidenced in heavy investments in research and growth, especially in industries such since fact technology, pharmaceuticals, bio-genetics, aeronautics and satellite discourses. The social sciences also generate intricate models of sociological and economic forecasting.

Few sociologists have interpreted these phenomena since signifying a movement to a 'postmodern', postindustrial community. This may be a semantic exaggeration, given that mainly transforms under late industrialism have flowed from the logic of capitalist industrialization itself, such since mechanization and technological innovation, the increase in complexity of industrial institution and the union of science with industry and bureaucracy. But these transforms do add a new dimension to contemporary communities, such since the decline in manufacturing, and the advent of computerized information processing that can replace masses of white-collar workers. And urbanization may give method to the decentralization and depopulation of several municipalities since old manufacturing industries decline and new service industries move out.

Recent trends in the USA and UK indicate that the countryside has begun to gain population and the municipalities to lose it. Speaking globally, however, urban life continues to spread in excess of greater regions. Metropolitan regions have merged into the megalopolises, with populations of 20 to 40 million. Chains of contiguous municipalities and areas with massive populations may be establish in the urbanized since well poorer countries.

These procedures embody patterns in modern global community. The structural forces of industrialism have produced reactions against big-level bureaucratic institution, and movements for alternative and intermediate technologies. The political realm too, has witnessed such a reaction. All in excess of world, not least in Europe, there have been local movements for autonomy or independence - ironically, globalization has kept pace with fragmentation. Regions such since Scotland in Britain, Normandy in France, the Basque area in Spain, and many areas in the erstwhile USSR have all urbanized such movements and aspirations.

The break-up of Yugoslavia in the civil war of the 1990s was only the mainly extreme instance of a common trend. New shapes of internationalization of the world economy and polity have given rise to new nationalisms. It is arguable that the latest assertions of ethnicity, civilization and 'custom' reflect efforts through endangered elites in disintegrating states to rally public disquiet towards a new conservative 'size politics'. Howsoever historians of the future will see these phenomena, it is undeniable that the procedure of modernization has reached a significant turning point, and the governing institutions of the post-1945 world order no longer look capable of managing rapidly changing social, economic and political realities.

REVIEW QUESTIONS

- What do you understand by the State?
- Write a note on the liberal conception of the State.
- Briefly compare the conceptions of the welfare State and the minimal State.
- What are the essential features of the critique of capitalism as propounded by Marx and Engels?
- What do we mean by modern society?
- How is the process of secularization a part of modern social structure?

CHAPTER 3

The Modern State and Politics

STRUCTURE

- Learning Objective
- Bureaucratization
- Democratic politics
- Modern state and welfare
- Nationalism
- Review Questions

LEARNING OBJECTIVE

After reading this chapter, you will be able to:

- Explains the coming of bureaucratization as an institution in the modern era.
- Make a survey of different forms of democracy historically, theoretically as well as geographically. The attempt will also be to give a range of criticisms which have been offered to the notion of democracy and democratization process
- A discussion of one important feature and function of the modern state: welfare and social responsibilities.
- Explain the Nationalism

BUREAUCRATIZATION

Bureaucratization and the State

It is customary to note the procedure of formation of bureaucracy from in relation to the fifteenth until the eighteenth century in Europe since royal absolutisms imposed themselves against feudal nobilities. However, this was more a procedure of centralization of authority in the hands of the king, not of its professionalization in the manner of a contemporary bureaucracy.

The king gradually monopolized authority and appointed his own officials to collect taxes, administer justice, and run the armed forces, denying such powers to the feudal nobility and other estates. The nobilities and estates could now merely act since employees or mediators of the king, no longer in their own right. In words of professional capability, the persons employed through the king were no dissimilar from those of the great feudal magnates. They were chosen for their loyalty and appointments were acts of personal whim and patronage.

The king merely commanded a superior region of patronage with greater possessions and higher stakes to play for. Through this means the contemporary state, since the monopolist of the exercise of

legitimate coercion, or the absolute centre of authority in any single territory, was recognized through the eighteenth century; but its institutions were not the contemporary professional ones we know today. That transformation occurred in the nineteenth century in Europe through when the challenge from feudal nobilities and regional estates had been overcome, and the contemporary state accumulated apparently unlimited possessions by industrialization.

The challenge before the state was to harness and use these massive new possessions and ever newer sources, both material and human. Generating and exploiting material possessions took the shape of industrialization; doing the similar with human possessions took the shape of social mobilization. Entirely new institutions and professions were required for these behaviors; and the emergence of professional bureaucracies takes lay against this backdrop. The first of these were the direct servants of the state, the civil servants and the armed forces. The direct behaviors of the state vastly expanded, starting with Britain from the 1830s, and with it, the number of employees of the state. This occurred with interventions through the state in the meadows of factory inspection, public health, municipal management, school education, and poor relief, all in a wave of “reform” in the 1830s, topped through the parliamentary reform of 1832 when the franchise was extended.

But all these were accompanied through a comparable campaign against “corruption” and in the reason of “efficiency.” Through corruption the reformers meant the organization of patronage in lay as the sixteenth century, through which officials were appointed since personal favors, salaries were distributed for doing small or nothing and worse even, persons could buy their occupations, since happened especially with army officers. The sweeping reforms of the thirties and forties did absent with several but not all of these practices, and appointments now began to take lay against proven professional qualification, especially by the competitive examination.

Therefore officialdom both vastly expanded and became immensely more professional. This was when schools became contemporary centers of high excellence education, mutating from the Dootheboy’s Hall caricatured in Charles Dickens’ *Nicholas Nickleby* to Thomas Arnold’s public schools, celebrated in *Tom Brown’s Schooldays*. Likewise, universities became centers of contemporary professional education, and academic scholarship itself became a new profession. In the eighteenth century, the education of an aristocrat did not need a university, but it did require the “grand tour” of the courts of Europe, to learn modes and acquire social contacts. In the nineteenth century, the grand tour was discarded, university education became indispensable, and Oxford and Cambridge assumed their formidable reputations and locations of eminence.

All these organizations were dominated through competitive examinations. The procedure was completed in the next wave of reforms in the 1860s and 1870s, throughout the first government of W. E. Gladstone. In levels from 1870, entry into the civil service was to take lay by competitive examination; purchase of commissions in the army was abolished; in 1873 seven courts of law dating from medieval times were merged into one Court of Judicature, and the obviously unprofessional

judicial functions of the House of Lords were terminated; and in 1871 the Anglican Church's monopoly of teaching posts at Oxford and Cambridge was ended. Disraeli's government in 1874-1880 followed up with welfare events which furthered the first series of the 1830s: a maximum of 56.5 working hours per week; further restrictions on the legal age for employment; the effective introduction of what has become approximately a religious observance in urbanized countries, the weekend; regulation of working class housing; laying down averages for sewage disposal; dominates on the adulteration of food and drugs; restricting the pollution of rivers; establishing safety limits for the loading of ships and much else.

Since may be gauged from this extraordinary series, each sphere of expansion of government action demanded the recruitment of a fresh body of professionals, whether to inspect factories, to job out sewage disposal organizations, or to manage pollution. In each case troubles had to be diagnosed, solutions proposed, and averages recognized, all of which required advanced academic competence gained from the contemporary university organization; they then had to be enforced which required bureaucratic "efficiency"; and more had to be prepared for since newer regions emerged for intervention with each technical advance or with "progress." The procedure was never-ending; government became gargantuan and ever more "bureaucratic"; but the demand for more and more of it was insatiable.

This procedure was slower in France, despite the French reputation for absolutist states, royal bureaucracies, and Napoleonic efficiency. These high stages of professionalism and bureaucracy were attained in Paris, but the province remained in the hands of regional interests to a degree greater than in Germany or Britain, although less than in the Mediterranean. Napoleon certainly conceived of bureaucracy since a perfect chain of command in which the central power issued instructions that passed "swift since an electric current" to subordinates, that is the prefects governing the 83 departments, sub-prefects in the *arrondissements*, and mayors in the 36,000 communes. The model was of perfect bureaucracy, and the prefect enjoyed ample authority of every type that a government in a modernizing state can possess and hence dispensed patronage since a regional potentate.

For that extremely because regional interest clusters consisting of landlords, businessmen, the Church, unions when they arose, and peasant lobbies, all competed furiously to gain manage of these appointments; in effect these offices became mediators of regional factions and clans rather than of the state itself. Already, through 1866, 37 percent of the mayors were farmers; after they began to be elected from 1882, that trend was emphasized. Through 1913, 46 percent were farmers, and in the negligible communes since several since 78 percent.

Therefore appointments became arbitrary; transfers were frequent according to regional factional struggles, officials were overtly political rather than neutral, they were expected to ensure the election of regional politicians, and they were punished or rewarded according to their performance in such matters. It was in everybody's interest to resist rationalization, and the competitive

examination organization was introduced only in the 1880s. But thereafter the procedure gathered momentum, and especially after World War I France became another typically advanced industrial community in these compliments.

There could be considerable variations flanked by dissimilar states and images and ideals may be only distantly related to reality. Russia engaged an extreme location in these compliments, both before 1917 and after. In the nineteenth century, this was an under governed country despite the extraordinary concentration of authority at the top. The cities and the provinces were left to several shapes of regional self-regulation through regional notables and factions, all in a manner that did not challenge the authority of the state. Until the forties officials were astonishingly untrained, with high rates of actual illiteracy. But a new educational organization was set in lay from the forties, with new universities like Moscow and Kazan, and a new generation of qualified officials took up locations throughout that decade.

In forbidding circumstances they relentlessly pursued their goals of professional quality and “progress”, none of which meant democracy but certainly did mean efficiency; they were especially concerned to eliminate arbitrariness and to set up the rule of law and rational management. It was thanks to the attempts of this generation that the “great reforms” of the sixties were accepted out, that is, the abolition of serfdom, the introduction of elected regional government bodies recognized since the zemstvo, the making of professional advocacy and courts of law that acquired a European reputation for high averages, and increasingly higher averages in the civil services and armed forces. However, a uniform competitive examination organization was never introduced and appointments remained acts of patronage. But this patronage was exercised in the middle of a widening pool of expert manpower thanks to the education organization expanding and improving in excellence at therefore rapid a rate. The greatest extension of government was possibly in the zemstvo and the cities, in the domains of public health, elementary education, agronomy, collecting statistics, maintaining discourses and other characteristics of regional modernization. These were all occupations accepted out through armies of graduates of universities and sundry higher educational institutes, especially medical, technical, or engineering institutes. They were recognized since the “Third Element”, therefore described because the first was the nobility and the second was the bureaucracy in regional community; but this Third Element was the backbone of the attempt because they were the “experts.”

In Soviet times, these procedures were accepted distant, with high stages of professionalism and specialization, since in advanced industrial communities. Owing to the immensely rapid rate of industrialization, collectivization of agriculture, and other procedures of modernization, the administrative building was professionalized at a same rate, not the half century and more that Britain took in the nineteenth century. The greatest stress was placed on technological education to optimize industrialization, and a massive body of competent managers and technological staff poured

out of these institutes to run the economy. Presently since Western bureaucracies present a public image of training in the humanities, law, and the social sciences, the Soviet image of the administrator was of technocracy; but all were consistently professionals selected for their expertise, combined with loyalty to the regime in question.

However, there were notable differences. All action was bureaucratized and professionalized, not only the direct action of the state and of the Party, but even of professions which are in principle utterly inimical to these shapes of institution or regimentation, namely writers and artists. Even these were required to shape their own institutions to carry out their creative job, like officials, within such buildings. The Union of Writers is merely the mainly well recognized. This did not in information prevent jobs of great significance and originality being produced, but authors were answerable to the state in this fashion. The state provided patronage and support by these institutions, and demanded from them that averages of quality and expertise be recognized and enforced.

It therefore elaborated hierarchies of attainment and patterns of recognition, which, in the West, was considerably the job of the market.

Bureaucracy in Political Parties

Political Parties, like all else, tended to become bureaucratic buildings since they transformed themselves into big size institutions from the 1860s and 1870s especially. In the UK, the party used to be a loose association of clusters occupied in regional politics, with great differences on issues of concern and shapes of functioning. But then the following transforms occurred: 1) From in relation to the 1867, the regional party club network expanded enormously, with each party, Liberal and Conservative, organizing its own brass group, football clubs, benefit communities, and even structure communities in a great wave of mobilization that was apparently non-political, but was intended to foster political loyalties to the party that was promoting this range of activity. 2) Each of them organized their own "Constituency Associations" consisting of regional voluntary activists, who came to be recognized since the "caucus."

These associations were centralized in a national party body: for the Liberal Party it was the National Liberal Federation from 1877, and for the Conservatives it was the National Union of Conservative and Constitutional Associations (NUCCA) from since early since 1867 but acquiring momentum in the 1880s. 3) This building allowed the central party leadership to impose strict discipline on the regional party units, especially to decide electoral strategy, candidates for election, electoral alliances, and therefore on.

The typical party bureaucrat, recognized since the party agent, appointed through the central command, now managed these associations. His largest occupation was to ensure that party supporters were entered on the voters' lists, to give intelligence to the centre on the public mood, and to impose discipline in the vicinity. The results were apparent in the nineties for the Conservative

Party which was bigger organized than the Liberals: in the 1850s, governments suffered 10 to 15 defeats in parliamentary votes in a year; from 1900, the standard was presently one per session.

Through 1914 the party had become a centralized bureaucratic machine that overrode regional, individual differences and preferences and headed toward becoming a size party with a superior and superior electorate. The regional enthusiast, activist, or notable was overtaken through the party official from the centre, in the manner that royal bureaucracies subordinated the remains of feudal aristocracies all in excess of Europe flanked by the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries; and independent members of parliament were increasingly an item of the past.

This procedure sustained during the twentieth century, with the Labour Party following suit when it replaced the Liberals since the alternative to the Conservatives from the twenties. In the Labour Party also, the candidate is formally selected through the constituency body, but this is subject to central manage. The sovereign body is the Annual Conference of delegates and members, but its settlements are never binding on the party whether in government or in opposition despite the several pious and ideological reports to the contrary. The conduct of members in parliament is decided solely through the central party bureaucracy. This party makes loud claims to its being more democratic than others; but it is like any other, a size institution run through an oligarchy by its paid bureaucracy.

The German party organization urbanized in comparable manner. The Social Democratic Party or the SPD through its German acronym, shaped in 1875, and from the 1890s rapidly became a size party with a big deal union foundation like the Labour Party. Indeed, the German civil service became something of a model crossways the ideological spectrum, from the right wing pressure cluster, the Agrarian League, for corporate like Siemens and Krupp, and even for its bitter antagonist, the SPD. Since with the Labour Party, the Party Congress is the sovereign body; but not only does it meet only once in two years after 1914, but the party leadership and the parliamentary party recognized since the “fraction” in the Bundestag have the decisive say. The conservative opposition, the Christian Democratic Union or the CDU, differs only through being a trifle looser.

It has tended to be more dominated through personalities, especially Konrad Adenauer, the Chancellor from 1949 to 1963 and party chairman until 1966. However, in fundamentals of institution, it differs small from its principal opponent, the SPD. The contrast, too little extent, is France and the Mediterranean states. France, despite its fearsome reputation for Napoleonic bureaucracies, in information possessed parties with weaker organizational buildings than the German or British counterparts. The cause is possibly more to do with the mass of parties: the German SPD had 1.7 million members in 1914, the British Conservative Primrose League could boast more than 2 million members, while the French *Part Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière* (SFIO) had only 35-75,000 members and the Activity Libérale Populaire only 250,000. In France, regional powers and personalities counted for more than national institution. Regional bodies of the

village and canton decided on candidates, provided the election machine, organized the campaign, and grabbed the benefits in case their candidate won the election.

The benefits were the usual patronage of the state, occupations, subsidies, relief, contracts and the like. The national party institution had great difficulty exercising manage in excess of deputies, for, if these deputies kept their regional supporters happy, there was small the national body could do. In these senses, French parties reflected the localism and patronage politics of the French bureaucracy also. These characteristics changed after World War II, especially with the Communist Party (PCF) being such an excellent bureaucracy in typically Stalinist fashion to the extent of its not allowing even direct discourse flanked by party cells at the foundation. These cells were required to communicate only with their larger stages that are vertically.

This, it should be noted is one of the typical characteristics of the bureaucracy of state, where discourses flanked by departments necessity take lay only with the permission of the head of the department and not flanked by lower officials in the hierarchy. The mainly obvious cases of party bureaucracies are those of the fascist and socialist states. The fascist bureaucracies formally submitted to the “leader-principle”, that is, a single charismatic leader controlled the whole movement, the party, and where suitable, the state itself. But in contemporary times a single leader cannot manage personally such massive machines since those of industrial communities; and however charismatic, energetic, or able the leader or dictator, he could not be any more personal in his choice of officials than the American president is: he had to submit to the logic of bureaucratic building to get items done.

These shapes of leadership were chosen differently from those of the electoral organizations of the democracies, they provided a dissimilar ideological direction, and they adopted a separate approach of their own; for the rest they ruled contemporary industrial or industrializing communities by well-known buildings of bureaucracy. The professionalization and bureaucratization of political parties is arresting for the party having been originally conceived since an agent of democracy against the bureaucracy of the state.

A considerable amount of democratic rhetoric is employed through these bodies to rally size support and to further their campaigns to power the state. But the procedure of on behalf of size electorates and securing their support imposes its inexorable logic on these institutions; and they necessity summon the professional to exploit all the techniques of administration and management to ensure the required results. In addition, parties aspire to install their own governments or actually do therefore, in anticipation or furtherance of which they replicate the buildings and functioning of the government itself. Since a result, multiple bureaucracies of professionals emerge; those of the civil service itself, and those of the respective political parties. In the case of single party states, there are ostensibly presently two such bureaucracies, those of the party and of the state. But in information

there could be several of them, all hierarchies competing for the attention of the Leader and foundations for maneuvering into the top location.

Therefore, even in Hitler's Third Reich, the following buildings competed with each other, and each one of them could have provided the avenue to the top: the Nazi Party itself or the NSDAP; the SS, headed through Himmler, who idea of himself since the successor; the armed forces, which periodically conspired to overthrow Hitler and eventually provided the actual successor in 1945, Grand Admiral Doenitz; and the security services. This characteristic was more pronounced in the fascist and conservative dictatorships that spread crossways Europe in the inter-war years. Such competition however does not and did not take the shape of elections, for which cause they are not described democratic.

The mainly extreme and lucid case is that of the Soviet Union in which a single bureaucracy ran the country, that of the Party itself; it provided the sole arena to aspire for authority; and all competition to reach the top took lay strictly within it. All the other bureaucracies were strictly subordinate to it and never did challenge its monopoly, whether they were the planners, the managers, common management, the armed forces, or the security services. Since such, this single Party was, in itself, like the multiple party organization of the liberal democracies, for in each case either the single Party or the multiple parties was the sole avenue to authority, not the military, the paramilitaries, the civil services, the religious hierarchies, the corporate building, the legal establishment, or the academic organization. Since has been noted earlier, the manner in which leaders and rulers are chosen in contemporary bureaucratic communities is not bureaucratic, but the instruments with which they rule are consistently bureaucratic crossways the ideological divides.

Bureaucratization in Deal Unions

Unions is the other typically democratic institution of contemporary times, embodying the hopes of the "exploited" to close a presently sharing of authority and wealth. They are arguably also the first and mainly significant of the non-governmental institutions (NGOs). Their origins and formal processes are quintessentially democratic: they were and are voluntary associations mostly of persons asserting their rights. By mainly of the nineteenth century they were presently such bodies, sprouting in factories and workplaces since and when occasion demanded, generally to protect their wages or to demand higher wages and shorter working hours. Factories were little in mass, unions were also little, and the negotiations were highly personal, flanked by some workers and an employer.

But dramatic transforms occurred from the eighteen seventies, with a new wave of industrialization, new technologies, and new buildings of administration. Plant mass became superior, technologies diversified and grew in sophistication, and administration was separated from ownership, leading to the emergence of professional administration. Workers' protest actions similarly became all the more intricate, superior in scope, covering several factories simultaneously, or a full industry or area, and

negotiations flanked by unions and administration became more professional and less personal. Beside with the professional manager there appeared the professional union official.

Two new bureaucracies began to side each other, those of corporate administration, and those of the unions. Presently since managers required academic qualifications, examination processes for selection, and training programs, union officials were now selected for their qualifications, subjected to competitive selection examinations, and were thereafter trained on the occupation. They were no longer presently workers on behalf of other workers; they could be anybody chosen for their skills at organizing research, framing plans for activity, committee job, and negotiation.

Negotiating skills were especially decisive, and in the middle of them high competence in mathematics and economics, as union officials were expected to negotiate ceaselessly on costs of manufacture, productivity, profits, wage rates, averages of livelihood, insurances, welfare and the like. But the demand went beyond negotiation. Unions had to prepare their plans on the foundation of the state of the economy, not merely of a single factory or industry; their understanding of the economy and their capability to convince a wider public in relation to the impact of their actions on the economy and on the rest of the population became basic. This became ever more challenging since union activity began to play a role in national elections. Political parties crossways the ideological spectrum, from left to right, prospected for support in the middle of unions; and the social democratic or labour parties with socialist ideologies were especially energetic and commanded the main following in the middle of the working class.

Since unions supported scrupulous political parties, they needed to plan, advertise themselves, and act in tandem with the political parties and their priorities. The party bureaucrat and the union bureaucrat had to job in unison, both leaving the rank-and-file voter and rank-and-file union member distant behind. Since socialist ministers entered governments from the beginning of the twentieth century, and since social democratic parties became governments or led coalition governments from the twenties, union, party, and civil service officials had to job jointly and on an equal footing with comparable stages of competence.

For the purposes of national representation, unions built up national institutions to symbolize them. These were federations of unions, or head institutions, samples of which are the Deals Union Congress (TUC) in Britain, the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) in France, or the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) in Germany. There could be more than one such federation in a single country, with each ideological orientation forming its own head institution also.

These are merely representative listings. Therefore the original union of a single factory had first become a member of a federation of unions within an industry, and these federations then shaped the national federation like the TUC. Since may be imagined, these enormous bodies could be run only through full-time paid officials, not through workers taking time off job to seem after the interests of other workers. These national federations also routinely negotiated and signed agreements with

national federations of employers, a typical specimen of which would be the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) on behalf of British capitalists.

How deeply immersed unions are in affairs of state and responsible for governance may be gauged from the instances of Britain and Germany after World War II. British unions appeared from the War with heady plans for 1) public manage of core regions of the economy, including nationalization and long regulation of the private sector; 2) high stages of employment by demand administration; 3) long welfare “from cradle to grave”; and 4) scheduling of investment, including even an ambitious scheme of a “manpower budget” that would create annual estimates of manpower necessities and availability therefore that investment could be intended to ensure adequate stages of employment. But it was all conceived in the manner that any civil servant might; there was no concession to “democracy” in these plans; and the TUC took the decision-making hierarchy for granted with workers at the bottom, and assumed that professional administration, under the surveillance of the government of course, would ensure that the benefits reached workers.

Democratic guarantees place in the attendance of the TUC and of the Labour Party, not of workers playing a direct role. Small of all this was achieved in information, especially as the TUC was not committed to socialism or to scheduling and was merely anxious that the agony of the Depression years should not be repeated. So it was satisfied with the long welfare organization recognized, that in relation to the 20 percent of productive capability was publicly owned, and that demand administration kept employment stages high. Even this relatively modest attainment demanded considerable responsibility for governance and professionals to control the role of the TUCs.

They had to be good economists sufficient to understand that if they pressed their wage demands too distant and were too successful, inflationary pressures would build up and real wages would not rise adequately, for which they would eventually have to take the blame. In like manner, they had to be nimble political managers to stay a friendly Labour government in authority and to accept the constraints and responsibilities that authority brought. All these were functions of professional economists, political managers, and officials, all distant removed from the original ideal of a deal unionist fighting for his small union.

This is not a question of centralization of decision-creation therefore much since of its professionalization. Therefore, the British union building is astonishingly, indeed bewilderingly decentralized, and the TUC has small manage in excess of the national federations and great industrial unions; trades are struck flanked by unions in an industry and the corresponding employers’ federation, and often lower down the hierarchy; any union could negotiate anything and any agreement could be abrogated; multiple unions flourished in an industry, the bane of British industrial dealings according to few; and even on the employers’ face multiple bodies flourished until the coordinating top body, the Confederation of British Industry was shaped since late since 1965. This could pass for democracy; but it is a democracy run through officials, not workers.

German unions after the War were even more optimistic than the British because they were the only sector in Germany untainted through National Socialism.

Since codified at the Munich Congress of the DGB in 1949, they expected:

- Co-determination (*Mitbestimmung*), that is, to run industry together with capitalists through having an equal number of union-appointed directors on boards of companies;
- Comprehensive welfare;
- Socialization of key industries;
- Unions to be non-partisan and organized for each industry; and
- Scheduling.

Small was eventually achieved, chiefly because of the Cold War, the rightward political drift in Germany, and the continuous government through the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) all the method until 1963. However, what was attained was 1) advanced stages of centralization and of industrial unionism, eliminating multiple unions that had therefore plagued the Weimar Republic in the twenties and early thirties; 2) according to the Jobs Constitution Act of 1952 only one-third of the directors were to be from the unions, not half since originally hoped; 3) advanced welfare.

In retrospect, this is considerable, and needs unions to play a biggest role in governance. In the mainly significant two industries however, coal and steel, parity flanked by labour and other directors had already been achieved through 1947 and was formalized in 1951.

German union activity is also marked through an advanced degree of “juridification”, that is, any activity has to be according to the law in all its detail, union membership is completely voluntary, communal bargaining may take lay only flanked by unions and managements, and strikes may be organized only through unions and not throughout the life of a contract. Violations of these principles draw severe penalties at law and unions necessity function like any corporation with full legal liability. When the DGB amended its radical Munich Program at Düsseldorf in 1963, only nationalization was reduced in importance while codetermination retained its pride of lay.

Therefore unions have to function, not merely since pressure clusters to extract what they can for their members, but more since partners in industrial governance, and therewith since another type of administration. A consistent challenge is mounted from the foundation, from the rank-and-file, what are recognized in Britain since the shop stewards and in Germany since jobs’ councils or *Betriebsräte*. These are elected bodies at the lowest stages of institution; they symbolize the immediate democracy of workers; they are concerned only with the scrupulous troubles of their members; and they have been uniformly more radical than the union bureaucracies.

In Britain they have repeatedly erupted to challenge union leaderships’ relations with managements and governments. In Germany however, the highly regulated union organization has integrated even

these potentially radical and independent bodies. They have been permitted to negotiate agreements in extension of what unions themselves do, for instance with respect to bonuses but not wages.

Therefore dualism, or the coexistence of unions and of jobs' councils, has been built into the organization. The situation in the Soviet Union and East Europe (after 1945) was dissimilar in sure compliments. Here also the union, party, administration and state bureaucracies occupied with each other, each acting for its own constituency.

However unions did not act to assert the rights of workers as they were already in a state which had abolished capitalists and capitalism, and the state itself claimed to be the promoter of the interests of workers. This matter was settled since early since 1921, at the Tenth Party Congress in Russia, when unions were denied the right to agitate on behalf of workers against administration, and they had to accept the function of partnership in governance, with its necessary discipline. This was then derided since "statization" and bureaucratization. In effect in the Soviet Union, all four bureaucracies were dissimilar shapes of state bureaucracies, functionally differentiated from each other like ministries, but all equally subject to the similar political imperatives and leadership in a manner that was direct and constitutional.

The role of the unions so was to ensure that the policies of the Party and of the state with respect to the welfare of workers were accepted out and that productivity and discipline were maintained at suitable stages. While labour policy was determined at the top, unions at the foundation occupied with administration on deciding the worker's wage category, job quotas, bonuses and the like, which typically the German jobs' councils also dealt with. Unions participated in framing plans at the enterprise stage, kept a watch on welfare and wage characteristics of the law, monitored disciplinary proceedings, and attended to all welfare matters like housing, recreation, education, and healthcare.

Unions had separate functions in the West and the East, but they belonged to networks of hierarchies of officialdom in symmetrical fashion.

DEMOCRATIC POLITICS

Democracy: Ancient and Contemporary

In 1992, 2500 years of democracy were enthusiastically celebrated all in excess of the world. This was a rare celebration for two causes. Firstly, while anniversaries of statesmen, revolutions and the founding of nations are quite commonly celebrated, no other political ideal has ever been celebrated in this method. Secondly, democracy in the contemporary world is quite dissimilar from democracy since it was practiced in ancient Greece 2500 years ago.

The democratic thoughts and practices with which we are here concerned are emphatically contemporary, but it would be useful to briefly note the chief characteristics of democracy in the municipality-state of Athens (widely measured to be the mainly stable, enduring and model shape of democracy in Greece) in ancient times. Appropriately, the term democracy itself is of Greek origin.

The Greek term *demokratia* is a combination of the terms *demos* (meaning the people) and *kratos* (meaning authority or rule).

Therefore, the one general principle underlying democracy in both the ancient and contemporary worlds is the idea of rule through the people, whether directly—by personal participation—or indirectly, by elected representatives. The significant variation, of course, is in the method in which ‘the people’ were defined. In the ancient Greek polity, the ‘demos’ was rather restrictively defined, and notably excluded three largest categories of persons: the slaves, women, and *metics* (the foreigners who existed and worked in the municipality-state).

This meant that barely a quarter of the total population were members of the citizen body. Nevertheless, it is notable that the direct participation of a 40,000 strong citizen body was no mean attainment. The actual career of Athenian democracy was fairly troubled, since aristocrats, generals and demagogues made periodic efforts to manage authority. Their contempt for the poor—called since ‘the mob’ or ‘the rabble’—discovers echoes in the contemporary world, where democracy was achieved by thrash about, and against considerable odds.

Indeed, the thrash about for democracy everywhere and during history, has been simultaneously a thrash about against political excellence based on, and justified through, inequalities of birth and wealth. At its best, however, Athenian democracy conveys an impressive picture of direct participation through citizens in the assembly which deliberated and took decisions on all policy matters, and met on several occasions since 300 days in the year. Citizens also participated directly in government, since they were chosen through lot to serve in official administrative and judicial locations.

Democracy in the Contemporary World: Thoughts and Institutions

The story of democracy in the contemporary world is not merely the story of the development of democratic institutions in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. An understanding of contemporary democracy is not possible without an explanation of the social and political thoughts, since well since of the patterns of material growth in the economic and productive spheres of the communities in which contemporary democracy took birth.

Since one of the ‘feature institutions of modernity’, democracy was the result of intricate and intertwined procedures of ideological, social and economic transform. In Britain, this transform was signaled through the Industrial Revolution that began in the transitional of the eighteenth century, while in France and America it was launched through the political revolutions in the last quarter of that similar century.

Britain is conventionally regarded since the first contemporary democracy because, in the aftermath of the Civil War (1640-1649), royal absolutism was brought to an end, and powers were transferred from the crown to the two Houses of Parliament, of which one, the House of Commons, was an elected chamber. However the franchise sustained to be highly restricted—based on ownership of

property—manage of the executive had effectively passed to a loose coalition of the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, such that political clash was henceforth peacefully mannered flanked by competing elites. It was only in the nineteenth century that the expansion of the suffrage took lay, beginning with the enfranchisement of the upper transitional classes in the Reform Act of 1832.

This was followed through the gradual extension of the franchise to the working classes, mainly since a response to the pressure of political struggles through the working-class and radical movements like Chartism. Through the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and three Reform Acts later, in relation to the two-thirds of the male population stood enfranchised. It was, however, not until 1929 that women secured the right to vote, and universal adult suffrage was only fully achieved in 1948, when plural voting was abolished in favor of the principle of one-person one-vote.

Since in Britain, therefore also in France, the attainment of universal adult suffrage was not completed until 1946. The rather more radical custom of democracy in France was inaugurated through the French Revolution of 1789, with its stirring call of Liberty-Equality- Fraternity. The principle of popular sovereignty was crucial to the deliberations of the National Assembly. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen proclaimed the following individual rights since the natural and imprescriptibly entitlements not merely of French citizens, but of ‘mankind’ at big: in the middle of others, the rights of personal liberty, freedom of idea and religion, security of property and political equality.

However the Revolution proclaimed an end to both the feudal economy and two centuries of royal absolutist rule, republican democracy in France suffered several reverses. The revolutionary constitution of 1791 recognized something akin to universal male suffrage (however the philosopher Condorcet and few others advocated the extension of the franchise to women, this was seen since quite contrary to public opinion), and even the property requirement for the right to vote was low sufficient to exclude only domestic servants, vagrants and beggars. Therefore, four million male citizens won the right to vote in 1791, but four years later, more restrictive property necessities were introduced, bringing down the number of voters to presently 100,000 wealthy taxpayers. Universal male suffrage was reintroduced only after the revolution of 1848.

In the United States of America, too, the advance of democracy in the aftermath of the Civil War was restricted to white men, and the enfranchisement of women, since also of indigenous and black people was not achieved until the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the Declaration of Independence (1776) was the document that simultaneously affected the legal making of the United States of America, and that of democracy in that country. However slavery sustained to be practiced until the mid-nineteenth century, the American Revolution did give the contemporary world its first democratic government and community. Hereditary authority—of monarchy and aristocracy similar—were overthrown since republican government, in which all citizens were at least notionally equal, was put in lay.

A significant institutional mechanism of the isolation of powers flanked by the three branches of government—the executive, the legislature and the judiciary—was also effected, creation it hard for any one branch to exercise arbitrary or untrammelled authority. The ideological importance of these early—albeit limited—victories of democracy cannot be underestimated. It has been argued that the foundations of democratic thoughts had been prepared through the implicit egalitarianism of the Reformation. However the Reformation was often—since in Britain and Germany, for example—accepted by through absolute monarchical authority, Protestantism nevertheless had the extensive-word effect of creating religious minorities, and so providing the grounds for doctrines of religious toleration to be articulated.

The idea that God spoke directly to individuals, without the mediation of priests, also made possible and legitimate the questioning of political power. The political thoughts of the Levellers, John Locke and Tom Paine, and documents like the French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789), and the American Declaration of Independence (1776), expressed the significant thoughts and principles that have underpinned democracy in the contemporary world. These scripts and documents are also often seen since charters of liberalism, and liberalism was indeed a significant handmaiden of democracy at this time. This is why it is not surprising that the beginnings of democratic theory are distinguished through a strong emphasis on the concept of liberty, rather than the concept of excellence with which it later came to be recognized.

Since their name indicates, the Levellers in seventeenth century England advanced a radical conception of popular sovereignty and civil liberties. Interrogating property ownership since the foundation for political rights, they advocated an almost universal male suffrage, however—echoing ancient Athens—servants and criminals, separately from women, were to be excluded. John Locke's *Second Treatise on Government* (1681) is a significant source-book of classical liberal thoughts.

In this job, Locke presents an explanation of a hypothetical state of nature, governed through a Law of Nature, which mandates that no individual ought to harm another in life, health, liberty or resources. The natural excellence of men—stemming not from any excellence of endowment in words of virtue or quality, but from the information that they are all equally creatures of God—gives them the equal right to freedom. However this state of nature is governed through a Law of Nature that endorses these rights, there is no agency to administer and enforce this law.

So, to prevent others from invading their rights or to exact retribution for such invasions, men will enforce the law since *they* interpret it. In a state of nature that is mainly characterized through peace and mutual assistance, the absence of such an agency contains endless possibilities for clash, and these are the chief inconveniences of the state of nature, which is so transcended by a social contract. This social contract, founded in the consent of every individual, is the foundation of legitimate government. Civil law necessity now conforms to the eternal rule that is natural law, and hence the purpose of political community and of government is the preservation of the life, liberty and property

of individuals. If the government fails to discharge the purposes for which it was created, the people have the right to resist and replace it.

It is this report of the core principles of classical liberalism—individualism, popular sovereignty and limited government—that provided the basis for liberal democracy. These principles were also celebrated in the American Declaration of Independence (1776), which followed Locke in describing since natural and inalienable the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness (the last widely interpreted since an euphemism for property). The sustained exclusion of slaves and women from the category of those who possessed such rights is only one instance of the contradiction flanked by the universalism of liberal principles and the selectivity of liberal practices.

The French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789) reflected the republican spirit of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in idealizing citizenship through presenting individuals since public-spirited members of a society. For Rousseau, however, representative government basically was not good sufficient, and the only shape of free government was direct democracy in which citizens would participate directly. Of course, Rousseau was aware that gross inequalities of wealth since well since big political societies were obstacles to popular sovereignty, while liberty, welfare and public education in the context of a little city-state provided the ideal circumstances for democracy.

Explaining Democracy and Democratization

However liberal thoughts establish institutional embodiment in democracy, democracy was not basically the result of a fruitful swap flanked by political thoughts and political institutions, confined to the domain of political activity.

We cannot understand the birth of democracy in Europe without little reference to the significant material transformations that were taking lay in these communities. Industrial capitalism created new social classes which questioned the stranglehold of the older elites, whose authority was based entirely in the ownership of land, and demanded a share in political authority.

Gradually, the transitional and working classes also became more vocal and assertive in claiming rights of political participation. These wars required higher stages of technology, the deployment of the industrial authority generated in the community, and more intensive resource (in words of extraction of taxes) and social mobilization through the state. All this gave to contemporary states a greater centrality in the life of their citizens than they had previously enjoyed.

This centrality of the state naturally resulted in greater pressures for controlling the state and distribution in the authority and the possessions that it commanded. The pressures for democratization were surely facilitated through these growths, since they were through the greater literacy, and new shapes of discourse and transport that made political institution possible for clusters that had, in the past, been ruled, without actually participating in ruling. Few historians have suggested that these procedures of democratization took lay in the course of ‘the extensive nineteenth

century', the era from 1760 to 1919, beginning with the Industrial Revolution and ending with the First World War.

At the inception of this era, there were no democracies, but through its end mainly Western states had few shape of liberal democracy in operation. In Western communities, capitalist industrialization is widely whispered to have been a powerful impetus to democratization. However, outside of the west, social theorists have several dissimilar explanations for the varied circuits by which democratization occurs, in what sorts of historical conditions, at what stages of material growth, and therefore on. They have tended to search for such historical patterns to explain the nature and even durability of democracy in specific contexts, since also the past and future connection flanked by democracy and growth.

Few scholars, like Barrington Moore, have sought to explain democratization in words of extensive-word procedures of historical transform, especially the changing buildings of authority. Why, Moore asked, did England and France move towards liberal-democracy, while Japan and Germany turned to fascism, Russia and China to communism and India proceeded in an altogether dissimilar direction. His answer was that the circuit to liberal democracy generally lies in a general pattern of changing connections flanked by peasants, lords, the urban bourgeoisie and the state.

The signposts on this journey include the following: the investment of the agricultural surplus in industrial development; a turn towards commercial agriculture and so greater freedom for the peasantry; a balance of authority flanked by the state and the landed aristocracy; a dynamic bourgeoisie with its own economic foundation leading a revolutionary break from the past; and therefore on. Other scholars, also searching for a structural account for democratization, have argued that procedures of democratization are powerfully formed through *class authority*, *state authority* and *transnational authority*. They emphasize the changing dynamics of class authority in relation to the building and shape of state authority, and the context of both these in transnational authority, taking several diverse shapes such since imperialism or economic/military dependence. Patterns of economic growth therefore effect significant transforms in the nature of class forces and class divisions, and both these interact with the state and political institutions to redefine community and politics.

In addition, the nature of civil community, the political civilization of a community, and international factors (ranging from aid to war) are also helpful in accounting for patterns of democratization. On the entire, while relative studies can give few illumination, it is futile beyond a point to search for a single account that can explanation for the emergence (or not) of democracy in any given country at any point in the history of the last two centuries. There is tremendous difference, crossways both time and legroom, in the shapes of democracy that have evolved in dissimilar sections of the world, and no one account—however comprehensive—can explain them all.

This is why, however the development of democracy in Europe and the United States by the nineteenth century is generally treated since the exemplar of democratization, the experience of post-colonial democratization in Latin America and Asia, and of post- Communist democratization in Eastern Europe, has raised questions in relation to the circumstances under which democratic institutions take root in few countries but not in others. This is also why it is hard to set up uniform averages for judging or comparing the nature and extent of democracy since establish in the dissimilar states which claim or have historically claimed the label of democracy. The ‘real world of democracy’, since the political theorist C.B. MacPherson famously described it, has been populated through several variants of democracy: from bourgeois democracy to socialist and even communist adaptations, each of which has insisted that *its* shape of democracy is the truest and mainly genuine. The eagerness with which the title of democracy is claimed points, in information, to the unparalleled legitimacy that this shape of government has approach to enjoy in the contemporary world. Since a corollary, it is significant to note that it has now approach to be established that the link flanked by liberalism and democracy is not a necessary one. Liberal-democracy may be seen since a historically specific shape of democracy, based on a culturally specific theory of individuation.

It combines liberalism since a theory of the state with democracy since a shape of government. Since such, for communities which attach greater significance to the society than to the individual, the democratic section of liberal-democracy (such since free elections and freedom of speech) is more universalizable than its liberal component. It has, therefore, become possible today to speak not only of dissimilar paths to democracy, but also of dissimilar methods of being democratic, or even being ‘differently democratic’. Despite these limitations, it is true that the twentieth century saw an unparalleled extension of democracy in words of both its *inclusiveness* since well since its *spatial expansion*.

Beginning with the extension of the suffrage to women in the older western democracies, and ending with the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa, democracy in the twentieth century surely became more inclusive. The provenance of democracy also increased in spatial words, since—following decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s—it was eagerly adopted through mainly of the new nations of Asia and Africa. Several of these new laboratories of democracy did not control to sustain it, and in the 1990s the procedure of democratization met new challenges in post-Communist Eastern Europe.

It is clear, then, that the history of democracy has through no means been an uninterrupted, smooth or even procedure. It has been marked through successes and reversals within scrupulous democratic communities, but it has also varied crossways countries and continents. This is also true of the arguments of the critics of democracy.

Democracy and its Critics

Democracy has had its fair share of critics and even enemies in the contemporary world, no less than in ancient Greece. If the Athenians of the ancient world feared democracy since potential monocacy, the 19th century English political philosopher John Stuart Mill expressed his fear of the tyranny of the majority, which he equated with ignorance and a lack of education.

Mill's anxiety was that democracy would mean the dominance of mediocre public opinion, elbowing out dissent and creative thoughts. Nevertheless, Mill significantly improved upon his intellectual inheritance of Utilitarianism through his impassioned defense of liberty and through his insistence on several welfare events for the working classes. This gives him a special location in the liberal custom, since the forerunner of social-democracy and the principles of the welfare-state. The socialist critique of democracy has its origins in the scripts of Karl Marx whose attitude to democracy was somewhat ambivalent.

Even since he viewed bourgeois democracy since inherently flawed, on explanation of its class character, Marx nevertheless endorsed the battle for democracy since a significant stepping-stone on the journey of the proletariat towards revolutionary transform. In the Soviet Union, however, democracy was characterized since a handmaiden of capitalism, which could not be used to realize, by peaceful means, the ascendancy of the working class. In the middle of the mainly significant critics of democracy were the elite theorists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca, whose thoughts struck a sympathetic chord in Mussolini's fascist politics. For Mosca, all talk of democracy was ideological hogwash, because the reality was that, during history, community had always been divided flanked by elites—a minority of the population which had taken the biggest decisions in community- and the size of the people.

The dominant minority, the ruling class, was beyond managing of the majority or the size, which the elite theorists viewed since atomized, ignorant, politically incompetent and incapable of concerted dynamic political activity. In the mid-twentieth century, this argument was taken forward in the 'realist' explanation of Joseph Schumpeter who said that the classical, eighteenth century definition of democracy (since an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions through creation the people decide issues by the election of legislators to carry out their will) was flawed because the people were ignorant, irrational and apathetic, and so the principle of popular sovereignty was meaningless. In a democracy, said Schumpeter, there necessity is recognition of the basic information of leadership. The role of the people should be restricted to choosing their rulers by competitive elections, and thereafter leaving them to govern.

This redefinition changed the purpose and the essence of democracy from that of vesting decision-creation authority in the electorate, to that of merely selecting representatives. The normative force of the democratic ideal was therefore undermined. Nevertheless, the equalizing thrust of democratic institutions seems to have persisted. At least few of the anxieties of nineteenth century observers,

that democracy would have an alarming impact in words of revising social rankings and undercutting the authority of hereditary elites, proved to be true. At the similar time, however, democracy proved to have a sure authority of containment of social divisions, to the extent that it provided peaceful avenues of political competition and prevented social inequalities from acquiring an explosive or violent shape.

Modern Challenges to Democracy

In the middle of the significant challenges to democracy at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the following may be recognized:

- Growth
- Varieties
- Gender
- Globalization

Growth

However several scholars have tried to set up a correlation flanked by democracy and growth, through exploring the extent to which democracy furthers or inhibits growth, there is no conclusive proof concerning the connection flanked by these? The slow pace of growth in India is sometimes attributed to its adoption of democracy, while the developmental successes of the East Asian economies are attributed to their lack of democracy.

However, the relative studies undertaken through scholars present mixed results and do not conclusively set up either that democracy inhibits growth or that it facilitates it. Backdrop historical circumstances, the nature of economy and community, significantly affect developmental outcomes. Logically, to the extent that people have the right to create claims upon the state and to insist that the state is responsive to requires, democracy is potentially a powerful weapon against poverty and deprivation. If the poor in developing democratic communities have failed to exploit this weapon effectively, this should be blamed not on democracy per se, but attributed to the concentration of economic and social authority that predisposes the state to act in methods that are biased in favor of dominant classes and social forces.

Further, conventional notions of growth (equated with economic development) are today being fundamentally challenged and questioned, mainly famously in the human growth perspective of noted economist Amartya Sen. Sen has drawn attention to the importance of providing people with economic entitlements and social opportunity buildings, therefore that they may enlarge their human capabilities and enhance their skill to determine their own life-plans. Therefore defined, growth

should create political participation more meaningful, even since democracy gives channels by which people can press their claims for growth upon the state.

Varieties

Till the transitional of the 20th century, classical democratic theory was ambivalent on the question of cultural varieties. The first significant challenge of pluralism in a liberal polity was the civil rights movement in the United States. More recently, immigrant populations in Europe, since well since indigenous people in Australia, Canada and the United States, have demanded cultural recognition and society rights.

These claims have pointed to a significant gap in democratic theory which makes a virtue of its commitment to individual equality, but remnants blind to varieties, and therefore does not sufficiently respect cultural plurality. This can mean that minority clusters, defined in words of their distinctive cultural or racial or ethnic identity, will suffer. Individual members of such clusters may be formally entitled to equal rights in the polity, but social prejudice and lack of equal opportunity may render them less than equal. In such conditions, the neutrality of democratic theory becomes a problem, since it prevents special thought from being given to those citizens whose formal excellence is undermined through the disadvantages and prejudices that they are subject to through virtue of their cultural identity.

Hence, the state necessity moves beyond mere tolerance, which is essentially a negative value, to affirm the value of multiculturalism. This challenge has also been hard to accommodate because classical democratic theory has envisaged the individual, and the individual alone, since the legitimate bearer or subject of rights. Within such theory, it has been closing to-impossible to conceive of clusters since the bearers of rights. In recent years, the communitarian critics of liberalism have argued that individuals are not the autonomous pre-social creatures that liberal theory makes them out to be. Rather, they are shaped and constituted through the customs and societies in which they are situated. Hence, minority's necessity is given cluster rights in order that their civilizations may be protected from assimilation through the dominant civilization.

Gender

It is notable that, even in Europe, the house of liberal-democratic theory, the granting of the suffrage to women has been a slow procedure. Switzerland gave women the right to vote since recently since 1971. Even today, women in Kuwait do not possess this right. In several countries where they do possess democratic political rights, women continue to lack political and economic authority. In 1993, it was estimated that women owned only 1 percent of the world's property and earned 10 percent of world income.

In national legislatures, they reported for presently 10 percent. Early feminists like Mary Wollstonecraft had invoked essentially liberal notions of excellence and universal individual rights to buttress the claim of women to equal rights of citizenship. Today, approximately a century after female suffrage was first granted, it is clear that franchise alone had a limited potential to change women's lives, leading 'second-wave' feminists to question the evident gender-neutrality of the liberal conception of the individual citizen.

There are two significant characteristics of the feminist challenge to democracy. Firstly, feminist arguments have pointed to the male-centered character of democratic theory and institutions. The customary division flanked by the private and the public realm, feminists argue, tends to relegate women to the private sphere characterized through subordination to patriarchal authority and lack of freedom, while democracy is restricted to the essentially male-oriented public sphere. Despite ostensibly universal and gender-neutral categories of citizenship, women have sustained to suffer subordination and exclusion, both within and outside the family. The availability of rights is further severely compromised for those belonging to subordinate social clusters (e.g., racial or religious or linguistic minorities or lower castes in India), and especially therefore for women belonging to these clusters. Even in their mainly minimal and negative conception, rights are frequently not accessible to big numbers of women.

Let alone the right to create meaningful choices in relation to the one's life in accordance with one's conception of self-realization, vital civil and political liberties are routinely denied or severely constrained. These include, variously, the free exercise of the right to franchise, freedom of association and movement, the right to be elected, reproductive rights, etc.

This is why feminists have sought, secondly, to 'engender' democracy, through providing for greater participation for women in political procedures, if require be through quota-based reservations in political parties or legislatures. The case for quotas is often justified through an appeal to Anne Phillips' argument that a *politics of thoughts* (political choice flanked by the policies and programs of political parties, rather than on the foundation of cluster concerns and interests) does not ensure adequate policy concern for clusters which are marginalized or excluded. This suggests the importance of a *politics of attendance*, in which women, ethnic minorities and other likewise excluded clusters are guaranteed fair representation. In this method, feminists have attempted to rework the theory of democratic representation.

Globalization

The institutions of democracy since we have recognized it are inextricably connected to the idea of the sovereign and territorially defined contemporary nation-state. Therefore are its principles and practices, whether these pertain to the nature of citizenship or the idea of self-governance by consent

and representation. Therefore, a democratic political society is assumed to be one whose borders are coterminous with those of a territorial nation-state.

To the extent that it entails transcending national borders, globalization is increasingly changing all this. Globalization, since we know, increases the intensity of transnational flows of deal, fund, capital, technology, fact and even civilization. In therefore doing, it makes it hard for democratic governments—particularly in the countries of the South—to manage their own affairs internally and in a self-contained method. The new institutions of global governance, such since the International Monetary Fund or the World Deal Institution, perform regulatory functions but are not themselves organized in methods that are democratic or accountable.

On the contrary, they reflect and reinforce the asymmetries of global authority dealings. However, even since the forces of global capital and global institutional authority lay limits on democracy since it is practiced within nation-states, globalization and the fact flows made possible through it do have a sure democratizing potential too. One of the mainly striking instances of this is the phenomenon described ‘global civil community’, a word that defines the institutions, associations and movements which cut crossways national boundaries, and generate new kinds of political solidarities approximately issues of environmental degradation, or women’s oppression, or human rights.

Of course, these movements and institutions are often criticized because they are themselves unaccountable. Another shape of supranational democracy and citizenship is establish in the making of local institutions like the European Union, which seek to advance models of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ beyond the nation-state. Cosmopolitan democrats consider that the period of the sovereign state is coming to an end, and there are transformative possibilities in globalization and regionalization which can lead us towards greater and more substantive democratization. Therefore, while several people consider that the nation-state is the mainly appropriate location for the practice of democracy, there are others who argue that as the practice of authority in the world is being rapidly transformed, the mechanisms of democracy have also to be provisioned and perhaps redesigned.

MODERN STATE AND WELFARE

The Welfare State

One of the defining aspects of the contemporary state is seen in the responsibility it takes for the welfare of its citizens. The state regulates social and economic dealings to ensure the well being of its entire people. This transform from a time when charity and relief provided through the family, society or Church to social welfare is seen since the procedure through which the contemporary

Western European State has progressed and this history is inextricably connected with the making of a contemporary sensibility.

In the pre-modern era, it is argued, the individual could only appeal to the Church or religious clusters, family or the society when faced with poverty or illness and the reasons of poverty were often seen either in fate or in individual failure. Societies or individuals in distress could then appeal to the charity or benevolence of the rulers or that of their family or society. Industrialization brought with it economic development but also the development of urban centers where a rising class of people existed at existence stages.

The contemporary state began to tackle the social troubles that arose out of this by events that grew in coverage both out of a strong sense of humanitarian concern since well since because of a fear of social unrest. This body of legislation urbanized the welfare state where not presently the poor but all citizens were entitled to a variety of social benefits such since a minimum wage, access to public health organizations and schemes were recognized for social insurance such since old age pensions, or unemployment benefits. The state moved from moral exhortation to providing assistance to help the disadvantaged and since it did therefore it took positive steps to reduce income disparities by taxation and special schemes to benefit those who were economically or socially disadvantaged.

How does this procedure take lay? Is it a natural progression since communities modernize and develop? What underlies this humanitarian concern? Few historians would explain disinterested reform since serving class interests therefore that the ascendancy of a new class led people to think in words of social legislation. Is there a convergence therefore that all communities gradually emulate the experience of the European states? The European experience has become the norm against which to measure the progress of all states but it can be argued that the history and customs of a country can act since equally significant powers on the form and character of welfare policies and the philosophy that underlies them.

Modern debates in relation to the entitlements and welfare policies both in the United States and Western Europe since well since in India and other developing countries have been sharp and acrimonious criticizing state assistance for removing incentives for job since well since for placing an intolerable burden on the state exchequer. Critics have also seen help to the disadvantaged since a shape of 'reverse discrimination'.

These debates highlight the dissimilar come that countries have followed and an examination of the history of social legislation will allow us to understand that there is not one ideal organization to which all countries have to aspire to emulate. An examination of English and German social legislation illustrates the differing approaches and objectives that the two countries had therefore that even when we talk of the West it is significant to bear in mind the varieties that this term often hides. The history of social legislation in Japan illustrates how a non-Western community that urbanized within the era of Western dominance was able to develop a welfare organization that owed since

much to the new doctrines and thoughts coming from the West since to its own historical customs. Through considering both Western and non-Western countries it will be possible to see the intricate strands that have contributed to shaping the nature of welfare in the contemporary world.

From Charity to Welfare: The English Experience

England was the first European country to approach under the spell of industrialization. Since a consequence, it took the lead in contemporary institutions like democracy and a contemporary representative state organization: England also had an extensive custom of charity. These characteristics placed England at the centre of any debate on welfare state. In this part as suggested, seem at the English experience of charity and welfare.

Elizabethan Poor Laws

The European experience has been heavily convinced through the experience of Britain which has had an extensive history of public assistance to the poor and private charity. The poor were in earlier times wards of the Church but through Elizabethan era in the sixteenth century laws were enacted to set up a national organization of relief that provided legal and compulsory help to the poor. The Poor Laws were codified in 1597-1598 and reenacted in 1601 and under these laws the parish became the vital part of management to control relief job.

A compulsory tax was imposed on each household and this money was used to give relief to the aged, the infirm but not the 'sturdy beggar'. The able-bodied poor were punished. Social reformers and social legislation was concerned with discouraging dependence on charity that would lead to idleness. They did this by forced job or punishments such since whipping. The principle that the poor laws were based on was 'job for those that will labour, punishment for those that will not, and bread for those who cannot.' In economic idea the idle poor also represented an intolerable drain on the wealth of the nation and consequently several schemes were devised to put them to job. Reformers wrote in relation to the workhouses and labour camps and the condition in the workhouses were intended to be worse than outside. Section of the concern in relation to the drain of wealth was due to the expenditure on relief jobs which rose to astronomical heights from £665,000 in 1685 to £900,000 in 1701 and through 1711 it was in excess of £2 million and that for a population of 6 million! It was this backdrop that put England distant ahead of the other European states in its concern and policies for the poor.

Several travelers were impressed and wrote glowingly of these polices. Benjamin Franklin came to England in 1766 and praised the method England looked after her poor but he also raised the question that was much debated in modern England, and which continues to evoke a debate even today. He wrote, "There is no country in the world where therefore several provisions are recognized for them; hospitals, almshouses, a tax for the support of the poor...In short, you offered a premium

for the encouragement of idleness, and you should not now wonder that it has had its effect in the increase of poverty. Alexis de Tocqueville, a French scholar visited England in 1833 and wrote a *Memoir on Pauperism* (1835) where he wrote “with indescribable astonishment...one-sixth of the occupants of this flourishing kingdom live at the expense of public charity”.

He was astonished because he saw England since a urbanized, wealthy country, the extremely “Eden of contemporary civilization” and noted that other European countries were poorer and the poor in England rich compared to the European poor but English poverty was of a dissimilar kind. This poverty amidst plenty had nothing to do with existence but for the English “the lack of a multitude of items reasons poverty”. This was, he wrote, also accompanied through a commitment to alleviate poverty for ‘community considers itself bound to approach to the aid of those who lack them. These transforms brought in relation to the more reasoned and systematic shape of social activity to mitigate poverty. It transformed what was private charity oven out of a moral duty into a legal obligation. Like Franklin before him Tocqueville noted that the guarantee of the means of existence removes the stimulus to job and will promote idleness.

Tocqueville, since a result, came out openly in defense of private charity. Public charity, through marking the recipient since a pauper, he wrote, stigmatizes the recipient since well since creates incentives for idleness. The poor had to write their names in poor rolls and Tocqueville establish this to be, “a notarized manifestation of misery, of weakness, of misconduct on the section of the recipient.”

Poverty and Charity: Differing Perspectives

Economic growth since well since social dislocation marked the capitalist transformation of the world flanked by 1750-1850. In this situation thoughts in relation to the relief and charity also began to transform. The reform sentiment that gathered momentum throughout this era affected a range of social policies but possibly the movement against slavery was the mainly dramatic of these. Electoral reforms allowed greater participation and in turn parliament was made more sensitive to popular opinion and became the vehicle for realizing social legislation.

The reforms of 1834 set up a Central Poor Commission to supervise the management of poor relief that had become inefficient and corrupt. The able-bodied poor were kept out of relief organization by the workhouse test as circumstances in the workhouse were always harsher than outside. Yet these reforms did set up an organization that accepted social legislation further through regulating hours and circumstances of job in factories and mines. Concern for public health had become particularly necessary because of the cholera epidemics of 1831-3 and 1847-8 but the untiring attempts of Edwin Chadwick were equally significant for a bigger institution of urban life. An Act of 1848 recognized a central board of health on the rows of the Poor Law Commissioners that had the authority to set up regional boards.

Other Acts enforced regulations governing education, prison circumstances, and working circumstances for children and women. The New Poor Laws gave rise to intense debates that centre approximately a distinction flanked by the poor and the pauper. The laws it was argued was 'pauperizing the poor'. This was because the laws gave an allowance to the poor. The finances for this allowance were generated by extra rates levied on tax payers. It was argued that not only did this job since a disincentive to job but it drove wages down, led to a fall in productivity, and was a burden on those who paid the extra rates but did not benefit from it. Because of this burden these people were driven to swell the ranks of unemployed agricultural labour.

The question of who are the poor was central too much of the debates and proposals for social legislation. At the end of the eighteenth century Edmund Burke had objected to the phrase 'laboring poor' arguing that there were 'laboring poor' who worked for their existence and the 'poor' who were the sick, infirm, or those orphaned in their infancy or incapacitated through old age. The Church had given alms regardless of whether the recipient labored or not since did the Elizabethan poor laws. Malthus argued against the idea that an expanding industrial economy would produce enough wealth to give for the 'happiness and comfort of the lower orders of community'.

Industrial development would lead to a development in population but agricultural manufacture would not raise leading to a worsening of circumstances for those struggling for existence. Any relief given to these paupers would increase their population and consequently worsen the situation since there would be a decrease in food accessible for the whole poor population. The only method to break out of this vicious cycle was by the exercise of 'moral restraint'. It was this kind of thinking that supported and continued programs of social amelioration and created a division in the middle of social reformers. It was this thinking and these debates that are reflected in Disraeli's comment that in England now "Poverty is a crime" or in Thomas Carlyle's report that these laws put a 'bounty on unthrift, idleness, and beer drinking.'

The debates however, also had a positive effect since they shifted concerns from poverty narrowly defined to superior issues of the obligations of state and community, of the reasons of social inequality, the foundation of law and obligation. Thinkers such since Karl Marx and Friedrich Engles argued that inequities in the organization could only be changed by revolutionary transform that would give the full value of his labour to the worker, others sought to return to the old society based organizations that had disintegrated and few others sought to bring in relation to the legal restrictions that would regulate factory job, public health and mitigate the effects of early industrialization. Since the common condition of the working class began to improve the stigma attached to poverty began to transform and disappear. It was now narrowly focused on the urban vagrant whom Henry Mayhew characterized since the 'peculiar poor' marked through a 'distinctive moral physiognomy'.

This differentiation of the poor was taken further through Charles Booth who by cautious household surveys, (published since *Life and Labour of the People of London* flanked by 1889-1903 in 14

volumes) made a distinction flanked by the extremely poor (paupers, street folk) and the comfortable working class. He drew a poverty row and laid the foundation for providing social legislation to help this category of deserving poor and they benefited from subsequent legislation such since the Old Age Pensions Act of 1898 or the National Insurance Act of 1911.

Relief to Services: Transform to Welfare

Poverty and its relief were now transformed into a social problem that required a dissimilar come. It was no longer a matter of providing relief but services and these not presently to a scrupulous cluster of people but to all citizens. Moreover, these were not the bare minimum required but would soon be set at what the 1945 Labour Party manifesto described the 'optimum average'.

Comprehensive social legislation was made a reality with the Liberal party in 1905 under the leadership of the younger generations of liberals, Herbert Asquith, David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill and the pressure of deal unions. They were committed to waging a war against misery and squalor. Under their leadership an impressive array of legislation was enacted: Workers Compensation Act (1906), Old Age Pension Laws (1908), Deal Board Acts (1909) that was empowered to set up special commissions to fix a minimum wage for workers.

The National Insurance Act (1911) which was a contributory scheme for all workers was modeled on Bismarck's scheme of 1883-9 and made friendly communities and deal unions 'approved communities' to administer the scheme reflecting the cooperation flanked by state and voluntary bodies. Likewise events for city scheduling were convinced through German laws and the Education Act of 1902 was an effort to catch up with the German and French organizations that were distant more advanced. The Liberals also enacted laws to clear slums and build proper houses for the poor in 1909. This aside from improving livelihood circumstances also fuelled a construction boom in the coming years.

Lloyd George's proposed budget of 1909 which was defeated in the House of Lords was written reflecting this new philosophy of welfare. He provided for an increase in income tax since well since a super tax on the incomes of the rich. He proposed to confiscate 20 per cent from unearned increment of land values since well since levied a heavy tax on undeveloped land. These revenues were to be used for old age pensions since well since other shapes of social insurance. They would also go towards changing the social building through breaking the monopoly of the rich nobility. There were several large landowners in the middle of the nobility, for example the Duke of Westminster owned in excess of 600 acres in London at this time. However defeated the Liberals supervised to enact several of these events when they came back to authority in 1910.

The post war years convinced through the economic crisis and unemployment before the war and this sense of crisis throughout the war fuelled the resurgence of left wing movements all in excess of Europe. People increasingly demanded that the state had an obligation to close the well being of its

citizens. In 1942 Sir William Beveridge's Statement on Social Insurance and Allied Services (1942) laid out a practical plan for a comprehensive public defense of the individual. It was on the foundation of this that the Labour government of 1945 enacted laws that ended the old poor law organization and created a social security organization that brought jointly earlier elements since well since allowed for voluntary schemes since well. Education had been reorganized by the Butler Act of 1944 and in 1945 an organization of family allowances was started.

Social Legislation for Social Manage: Germany under Bismarck

In Europe Germany presents an instance where a dissimilar philosophy helped to determine the nature of the welfare organization. Poor relief had traditionally been left to the communes but in Prussia systematic attempts were made to give relief for the poor. In the Rhine provinces an unsuccessful effort had been made in 1824 to restrict working hours of children in factories. They became more concerned when they realized that these provinces were not contributing their full quota of troops because of physical troubles in the population.

The powers to manage industry had been taken absent from the guild but after the transitional of the century they were given the function of social insurance. An organization of state sponsored education was also urbanized. Germany under the leadership of Otto von Bismarck was the first country to adopt comprehensive social legislation. Bismarck was motivated through a political vision glorifying the nation and an economic vision that stressed national self-sufficiency and paternalism. He also sought to counter the threat posed through the demands of a socialist movement. In the Reichstag he stated clearly that the purpose of enacting legislation to give insurance against sickness and old age to workers was therefore that 'these gentlemen will sound their bird call in vain. The workers health was significant to the nation because the worker was also the soldier that protected the state.

The duty of the State, according to Bismarck was to regulate all characteristics of life in the national interest. To create the nation strong it was necessary to help the weaker citizens. The logic of the Bismarckian view can be traced to the transforms brought in relation to the throughout the French Revolution when the levee en masse or universal conscription was introduced in August 1793 and then sustained in the Law of Conscription 1798. The state now had the right to call up all its citizens to defend it. Now wars became conflicts flanked by nations therefore that in democratic communities presently since the state could call up all its citizens to defend it, it became the duty of the state to seem after the welfare of its people.

The scope of the revolutionary government in France reflected this new connection since it accepted out policies to improve and assist its people even abolishing slavery in the colonies. Since David Thompson writes, "This relationship flanked by the requirements of warfare and the growth of welfare was to remain consistent during subsequent European history." Bismarck's motives have

been debated and it has been noted that he never mentioned social legislation in his memoirs. However, that is not a reliable guide because even since Minister President of Prussia in 1862-63 he had begun to think of insurance plans for workers therefore that the subsequent legislation he initiated grew out of this earlier thinking. Certainly Bismarck tried difficult to eradicate socialism, presently since difficult since he tried to manage the Catholic Church, since a force in German political life.

The anti-Socialist law of 1878 however failed to curb the development of socialism and was allowed to lapse in 1890. The German welfare organization codified earlier voluntary behaviors through guilds, parishes and benefit communities by laws passed flanked by 1883 and 1889, sought to give insurance for urban workers against sickness, accident and troubles of old age. These were further extended in 1911 to non-industrial workers such since agricultural workers and domestic servants therefore that in 1913 approximately fourteen and a half million people were insured. In information the German welfare organization provided the mainly comprehensive defense to workers in all of Europe and became a model that several copied.

State Preserving Policies: Combating Socialism by Legislation

Throughout 1883-84 Germany enacted social legislation that provided for factory inspection, limited the employment of women and children, fixed minimum hours of job, recognized public employment agencies and insured workers for their old age. Except for unemployment insurance Germany under Bismarck had adopted all the elements of welfare legislation.

These events were adopted because since the Emperor stated in the Reichstag in February 1879, while introducing the anti-socialist law of 21 October, 1878 that this House would not refuse its cooperation to the remedying of social ills through means of legislation. A remedy cannot alone be sought in the repression of socialist excesses; there necessity is simultaneously the positive advancement of the welfare of the working class. And here the care of those workpeople that are incapable of earning their living is of the first importance. The report added to the Accident Insurance Bill, March 1881 explained the motives of the legislation in clear words that the state: should interest itself to greater degree than hitherto in those of its members who require assistance, is not only a duty of and Christianity—through which state institutions should be permeated—but a duty of state-preserving policy, whose aim should be to cultivate the conception—and that, too, amongst non-propertied classes, which shape at once the mainly numerous and the least instructed section of the population—that the state is not merely a necessary but a beneficent institution.

These classes necessity, through the apparent and direct advantages which are secured to them through legislative events, be led to regard the state not since an institution contrived for the defense of the bigger classes of community, but since one serving their own requires and interests. In Europe other countries also followed this path to cope with the democratization of politics. France enacted a

law to regulate the employment of women and children and it fixed ten hours a day since the maximum for all workers. Working hours were further reduced in 1905. Other laws instituted free medical services, defense to labour unions and compensation for job related injuries from the employers and finally in 1910 an old age pension organization. The Italian government also passed same laws; except for it did not give free medical services however it encouraged co-operative stores and provided nationalized life insurance.

From Benevolence to Society Centered Welfare: The Case of Japan

Unlike these polices that were marked through obligatory help on a extensive word foundation in pre-contemporary Japan thoughts of welfare were based on an ideology of benevolent rule where the ruler helped to mitigate the suffering of his people by timely help. To demonstrate his compassion and re-assert his moral power the ruler would give relief. Relief generally followed bad harvests and often massive sums were used to purchase rice that was distributed to the people. Through the early nineteenth century such aid was complemented through construction projects that provided job. The nature of this relief was grounded in a hierarchical connection flanked by the lord and his people but this was also reinforced through the demands of political continuity.

Peasants hit through famine posed a threat to social and political continuity therefore benevolence became a basic political instrument. The rulers saw the political must of ameliorating the effects of disaster but their benevolence was not unlimited. The people who could be helped were limited to those who had no one to turn to such since orphans and the destitute. It was not meant for the able-bodied for whom moral exhortations to be diligent and thrifty were the favored panacea. Relief events were accepted out mostly by the family and the society.

As taxes were paid collectively the richer families were motivated to help the weaker and poorer. However, the authorities, domain or central actively encouraged and helped to set up institutions to give help in calamitous times. In few domains granaries were set up in villages to give rice throughout emergencies and charity was encouraged through official commendation.

Taking Care of the Urban Poor: Prosperous Merchants and Charity

Pre-contemporary Japan had a high proportion of its population livelihood in urban centers. The capital Edo (now described Tokyo) had in excess of a million people at its height and Kyoto and Osaka a population of almost half a million each and there were in excess of dozen big castle cities. These urban centers attracted people from the countryside and inevitably a class of vagabonds and those with no fixed job grew. The municipalities mostly administered directly through the Shogunate set up relief shelters in the mid-seventeenth century.

These provided temporary help after which the people were sent back to their villages. These gradually became permanent facilities through the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. In

the late eighteenth century a kind of workhouse was started in Edo where the aim was to help those without a criminal backdrop to learn new skills and become gainfully employed. This was in section a reaction to famine since well since urban riots. The inmates were also given a course of practical ethics to ensure that they were provided the suitable moral foundation to develop their lives. Beside with this a fund was created for providing temporary relief throughout emergencies since well since on-going help for the aged, children and the ill without comparatives.

The level of the help provided can be gauged from the information that in 1805 in relation to the 4 out of 1,000 townspeople in Edo received help. This relief organization was continued through a special tax and supervised through prosperous merchants. This was then compared to Shogunal benevolence a more public and continued relief organization than the events practiced in the villages that tended to trade with specific emergencies.

Confucian Piety and Self-Help: The Thoughts of Ninomiya Sontoku

The growth of such institutions was accompanied through thoughts in relation to the how to tackle poverty and give aid to the downtrodden, poor and destitute. Ninomiya Sontoku (1787-1856) was the mainly well-known of the philosophers coming out of a wealthy cultivation family who advocated self-help. He and other reformers like him preached Confucian thoughts of filial piety and diligence but they did not see the social order since static. They argued that even poor peasants through working difficult, being thrifty and improving productivity through by new agricultural ways could improve their lot and become prosperous.

However, it necessity be noted that while promoting self-help they did not see the self since the individual but rather since the society. This led them to be critical of charity since counterproductive and they placed their emphasis on mutual assistance since well since interest free loans. Therefore in 1830 Ninomiya Sontoku wrote, "Grants in money, or release from taxes, will in no method help them in their distress. Indeed, one secret of their salvation lies in withdrawing all monetary help from them. Such help only induces avarice and indolence, and is a fruitful source of dissension in the middle of the people." These were the dissimilar strands that jointly with the new thoughts coming from the West that formed the intellectual and institutional shapes those welfare events would take in the contemporary era. What does emerge is that sure key elements had been clearly formulated and these underlie much of the modern script on the subject.

These elements are that the problem of poverty can only be resolved by the joint attempts of the society and the state, the fear that relief would lead to laziness and dependence on state help and that moral suasion was a significant element in resolving the problem of poverty.

Meiji Welfare Policies: Saving the Samurai or Charity begins at Home

The making of the contemporary state in Japan began after the restoration of 1868 when the Tokugawa Shogunate was overthrown and the Meiji Government recognized. The Meiji government instituted a series of events to set up the institutional building of a contemporary state organization grounded in the belief that it was the responsibility of the state to make a strong and wealthy country. Since in several other regions the idea of welfare was heavily convinced through the earlier notions of giving relief to the needy therefore the government responded to disasters and helped those without support.

The major beneficiaries of state aid through the new Meiji government were the samurai, the erstwhile ruling class that since a class had seen its incomes decline. The government alive to the potential of political disruption instituted a scheme to commute their land rents into government bonds that would enable them to create the transition. Government practices were also convinced through the instances now accessible to them from Europe. Therefore the Agricultural distress fund Law of 1880 which set up reserve finances to give grants or loans to those affected through bad harvests was modeled on regulations in effect in Prussia. Under this law throughout 1881-1886 in excess of three million affected people were helped and another million families received grants.

The success of this was praised in German newspapers of the day but this fund was severely curtailed after 1890 when the state withdrew its contributions. Other clusters of poor who did not constitute a political threat were not therefore generously looked after.

Relief and the Poor: Dangers of Dependence

The Meiji government's centralization policies establish in civic institutions alternative centers of authority that needed to be curtailed. Therefore the fund supervised through the prosperous merchants of Edo was abolished in 1872 despite the huge relief job it had done throughout the turmoil of the Meiji restoration. The vital law that looked after the welfare of the poor was the Relief Regulations of 1874. This law aimed to give little assistance to the poor but because circumstances for giving relief were therefore stringent that actually extremely some received it. In 1876 only 2,521 received it and through 1892 it had gone up to only 18,545 and this despite years of recession and distress.

The idea that state welfare could debilitate the recipient remained extremely strong. Therefore the Home Ministry wrote that 'if the elderly, sick, poor and decrepit grow accustomed to relief, in the end, will not good people lapse into idleness and lose their spirit of independence and, in scrupulous, become reliant on the government.'

Power of Western Thoughts on Japan

Thoughts in relation to the poverty began to be convinced through western scripts where the power of John Malthus Essay on Population gave rise to a massive literature against public assistance programs. In books such as Henry Fawcett's *Pauperism: Its reasons and remedies* it was argued that poverty was due to individual failing and the answer was in self-improvement rather than government assistance. Likewise, Fukuzawa Yukichi, arguably one of the mainly influential Meiji thinkers, argued for a national relief law, on the foundation of England's New Poor Law of 1834 but only if it served to take people off state assistance. This thinking was reflected, in the reduction of public relief through state bodies.

In 1881 the Tokyo Prefectural assembly stopped finances for free medical treatment and the first popularly elected Imperial Diet of 1890 attacked the government's poor relief bill. English liberalism and thoughts of laissez-faire (non-interventionism) helped to buttress government desire to reduce expenditure on poor relief. The government sought to ensure that relief would be supervised by the society and the family and in this the Civil Code of 1898 provided explicit support. In other terms the state intervened to force family and neighbors to aid the poor.

The state worked by private relief attempts in time of emergencies and this policy proved successful because Japan was still mainly an agrarian community. The number of farm households declined gradually till WWII and this meant that family, society and mutual assistance networks sustained to function effectively. The mid-1880's witnessed economic recession and social troubles therefore much therefore that the question of poverty and how to eliminate it became a central focus of discussion and debate. The power of Bismarck's social policies in Germany provided an alternative circuit for few of the leading Japanese thinkers and bureaucracy involved in formulating policy. They argued that it was the responsibility of the State to raise productivity and uphold order and for this the health and well being of its population was an integral element.

Bureaucrats convinced through these thoughts wanted a European approach welfare program in which public assistance and social insurance for workers would be provided. The first effort to vary the Relief Regulations, beside European rows, where central finances would be disbursed by cities was defeated.

Redefining Japanese Welfare: The Variation from Europe

In Japan in 1902 when another effort to propose a poor relief bill was made critics argued that it would encourage indolence, drain possessions and increase the number of poor. A man who represented this new thinking was Inoue Tomoichi, who had made a secure revise of the welfare organizations practiced in Europe and written extensively on them. In his several official locations he was to exercise a great power on policy formation.

Now they began to describe Japanese policy in words of its variation from England, Germany and other European countries. Their concern was how to prevent the rise of poverty that seemed to accompany industrialization and for this they argued that welfare is not a right but an act of mercy through the State and will be given through the central government. The healthy poor will be excluded unlike Europe where there was an on-going relief organization for the healthy and able bodied poor. Here arguments were advanced that Japan was dissimilar from the West because in Japan the family was the significant part rather than the individual.

This was the cause for a low population of poor and helped to stay relief expenditure through the state down since well. They saw England since the prime instance of escalating welfare expenditure. In this they were successful since the number of welfare recipients was brought down therefore that in 1903 it was only 3 in 10,000 Japanese. There were subsequent cuts in the central budget and the responsibility was shifted to cities therefore that even since the population rose and inflation grew welfare expenditures fell. Government attempts were directed at preventing poverty by moral instruction. The idea that poverty could be reduced by a proper moral curriculum and training was in section a product of the power of the British Fabian socialists Beatrice and Sydney Webb. Beatrice Webb's Minority Statement to the Royal Commission on the Poor Law (1905-1909) argued for abolishing the Poor law.

Their together written book *The Prevention of Destitution*, (1911) suggested that while preventive events such since minimum wages, education, medical services were significant there was also an equally significant require to reform the habits of the unemployed. In row with this thinking the Webbs when they visited Japan accentuated to their hosts require to prevent the poor from developing the idea that relief was a matter of right.

National Objectives and Welfare: Strengthening State Manage

The era after the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905) saw government policies successfully integrating and linking the individual and the state. Policies were directed at directing individual attempt to fulfill national objectives and welfare polices too were drafted within this framework. Rather than poor relief the government focused in rebuilding the society since with urbanization and industrialization society and village bonds had loosened if not withered absent.

The development of slums in urban centers reflected the growing numbers of poor workers. In the Regional Improvement Campaign (1906-1918) the government used cities since well since private institutions to organize society clusters such since the regional "repaying virtue communities (*hotokusha*) The government also encouraged regional leaders to undertake social job and to that end sponsored seminars at the national and regional stage to teach them how to go in relation to the doing this. It also recognized in 1908 a central Charity Association to revise issues of poverty and carry out relief job.

Private Charity: Emperor and Christian Clusters

The government guided private job because since they said unlike the West Japan did not have an extensive custom of private charity. Christian clusters played an extremely significant section both in setting up orphanages and other charitable institutions and in influencing government policy on moral reform. It was Christians such since Tomeoka Kosuke, a social reformer who was active in introducing the thoughts of Ninomiya Sontoku that difficult job and thrift would eliminate poverty.

The Imperial household also played a big role in contributing to welfare behaviors by donations. These were directed by private institutions and often motivated through a desire to curb radical political movements. Therefore the main donations were made in 1910 when twelve socialists were executed for allegedly trying to kill the Emperor. In words of the amount of money spent private institutions sustained to play a biggest role but the state supervised several of the voluntary bodies often forcing people to donate. The thinking behind government policies sustained to be that relief was not a matter of right.

New Thoughts in Relation to the Relief: Public Responsibility of the State

The years following WWI saw the emergence of Japan since a biggest political actor on the international scene. Internally the expansion of the economy also helped to sharpen social troubles. Japanese bureaucrats since well since reformers began to now seem for welfare models in Britain, Weimar Germany and the United States. Relief job had been managed through the Bureau of Regional Affairs but through 1920 a Bureau of Social Affairs was recognized which looked after poor relief, veteran's assistance, children's welfare and unemployment. The bureaucrats in these offices had a dissimilar viewpoint.

They argued that in these new times it was no longer possible to rely on family or neighborhood for relief. The state necessity spends possessions on ensuring public assistance. They saw community since the part at which poverty could be tackled and this view was grounded in social theories emanating from Europe that said the state had a public responsibility. However, even while the state's obligation to relieve poverty now became the key element in social policy earlier thoughts were not jettisoned and the family organization sustained to be stressed.

Also the idea that public assistance necessity not make dependency sustained to be a biggest strain in official documents since well since in the thinking of reformers. The Bureau supervised to institute labour exchanges (1921) workers health insurance (1922) restrictions on job hours for children, women (1923) mandatory retirement age and severance pay (1936) and seaman's insurance (1938). While debates sustained in relation to the organization to adopt and several commissions studied European practices the district commissioner organization urbanized in Osaka was an innovative

contribution. In each school district the government selected a regional notable or person of virtue. Each of these unpaid commissioners was responsible for two hundred households.

They in turn elected representatives to an Executive Council which met once a month. The commissioners surveyed the poor in their region, provided counsel and helped organize relief finances or medical care and other social services. This organization spread therefore that through 1931 district commissioners were in 43 prefectures and through 1942 there were almost 74,560 commissioners (4,537 of them women). Almost all the cities had adopted this organization through 1942. The district commissioner organization became the cornerstone of social policy because it was cost effective and allowed timely intervention to help families in a variety of methods ranging from advice on bigger household administration to medical care or providing relief. The commissioners could also help to correct household registers since they tracked down comparatives who could give support to destitute comparatives.

These commissioners came from the transitional classes rather than the regional notables who had been the earlier focus of relief organizations.

The Ministry of Health and Welfare: Furthering the War Attempt

The district commissioner's organization was followed through the Relief and Defense Law (1929) which was not in any method dissimilar in its assumptions from the earlier relief regulations but with the war in China the government recognized the Ministry of Health and Welfare, at the suggestion of the Army Ministry. The military wanted an efficient health policy for not only its soldiers but for the people from whom it drew its soldiers. The revised Military Assistance Law of 1937 provided for assistance with minimal necessities.

Moreover, the assistance was not channeled by the family and the recipient did not lose his right to vote. Unlike earlier organizations this did not create it hard for the poor to seek state relief. By the war all organizations including the district commissioner's organization were directed towards the war attempt. This helped in providing welfare facilities for the common population rather than presently the poor. For example, day care centers were provided for all children, since was medical care allowances to fatherless families and finally in 1938 a National Health Insurance Law that sheltered the entire population was passed.

The war years while they did see a broadening of the scope of social legislation did neglect the destitute and infirm because it concentrated on the mobilizing the nation for the war attempt. Japan's social legislation did not achieve the stages of Britain, the United States or several countries in Europe till after WWII. The history of its pre-war organization illustrates that indigenous institutions and practices played a significant role in shaping social legislation often incorporating and structure on West European and United States policies. Equally Japanese policy makers changed and adapted these thoughts to suit their objectives.

NATIONALISM

What is a Nation: How are Nations Shaped

Are nations shaped or is humanity inherently blessed with nations? In other terms, are nations a contingency or are they an integral section of human condition? Understandably mainly nationalists (nationalist ideologues, writers, poets or practitioners of nationalist politics) have tended to seem upon nations since given and somewhat perennial. These nations, according to nationalist perception, only needed to be aroused from their deep slumber through the agent described nationalism.

In the traditional nationalist perception the role of nationalism has been seen since that of an 'awakener' who makes nations rise from their deep slumber. In the nationalist communication nations seem like sleeping beauties staying for their prince charming! What is missing in this understanding is the *procedure* by which nations themselves arrive in this world. Nations were not always there; they appeared at few point. It is so significant not to see nationalism in its own image.

Definitions on nations have been quite scarce. It would be true to say that nations have been *called* much more than they have been *defined*. Possibly the earliest effort to describe a nation was made in 1882 through Ernest Renan, a French scholar. He defined nation, since a human collectively brought jointly through will, consciousness and communal memory (and also general forgetfulness, or a communal amnesia). He described the nation since an exercise in everyday plebiscite. He forcefully rejected the notion that nations were created through natural boundaries like mountains, rivers and oceans. He accentuated the role of human will and memory in the creation of a nation. A human collectivity or grouping can *will* itself to shape a nation. The procedure of the making of a nation is not dependent upon any natural or objective criteria and a nation, in order to be, is not obliged to fulfill any of the objection circumstances.

Renan's understanding of nation, pioneering however it was, could be criticized on three descriptions. One, it overlooked the specificity of nations since a unique shape of human grouping. Whereas Renan defined a nation well, he defined several non- nations since well, or clusters that could not be measured nations—actual or potential. Through his definition, any articulate, self-conscious human cluster with few degree of livelihood jointly (a club, a group of thieves, residents of a locality, students livelihood in a hostel or a university) could be described a nation. Will and consciousness are elements which can be established in several (indeed mainly) human groupings.

This definition helps to identify a greater number of human groupings but does not go extremely distant in distinguishing nations (actual or potential) from non- nations. It is a definition-net which, when cast into the sea of human groupings, captures the nations but also several obvious non-nations. It successfully lists all the possible human groupings which have the potential of developing into nations, but doesn't explain precisely which ones actually do. Two, the question in relation to the role of consciousness in the creation of nation is a bit tricky and intricate. Consciousness

necessity certainly assumes the substance that it is conscious of. In other terms, nations have to first exist, if people have to develop the will and consciousness of belonging to that unit. Consciousness can only follow the creation of the nation, not precede it.

And if the emergence of the consciousness is of a later date than the creation of a nation, then certainly consciousness cannot be seen since having contributed to the creation of the nation. Consciousness can at best define a nation, not describe it. This then is the great paradox in relation to the role of will and consciousness in the creation of the nation. A human collectivity described the nation cannot exist without 'human will' (Since Renan rightly pointed out); yet factors pertaining to will and consciousness cannot be sufficiently invoked to describe a nation. The polemical question on their connection will be: does a national make its own consciousness or does the consciousness make the nation? Three, it was rightly pointed out that coming from France (culturally a fairly homogeneous community that already possessed few of the characteristics of a nation) Renan may have taken the objective factors (like language, territory etc.) that went into the creation of a nation, for granted. Renan measured nations to be a specifically Western European attribute. In other terms, nations could only emerge in communities that were already culturally homogenous.

That heterogeneous clusters could also evolve (or invent, or sometimes even fabricate) homogeneity in their journey towards acquiring nationhood, was something that was not extremely clear to Renan. A significant corrective to Renan's understanding was provided through Joseph Stalin in 1912. Stalin offered a much sharper and comprehensive understanding of nations. Nation was a human collectivity distribution a general territory, language, economic life and a psychological create-up. His complete definition in his own terms: 'A nation is a historically constituted, stable society of people, shaped on the foundation of the general language, territory, economic life and psychological create-up manifested in a general civilization.' Stalinist definition consisted of objective yardsticks since against the subjective factors enumerated through Renan. However, the Stalinist definition was not entirely without troubles and he may have in excess of stressed the role of factors like language and territory. Stalin may not have taken into thought the capability of several human clusters to shape nations *without* already being blessed through either a single language or a general territory.

Jews in the 20th century, scattered by Europe and America and totally devoid of a territory they could call their own, nonetheless possessed the necessary prerequisites of a nation, without fulfilling few of Stalin's criteria (however they would fulfill Renan's). If Renan's definition-net was too wide catching nations since well since several non- nations, Stalin's net tended to be a bit narrow, leaving out significant nations however it eliminated the risk of catching non- nations. It should then be possible to seem upon Renan and Stalin since complementing rather than contradicting each other. The question then is: do Renan and Stalin, put jointly, and cover the whole spectrum? Can an assemblage of the two definitions be measured adequate in identifying *all* the nations (actual and potential) of the world? The problem with both sets of definitions is that they are both totally rooted

in Western European experience and therefore leave out of their orbit a significant number of national formations which may not have shared a general territory or even language (e.g. Jews in the early 20th century, Indian Muslims in the 1940s, Poles in the late 19th century etc.).

The western European experience of nation is connected directly to state and territory. So drawing upon this experience, these definitions have tended to see nations in precisely these words. But there is no cause for us to take such a restricted view of nations. The trajectories of national formations is a varied one and this variety requires to be grasped and retained: few nations inherit empires and slice pieces of nation-states for themselves; few nations inherits states and turn them into nation states; few nations inherit nothing—no state, no empire, no territory, no single language—and fight (not always successfully) for the making of a nation-state. It is significant to acknowledge the possibility of nations exiting without a pre-existing state and fighting precisely to make a state *of their own*.

These have often been referred to since ethnic nations since against territorial nations. This distinction (flanked by ethnic nations and territorial nations) may or may not be valid, but there is no cause for us to privilege one variety of nations in excess of the other. The range that is sheltered through the two definitions mentioned in relation to the immense but through no means complete. Stalin and Renan certainly symbolize two ends of the spectrum. ‘Will’ creates too big a package of nations and non- nations; language and territory tend to leave out significant nations. The former is too inclusive, the latter too exclusive. In information both the components put jointly are not able to accommodate all nations. What then is the crucial element missing? It is here that Ernest Gellner gives the answer.

In the ultimate analysis, nations are best understood *in the spirit of nationalism*. Contrary to popular belief it is not nations that lead to nationalism, but that nations are created through nationalism. Nations are not the product of few antiquity or the working of few far historical forces (not always anyway) but they are the making of nationalism, *in alliance with sure other factors*. Human grouping may possess the aspects enumerated through Renan and Stalin, but they acquire nationhood only when they are imbued with the spirit of nationalism. Therefore nations are created through the objective naturalist factors like general language, territory, history economic life; beside with voluntaristic factors like will, consciousness and memory; *and nationalism*. A scrupulous nation is created through its nationalism.

The connection flanked by the two is somewhat like the proverbial egg and the chicken. It is hard to determine what came first but simple to predict that they constantly reproduce each other. The three components—will (Renan), civilization (Stalin) and ideology (Gellner)—therefore complete our definition of nation. The scripts of the three scholars are stretched in excess of an era of 100 years. Renan wrote his piece in 1882 and Gellner provided his definition in 1983. We can therefore say that a comprehensive definition of nation that is accessible with us today took in excess of a century to evolve and is the result of a combination of several intellectual contributions.

Nationalism

As our definition of nations has become therefore crucially dependent on nationalism, we require answering the question: what is nationalism? In this part we would effort to give a definition of nationalism. As suggested, then talk about the emergence of state and nation since constitutive elements in our understanding of nationalism and nation-state.

Defining Nationalism

Strangely sufficient, a lack of consensus on the question of nation does not quite extend to the question of nationalism. For a global definition of nationalism, it is best to again depend on Ernest Gellner: 'Nationalism is political principle that holds that national and political units should be congruent.' In the middle of the scholars who have grappled with the problem of nation and nationalism, he really stands out for a variety of causes. Mainly of them have begun their enquiry through first trying to describe nation, and from there they have gone on to describe nationalism since the articulation of the nation. Gellner is almost certainly the only one who has begun his enquiry through first defining nationalism and then having moved on to nation. His definition of nationalism covers, at one stroke, national sentiment, thinking, consciousness, ideology and movement.

The definition is easy and profound. If the two concepts employed in it—political part and national part- is decarbonizes to mean state and nation, respectively, it becomes even simpler. We, livelihood in contemporary times, tend to take nation and state for granted and moreover, tend to taken them to be more or less the similar item. We do therefore because they seem to us since extremely almost the similar items. But there is no cause for us to consider that the two may have always been the similar item, or to exploit Gellner's terms, they may have always been congruent. After all, their congruence is not a condition given to us; it is the insistence of the agent described nationalism.

For this coming jointly of state and nation, there are clearly three pre-circumstances—there should be a state; there should be a nation; and finally, they should be nationalism to tell the other two that they are meant for each other and cannot live without each other. In other terms, the present day congruence of nation and state (emergence of nation-state) is a product of three specific growths in human history. When did the three occur in human history? Let us now focus on the emergence of state and nation since preconditions to the growth of nation-state. We seem upon nationalism since a contemporary phenomenon and understand it to be rooted in the transformation of the world from agrarian to industrial. We require to so answering two questions: Why did nationalism not emerge throughout the agrarian era? What was it in relation to the industrial community that necessitated the emergence of nationalism?

In this part as suggested, also attempt and answer these questions through pointing out few salient characteristics of the agrarian community and of the industrial community.

Emergence of State and Nation

State, since the centralized, authority wielding agency, did not arrive in this world for an extremely extensive time; it may sound improbable but is true that mankind, for mainly of its life—in relation to the 99 percent, existed happily without a state. Human community, in its pre-agrarian level, was a stateless community. Communities were little; shapes of institution were easy; division of labour was elementary. The nature of swap, wherever it lived, was such since could be supervised easily through people themselves without having to resort to any central power.

People did not require a state and, since a result, did not have one. The pre-condition for the arrival of the state, and so nationalism, basically did not exist. The first agrarian revolution—indeed the first revolution recognized to mankind-initiated the first biggest transformation in human life. It liberated a part of the population from having to fend for themselves; it could now be done through others. Those who were freed from require procuring food for they were obliged to do other items. A division of labour came into being. With the passage of time this division becomes more intricate. Clusters of people were separated and stratified.

A state came into being to uphold law and order, collect surplus, resolve disputes when require arose, and, of course, to regulate the swap mechanism. Of course, not all agrarian communities had a state; only those with an elaborate division of labour did. Easy agrarian communities resembling their pre-agrarian ancestors could still control without one. State, at this level of human history, was an option, and since an option, was crucially dependent upon the existing division of labour. A hypothetical anti-state citizen of the medieval world could still hope that under circumstances of a stable division of labour, state might be dispensed with.

Our medieval anti-state protagonist would certainly have been disappointed, if he had existed extensive sufficient, through the arrival of the industrial period which increased this division of labour manifold thereby ensuring an extensive life for the state. State, under circumstances of industrial economy, was no longer an option; it became a must. Since of today, the state is still with us, strong since ever, and the vision of a stateless community in few far future is there only to test human credulity. Therefore the state has arrived and illustrates no signs of disappearing. What in relation to the nation, the other pre-circumstances? We certainly did not hear of a nation in the medieval times, however we did hear of cultural clusters and units. It is possible that nations may have grown out of these cultural units, under circumstances favorable for their development. Cultural units that lived in the medieval world were either extremely little (based on tribe, caste, clan or village) or extremely big (based on the religious cultures of Islam and Christianity).

This range was also accessible to political units. They were either extremely little (municipality-states or little kingdoms) or extremely big (Empires—Holy Roman, Ottoman, Mughal, Russian). Therefore the cultural units lived in the medieval world and therefore did the political units. They often cut crossways each other. Big empires contained several cultural units within their territory. Big cultural units could easily accommodate themselves under several political units. They felt no great require for any biggest re-allocation of boundaries to suit nationalist imperative. Nobody told them that they were violating the nationalist principle.

None—either the political or the cultural part- was greatly attracted to one-civilization-one polity formula. Indeed it was not possible to implement such a formula even if the impulse had lived (which it did not). Why was it that the passion for nationalism, therefore feature of our times, was missing both from the human mind and the human heart throughout the agrarian times? In order to address this question, we require focusing on few of the characteristics of the agrarian community.

Agrarian Community

Therefore distant our contention in this part has been that whereas few preconditions (emergence of state, attendance of separate cultural societies) for the growth of nation-states had materialized in the agrarian era, few others (transformation of cultural societies into national societies, the emergence of the ideology of nationalism) had not. The question is: Why didn't we see the emergence of state since representative of cultural societies throughout the agrarian era? Why was the ideology of nationalism away from the world throughout there similar era? What was it in relation to the agrarian community which inhibited the development of these preconditions to the growth of a nation-state organization? Few of these questions can be satisfactorily answered if we could attract a cultural map of the world. Ernest Gellner has actually drawn such a map.

The map consists of three biggest dividing rows. Row 1, the greatest social divide recognized to mankind, has the horizontally stratified clusters of political, military and religious elite on top of the row and the numerous societies of food producers, artisans and general people below the row. Row 2 divides the three (or perhaps four) kinds of medieval elite—political, military and religious and those who possessed knowledge by mastery in excess of written world. In few cases a commercial elite also joined the apex. Their way of recruitment and reproduction varied from community to community.

It could be open or closed, hereditary or non-hereditary. Their connection with each other also varied from territory to territory. The religious elite (Ulema, Clergy, and Brahmin) could control the political elite or vice-versa. Culturally they shaped dissimilar clusters, but they were all united through their great aloofness from general people. A China-Wall stood flanked by them and the easy peasant would dare not cross it. Indeed it was impossible for him to do therefore. To join the exclusive high civilization, he would require at least one of the attributes like special pedigree,

chosen heredity, privileged status, divine sanction and access to literacy and written term. None of it was accessible to him. The third dividing row stood vertically creating laterally insulated societies of general people.

They existed for centuries in stable cultural formations, not particularly informed in relation to the attendance of other clusters crossways the vertical rows. Written term was rarely accessible to them. They could not write and to understand what was written, they relied upon the clergy or the Ulema or Brahmin. They paid their ruler what was demanded from them. In the absence of literacy they evolved their own organization of discourse which was context based and would be unintelligible outside the context or the society. This discourse would not cut crossways the vertical row; indeed there was no require for it, for crossways the row the other cultural cluster would exploit its own evolved discourse. The exploit of literacy for them seldom extended beyond require communicating. Education in the middle of these clusters was like a cottage industry. People learnt their skills not in a University but in their own regional habitation. Only scholars, from the apex went to the Universities to learn Latin, Greek, Sanskrit or Persian.

The skills acquired from the cottage industry were handed in excess of from generation to generation. The result: the citizens of the agrarian world existed in laterally insulated cultural groupings. They did not require literacy; they used their own evolved shape of discourse valid only in their civilization. They existed in stable cultural formations. Horizontal mobility did not exist. Vertical mobility was out of the question. They viewed (or did not view) the exclusive high-civilization at the apex with an aloof aloofness and felt no require to relate to it. Both the ruler and the ruled felt no great require for any type of identification with each other. Man was (and still is) a loyal animal and his loyalty was rightfully claimed through his village, kinship, caste, religious or any other shape of ethnic ties. Indeed he was a product of these ties. The exclusive high-civilization generally did not effort to claim his loyalty, for to do therefore would be risky: it might weaken or even erode the China-Wall. In other terms, it might convert the China-Wall into a German-Wall.

There was sufficient loyalty evoking units accessible to them. No cultural bonding lived, or could perhaps exist, flanked by the ruler and the ruled. The ruler was neither chosen through the people, nor was he representative of them. The people in turn felt no require to identify with their ruler. This was the scenario in which man existed in pre-contemporary times. The stability and continuity of the pre-contemporary world terminated with the arrival of the industrial economy and community. It is our argument that this transformation—from the agrarian to the industrial—created circumstances for the rise of nations and nationalism. In the next part let us seem at few of the characteristics of the industrial community.

Industrial Community

The medieval man might have gone on livelihood like this happily ever after, had an accident of tremendous consequence not occurred. The tranquility and the continuity of the medieval world was shaken with a jerk through the strong tidal wave or a massive hurricane of industrialization hitting the world, however not all of it at the similar time. Nothing like this had ever happened to mankind.

This single event transformed the cultural map of the world profoundly and irreversibly. The industrial community, when it was finally recognized in *few* pockets of the world, was establishing to be presently the opposite of the agrarian community in extremely fundamental methods. Five crucial characteristics of the industrial community separated it from the agrarian world and had implications for the emergence of the nationalism. One, it was a community based on perpetual development—both economic and cognitive, the two being interrelated. Cognitive development in the realm of technology, however not confined to it, directly fed into economic development and the latter, in turn facilitated investments for technical updating. Transforms had occurred in the agrarian world, but it was never a rule.

The industrial community showed a tremendous commitment to continuous transform and development. The idea of progress was born for the first time. Technology and economy got connected to each other in a manner in which they were not in the pre-contemporary times. A constantly growing community would not allow any stable barriers of rank, status and caste. The two are indeed incompatible. Social buildings, which had taken their permanence for granted in the agrarian world, would discover it impossible to resist the hurricane of industrialism. Two, it was literate community. Literacy in the agrarian world was confined to the exclusive high-civilization, in other terms to the king, priest and the scholar. The general man did not require literacy and did not have it or had it at an extremely elementary stage which could easily be imparted through his family or the society.

Industrial community, on the other hand, cannot survive without universal literacy. Why should full (or extremely almost therefore) literacy be a precondition for the smooth functioning, indeed the extremely subsistence, of the industrial community and economy? There are in information several causes why it has to be therefore. One industrial economy needs greater participation in the running of the economy through a much superior part of the population. These participants, drawn from extremely dissimilar cultural backgrounds and involved in extremely dissimilar tasks assigned to them, necessity is able to communicate with each other in order to ensure the running of the economy and the organization. Drawn since they are from dissimilar cultural settings, they cannot communicate in their old idioms.

They have to communicate in few standardized idiom in which all of them have to be trained. This is an enormous task and can no longer be performed through the traditional agencies (family, guild, society etc). Traditional agencies, rooted in their own cultural contexts, cannot, in any case, impart

context-free education. Such training can only be imparted consistently to all citizens through an agency since big since the State. In other terms, education which was a cottage industry in the agrarian world, necessity now become full-fledged, impersonal and organized contemporary industry to turn out neat, uniform human product out of the raw material of an uprooted anonymous size population.

Since a result, people start resembling each other culturally and share the similar language in which they have all been taught. The language at school may initially be dissimilar from the language at house, but gradually, in relation to the generation's time, the language at school also becomes the language at house. The Hungarian peasant only initially speaks two words—the regional dialect at house and its refined and comprehensive adaptation at school. Gradually, within a generation or therefore, the latter replaces the dialect at house also.

This procedure helps in the making of a seamless, culturally uniform, internally standardized community and therefore fulfils a biggest precondition for nationalism. Two, the new organization also demands that these trained men should be able to perform diverse tasks suited to the necessities of a constantly growing economy. They should so be ready to shift occupationally. Only a generic educational training, imparted through a big centralized agency, can ensure that men are competent and qualified to undertake newer tasks. The paradox of the industrial age is that it is an organization based on specialist but the specialist in the industrial age is extremely common. Every man is a specialist. Every man is *trained* to be a specialist.

One half of this training is generic (based on language, cognition and a general conceptual currency); the other half is specific and necessity is dissimilar for dissimilar tasks (like doctors, managers, engineers, computer personnel etc.) Now anyone required to shift occupationally can be trained *specifically* for that task because he has already received the generic training. This enables people to move occupationally crossways generations and sometimes within the span of a single generation. This gives the industrial community a sure mobility, which also facilitates the nationalist project. Three, an industrial community is one in which job is not manual but semantic. It does not any longer (certainly in mature industrial communities) consist of ploughing, reaping, threshing, but rather of handling machines and pushing buttons. In the pre-contemporary world job consisted of the application of the human muscle in excess of matter with the help of elementary technology based on wind and water.

All this transforms with the arrival of contemporary technology. A qualified worker in an industrial economy is one who necessity know which button to press, how to operate the machines, and if possible, to fix minor errors. In other terms contemporary workers have to manipulate not items but meanings and messages. All these qualifications need literacy imparted in a standardized medium. The image of a worker, presently uprooted from his village and pushed straight into industry is rapidly becoming archaic.

A worker is not inherently suited to the tasks of the contemporary economy; he requires to be trained (which implies literacy) to perform his tasks suitably and satisfactorily. Contemporary economy does not presently require a worker; it requires a skilled worker. A section of the ability is also the skill to perform dissimilar tasks, since and when require arises. Since stated earlier, imparting standardized context free education to such a massive number is a monumental task and cannot be performed through the agencies which had been doing it for century's namely kin, regional unit, county, guild. It can only be provided through a contemporary national education organization, 'a pyramid at whose foundation are primarily schools, staffed through teachers trained at secondary schools, staffed through University trained teachers, led through the products of advanced graduate schools.' Only the state can uphold and seem after such a massive building or delegate it to one of its agencies. The implications of such a literate community are several; emergence of nationalism is only one of them. It creates internally standardized and homogeneous cultural societies. This is presently what nationalism requires. The third, fourth and fifth characteristics of the industrial community are actually an extension of the first and the second (i.e. literate community, committed to perpetual development). It is mobile community; it is an egalitarian community; and it is a community with a shared high-civilization and not exclusive since it was in the agrarian world.

Let us briefly seem at all three. The agrarian world was a stable order devoid of any great transformations. The circumstances creation for any type of mobility basically did not exist. The industrial community through contrast is essentially unstable and constantly changing. The transforms include the strategic site of the social personnel within it. Locations are changing and people so cannot take their current social status for granted; they might lose it and create method for others crossways generation. The factors that restricted mobility are no longer operative in an industrial economy. The region and scope of a man's employability gets enlarged thanks to literacy imparted in a standardized medium. His cultural nests have been eroded and his status is threatened through the arrival of new social and economic roles.

The industrial community acquires the characteristics of systematic randomness (something like the children's game of snakes and ladders) in which men cannot take their present location for granted. The mobility (physical, spatial, occupational, social) engendered through the industrial economy is exceptionally deep and sometimes unfathomable. A mobile community has to inevitably be an egalitarian community. Roles and locations are not fixed and are certainly not determined through social status. A peasant's son require not be a peasant; what occupational location he occupies will depend, not on his heredity or society's status, but on his own competence and training. The role of social status does not totally diminish in the industrial community, but it loses the eminence that it enjoyed in the agrarian world.

The account of the industrial community since egalitarian does not match with the brutally inhuman and in egalitarian circumstances that prevailed in the initial years of the industrial economy. But they

were soon overcome, paving method for a more mobile and egalitarian order. All the four characteristics put jointly (a community based on perpetual development, literate community, mobile community and also egalitarian) would ensure the fifth one also. The agrarian world was characterized through deep and stable barriers—both vertical and horizontal. The major barrier was that of status and high civilization. The high civilization(s) of the king, priest and the scholar was/were continued through access to literacy and the privileged status. Both these characteristics disappear in the industrial community.

Everybody gains access to literacy and a growing, mobile community presently does not allow any barriers to settle down for extensive. To quote Gellner again, ‘Men can tolerate terrible inequalities, if they are stable and hallowed through tradition. But in a hectically mobile community, tradition has no time to hollow anything. A rolling stone gathers no aura, and a mobile population does not allow any aura to attach to its stratification.’ The implication of all this is that the high civilization loses its exclusiveness and becomes shared. All this has serious implications for the emergence of nationalism. The result of the growths was that mankind was shaken out of its neatly nested cultural zones and liberated from the several identities which had claimed its loyalty for centuries.

Man ceased to belong to his regional ties; indeed they were receiving increasingly hard to recognize. He has now, either already or aspired to be, a member of the shared high-civilization. The guidelines for the membership of this shared high-civilization were provided to him through the uniform educational organization. Man sustained to be a loyal animal even in the industrial community, but the units challenging or claiming his loyalty had either disappeared or were in a procedure of disappearing. Who, or what, should claim his loyalty now? The prestige of the contemporary man depends not upon his membership of primordial ties but upon his membership of the new shared high-civilization transmitted through a uniform education organization provided through the state.

He is now a product of the shared high-civilization and has a vested interest in its preservation and defense. And he knows his civilization can be protected only through the state, *its* own state. In other terms a marriage of civilization and polity is the only precondition to his dignified subsistence in a world of dissolving identities. His national identity is significant to him and only a state representative of his nation can ensure the preservation of this identity. *This* is nationalism. And this is why contemporary man is nationalist. The big culturally homogenous national units cannot be preserved and protected through the part itself.

They require a political roof of their own. This explains the nationalist man. But it does not explain why the state should be keen on protecting this national unit? Why can't it presently be happy ruling in excess of the territory, and bothering in relation to the small else, like the medieval state did? Why necessities the contemporary state insist on the unmediated membership and loyalty of its citizens? It has to because the contemporary state, under circumstances of contemporary economy, cannot function without an active participation of its citizens. Didn't it train them to be literate and

occupationally mobile? Contemporary state requires not only trained men but also committed and loyal men. They necessarily follow the instructions of the state in which they live, and of no other subdivision within the territory. Only nationalism can ensure this. To sum up the argument, contemporary industrial economy has transformed the world culturally and economically. It needs everybody to be literate. This literacy has to be imparted in a uniform standardized manner to facilitate the running of the economy. This procedure displaces people out of their close cultural nests and destroys their loyalty inducing regional identities. Gradually it rehabilitates them since a member of a new homogenous cultural unit, held jointly through literacy.

The China-Wall breaks down allowing people entry into the high-civilization (or rather the high-civilization extending to people) which ceases to be exclusive. Rules of the new membership are simple (literacy) and circumstances favorable. These new national units owe a great trade to the political part that educated them. Contemporary economy had displaced them; the state rehabilitated them since members of a new national society.

The two tasks were of course complementary. The new national society (nation, if you like) would be keenly desirous of preserving its identity, autonomy and unity (nationalism, if you like). It has nowhere to go, no past to seem back to except for romantically. It seems up to the state for its defense; or rather it wants a state of its own for guaranteed preservation and defense. To return to the definition; nationalism insists that nation and state be congruent. We now know why. As the bulldozer of the contemporary economy flattened out all the existing cultural-ethnic variations and also the traditional units of the community, how did it make new national units and loyalties? Bulldozers are not recognized to make solidarities.

In other terms, as all the medieval cultural nests were destroyed through contemporary economy, why didn't the world become one cultural part requiring one single political roof? Why was the world divided in the middle of several nations requiring several nation states? To put it basically, why did we have several nationalisms instead of one world nationalism described internationalism? Indeed it was predicted through 19th century Marxism and liberalism similar. It basically did not occur. Why? Section of the answer to the question necessarily reckon with the tidal wave nature of industrialization which did not hit the whole world at the similar time and in the similar manner.

There were clearly at least three waves (perhaps more)—the early wave to hit Western Europe and North America; a slightly later wave to hit the rest of Europe and Japan and a third wave that hit the remaining section of the globe that later came to be recognized since the third world. The recipients of the third wave did not achieve the economic and cultural transformation with which the early industrial wave had blessed Europe and North America. They only underwent political power through the early industrial countries. The dissimilar timing of the waves may have been an accident or may have been because few sections of the medieval world were bigger prepared for a growth of this type than other sections.

But a dissimilar timing of the arrival of the industrial wave effectively divided the globe into dissimilar zones. Secondly, contemporary economy did not presently anticipate people to be literate; it expected them to be literate in a scrupulous language (English, French, and German). It couldn't be the classical language of the high-civilization like Latin (it would be hard to train easy peasants in the classical language) or the folk language of the people (the dialect may not be appropriate for a big-level transmission). The literacy would so have to be imparted in new contemporary words resembling both the folk and the classical. People, after getting generic training in a scrupulous language, were obliged to seem upon themselves since members of the shared high-civilization fostered through *that* scrupulous language.

Moreover, the language (and the shared high culture) also determined the frontier of man's mobility. If he traveled beyond the frontier row of that language and the shared high-civilization he was trained in, he would not be useful in the new territory (unless he was smart sufficient to equip himself with the new cognitive set up). It is for this cause that contemporary man does not basically think; he thinks since French or German. To extend the argument, contemporary man does not basically exist; he exists since French or German. And he can exist with dignity only under a French or German political roof. The story therefore distant resembles West European brand of nationalism. Would it be applicable to communities where nationalism took the shape of protest? Can it, for example, be applied to the Indian sub-continent? Indian people acquired a contemporary state in the shape of British imperialist state for the whole territory, but refused to live under it.

The essence of western European nationalism was that the Contemporary English or French man could live only under a state that was English or French, respectively. In other terms, the essence of western European nationalism was loyalty to the state. Essence of Indian nationalism, on the other hand, was rebellion against the state. However in spite of vital variations, sure commonness can be established flanked by the European and the Indian nationalism. The arrival of the contemporary economy, however tentative, indirect and incomplete, did make circumstances for transformation, albeit incomplete, of herds of cultural societies into a national part of Indian people.

These people insisted on having *their* own political unit. This insistence (nationalism, if you like) gradually created and fostered an Indian nation. This Indian nation was dissimilar from its European counterpart in that it was not being continued through a uniform educational organization imparted in a single language (although English did help in uniting the intelligentsia). It was being created not through the uniform condition of economic growth, but the uniform condition of economic use through the alien state. This use was contemporary in that it was systematic, orderly and efficient unlike medieval shapes of loot and plunder. Indian nationalism was based on this cognition and on the desire that the national part of Indian people should have its own political roof. The bulldozer of industrialization was not operative in India.

The pre-existing socio religious identities were so not flattened out: few were politically overcome through Indian nationalism; similar made their peace with it; few others challenged it; and few actually became successful in obtaining their own political roof for their perceived national unit. The varieties and cultural plurality of Indian nation (The 19th century Indian nationalists rightly described it a nation-in-creation) created the legroom for the possibility of rival or breakaway nationalisms. Therefore came into being Pakistan in 1947 based on the notion of all Indian Muslims being a nation. But the territorial spread of Pakistan (with an east and a west wing on either face of India separated through well in excess of 900 miles) created a further legroom of yet another breakaway nationalism on territorial grounds.

Therefore came into being Bangladesh since an independent nation-state in 1971. One scholar, possibly articulating the extent of scholarly incomprehension on nationalism, likened nationalism to a genie that had somehow been released from the bottle of history few two hundred years ago and as then had been stalking diverse lands and people without anyone being able to manage it. Nationalism may not be since unexplainable since a genie but it has certainly pervaded the whole universe including its people and territories. And it illustrates no signs of disappearing.

The neat and almost complete division of the globe into roughly 200 more or less stable nation states is no guaranty against a resurgence of nationalism. But nationalism cannot continue to perform old roles. For almost 150 years flanked by the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the end of the Second World War in 1945, nationalism was the lone promoter of nation-states. Now that this task looks to be in excess of nationalism necessity now turn into a destroyer of the existing nation-states by the resurgence of breakaway nationalisms seeking to make new nation-states. This means that communities with cultural, religious or linguistic plurality and an uncertain economic growth may still go by all the violence, hatred and brutality that have approach to be associated with a surcharged nationalism.

Levels of Nationalism: Kinds of Nationalism

The account for the emergence of nationalism necessity creates allowance for two factors. One, nationalism could not have appeared in a day but that its emergence was spread in excess of levels which require to be situated at several points in the transformation of the world from the agrarian to the industrial. The part constructed two ideal kinds of human communities, the agrarian that was mainly nationalism resistant and the industrial that emerged destined to be nationalism prone.

The two formations necessity certainly not has lived in their pure shape in mainly cases. But mainly agrarian communities would have shown resemblance to the model constructed. Similarly, the advanced industrial communities should possess the traits listed in our account of the industrial community. The timing, pace and trajectory of the transformation from one to the other would inevitably modify from territory to territory.

The vital point is that the dissimilar levels in the arrival of nationalism are related to this transformation. As the extremely nature of this transformation was dissimilar for dissimilar communities (and almost certainly nowhere was it therefore neat and complete), the levels of nationalism also varied. It is, so, not possible to construct levels consistently applicable to all sections of the world. It is still significant to stay in mind that nationalism, like other global phenomena (capitalism and colonialism) arrived in this world by levels and not in one single transition. Two, nationalism arrived in levels, but nowhere did it duplicate itself in form and shape. Although the whole world changed dramatically in the last 200 years from being nationalism free to being totally dominated through nationalism, the nature of nationalism differed dramatically from region to region.

Therefore profound is the transform that few scholars have begun doubting the extremely existing of the generic category described nationalism. No two nationalisms are established to be same, yet all nationalisms do share sure vital traits in general. This indeed is the great paradox of nationalism. To put it differently, nationalism transforms its shape in dissimilar communities yet retains its essence in all of them. Nationalism led to the transformation of nations into nation-states, but the procedure of this transformation varied. The several nation-states of the contemporary world were created by multiple circuits, characterized through dissimilar *types* of nationalisms.

A general myth has been to seem at the arrival of nation-states by only two circuits—the market and the protest, i.e., nationalism engendered through the market forces or through national movements. In information the range of nationalist experience is much more varied than that. Two prominent scholars on nationalism, Ernest Gellner and Anthony Smith have created their own typologies of nationalism. Let us briefly seem at both at them.

Gellner's Typology

Gellner, script exclusively in relation to the Europe, divided Europe into four zones traveling from west to east and formulated four dissimilar kinds of nationalisms applicable to each zone. These can be seen on the map of Europe given here. Gellner understood nationalism in words of a marriage flanked by the states and a pervasive high-civilization and saw four dissimilar patterns of this marriage in the four European zones. Zone 1, situated on the western belt consisting of England, France, Portugal and Spain witnessed a rather smooth and simple marriage of the two, because both the ingredients (state and high-civilization for the defined territory) were present prior to the arrival of nationalism.

In Gellner's metaphor, the couple was already livelihood jointly in a type of customary marriage and the strong dynastic states more or less corresponded to cultural linguistic zones anyway, even before the decree of nationalism ordered them to do therefore. In other terms, these communities fulfilled the nationalist principle before the arrival of nationalism. Only the minor cultural variations *within*

these communities needed to be homogenized; peasants and workers had to be educated and transformed into Englishmen, Frenchmen etc. Needless to say this procedure was smooth and clash-free and so did not need any violence for the fulfillment of the nationalist principle. Zone II (present day Italy and Germany), located on the territory of the erstwhile Holy Roman Empire, was dissimilar from zone 1 in the sense that, metaphorically speaking, the bride (high civilization for the territory) was ready (in the middle of the Italians from the days of early Renaissance and in the middle of the Germans as the days of Luther) but there was no groom (state for the exclusive territory).

Whereas strong dynastic states had crystallized in zone 1 beside the Atlantic coast, this zone was marked through political fragmentation. The age of nationalism, which had established both the elements (state and high civilization for the territory) present in zone 1, established only one (high civilization) in zone II. Therefore, although no 'cultural engineering' or ethnic cleansing was required here, a state-protector corresponding to the region had to be established or created. It was for this cause the nationalist project here had to be concerned with 'unification'.

Here also, since in zone I, nationalism was benign, soft and clash-free. There were no claims and counter-claims for the territory. Culturally homogeneous territories did not have to be carved out; they already lived. The high-civilization also lived; it only needed to reach out to peasants and workers. It is in zone III (territories east of Germany and west of Russian Empire, regions of present day Poland, Ukraine, Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania, Balkans etc.) that nationalism ceased to be benign and liberal and had to necessarily be nasty, violent and brutal. The horrors, generally associated with nationalism, were inevitable here since neither of the two preconditions (state and high-civilization) lived in a neat congruent fashion.

Both a national state and a national civilization had to be carved out. This procedure required violence, ethnic cleansing, forced transfer of population in a region marked through an intricate patchwork of linguistic and cultural variations. The civilizations' livelihood at the margins of the two empires (Ottoman and Russian) did not correspond either with a territory or language or state. Here, in order to meet and fulfill the nationalist imperative (passion for nationalism was quite strong in 19th century Europe), plenty of brutal earth-shifting had to be done in order to carve out regions of homogeneous civilizations requiring their state culturally uniform nation-states could only be produced through violence and ethnic cleansing.

To quote Gellner, 'In such regions, either people necessarily be persuaded to forego the implementation of the nationalist ideal, or ethnic cleansing necessarily take place. There is no third method.' Zone IV is the region of Russian Empire on the farthest east in Europe. This zone was unique in few methods. The First World War relegated the empires of the world (Habsburg, Ottoman, Russian) to the dustbin of history. Yet the Russian Empire survived under a new dispensation and the socialist ideology. The marriage of state and civilization did not take place here, or at any rate not for an extremely extensive time. The nationalist imperative was kept ruthlessly


under check through the Tsarist Empire, and was, contained creatively through the supra-nationalist ideology of socialism, through the soviet Empire.

In information several of the national civilizations flourished under the USSR; few were even nurtured through the state. There is no proof that the collapse of the Soviet Russia in 1991 was brought through nationalism, but nationalism certainly benefited through the dismantling of the empire. In other terms, the marriage of state and civilization *followed* the disintegration without causing it in any method. A high civilization in dissimilar cultural zones had been in a method nurtured through the socialist state, and the other element (the state) basically arrived upon the collapse of the Soviet Empire.

Anthony Smith's Typology

Is it perhaps to make a same typology for the whole world? However a neat zonal division of the world (beside European rows) is not possible and the pattern would be much more intricate, Anthony Smith has attempted few type of a division of a world into dissimilar kinds of circuits that nationalism takes in its journey towards making of nation-states. It can best be understood by the table 1 given below.

Table 1. CIRCUIT TO NATION STATE



His vital division is easy. The making of nation-states has taken two circuits—gradualist and nationalist. The gradualist circuit is generally clash free and contest free and is one where the initiative was taken through the state to make circumstances for the spread of nationalism. Nation-states were therefore shaped either through direct state sponsored patriotism (like zone I of Gellner) or were the result of colonization (Australia and Canada: they did not have to fight for independence) or provincialism where civilizations/ states presently ceded from the imperial authority, were granted independence and were on their method towards becoming nation-states.

One characteristic of the gradualist circuit is that it was marked through the absence of clash, violence, contesting claims in excess of nationhood or any national movement. The other, nationalist circuit is characterized through rupture, clash, violence and earth-moving. Smith divides this rupture-ridden circuit into two sub-circuits—those of ethnic nationalism and territorial nationalism. These words are self-evident and their meanings clear. The ethnic sub-circuit is divided into two lanes—based on renewal and secession. Renewal is based on the renewal or the revival of a declining ethnic identity like Persia in the 1890s.

The secessionist lane could be further divided into three through-lanes of breakaway, Diaspora and irredentist nationalism. The breakaway cluster (either from empires or multi-national states) sought to sever a bond by cessation like Italians and Czechs from the Habsburg Empire; Arabs, Armenians and Serbs from the Ottoman Empire; and Poles and Ukrainians from the Tsarist Russian Empire. Bangladesh that broke apart from Pakistan in 1991 could also approach in the similar category. The Diaspora nationalism is best represented through the Jews. Totally devoid of a state, territory of their

own, or even a high-civilization till the mid-19th century, Jews existed for almost two centuries like perpetual minorities on other people's lands.

They were eventually constituted into a nation-state by thrash about, other powers' diplomacy, ethnic cleansing (done to them through others), and earth moving and also through statistical probability of being on the right face in the great world war. Had the war gone the other method, we can be certain that Israel would not have been shaped into a nation-state in 1950. The irredentist nationalism normally followed a successful national movement. If the new state did not include all the members of the ethnic cluster (this mildly violates the nationalist principle) who existed on the nearest land under a dissimilar polity, they would have to be redeemed and the land on which they existed. This happened in Balkan nationalism in the middle of Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians and in Germany of Somalia today. Territorial nationalism occurred when a heterogeneous population was coercively united through a colonial authority.

The frontier of the territory and the centralized management of the colonial authority shaped the focus of the nation to be. On taking in excess of authority (invariably by a national movement) the nationalists attempt to integrate the culturally heterogeneous population (tribes, several other cultural clusters and people livelihood on the periphery), who had neither shared history nor general origin except for colonial subjugation.

This happened for example in Tanzania and Argentina. In sure examples (Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Kenya, Nigeria) there were national movements that defined their aims in words of wider territorial units, yet were clearly spearheaded through members of one dominant ethnic cluster. Later their power was challenged through other smaller clusters, creating legroom for a breakaway nationalism.

Nationalism in South Asia

The range of nationalists' experience is massive. There might still be pockets that are left uncovered. What in relation to the India? Where does the sub-continent fit? It is often not realized that although the sub-continent experienced a biggest nationalism, it was not the only one. India experienced four dissimilar types of nationalisms, and it is presently since well to briefly get acquainted with it.

The biggest Indian nationalism was territorial, anti-colonial and led to the making of a nation-state by a national movement. Its territorial boundaries were defined partly through the colonial conquest and management and partly through the strong dynastic states that rules the territory from time to time (Maurya, Gupta and Mughal Empires). It acquired not only one but three separate high-civilizations throughout the colonial era. There was an Islamic high-civilization inherited from the Mughal times and continued through Urdu that flourished in the pockets of Uttar Pradesh and Punjab. There was of course a high Brahmanic civilization that had thrived in the past sometimes with official defense and sometimes despite it.

Beside with these a new high-civilization, engendered through English language and continued through contemporary education, also urbanized initially in the three Presidencies (Madras, Bengal and Bombay), and later in the provinces of U.P. and Punjab. Although the dividing rows beside these civilizations were always fuzzy and never extremely sharp, the national movement that urbanized from the late 19th century onwards had a hard time trying to reconcile them. It was partly for these constraints that Indian National movement remained, during its life, linguistically and culturally extraordinarily plural.

As cultural unity is the hallmark of all nationalist projects, Indian national movement evolved the unique slogan of 'unity in varieties' and remained committed to both. Paradoxically the plural and non-coercive elements of the Indian national movement became its greatest strength and weakness at the similar time. The focus on cultural and linguistic plurality enabled the movement to maximize mobilization, but it also rendered Indian nationalism somewhat handicapped when confronted with a rival nationalism. Therefore, Indian nationalism inherited an administrative unity from the alien rulers, strove to make a political unity and generally refrained from imposing a cultural and linguistic unity.

When the new nation-state took in excess of after the successful culmination of the national movement in 1947, it went in relation to the task of creating cultural compositeness and economic integration. The second biggest nationalism was a rival to Indian nationalism. This led to the making of Pakistan. Pakistani nationalism was based on the well-known two-nation theory, which implied that Indian Muslims were not a section of an Indian nation but were a nation in them. The claim that Muslims in India were a nation was nothing short of an invented custom. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of this nationalism, declared that Indian Muslims *always* lived since a nation, but they did not realize this till the early decades of the 20th century! He launched a movement that led to the making of an independent nation-state of Pakistan. This nationalism, compared to its Indian counterpart, suffered from two disadvantages and enjoyed two separate advantages.

The disadvantages were that there was no given territory and no state for that territory. A territory had to be carved out and a state had to be fought for. Few of the nastiness of this nationalism were therefore inherent in this situation. The advantages that it enjoyed vis-à-vis its Indian counterpart were that it was based on a religious identity and that it did not have to fight the state. Religious unity proved easier to achieve and in a short span of time (the actual time taken flanked by the demand for a state and making of a state was seven years from 1940 to 1947!) Require for fighting the alien state by a national movement was dispensed with, given the information that Indian nationalism was busy doing presently that.

All Pakistani nationalism had to do was to inquire for its share when the battle for Indian independence intensified. Pakistani nationalism was strangely based on religious unity and territorial disunity. The east and the west wing of the new nation-state were separated from each other through

in excess of 900 miles. The new state took religious unity for granted and imposed linguistic and cultural unity without being able to achieve economic parity. The result was the emergence of a breakaway nationalism in 1971 that was territorial even though religion united rather than divided the two faces. The thrash about for the making of yet another nation-state was brief. The new state of Bangladesh fulfilled the nationalist principle but remained vulnerable to irredentist possibilities because of the neighboring region (West Bengal, now a section of India and originally section of a full province beside with the new nation-state of Bangladesh).

The two regions, West Bengal and Bangladesh have shared history and other similarities. However irredentism has not occurred here, there has been a transfer of population from Bangladesh to India at an alarmingly high rate. The fourth category is that of aspirant nationalism—forces for Khalistan in Punjab, Azad Kashmir in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the Tamil demand for a distinct state in Sri Lanka. These and almost certainly more may be described potential nationalisms.

If successful in few far future, and that is yet to be seen, these would be described breakaway nationalisms. The experience of potential nationalisms (or nationalisms which are not likely to ever culminate in the formation of new nation-states) is not specific to India but is a world phenomenon. The world today is replete with potential nationalisms to such an extent that through one estimate, for every single actual nation, there are at least ten potential ones.

These stories have generally not been told. It may be generally hard to expect a potential nationalism. It would be interesting to narrate the story of failed or abortive or embryonic nationalisms; in other terms the story of dogs that did not bark, to exploit the well-known phrase of Sherlock Holmes.

REVIEW QUESTION

- What do we mean by bureaucratization in the Modern World.?
- What are different forms of bureaucracy?
- Briefly discuss the historical process of democratization.
- What were the various ideas that were propagated on the concept of welfare?

CHAPTER 4

Capitalism and Industrialization

STRUCTURE

- Learning Objectives
- Commercial capitalism
- Capitalist industrialization
- Socialist industrialization
- Underdevelopment
- Review Questions

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After reading of this chapter, you will be able to:

- Explain the commercial capitalism
- Describe the significant features of commercial capitalism
- Understand the capitalist industrialization and industrial revolution
- Explain the socialist industrialization.
- Explain the meaning of underdevelopment.

COMMERCIAL CAPITALISM

Meaning of Commercial Capitalism

The question now is: what is then commercial capitalism and what is its era? Marxist historians have recognized a series of levels in the development of capitalism— for instance, merchant or commercial capitalism, agrarian capitalism, industrial capitalism and state capitalism— and much of the debate on origin and progress has hinged on differing views of the significance, timing and aspects of each level. The first level, i.e. mercantile or commercial capitalism provided the initial thrust and impetus for capitalism in the sense that merchants started becoming entrepreneurs to cater to market demands through employing wage laborers since well since through exploiting the existing craft guilds. Commercial Capitalism metamorphosed into industrial capitalism, which again gave method to socialism.

Because industrial capitalism was inseparably linked with troubles of the working class, this invariably gave rise to dissimilar currents of socialist considerations. Face through face with commercial capitalism sprang what is described agrarian capitalism (capital accumulated out of agricultural surplus) that characterized Europe of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries. Commercial Capitalism and agrarian capitalism were, so, two shapes of capitalism that overlapped with each

other, the variation flanked by them being that one appeared out of commercial surplus while the other out of agricultural surplus.

Agrarian capitalism sometimes metamorphosed fully into commercial capitalism i.e. invested the whole surplus accumulated from agriculture into commerce and sometimes transformed directly into industrial capitalism through investing in industrial growth alone. Sometimes capital was accumulated from both these sources, i.e. commerce and agriculture, and paved the path for the rise of industrial capitalism. Agrarian capitalism was accentuated through Immanuel Wallerstein who adopted a world-economy perspective, and measured its origin to be rooted in the agrarian capitalism.

Only transcending the national horizon, through establishing a world deal and commercial network, could fulfill the necessities of capitalism. In this world economy, there lived sure zones— like the margin, the semi-margin and the core— where international and regional commerce were concentrated in the hands of a powerful bourgeoisie. The strong states imposed unequal swap upon the weak states. So, the strong states or the core dominated the whole world economy in agrarian capitalism since well since industrial capitalism later. Trade also accentuated agrarian capitalism which was the essence of a national economy where manufacture is separated from consumption, and is made a source of profit after being utilized in profit-creation enterprises.

Agricultural revolution, so, played an extremely significant role in the development of capitalism through feeding a growing population and through creating a surplus to meet the demand for industrial raw materials. Reference is sometimes made to a fourth shape—state capitalism—defined through Lenin since a organization under which state takes in excess of and uses means of manufacture in the interest of the class which dominates the state; but the phrase, ‘state capitalism’, is also used to define any organization of state collectivization, without reference to its exploit for the benefit of any scrupulous class. Still there is a fifth shape in which there is an increased element of state intervention either in words of welfare programs or lessening the impact of business cycle.

This is welfare capitalism or protected capitalism. In all these levels of capitalism, recognized through the Marxist historians, so, the first level was merchant capitalism or commercial capitalism. Now, what is it? Precisely, capital accumulation out of the profits of merchants to be invested in several economic behaviors was what described commercial capitalism is. It took dissimilar shapes in dissimilar levels. For instance, it lived in few of its elements in ancient Egypt and in ancient Rome.

In Babylonia, in the municipality-states of classical Greece, in Phoenicia, in Carthage, in the Hellenistic states of the Mediterranean littoral, and in the Roman Empire, also throughout dissimilar levels Commercial Capitalism urbanized. There was, however, small uniformity of economic and political institutions in these variant shapes of commercial capitalism or merchant capitalism, which

at this time was in an extremely nascent level. Even where merchant capitalism lived in the ancient world, big applications of improved technology to goods manufacture did not happen.

In short, so, the ancient times were the age of capitalist accumulation, rather than capitalist manufacture. In the transitional ages, however, the shape assumed through commercial capitalism was entirely dissimilar. It was throughout this time that it urbanized in the true sense. In England, and even more emphatically in Holland, the birth of capitalism can be dated from the late 16th and early 17th centuries. Holland's supremacy in international deal, associated with its urgent require to import grain and timber (and hence to export manufactures) enabled Amsterdam to corner the Baltic deal and to displace Venice since the commercial and financial centre of Europe.

The capital therefore amassed was accessible to fund the well-known chartered companies (Dutch East India Company 1602; West India Company 1621). It also provided the circulating capital for merchants occupied in the 'putting-out organization' whereby they supplied raw materials to domestic handicrafts workers and marketed the product. This level of capitalism based upon riches amassed from commerce is recognized since commercial capitalism.

A significant point to notice in relationship with mainly of these early capitalisms is the combination of commercial and financial behaviors, of deal and banking. The kind of capitalism that was growing up in Europe in the Transitional Ages and was well recognized through 1500 was predominantly of this sort. Here place the distinction flanked by commercial capitalism of the ancient and Transitional Ages. For the mainly section, the manufacture of goods was still accepted on in a little method, on the foundation of handicraft job.

Under the 'putting out' organization, or Verlagssystem, (since it was described in Holland), a prosperous merchant (capitalist) buys the raw material, pays a variety of laborers to job it up into a finished product at house or in shops, and sells the finished product. The aspects that distinguished it from the ordinary handicraft organization were that it was done on a big level through hired labour, that the worker did not own the materials on which he worked and frequently not even his apparatus, and that one man controlled the entire procedure from start to finish. It was the merchants who made the crucial decision in relation to the approach, markets and volume of manufacture, and employed or turned out the craftsmen at will. The entire industry became merchant-dominated and craftsmen became mere wage earners.

It was also recognized since the domestic organization since the job was done in the houses of individual workers instead of in the shop of master craftsman. However, since has been pointed out, much before Holland or England, the therefore-described domestic or putting-out organization was in full swing in Florence and northern Italy through the 13th and 14th centuries. The Arte della Lana or cloth manufacturer's guild of Florence in the 14th century may serve since an instance of the putting-out organization. Its members bought wool abroad, brought it to Florence and had it made into finished cloth through carders, spinners, weavers, fullers and dyers who were paid wages.

The product then was sent abroad for sale. Even in Florence or Bruges or Ghent, industrial capitalism was never urbanized in the contemporary sense. There was nothing truly comparable to the factory organization of the 19th century. Predominantly, medieval capitalism was commercial and financial. It can so be said that a limited shape of 'early' or commercial capitalism, already recognized in the ancient world, had urbanized in Italy since early since the thirteenth century and later in the Low Countries.

This commercial shape urbanized in England in the 16th century and began to transform into industrial capitalism while elements of feudalism and the guild organization still lived. In short, so, the early level of capitalism, primarily founded upon commerce is described commercial capitalism, which in course of time metamorphosed into industrial capitalism. Capitalism, so, did exist in ancient world in the shape of commerce since well since guild organization and merchant dominated putting-out organization in the medieval world.

The Era of Commercial Capitalism

What then can be said to be roughly the date for commercial capitalism? Marx placed the beginnings of the industrial period in the 16th century but admitted that 'the first efforts of capitalist manufacture' (not merely capital accumulation, it should be noted) emerged precociously in the Italian municipality-states in the Transitional Ages.

Any emerging organism, even if it is still distant from having urbanized all its final aspects, bears within it the potential for such growth before it can be assigned a name. The roots of capitalism were, so, embedded, with all potentials of contemporary industrial capitalism in the transitional ages. The largest cause behind this place in the information that although creation of profit or heaping up of wealth was generally condemned, the growth of sure conditions left an indelible impact on the existing situation and transformed the whole procedure of economic behaviors. Flanked by 1100 and 1300, new gold and silver mines were opened up in Bohemia, Transylvania and the Carpathians. Furthermore, since several rulers became stronger they were able to coin more and bigger money.

Florence began to issue gold coins described florins, in 1252. Venice began the coinage of same pieces, described ducats in 1284. In the similar century France began to issue gold coins and improved silver ones. The increase in the number of coins permitted an increase in the volume of business transacted through money. The transitional ages were gradually developing what is described a money economy. According to scholars, while every economic organization seems first within the framework of another, there are few periods throughout which economic procedures reveal in a comparatively pure shape the characteristics of a single economic organization.

These are the periods of full growth of the organization; until they are reached, the organization is going by its early era, which is also the late era of the disappearing or retreating economic organization. Applying to capitalism this division into epochs, we may distinguish the periods of

early capitalism, full capitalism (Hochkapitalismus) and late capitalism. In the era of early capitalism, which lasted from the 13th century to the transitional of the 18th century, economic mediators, i.e. the entrepreneurs and the workers operated within the old feudal framework and retained all the characteristics of their handicraft origin and pre- capitalist mentality; the output of factories and manufactories was still not extremely significant.

In the era of full capitalism, which closed with the outbreak of the World War, the scope of economic action was expanded enormously, and scientific and technical application was also extraordinarily broadened. Intensified commercialization of economic life and debasement of all economic procedures into purely commercial transactions were the typical feature characteristics of this era. The era of late capitalism can be best characterized through describing the transforms which capitalism has been undergoing as the World War I. Maurice Dobb admits that organizations are never in reality to be establish in their pure shape and in any era of history and elements feature both of preceding and of succeeding periods are to be establish, sometimes mingled in extraordinary complexity.

However, he refuses to seem upon the middle era prior to the 'putting out organization', when the craftsmen had started losing their independence and were being subordinated to merchants, since early capitalism. Since he says, '...we cannot date the dawn of capitalism from the first signs of the appearance of big-level trading and of a merchant class, and we cannot speak of a special era of 'Merchant Capitalism, since several have done.' The opening stage of capitalism necessity be dated in England, not in 12th century since Henry Pirenne has done, nor in the 14th century with its urban deal and guild handicrafts since others have done, but in the latter half of 16th and early 17th century when capital began to flow into manufacture on a considerable level and such connections since that flanked by the capitalist and hired wage-earners or that flanked by domestic handicraftsmen and merchant capitalist in the putting-out organization appeared.

From 1100 on, real accumulation of wealth were made, frequently in the first example in the shape of coin, which might later be invested in land, structures, or ships. In few examples these accumulations sprang from the subsistence of an agricultural surplus. The profits of a growing commerce and the new mines enabled few merchants to heap up wealth. Often a man gathered wealth from one or two of these sources at once. Indeed, some medieval accumulations of money had a single, easy origin. However, one item is extremely noteworthy. 'Surplus value' or surplus existence lived both in feudal community and in the Egypt of the Pharaohs, but in neither case was bourgeois class its recipient.

But under Commercial Capitalism capital accumulation took lay out of the profits of merchants, quite independent of the employment of workers for wages. This is the point which distinguished commercial capitalism from other shapes of capitalism. The ancient era, so, was the age more of commercial accumulation rather than of commercial capitalism. Roughly speaking, so, the whole era

from 13th to 18th century, till the coming of industrial capitalism, can be designated to be the era of commercial capitalism, however, following Dobb, it can be said to have attained its climax from 16th century onwards.

Significant Characteristics of Commercial Capitalism

Since historians have argued, any historical era reveals the aspects of both the preceding and succeeding periods. In a same method, Commercial Capitalism also has sure characteristics of feudalism beside with capitalistic traits. In information, Commercial Capitalism or 'early capitalism' operated within the feudal framework. The feudal characteristics are since follows:

- Job was generally done in the houses of the producers and not under the factory shades of contemporary industries.
- Not full-level machines, but easy apparatus were used for manufacturing. And several a times these factors of manufacture were owned through the workers themselves.
- As factors of manufacture were limited, manufacturing was also on a much smaller level since compared to goods produced in factories.
- One man, i.e., the merchant entrepreneur, controlled the entire procedure from start to finish.

The capitalist characteristics were since follows:

- Stimulus of profit was the largest driving force behind the whole procedure.
- With rising desire for profit, the demand for labour was growing tremendously with the result that the merchant capitalists were hiring more and more workers.
- Financial advances were provided to the producers through the capitalists. These could be equated to wages under industrial capitalism.
- The final product since well since the whole profit was appropriated through the capitalist.

Development of Commercial Capitalism

Any level of capitalism, commercial or industrial, cannot be understood without little appreciation of the historic transforms that bring in relation to the appearance. In this complicated narrative it is significant to distinguish three biggest themes. The first concerns the transfer of institution and manage of manufacture from the imperial and aristocratic strata of pre-capitalist states into the hands of mercantile elements.

This momentous transform originates in the political rubble that followed the fall of the Roman Empire. There merchant traders recognized trading niches that gradually became centers of strategic power, therefore that a merchant Dom extremely much at the mercy of feudal lords in the 9th and 10th centuries became through the 12th and 13th centuries an estate with considerable measure of political and social status. The feudal sustained to oversee manufacture of the peasantry on his

manorial estate, but the merchant, and his descendant the guild master, were organizer of manufacture in the cities and of fund for the feudal aristocracy itself.

The transformation of a merchant estate into a capitalist class capable of imagining itself since a political and not presently since an economic force required centuries to complete and was not, in information legitimated until the English revolution of the 17th and the French revolution of 18th centuries. Feudal social connections were replaced through market connections based upon swap and this in turn steadily improved the wealth and social importance of the merchant against the aristocracy. The rise of market community, so, became the central theme in the overall transfer of authority from the aristocracy to the bourgeoisie. Economic institution of manufacture and sharing by purchase and sale dominated the whole scene. The economic revolution from which the factors of manufacture appeared came since an end product of a political convulsion in which the predominance of one social order is replaced through a new one.

This is the second theme in the historical development of capitalism. It resulted in the isolation of a traditionally seamless web of ruler ship into two realms. One of them involved the exercise of the traditional political tasks of ruler ship, and the other realm was limited to the manufacture and sharing of goods and services. A third theme calls attention to the cultural transforms that accompanied the development of capitalism. The attendance of an ideological framework based upon profit contrasts sharply with that of pre-capitalist formations. For a proper understanding of commercial capitalism, it is necessary to take a quick glance at the current of measures by which it evolved.

It passed by dissimilar levels finally reaching the level of contemporary capitalism. Feudal community had been recognized through the eleventh century when the institution of manufacture and extortion of surplus labour were accepted out for the benefit of the seigneur, an exalted landlord. Soon, however, the procedure of its decomposition began. The mainly extra ordinary economic characteristic in the era throughout 1000-1250 was a steady rise in the wages, rents and profits. However, since Carlo Cipolla has pointed out in his book 'Before the Industrial Revolution', throughout the thirteenth century, sure bottlenecks had begun to manifest themselves. Since demographic pressure steadily increased, there eventually came into play the economic law according to which lands with diminishing marginal returns are taken into farming.

The laws of supply and demand inevitably pushed rents up and real wages down Items changed considerably from the 14th century onwards due largely to two factors – 1) dreadful plague epidemic of 1348-51 since a result of which 25 million people disappeared in small more than two years, out of 80 million people who existed in Europe before the plague. 2) Wars and revolutions like the Hundred Years War (1337-1453), the War of Roses (1455-85) etc. which further depleted significantly the population of Europe. Flanked by 1347 and 1500, European population declined from 80 to 60 or 70 million. The result was a drastic cutting down of the effective labour force

leading to a rise of real wages, and a simultaneous stagnation or reduction of rents and interests. Consequently, the peasant classes improved their economic and social location comparative to the class of landed proprietors.

The weakening of the authority of the merchant guild and formation of numerous craft guilds suggests that craftsmen and workers in the cities were similarly improving their location comparative to the clusters of the merchant-entrepreneurs. Simultaneously, there was a renewal of commercial fairs, a renaissance of urban life and the formation of a commercial bourgeoisie. It is in this decomposition of the feudal order that the formation of mercantile capitalism or commercial capitalism took root. In excess of a era of many centuries the 'extensive journey' toward capitalism sustained in this direction: the extension of deal and power on the world level, the growth of techniques of transportation and manufacture, the introduction of new manners of manufacture and the emergence of new attitude and thoughts. From the year 1000, the European economy 'took off' and gradually gained ground. In the course of the 13th century, Venetian merchants proved to be more advanced since distant since business techniques were concerned than those used through the Byzantine Empire.

The organization of production at this time was widely by guilds, that is, economic and social association of merchants or craftspeople in the similar deal or craft to protect the interests of its members. Merchant guilds were often extremely powerful, controlling deal in a geographic region; the craft guilds (since of goldsmiths, weavers or shoemakers) regulated wages, excellence of manufacture, and working circumstances for apprentices. The guild organization declined from the 16th century because of changing deal and job circumstances which led to the emergence of the putting-out organization. The composition of international deal flanked by East and West indicated that it was in the 13th and 14th centuries that Europe asserted its superiority. One of the largest causes for European success, at least in the paper and textile industry, was the mechanization of the productive procedure through the adoption of the water mill.

The mainly spectacular consequences of the supremacy acquired through Europe in the technological field were the geographic explorations and the subsequent economic, political and military expansion of Europe. One of the extra ordinary results of the geographic explorations was the detection of the American continent or the New World and the beginnings of migration therein. The lightning overseas expansion of Europe had distant-reaching economic consequences. One of the biggest consequences was the detection in Mexico and Peru of rich deposits of gold and especially silver.

In 1503 valuable metals arrived from the Antilles; in 1519 the pillage of the treasure of the Aztecs in Mexico began; in 1534 the pillage of the Incas in Peru started. In the similar era that valuable metals became more abundant, prices rose because demand for goods had risen because the abundance of valuable metals had made people richer. But due to fall in population, since explained earlier, manufacture could not be expanded proportionately. Since a result, the rise in demand resulted in a

rise in price. Economic historians have labeled the era 1500 to 1620 since the 'Price Revolution'. It is generally held that flanked by 1500 and 1620, the standard stage of prices in the several European countries increased through 300 to 400 percent.

A confused debate ensued in which a number of reasons have been held responsible for causing high prices: farmers, middlemen, exporters, foreigners, merchants, and usurers since well since 'monetary revaluations'. In this debate the analysis of J. Bodin, a jurist from Anjou, is particularly significant. Bodin wrote 'the principal and virtually sole reason' of the rise in prices was 'the abundance of gold and silver which is greater today than it has been throughout the four previous centuries.... The principal reason of a rise in prices is always an abundance of that with which the price of goods is considered.' The net result was that the merchant and banking bourgeoisie gathered strength.

After Venice and Florence, Antwerp, London, Lyon and Paris urbanized, with populations surpassing 50,000 even 100,000. So, with banking and merchant bourgeoisies having acquired immense fortunes and national states having mastered the means of conquest and power, the circumstances were ready in the 16th century for the future growth of capitalism. It is in this sense that one can date the capitalist period since beginning in the 16th century. However, historians and economists have referred to this early level since mercantile or commercial capitalism. Significant progress in the field of deal and commerce took lay. This unprecedented commercial development naturally led to immense accumulation of capital and is referred to since the Commercial Revolution. It is undeniable that England, for example, was able to do what she did in the first levels of the Industrial Revolution partly because this previous Commercial Revolution allowed a considerable accumulation of capital: the profits of overseas deal overflowed into agriculture, mining and production. This situation is what is described Commercial Capitalism. The Commercial Revolution was an extremely significant economic event in the 16th and 17th centuries when the transformation of the European deal occurred since a result of the overseas expansion and the influx of bullion. In deal the mainly significant transforms were: development in international deal, ending of regionalism, trans-oceanic deal, development of markets, and new types of commercial institutions.

The growth in the international deal and the several means of banking and swap flanked by 1550 and 1700, especially in Holland and England, can be termed since the Commercial Revolution. It had sure outstanding feature characteristics. One of them was immense capital accumulation and intensification of Commercial Capitalism since we have already noted. Another was the development of banking. Since we have discussed earlier, banking was extremely limited in the Transitional Ages due to moral disapproval and was accepted on mostly through the Jews. Through the 15th century, however, the banking business had spread to southern Germany and France. The leading firm in the north was that of Fuggers of Augsburg.

The first in order of importance was the Bank of Sweden (1657), but the mainly significant one— the Bank of England — was founded in 1694. Another significant characteristic of Commercial

Revolution was the replacement of craft guilds through the springing of industries like mining, smelting and woollen industry. The mainly typical shape of industrial manufacture in the era of the Commercial Revolution was the domestic organization or the 'putting out organization' which urbanized in the woollen industry. Although the level of manufacture was insignificant, the institution was basically capitalist. Formation of regulated companies, i.e. an association of merchants grouped jointly for a general venture, was another characteristic of the Commercial Revolution. Generally the purpose of the combination was to uphold a monopoly of deal in few section of the world. In the 17th century this was replaced through the joint-stock company.

The remaining characteristic of the Commercial Revolution that requires to be measured was the development of a more efficient money economy. An average organization of money was adopted through every significant state to be used for all transactions within its borders. The making of national currencies was so really a significant attainment of the Commercial Revolution. Through the end of the 15th century, in Western Europe, the Mediterranean was the mainly urbanized region. But through the end of the 16th century, this region declined and the economic balance of Europe shifted to the Northwest region, on the Atlantic coast. There were transforms in the kind of commerce with the shift and development of deal. In the 16th century, the flow of spices from the East and the bullion from the West were significant.

But gradually new overseas products became staples of consumption in Europe and grew in commercial importance—indigo from the East, porcelain from China, cocoa from America, tea and coffee from the Distant East and the Close to East, etc. A considerable portion of the bullion from America went to India and the East. Require for slaves transplanted black population to America. European goods were also exported to far land, and this served since a boost to industries. Refining of sugar and preparation of tobacco were new industries. This acted since a great impulse to the development of capitalism from overseas expansion.

That is why till the end of the 17th century, capitalism can be described commercial capitalism, since it was capital dominated through commercial action. Maritime dominance also passed from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic shipping. This was due to the growth of cheaper shapes of sea transport through the Dutch and the English. The growth, so, can be summed up briefly. In the centuries following the 12th, with the rise of commerce and business, there grew up a class of merchants, traders and financiers who sought profit and looked upon usury since a normal section of their business life. However, of course usury was general in the middle of the Jews as the 11th century because they were the real moneylenders.

The prohibitions against usury issued through the church could mean nothing to them as they were not Christians. Since the merchant capitalists became more and more significant and since the church became involved in the financial and business mechanism of the times, the thoughts of the church and the public readjusted themselves towards the acceptance of the capitalist spirit. The earlier way

of production on a big level was by guilds in cities. The guilds were of significance in medieval economic growth because of their deliberate policy of promoting sectional interests.

A decisive transform took place in Western Europe, when the intermediary, the merchant capitalist, since a result of the 'putting out' organization, or Verlags system, separated the producer from the final consumer. All these growths as the 13th century constituted dissimilar levels of Commercial Capitalism or merchant capitalism. These capitalist tendencies remained confined, however, to commercial behaviors and within the feudal framework. The procedure was not complete through 1500, as more than a century later usury was still being denounced through churchmen, rulers and publicists.

Role of Mercantilism

Mercantilism, a word coined through Adam Smith, played an extremely significant role in the development of Commercial Capitalism. Maurice Dobb refers to it since 'an organization of state regulated use by deals—essentially the economic policy of an age of primitive accumulation.' In short, mercantilism can be said to be a state controlled economic policy which aimed at regulating the deal and commerce of the nation, since well since its factories and manufactures with the primary purpose of ultimately to concentrate and wield political authority through structure fleets, equipping army etc.

Although mercantilism varied from country to country, it had sure general feature characteristics like paternalism, imperialism, economic nationalism etc., which meant that the prosperity of a nation was determined through the quantity of valuable metals within its borders, became an essential element of mercantilism ever as valuable metals had started flowing in from America to the old world. Generally speaking, the era flanked by 16th and 18th centuries is designated since the era of mercantilism, since great economic development, an increase in the exploit of money, a sharp rise in the volume of aloofness deal, acquisition of more and more colonies etc. reached its zenith throughout this era.

Mercantilism is closely interlinked with Commercial Capitalism since development of the latter attracted the attention of the state and although the behaviors of the merchants were sometimes obstructed and hampered through the policy of mercantilism and so the merchants were forced to oppose mercantilist policies on those occasions, on the entire the merchants were positively benefited through the state policies like creating markets through acquiring colonies and thereby expanding exports through structure fleets, through providing defense against foreign goods through raising the tariff, through maintaining banks, through giving subsidies etc. Jean Baptiste Colbert, the French chief minister under Louis XIV, for instance, gave a tremendous boost to commercial capitalism through adopting a vigorous mercantile policy like prohibition of export of money, levying high tariff on foreign manufactures, and giving bounties to encourage French shipping. He also fostered imperialism hoping to increase a favorable balance of deal.

On the other hand, since Christopher Hill argues, the mercantilism of the Tudor monarchs in England was positively proguild and restrictive towards the putting-out organization, because with a weak army and bureaucracy it was easier for them to tax the urban guilds more effectively than the merchant-capitalists of the putting-out organization situated mostly distant absent in the countryside. A series of Acts, starting with the 1533 Statute, passed through the Tudors in an attempt to restrict them demonstrates the information. The Weavers' Act forbidding the clothiers to own more than one loom and two weavers and the Enclosure Commission set up in 1548 to seem into the enclosures slowed down the development of the putting out organization in England. The situation improved with coming of the Stuarts and Commercial Capitalism under the putting-out organization flourished.

Role of Deal

Since the name indicates, Commercial Capitalism appeared primarily out of profits of deal and commerce. The question now is what was the nature of this deal? The noted French historian Fernand Braudel thinks it to be extensive- aloofness deal. In his view, extensive-aloofness deal undoubtedly played a leading role in the genesis of merchant capitalism and was for an extensive time its backbone.

The views of contemporary historians, however, are hostile to it in several methods. Jacques Heers, for instance, script in relation to the Mediterranean in the 15th century, insists that there were a big number of short-range deals, instead of extensive-aloofness deal, the greatest traffic being in grain, wood and salt. Peter Mathias has also recognized with statistics that England's foreign deal on the eve of the Industrial Revolution was substantially smaller than her domestic deal. It has been argued that inter-local deal within Europe was a hundred times greater in the 16th century than the swap flanked by Europe and the New World.

Braudel says that even however the volume of regional deal might have been much greater and so the deal in the Mediterranean was in a location of minority, the value of minority in history should not be overlooked, however, he admits, today's historiography is concerned primarily with the experience of majority, of the millions forgotten through previous schools of history. In the first lay, Braudel continues, extensive-aloofness deal, recognized to German historians since Ferhandel, created clusters of Fernhandler – import-export merchants, who were always a category separately.

They introduced themselves into the route flanked by the artisan and his far raw materials – wool, silk, cotton. They also interposed themselves flanked by the finished product and its marketing in far spaces. The products of distant-off lands also establish their method into the hands of the import-export merchant like silk from China and Persia, pepper from India, cinnamon from Ceylon etc. The risks of long-distance deal were great, but therefore were its profits.

Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism

The question now logically arises that what precisely was the role of commercial behaviors and capital accumulated thereby in the transition from feudal mode of manufacture to industrial mode of

manufacture. The significance of commercial capitalism and its role in the transition becomes all the more striking in the transition debate, which ensued in the middle of scholars and historians.

Two levels of the debate can be recognized. 1) The Dobb-Sweezy controversy turned largely on what would be the correct Marxist account of the transition from feudalism to capitalism in the light of European experience. 2) The second level of the debate is less bound through such limitations.

Robert Brenner's critiques of the 'demographic model', supported through Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie of the Annales School, Michael Postan and Habakuk of the Liberal School and Marxist Guy Bois, the 'commercialization model' of Pirenne, Sweezy, 'the falling rent rate' of Perry Anderson, Rodney Hilton and 'World Organization' model of Immanuel Wallerstein, are not only rich in fresh insights and growths of Marxist analysis, but also utilize a size of new and meaningful proof on agrarian history, industrial and commercial development and demographic transforms.

The debate was largely in relation to the two points – whether the swap dealings or external deal demolished the feudal mode of manufacture; or whether inner contradictions like use of the peasant through the nobility and unproductive exploit of economic surplus like expenditure on war and luxury were responsible for the break-down of feudalism. There was an extensive time-gap flanked by the decline of feudalism in Western Europe throughout the 14th century and the beginning of the capitalist era in the second half of the 16th century at the earliest. Sweezy does not agree with Dobb's characterization of the intervening era since feudal. Rather he believes it since a traditional shape in which the predominant elements were neither feudal nor capitalist. According to the thinker, feudalism had its own dynamic stage (10th- 12th centuries) of expanding manufacture based on the extension of farming, few technological improvements and extraction of surplus and its exploit in unproductive methods.

Dobb indicated how the economic effects of deal and merchant capital were themselves formed through feudal class dealings and rather reinforced feudal obligations. Further, merchant or commercial capital is not directly involved in manufacture and hence its source of profit lies in the skill to turn the words and circumstances of deal against petty producers in agriculture and industry. Dobb made the following points concerning the emergence of capitalism: i) super session of serfdom through contractual dealings or rise of peasant property. This was the result of the inner contradictions in the feudal dealings flanked by the nobility and the peasantry.

The extremely misery of the peasantry created the danger of depopulation of manors. The effects of the nobility's expenditure on unproductive behaviors like war were equally disastrous. Overexploitation of labour, unproductive exploit of economic surplus and exhaustion of authority and opportunities to increase lord's revenue made the feudal mode increasingly untenable. ii) Dobb attached considerable importance to the development of capitalist elements from the ranks of direct producers released from feudal constraints and occupied in the petty mode of manufacture. iii) Dobb sees the English Revolution of 1640 since one in which artisans and yeomen seized political

authority from landlords and merchants. Le Roy Ladurie stressed the importance of the demographic model implying that the extensive-word trends of the feudal economy conformed to the Malthusian sequence of population development outstripping food supply and then demographic decline due to calamities like famine, starvation etc.

A population upswing would then be associated with falling wages, growing food prices and growing rents. According to the thinker, there was a separate upward surge of population throughout the 16th century, followed through a sharp decline in the 17th century. Abundance of labour in the 16th century due to population development gave a boost to feudalism. Conversely, feudalism received a blow in the 17th century with a sharp fall in population. This was, in the view of Ladurie, the decisive role of the demographic factor in shaping the nature and sequence of transition. Brenner criticizes both the demographic model since well since the deal-centered come. The largest thrust of Brenner's argument placed the growth of class building and state authority and its effects at the centre of analysis.

According to the thinker, the two fundamental troubles concerning the transition related to : i) the decline versus persistence of serfdom and its effects, and ii) the emergence and predominance of close little peasant property versus the rise of landlord-big tenant farmer dealings on the land.

The class-building had three layers— the state or the monarchy at the top, the gentry and feudal landlords at the transitional and the peasants and serfs at the lowest foundation. In the 14th and 15th centuries the perpetual class clash flanked by the second and third social clusters resulted in the triumph of the peasantry and serfdom came to an end. In England, however, as the monarchy was dependent on the gentry for taxes, it could not protect the peasantry against the oppression of the gentry and the feudal lords.

Since a result, the peasantry were ultimately again suppressed through feudalism, leading to their deprivation of land which were subsequently enclosed through the landlords. The successful enclosure movement in England laid the foundations of agrarian capitalism in the 16th century and this facilitated the procedure of her early industrialization. In France, however, the monarchy was directly dependent upon the peasants for taxes. Therefore the landlords could not enclose the lands successfully since the peasants resisted the move vehemently and the monarchy could not afford to impose it upon them against their will.

Since a result, agrarian capitalism could not develop in France. It was all the more delayed in Eastern Europe where monarchy was very weak, feudal lords were powerful and consequently feudalism sustained in its strongest shape. Perry Anderson, a Marxist, stressed like Dobb, Hilton and Brenner that transforms in social dealings necessity precede growth of productive forces. The nobility was unable to uphold serfdom after the feudal crisis because the cities gave peasants a shelter when they fled from their masters. In this manner, the political contradictions were first heightened and then resolved through its disintegration.

But unlike them, he rejected the view that class struggle plays a decisive role in the germination since well since in the settlement of social crisis. Like Sweezy and Wallerstein, on the other hand, Anderson stressed the importance of cities and international deal to the procedure of capitalist growth. His theory is also recognized since 'eclectic Marxism.' On the other hand, prominent scholars like Sweezy, Wallerstein, Perry Anderson established commerce and the capital accumulated thereby to be the mainly crucial link flanked by the decline of feudalism and the rise of capitalism.

Capitalist manufactories (i.e. big handicrafts employing wage labour) which competed with and ousted the old craft guilds, were the crucial link – the shape in which the metamorphosis of merchant capital into industrial capital was achieved. Paul Sweezy saw the *Verlagssystem* or the 'putting out organization', in which big merchants of the city employed craftsmen scattered in domestic workshops in the villages or suburbs since the mainly significant point from which procedure of transition to the matured factory organization of the Industrial Revolution started. Sweezy's view that merchant capital, which urbanized and blossomed within the construct of the feudal community, evolved directly into industrial capital, has, however, been measured through others since misconception in the sense that only if merchant capital was invested in industrial manufacture, could it be responsible for the transition to capitalism.

In other terms, it is to be clarified what is the distinction flanked by investment in commercial manufacture and that in industrial manufacture and why, so, the latter only could put an end to feudalism and simultaneously paved the path for the rise of industrial capitalism. These were:

- Under commercial manufacture the earlier way of production by guilds in cities underwent crucial organizational transforms since manufacture of goods came to be dominated through the merchant capitalists under the putting-out organization. The putting-out organization was much more elaborately urbanized and manufactories were created when merchant capital was invested in industrial mode of manufacture.
- The transform of investment from commercial to industrial manufacture was emphasized through the shift in the economic centre from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. While earlier commerce was confined to the Mediterranean and Baltic area, a geographical shift took lay to the north-western area of the Atlantic throughout the late 15th and 16th centuries. The causes were several, like, the soil circumstances in the Mediterranean Europe were inferior to those of North-Western Europe. Detection of valuable metals in America was another cause. It brought with it enormous international liquidity and marked the development of international deal. Flanked by 1500-1700 at least in Holland and England a commercial revolution took lay. Moreover, piracy deterred the merchants in the Mediterranean. Detection of new deal circuits by geographical exploration further accelerated the procedure of shifting the economic centre. Technical breakthrough was another cause.

- Under industrial manufacture, a much wider range of choice of goods than before was made accessible for the purpose of international deal, including a superior number of non-luxury goods;
- the volume of articles of general consumption for both international and domestic markets was considerably increased through industrial mode of manufacture

It can be said, so, that capitalism prevalent till the end of the 17th century was commercial capitalism, that is, capitalism dominated through commercial action. A big section of the goods in deal was obtained from the traditional sector—agriculture, domestic job and craftwork. This growing volume of deal emphasized the commercial aspect of the still expanding capitalism. However, the demand on the manufactures multiplied bringing in relation to the in the end a fundamental technical breakthrough—Industrial Revolution. A new economy was ushered in through the Industrial Revolution—well-known in the history of Europe since industrial capitalism. The metamorphosis of commercial capital into industrial capital was completed basically through two primary factors—the deployment of commercial capital increasingly into industries, thereby transforming it into industrial capital and a significant increase in the number of factories or manufactories, a typical characteristic of the industrial age which in its turn completed the decline of the ‘putting out’ organization.

Commercial Capitalism in Spain, Italy, France, England and Holland

Commercial Capitalism took dissimilar shapes in dissimilar countries. Here as suggested, revise briefly its characteristics in dissimilar biggest countries of Europe at that time. In Spain, the old colonial and commercial country of Europe, for instance, the development of commercial capitalism was not extremely successful for several causes. Spain possessed all the economic stimuli necessary for industrial development—gold and silver from the New World, rise in population and a class of affluent consumers. Still it failed since distant since industry and commerce were concerned.

The growth of the *Verlags* system or putting-out organization which symbolized the triumph of commercial capitalism did not grow adequately in Spain. It urbanized too little extent in the rural regions and struck a blow to the guilds, i.e. the Spanish *gremios* and benefited the merchants, but in the urban regions the guilds proliferated at the auspices of the government and set up rigid manages in excess of design and qualities of products, and thereby became a positive hindrance to innovations. Moreover, permission of entry of foreign goods and prohibition of the export of domestic products dealt a heavy blow to the domestic industries of Spain.

The overall defective tax organization of Spain was another impediment. Spain quickly became a country importing primary finished goods and exporting raw materials. Seville’s (a significant industrial centre and port on the Guadalquivir River) deal with the New World or America started declining and fell into the hands of foreign merchants. Initially it had a tremendous beneficial impact upon Spain and Seville became one of Europe’s biggest ports. It quickly became a significant centre of international deal, because rise in bullion led to a corresponding rise in prices and attracted traders to sell their products in the Spanish markets. The Spanish people also indulged in buying these

imported foreign goods for their own requires by bullion since a means of swap, rather than setting up industries for manufacturing goods. Agricultural foundation in Spain was equally poor and made Spain a biggest grain importing country. In other terms, 'Spain became a colonial dumping ground for foreign goods in Europe.'

Commercial capitalism, so, could create no headway in Spain since there was no inflow of capital, rather, its drain. Neither could Spain capture a substantial foreign market for herself, nor was there a sufficiently big house market, because high food prices left small in the hands of the size of the population to indulge in any other type of purchase. All these factors beside with technical backwardness retarded the procedure of industrialization. Enormous influx of capital, so, could not stimulate the development of commercial capitalism and its subsequent transformation into industrial capitalism. Since we had seen briefly earlier, even before it urbanized in England and Holland, the 'putting-out organization' flourished in Italy—Florence and Northern Italy in the 13th and 14th centuries. The biggest sections of Italy, however, remained tied to the traditional organization of manufacture and no further progress of Commercial Capitalism and its subsequent transformation into industrialism could take lay.

The largest cause was that Italy went on producing only high quality, expensive woolen cloth which was produced by old-fashioned guilds, which maintained obsolete shapes of economic institution and manufacture and were unable to produce in big quantities. So in Italy troubles like high cost of manufacture, expensive labour, heavy tax organization, cumbersome internal tolls, imports of wool from Spain etc. retarded the development of capitalism. Since a result, she failed to compete with England and Holland, who produced new draperies that were lighter and brighter since well since cheaper. In France and England, however, the situation was dissimilar. Deal urbanized in France in the 15th and 16th centuries, and Lyons became the mainly active financial centre of the west outside Italy. France's only biggest foreign supplier was Italy from whom she took fine silk, spices, drugs and dyestuffs. Later in 1536 the silk industry of Lyons was set up with a view to creation France gradually self-enough. Rouen on the Channel Coast linked Paris and northern France with the trading metropolis of Antwerp.

Ports of Normandy and Brittany had old recognized fisheries and after 1520 they turned to Newfoundland fishery. Bordeaux and Rochelle exported great quantities of wine to England and Netherlands. Salt was sent to Netherlands and the Baltic. Linen was sent to Spain from Morlaix, St. Malo and woolens, corn, wood, ironware, paper and other goods. Merchants of France adopted the putting-out organization since a result of which Commercial Capitalism flourished, while the independence of innumerable master craftsmen, journeymen, apprentices and casual laborers—particularly of textiles, construction, and mining and metallurgy industries—was ruined. They were replaced through what was described in the 16th century France – arts and manufactures—which

were not labour intensive, but were marked through capital concentration, as the numerous workers were only available to those who had capital and not to easy master craftsmen.

In the early 16th century, England was on the margin of European deal with marginal exploit of technology in industry and agriculture. The putting-out organization urbanized in the manufacturing units. 16th century capitalism in England was, so, essentially commercial in nature. Basically, the kind of industries in England were two—industries like coal, mining or iron smelting where technological improvement was required, and, on the other hand, the little-level industry of independent craftsmen who were gradually losing their independence at the hands of the merchant capitalists. Deal was in extremely limited things like raw materials primarily, the sole manufactured export being woolen cloth. All her vital requires she imported from other countries.

England traded primarily with Ireland, Normandy, Brittany, and Southwestern France, Northern Spain etc. from where she obtained wine, oil, dyestuff, salt and iron. England's deal with America initially started in the mid-16th century by Spain and then with the establishment of English colonies, England establishes a flourishing market in the New World for her manufactures. With the shift of the focal point of deal from the Mediterranean to Western Europe, England was placed at the centre of world deal through the mid-17th century. The Dutch commercial capitalism was dependent on Northern deal i.e. deal with the Baltic area and Norway. Special ships were urbanized for the purpose and soon the Dutch industry became the best one. Holland was also the primary producer of sugar. Amsterdam had sixty refineries in 1661.

The putting-out organization was urbanized in luxury and semi-luxury goods. In 1660's the United Provinces became the principal centre of manufacture in the European world economy. Since has been noted already textiles and ship-structure were her chief sources of capital.

Results of Commercial Capitalism

What were then the results of Commercial Capitalism? Evidently, the mainly significant was the development of industrial capitalism. Another was the development of a Scientific Revolution. The opening of America and the East and the consequent influx of Spanish gold and silver created a tremendous demand for shipbuilding and navigation and for the creation of the compass, maps and other instruments.

The age of Galileo, Newton, Harvey, Descartes, Copernicus and Leibnitz saw the victory of the experimental way and of the application of Mathematics in the account of reality. It was in this cultural climate that the school of 'arith politicians'—Grant, Petty and Halley- rose and urbanized. It helped to make an institutional building and a business ethic, which emphasized the growth of industrial capitalism and thereby was the prime reason of the development of big cities and industrial centers. Another effect of commercial capitalism was a rise in demand for consumer and capital goods—textiles, wine, weapons, equipment of several types etc. and also for commercial and

transport services for the transportation of finished goods since well since raw materials from one lay to another.

The slave deal resulted in transportation of black population to America. The rise in demand produced two dissimilar sets of consequences. One was that the rise in demand resulted in increased manufacture, but due to sure bottlenecks in productive tools, manufacture could not be proportionately increased leading to a rise in demand, which again resulted in rise in prices. The 'Price Revolution' was so an inevitable consequence of Commercial Capitalism. Scholars have also attributed a special maturity to the English pre-industrial economy. Accumulation of capital, large or moderate, for instance, enabled business to develop more elaborate techniques of capitalism. The credit organization was urbanized considerably because all these techniques were directly connected with the extension of credit.

The easy shape of Bill of Swap, for instance, gave method to a more complicated kind described the draft, which was in exploit through the mid-14th century and general through the 15th. Commercial Capitalism resulted in the development of markets that again had an extremely significant outcome—the rise of cities. From the nucleus of little trading centers, they gradually and gradually evolved into flourishing, wealthy cities with all aspects of urban culture. There is undoubtedly an eclectic account of the rise of medieval cities, but information is sure: without capital these cities could never have appeared since significant centers of swap of goods and products.

Therein place the role of Commercial Capitalism however of course, it would be wrong to regard them since microcosms of capitalism, because several cities in the early levels were themselves subordinated to feudal power. Nevertheless, they nourished the 'first germs' of merchant and money-lending capital that was later to be employed on a superior level. The Price Revolution, on the other hand, led to the rise of the bourgeoisie class. Nobles, who could not cope, became heavily in debt. Merchants, businessmen, traders, lawyers, i.e. the bourgeoisie, made fortunes and thereby appeared since a powerful force in community.

The beginnings of an organized trading interest in the cities, separate from the handicraft, evolved into secure corporations of richer merchants, who proceeded to monopolize wholesale deal and soon came to control the city government and to exploit their political authority to further their own privileges and explicitly excluded from their ranks the handicraftsmen. The rule of the merchant capital was recognized to the detriment of the craftsmen and these merchant capitalists or merchant bourgeoisie who replaced the earlier burghers, rose to play an exclusively preponderant role in the community posing a serious challenge to the old feudal aristocracy. All these consequences of Commercial Capitalism helped to accelerate the pace of the coming of Industrial Capitalism.

Through accumulation of capital, through stimulating expansion and diversification of demand and thereby creating new markets, through favoring the development of the bourgeoisie, Commercial Capitalism brought in relation to the drastic transforms in the entrepreneurial attitudes after

discarding the conservative methods and ways and paved the path for the entry of the Industrial Revolution—a spectacular landmark in the history of human development.

CAPITALIST INDUSTRIALIZATION

Capital

Strictly speaking capitalism is a word denoting a mode of manufacture in which capital in its several shapes is the principal means of manufacture. The word ‘capital’ (*capitale*, from the Latin term *caput* for ‘head’) first appeared in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, denoting stocks of merchandise, sums of money, and money carrying interest. Fernand Braudel quotes a sermon of St. Bernardino of Siena (1380- 1444), who refers (in translation from the Latin) to ‘that prolific reason of wealth we commonly call capital’ (*capitale*).

The word came to denote, more narrowly, the *money* wealth of a firm or a merchant. In the eighteenth century it gained general usage in this narrower sense, especially referring to *productive* capital. The noun ‘capitalist’ almost certainly dates from the mid-seventeenth century, to refer to owners of ‘capital’. In everyday speech now, the term ‘capital’ is generally used to define an asset owned through an individual since wealth. Capital might then denote a sum of money to be invested in order to close a rate of return, or it might denote the investment itself: a financial instrument, or stocks and shares on behalf of titles to means of manufacture, or the physical means of manufacture themselves.

Depending on the nature of the capital, the rate of return to which the owner has a legal right is either an interest payment or a claim on profits. Capital is an asset which can generate an income flow for its owner. Two corollaries of this understanding are, first, that it applies to every sort of community, in the past, in the present and in the future, and is specific to none; and second, that it posits the possibility that inanimate substances are productive in the sense of generating an income flow. This is the neo-classical conception of capital. It exemplifies what has become recognized since fetishism, or the procedure in which men project upon outside or inanimate substances, upon reified abstractions, these powers which are actually their own. Since Paul Sweezy, a critic of such economic theories argued, ‘As profit is calculated since a return on total capital, the idea inevitably arises that capital since such is in few method productive’. Therefore a ‘quantity of capital’ is postulated and this rather than human labour is attributed with the authority of producing wealth.

The Marxist concept of capital is based on a denial of these two corollaries. First, capital is something which in its generality is quite specific to capitalism. While capital predates capitalism, in capitalist community the manufacture of capital predominates, and controls every other sort of manufacture. Capital cannot be understood separately from capitalist dealings of manufacture. Indeed, capital is not an item at all, but a social relation which seems in the shape of an item. Although capital is undoubtedly in relation to the creation money, the assets which ‘create’ money

embody a scrupulous relation flanked by those who have money and those who do not, such that not only is money 'made', but also the private property dealings which engender such a procedure are themselves continually reproduced.

Capitalism

Capital is accordingly an intricate category, not amenable to an easy definition, and the biggest section of Marx's scripts was devoted to exploring its ramifications. Whatever the asset shapes of capital itself, however, it is the private ownership of capital in the hands of a class – the class of capitalists to the exclusion of the size of the population – which is a central characteristic of capitalism since a mode of manufacture.

Only Marxists have uniformly sought to integrate in a single theoretical construction the economic, social, political and cultural dimensions of the capitalist phenomenon. Neither Max Weber nor Joseph Schumpeter, nor Friedrich von Hayek, all of whom attempted to construct non-Marxist frameworks to understand capitalism, succeeded in supplying a satisfactory framework. Weber's intellectual enterprise was essentially one of relative history, intended to uncover the roots of the unique Western growth of what he described 'contemporary rationality', which was intrinsic to the capitalist organization.

Schumpeter remained essentially an economist and his mainly durable contributions have remained in economics, for instance, his theory of the economic role of entrepreneurship. Hayek made few highly astute observations in relation to the relation of capitalism to several other phenomena in contemporary community, such since democracy and the rule of law, but he never set out to construct a comprehensive theory embracing all these connections. The word 'capitalism' is more recent than 'capitalist.' Adam Smith, commonly regarded since the classical theorist of capitalism, did not exploit the word at all; he called what he regarded since the natural organization of liberty. It became general only after the publication of Werner Sombart's magnum opus and through then was generally seen since the opposite of socialism.

The term 'capitalism' is rarely used through non-Marxist schools of economics. Even in Marxist scripts it is a late arrival. Marx, while he exploits the adjective 'capitalistic,' does not exploit capitalism since a noun either in *The Communist Manifesto* or in *Capital* vol. 1. Only in 1877, in his correspondence with Russian followers, did he exploit it in a discussion of the problem of Russia's transition to capitalism. This reluctance to employ the term may have been due to its comparative modernity in Marx's day.

The *Oxford English Dictionary* cites its first exploit (through William Makepeace Thackeray) since late since 1854. Controversies regarding the origins and periodization of capitalism arise from the tendency to emphasize one out of several characteristics which can be said to characterize the capitalist mode of manufacture. Capitalism can be said to be characterized through,

- Manufacture for sale rather than own exploit through numerous producers. This contrasts with easy commodity manufacture.
- A market where labour authority too is a commodity and is bought and sold, the mode of swap being money wages for a era of time (time rate) or for a specified task (piece rate). The subsistence of a market for labour contrasts with its absence in either slavery or serfdom.
- The predominant if not universal mediation of swap through the exploit of money. This aspect accentuates the importance of banks and other financial intermediary institutions. The actual incidence of barter is limited.
- The capitalist or his managerial agent dominates the manufacture (labour) procedure. This implies manage not only in excess of hiring and firing workers but also in excess of the choice of techniques, the output mix, the job habitation, and the arrangements for selling the output. The contrast here is with the putting-out organization or with alternative contemporary proto-socialist shapes such as the co-operative, the worker-supervised firm, worker-owned and/or state-owned firms.
- Manage through the capitalist or the manager of financial decisions. The universal exploit of money and credit facilitates the exploit of other people's possessions to fund accumulation. Under capitalism, this implies the authority of the capitalist entrepreneur to incur debts or float shares or mortgage capital assets to raise fund. The contrast here would be with central financial managed through a scheduling power.
- There is competition flanked by capitals. The manage of individual capitalists in excess of the labour procedure and in excess of the financial building is customized through its consistent operation in an habitation of competition with other capitals either producing the similar commodity or a close to-substitute, or presently fighting for markets or loans. This rising competition forces the capitalist to adopt new techniques and practices which will cut costs, and to accumulate to create possible the purchase of improved machinery. This competition strengthens the tendency towards concentration of capital in big firms. It is to neutralize competition that monopolies and cartels emerge.

Capitalist Industrialization

Capitalism is the first level in the history of the world to coincide with the phenomenon of industrialization in its full-blown shape. Jointly, the new economic institutions and the new technology (in Marxist words, the dealings and the means of manufacture) transformed the world. Technological progress is the mainly essential feature of capitalist advance, but it is also one that is mainly hard to quantify or explain.

This is because its effects are diffused during the development procedure in myriad methods. It augments the excellence of natural possessions and labour authority (human capital) and has an impact on deal. Investment is the biggest vehicle in which it is embodied, and their respective roles are closely interactive. There is no doubt of its importance in capitalist development, or the contrast flanked by its role in capitalist and pre-capitalist industry. A biggest driving force of capitalist industrialization is the strong propensity to risk capital on new techniques that hold promise of improved profits, in strong contrast to the suspicious wariness of the pre-capitalist come to technology. Few scholars regard the application of science to industry since *the* distinguishing feature of contemporary industry.

Despite its attractiveness, this view has its difficulties. In the eighteenth century dawn of contemporary industry the body of scientific knowledge was too slender and weak to be applied directly to industrial procedures, whatever the intention of its advocates. In information, it was not until the second half of the nineteenth century, with the flowering of chemical and electrical sciences, that scientific *theories* provided the foundations for new procedures and new industries. It is indisputable, however, that since early since the seventeenth century the *ways* of science – in scrupulous, observation and experiment – were being applied (not always successfully) for utilitarian purposes. Nor were such attempts limited to men of scientific training.

Indeed one of the mainly extra ordinary characteristics of technological advance in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was the big proportion of biggest inventions made through ingenious thinkers, self-taught mechanics and engineers (the term *engineer* acquired its contemporary meaning in the eighteenth century) and other autodidacts. In several examples the word *experimental way* may be too formal and exact to define the procedure: *trial and- error* may be more apposite. But a willingness to experiment and to innovate penetrated all strata of community, including even the agricultural population, traditionally the mainly conservative and defensive of innovation. The mainly significant improvements in technology involved the exploit of machinery and mechanical authority to change tasks that had been done distant more gradually and laboriously through human or animal authority, or that had not been done at all.

To be certain, elementary machines like the wheel, the pulley, and the lever had been used from antiquity, and for centuries humankind had used a fraction of the inanimate powers of nature to propel sailing ships and actuate windmills and waterwheels for rudimentary industrial purposes. Throughout the eighteenth century, a notable increase in the exploit of waterpower occurred in industries such since grain milling, textiles, and metallurgy. The mainly significant growths in the application of power in the early levels of industrialization involved the substitution of coal for wood and charcoal since fuel, and the introduction of the steam engine for exploit in mining, manufacturing and transportation.

Likewise, although metallic ores had been converted into metals for centuries, the exploit of coal and coke in the smelting procedure greatly reduced the cost of metals and multiplied their exploits, whereas the application of chemical science created a host of new, 'artificial' or synthetic materials. However the *word* 'industrialization' is away from the job of Marx and Engels, the *concept* is clearly present. Marx distinguishes 'Contemporary Industry' or 'The Factory Organization' or 'The Machinery Organization' from earlier shapes of capitalist manufacture, cooperation and 'Production'. Contemporary industry is distinguished from production through the central role of machinery: 'Since soon since apparatus had been converted from being manual implements of man into implements of mechanical tools, of a machine, the motive mechanism also acquired an independent shape, entirely emancipated from the restraints of human strength. Thereupon the individual machine sinks into a mere factor in manufacture through machinery'. In similarity with production, Marx distinguishes two levels in the growth of the machinery organization. In the first level, 'easy co-operation,' there is only a 'conglomeration in the factory of same and simultaneously acting machines' by a single authority source'. In the second level, an 'intricate organization of machinery', the product goes by a linked series of detailed procedures accepted out through an interlinked chain of machines.

When this intricate organization is perfected and can carry out the whole procedure of manufacture with workers only since attendants, it becomes an 'automatic organization of machinery'. The conversion of hand-operated apparatus into instruments of a machine reduces the worker to a 'mere' source of motive authority, and since manufacture expands, the limits of human strength necessitate the substitution of a mechanical motive authority for human muscles. In the factory organization, all the machines are driven through a single 'motive force', the steam engine.

In *The Unbound Prometheus*, David Landes placed technology at the centre of the Industrial Revolution. He introduces this book through listing three regions of material advance that comprised 'the heart of the Industrial Revolution'. They are

- The substitution of mechanical devices for human skills;
- Inanimate authority – in scrupulous steam – took the lay of human and animal strength;
- There was a marked improvement in the receiving and working of raw materials, especially in what are now recognized since the metallurgical and chemical industries.

Theodore Hamerow has considered the course of this technical modernization in dissimilar European countries through citing the growing number of patents, the capability of steam engines and their diffusion in manufacture, the concentration of labour in factories and the increase in the efficiency of production through method of rises in output per man-hour. Maxine Berg has questioned few of the assumptions of these perspectives through pointing out that they reinforce the old 'technical determinism' of mainly descriptions of the Industrial Revolution.

Landes' come, she argued, traced the history of the mainly 'progressive' industries without enquiring into the patterns through which they were adapted within dissimilar *areas* in Europe; Landes did not explore why mechanization occurred faster (and earlier in her industrial history) in the USA than in England; and he had no answer to the question of why French industry establish it hard to adapt to British authority and coal-by techniques. Industrialization has approach to be used since a synonym for continued economic development.

It is said to happen in a given country when output and real incomes per head begin to rise steadily and without evident limit. Expansion of total output alone, however, is not an enough criterion of industrialization as, if population is growing more rapidly than output, it is compatible with declining real incomes per head. Nor can mere abundance of capital and land (which might give rise for a time to growing real incomes per head) produce a development in the economy which can be called since industrialization if material technology remnants unchanged.

A country which retains a big, even predominant, agricultural sector may be called since industrialized if real incomes rise and technology transforms. Associated with industrialization are a number of economic and social transforms which follow directly from its defining aspects. For instance, since real incomes rise, the building of aggregate demand will transform, as the income elasticity's of demand for the several goods accessible differ substantially. Whereas there is room for argument in relation to the length and makeup of any list of the concomitants of industrialization, there is close to unanimity upon the central identifying feature: the rise in real income per head.

Industrial Revolution

Almost certainly no word from the economic historian's lexicon has been more widely carried than 'industrial revolution.' This is unfortunate because the word itself has no scientific standing and conveys a grossly misleading impression of the nature of economic transform. Nevertheless, for more than a century it has been used to denote that era in British history that witnessed the application of mechanically powered machinery in the textile industries, the introduction of James Watt's steam engine, and the 'triumph' of the factory organization of manufacture. Through analogy, the word has also been applied to the onset of industrialization in other countries, although without common agreement on dates.

The expression *revolution industrially* was first used in the 1820s through French writers who, wishing to emphasize the importance of the mechanization of the French cotton industry then taking lay in Normandy and the Nord compared it with the great political revolution of 1789. In 1837, Jerome-Adolphe Blanqui referred to 'la revolution industrially' in England. Contrary to widespread belief, Karl Marx did not exploit the word in its conventional sense. It acquired common currency only after the publication in 1884 of Arnold Toynbee's *Lectures on the Industrial Revolution in England: Popular Addresses, Notes and Other Fragments*. Toynbee dated the British Industrial

Revolution from 1760. The dates implicit in Toynbee's *Lectures*, 1760-1820, were arbitrarily determined through the reign of George III, on which Toynbee had been invited to lecture.

This view went unchallenged for in relation to the 50 years, until Professor J.U. Nef stressed the essential stability of history and traced its beginnings to 1540-1660, with the new capitalistic industries of Elizabethan England. Early accounts of the phenomenon accentuated the 'great inventions' and the dramatic nature of the transforms. Since an 1896 textbook put it, 'The transform...was sudden and violent. The great inventions were all made in a comparatively short legroom of time...' an account that A.P. Usher dryly characterized since exhibiting 'all the higher shapes of historical inaccuracy.' Early interpretations also accentuated what were assumed to be the deleterious consequences of the new mode of manufacture.

Although increases in productivity since a result of the exploit of mechanical authority and machinery were acknowledged, mainly descriptions stressed the exploit of child labour, the displacement of traditional skills through machinery, and the unwholesome circumstances of the new factory cities. For mainly of its history, for mainly people, the word 'industrial revolution' has had a pejorative connotation.

Theories for the Emergence of Capitalism

The origins of capitalism are traced variously to the development of merchant capital and external deal or to the spread of monetary transactions within feudalism through the commuting of feudal rent and services into money. This debate concerns the transition from Feudalism to Capitalism and pertains largely to Western European experience where capitalism first appeared.

Whatever the causes for its origins, the era from in relation to the fifteenth century to the eighteenth century is generally carried since the merchant capital stage of capitalism. Overseas deal and colonization accepted out through the state-chartered monopolies played a pivotal role in this stage of capitalism in Holland, Spain, Portugal, England and France. The industrial stage of capitalism opened with the upsurge in authority-by machinery in the Industrial Revolution in England.

This part will briefly look at theories for the emergence of capitalism advanced through four biggest thinkers, namely Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Franklin Mendels and the theory of Proto-Industrialization and Immanuel Wallerstein.

Adam Smith

In the model put forward through Adam Smith (1723-90) in *An Enquiry into the Nature and Reasons of the Wealth of Nations*, Book 1, the growth of a community's wealth –equated with the growth of the productivity of labour – is a function of the degree of the division of labour.

Through this Smith basically means the specialization of productive tasks – classically achieved by the isolation of agriculture and manufacturing, and their assignment to country and city respectively. The division of labour in industrial manufacture made possible an unprecedented development in output and productivity. If it was possible to sell this enhanced output in excess of a wide market,

then such division would prove profitable, and the profits could be ploughed back into further profitable action.

For Smith, the degree of specialization is bound up with the degree of growth of deal: the degree to which a potentially interdependent, dedicated labour force can be – and is – connected up via commercial nexuses. Therefore we get Smith's well-known principle that the division of labour is limited through the extent of the market – literally, the mass of the region and population connected up via deal dealings. For Adam Smith the growth of deal and the division of labor unfailingly brought in relation to the economic growth. Smith's argument that the isolation of production and agriculture and their allocation to city and country, consequently upon the growth of trading relationships, will lead to a procedure of economic development, since a result of the increased productivity which 'naturally' follows from the producers' concentration on a single row of manufacture rather than a multiplicity of dissimilar ones, has a sure plausibility.

In locating the development of wealth in the interaction flanked by division of labour and development of markets, Smith liberated economics from an agrarian bias such since the Physiocrats had imparted to it, or the narrow commercial bias that the Mercantilists had given it. Surplus did not originate in land alone, nor was the acquisition of treasure (valuable metals) any longer the sole or desirable measure of economic prosperity. Therefore wealth could take the shape of (reproducible) vendible commodities.

If the wealth holders then spent it productively in further investment wealth would grow. The development of commerce and the development of liberty mutually determine each other for Smith. Smith and his fellow 'political economists' traced the advance of capitalism to the onset of circumstances that liberated purportedly inherent human qualities and to the beneficent operation, in market transactions, of an 'invisible hand' that brought the general good out of the conflicting self-interest of all individuals.

Commerce could be seen since a key to prosperity, but only its unhindered pursuit would close the maximum prosperity. Commerce, through spreading world-wide and creation the accumulation of wealth possible in liquid (that is, transportable) shape, renders merchants independent of political tyranny and hence increases the chances of the development of liberty.

Karl Marx

The transition from Feudalism to Capitalism was never a biggest preoccupation for Marx (1818-83) and Engels.

It was nonetheless a problem addressed periodically in discussion of more central themes such since the historical materialist way, the capitalistic mode of manufacture, or class clash in history. To Marx, capitalism was powerful and dynamic, a larger shape of manufacture that promoted economicTm[(-)]

development distant anything possible in feudalism. He attributed its appearance not to the release of natural, unchanging human predispositions but to specific economic, political, and legal events.

In Marx's interpretation of the emergence of capitalism two broad perspectives are offered. He first emphasizes the corrosive effect upon the feudal organization of mercantile action, the development of a world market and new expanding municipalities. Mercantile capitalism, within an autonomous urban sphere, gives the initial dynamic towards capitalism: merchants entered manufacture and employed wage laborers. The second variant, apparent especially in *Capital*, centers on the 'producer' and the procedure whereby the producer (agricultural or in the crafts sector) becomes merchant and capitalist. Marx regards the latter since 'the really revolutionary path' to capitalism as these changes the institution and techniques of manufacture.

This is because mercantile action (the first variant) may well turn products for exploit into commodities for swap, but it does not explain how and why labour authority should itself become a commodity. Also, although the merchant path separates the worker from ownership of the product, it retains inherited techniques and social institution of manufacture. It is so ultimately conservative. Hence it cannot explain the transition to capitalism.

The primitive (or original) accumulation of capital is a concept urbanized in Marx's *Capital* and *Grundrisse* to designate that procedure which generates the preconditions of the ongoing accumulation of capital. In Marx's terms, 'primitive accumulation is nothing else than the historical procedure of divorcing the producer from the means of manufacture'. (*Capital*, 1: 873-5). Marx's focus is upon how one set of class dealings becomes transformed into another. In scrupulous, how it is that a property-less class of wage-laborers, the proletariat, becomes confronted through a class of capitalists who monopolize the means of manufacture. Several of Marx's contemporaries saw capital since the result of abstinence and saving, since the original source for accumulation. Marx's point is that primitive accumulation is not an accumulation in this sense at all.

Abstinence can *only* lead to accumulation *if* capitalist dealings of manufacture, or the polarization flanked by a class of capitalists and a class of wage-laborers, are already in subsistence. Marx argued that as pre-capitalist dealings of manufacture are predominantly agricultural, the peasantry having possession of the principal means of manufacture, land, capitalism can only be created through dispossessing the peasantry of the land. The origins of capitalism are to be establishing in the transformation of dealings of manufacture on the land. The freeing of the peasantry from land is the source of wage laborers both for agricultural and industrial capitalism.

For Marx the first and foremost effect of the 'agricultural revolution' in England was to expropriate the peasant from the soil and set up capitalist agriculture. A new money-oriented nobility and gentry forcibly enclosed demesne, general and waste land, consolidated little farms into superior ones and at times converted to pasturage. Capitalist farmers grew from a differentiation of the peasantry.

Enclosures converted property characterized through shared rights into private property. The genesis of capitalist agriculture contrasts sharply with the birth of capitalist industry.

While agriculture generated both its own capitalists and workers, the urban crafts played a distinctly secondary role in forming either pole of industry. Rather, the agricultural revolution supplied the laborers and merchants advanced much of the money to employ them and formed markets in which their products were sold. For Marx, merchants could foster primitive accumulation through usury, crushing artisanal guilds, expanding markets, providing employment or through investing profits. While Marx emphasizes domestic reasons of proletarianization, he focuses primarily on international commerce in accounting for the genesis of the industrial capitalist. This interpretation stresses the forcefulness, often genocidal, and the unevenness of primitive accumulation.

It was by servile labour in the colonies, the slave deal, and commercial wars that the English prospered and replaced the Dutch since the dominant mercantile authority through 1700. Government laws, monopolies, taxes and debt assisted the procedure. Distant from the state being a brake on or an enemy of capitalism, Marx held it was one of its principal progenitors and servants.

The Theory of Proto-Industrialization

The theory of 'proto-industrialization' (henceforth PI) actually started with Franklin Mendels' 1969 dissertation at the University of Wisconsin, 'Industrialization and Population Pressure in Eighteenth-Century Flanders.' This was a revise of the relatively rapid population development experienced in an internal area of Flanders, where a peasant population combined agriculture with section-time linen production.

Much of the output was sold on overseas markets through entrepreneurs in Ghent and other market cities to far markets, especially those of the Spanish Empire. The workers, family units of husband, wife and children, generally cultivated little plots of ground since well, although they also bought additional supplies in markets. The word has subsequently been refined and extended in both legroom and time to other, same industries.

In few examples – for instance, the Lancashire cotton industry – it has been seen since the prelude to a fully urbanized factory organization. In others, however, such since the Irish and even the Flemish linen industries, no such transition occurred. PI had distinctive patterns of growth. It generally originated in rustic areas and declining or big-level agricultural regions. Scholarship on PI emphasizes interconnections in the middle of widening markets, growing populations (especially rural) seeking wage-earning employment, and the search for cheap labour through entrepreneurs.

Highlighting rural, household and local transforms, studies of *Industrialization before industrialization* through Peter Kriedte, Hans Medick and Jurgen Schlumbohm of the Max Planck Institut fur Geschichte in Gottingen in 1981 (but first published in German in 1977) attempted to situate PI within the 'transition from feudalism to capitalism.' PI is credited with creating the key

transforms in the exploits of land, labour, capital and entrepreneurship which made the Industrial Revolution possible in the following methods:

- The generation of supplementary handicraft incomes will lead to an expansion of population, breaking up the self-regulating or homeostatic equilibrium of pre-industrial populations – through this procedure, the natural rate of development of population increases but also becomes adjusted to the augmented means of existence that are in the vicinity accessible. Handicrafts generated the labour supply of the Industrial Revolution.
- A area therefore experiencing growing population and growing PI will soon begin to encounter diminishing returns since dispersed industry creates difficulties in the collection of output and the manage of quality. This will conduce to the concentration of manpower in workshops and then to the exploit of labour-saving mechanical inventions. In this manner, PI created pressures leading to the factory organization and to new technology.
- Since a result of PI growth, capital for these workshops or the introduction of machines will accumulate in the vicinity in the hands of merchants, commercial farmers or landowners. In this manner, PI is supposed to have led to the accumulation of capital.
- PI will lead to the accumulation of technological knowledge through merchants since a result of their experience with inter-local and international deal. In this method it gives ‘a training ground in which the early industrialists were recruited’, and a new supply of entrepreneurs.
- The simultaneous growth of PI and a local commercial agriculture will prepare the agricultural sector for the task of supplying food throughout the urbanization which accompanies the subsequent stage of industrialization, that is, PI leads to agricultural surpluses and reduces the price of food.

PI and the related words refer primarily to consumer goods industries, especially textiles. Well before the advent of the factory organization in the cotton industry, however, other big-level, highly capitalized industries lived, producing capital or intermediate goods, and sometimes even consumer goods. The French *manufactures royals* were generally situated in big factory-like buildings where skilled artisans worked under the supervision of a foreman or entrepreneur, but without mechanical authority.

Same ‘proto-factories’ were built through noble landowner-entrepreneurs in the Austrian Empire (Bohemia and Moravia) and elsewhere. Big landowners also acted since entrepreneurs in the coal industry, mining the deposits situated on their estates. Iron-jobs, generally situated in rural regions close to timber (for charcoal) and iron ore, sometimes employed hundreds, even thousands of workers. Lead, copper, and glass-jobs also frequently had big-level institutions, since did shipyards.

The state-owned Arsenal of Venice, dating from the Transitional Ages, was one of the earliest big-level enterprises in history.

Immanuel Wallerstein

Capitalism was from the beginning, Wallerstein argues, a matter of the world-economy and not of nation states. Capitalism has never allowed its aspirations to be determined through national boundaries. For him, 'the only type of social organization is a world organization, which we describe quite basically since a part with a single division of labour and multiple cultural organizations.' There could be two diversities of such world organizations, one with a general political organization and one without.

These he described, respectively, world empires and world-economies. The contemporary world organization, which created a European world economy with an unprecedented building originated in sixteenth century Europe, throughout what Braudel described the 'extensive sixteenth century' (1450-1660). The geographical limits of this world economy, determined mainly through the state of technology at the time, included North- West Europe, which became the 'core' of the organization. Dividing the world into two more elements, Wallerstein placed Eastern Europe (but not Russia) and Spanish America at the 'margin', while the Mediterranean littoral (Spain and the Northern Italian municipality-states) became a 'semi-margin'.

How did the European world-economy operate? The core regions had size market industries, international and regional commerce in the hands of an indigenous bourgeoisie, and, relatively advanced and intricate shapes of agriculture. The peripheral regions were mono-cultural, with the cash crops produced on big estates through coerced labour. The semi-peripheral regions were in the procedure of de-industrializing, although they still retained few share in international banking and high-cost, excellence industrial manufacture.

The shape of agricultural labour manage used there was mostly sharecropping, a shape that was intermediate flanked by the freedom of the lease organization and the coercion of slavery and serfdom. This world was comprised of a multitude of political entities. In the core states relatively strong state organizations appeared with an absolute monarch and a patrimonial state bureaucracy.

Through contrast, the critical characteristic of the margin was the absence of a strong state. The semi-margin was, once again, in flanked by in its polity. Through the end of the sixteenth century the decline of state power was clear in Spain and in the big municipality-states of north Italy. The essential characteristic of a capitalist world economy is manufacture for sale in a market in which the substance is to realize the maximum profit. In such an organization manufacture is constantly expanded since extensive since further manufacture is profitable, and men constantly innovate new methods of producing items that will expand the profit periphery. Wallerstein recognized three levels in the growth of the world-economy.

The first was one of agricultural capitalism, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. In this level wage labour is only one of the manners in which labour is recruited and paid; slavery, 'coerced cash-crop manufactures' (his word for the therefore-described 'second feudalism'), share cropping and tenancy are all alternative manners. The second level commenced with the world-wide recession of 1650-1730. In this level England first ousted the Netherlands from her commercial primacy and then successfully resisted France's effort to catch up. It was only in the third level from the mid-eighteenth century that capitalism became primarily industrial (rather than agricultural or mercantile).

In this level industrial manufacture symbolizes a constantly growing share of the world's total manufacture. Since importantly too, there is the geographical expansion of the European world-economy to include the whole globe.

Dissimilar Paths to Industrialization: Britain, France and Germany

There have been and are several paths to industrialization flanked by countries. One would anticipate this from their historical and geographical varieties, with associated variations in the gestation era involved. It is these differences that militate against a non-country specific theory of capitalist industrialization.

Britain's transition to capitalist industrialization was not at all typical of the European experience. Therefore Patrick O'Brien and Caglar Keyder, suggest that the British experience is 'initial' rather than 'normal practice', especially with regard to the comparative mass and productivity of agriculture. They state that 'Economic theory lends no support to assumptions....that there is one definable and optimal path to higher per capita incomes and still less to the implicit notion that this path can be recognized with British industrialization since it proceeded from 1780 to 1914'.

Instead of being presented since the paradigmatic case, the first and mainly well-known example of economic development, the British Industrial Revolution is now depicted in a more negative light, since a limited, restricted, piecemeal phenomenon, in which several items did *not* occur or where, if they did, they had distant *less* effect than since previously supposed. Instead of stressing *how much* had happened through 1851 (whatever the qualifications), it is now commonplace to note *how small* had actually altered (whatever the qualifications). Recent research has stressed the gradualness of transform when seen from a macroeconomic standpoint and has also been tending to argue that the 'industrial revolution' was not merely economic, but social, intellectual and political too. The transform in emphasis in historiography has been from national aggregates and sectoral analysis to local differences and uneven growth, from the some big and successful businessmen to the several little and inept entrepreneurs.

Social history has shifted absent from examines of new class formations and consciousness, since characterized through E. P. Thompson and accentuated through J. Foster to identifying stability

flanked by social protest and radicalism flanked by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Then, an influential tendency in the socio-cultural historiography of the 1980s has argued that the British Industrial Revolution was extremely incomplete (if it lived at all) because the industrial bourgeoisie failed to gain political and economic ascendancy. Economic and political authority remained in the hands of the landed aristocracy: 'Gentlemanly capitalism' prevailed.

The biggest division in the social and political life of nineteenth century Britain is argued to have been that flanked by the dominant gentlemanly capitalism of the aristocratic and rentier classes, and a subordinate industrial capitalism. The historiography of the British Industrial Revolution has moved absent from viewing the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (particularly 1780-1815) since a unique turning point in economic and social growth. For instance, A.E. Musson's survey, *The Development of British Industry* criticizes what he regards since 'the common interpretation presented in mainly textbooks', namely that 'the industrial revolution had taken lay through 1850, that the factory organization had triumphed.' He stresses the extent to which consumer goods industries remained handicraft industries, situated in little workshops; the degree to which, since shown in the 1851 Census, patterns of employment and occupational building remained dominated through traditional craftsmen, laborers and domestic servants; and the extremely slow rate at which factories spread and steam authority was diffused.

He argues that 'There are good grounds for concerning the era 1850-1914 since that in which the Industrial Revolution really occurred, on a huge level, transforming the entire economy and community much more deeply than the earlier transforms had done.' Few historians challenge the broad view of the Industrial Revolution expressed in T.S. Ashton's memorable phrase, 'A wave of gadgets swept in excess of England.' Ashton's view was widespread throughout the 1950s and 1960s. His critics see the Industrial Revolution since a much narrower phenomenon, since the result of technological transform in some industries, mainly notably cotton and iron.

Crafts wondered whether it was possible that there was virtually no industrial advance throughout 1760-1850. As the 1980s, studies of the Industrial Revolution have borne out its gradual pace of transform. New statistics have been produced which show the slow development of industrial output and gross domestic product. Productivity grew gradually; fixed capital proportions, savings and investment patterns altered only gradually; workers' livelihood averages and their personal consumption remained mainly unaffected before 1830 and were certainly not squeezed. Research through Williamson, Knick Harley and Feinstein has revealed the information that Britain passed by a turning point approximately the 1820s.

Development in National Income was much lower before than after that date. There was a doubling in the development rate of industrial manufacture too. Feinstein's estimates of the rate of capital formation illustrates that it drifts upwards from then, since does the rate of capital accumulation and the development rate of capital invested per worker employed in industry. The turning point was

dramatic in the average of livelihood. The adult, male, working class real wage failed to increase flanked by 1755 and 1819, but from 1819 to 1851, it rose at an annual rate of 1.85%.

In the middle of the early industrializes, France remnants the mainly aberrant case. That information gave rise to a big literature devoted to explanations of the supposed 'backwardness' or 'retardation' of the French economy. The dominant tendency in the Anglo- American literature on contemporary French economic development was to treat it in this context.

Indeed, in what might be regarded since the founding explanation of that growth, Sir John Clapham went therefore distant since to muse that 'it might be said that France never went by an industrial revolution.' What has impressed economic historians since they have looked at nineteenth century France is the failure of few dramatic breakthroughs to seem, the absence of a marked acceleration in development? Recent new empirical research and theoretical insights have shown that the earlier debates were based on a false premise. In information, although the *pattern* of industrialization differed from that of Britain and the early industrializes, the *outcome* was not less efficient and, in words of social welfare, may have been more humane. Moreover, when one seems at the patterns of development of successful late industrializes; it seems that the French pattern may have been more 'typical' than the British.

Two factors in the French situation explanation in big measure for its unjustified reputation for 'retardation', namely, the dramatic fall in marital fertility, which reduced the development rate of the population to less than half that of other biggest nations; and, the scarcity and high cost of coal, which resulted in a lower output of the heavy industries (iron and steel, in scrupulous) than in other big nations, such since Britain and Germany. Moreover, these two factors in combination help to explanation for many other characteristics of the French pattern of industrialization, such since the low rate of urbanization, the level and building of enterprise, and the sources of industrial power. The familiar feature of French industrialization was a relatively slow expansion of big-level capital-intensive shapes of manufacture.

Investment in the advanced sector proceeded at a leisurely pace, there being no clear acceleration until the 1850s or 1860s and there was a correspondingly limited increase in new employment outlets. In 1851, at the first industrial census, what the French call *la grande industrie* engaged 1.3 million workers, or less than 25% of the industrial labour force.

More in proof were the 'proto-industrial' shapes. The persistence of domestic workshops and hand tool ways until at least mid-century, if not beyond, was general to an entire variety of industries, with urban artisans tending to job full-time on the higher excellence goods, leaving the less skilled tasks to the peasant worker. Even in the more mechanized industries, big numbers of mines, iron jobs, spinning mills and weaving sheds were little through British or German averages, situated in accessible rural regions and dependent on labour which sustained to job section-time in agriculture.

Unlike Britain or France, capitalist industrialization in Germany had to wait the formation of a well-defined region, a unified Germany, before it could commence.

Before the mid-nineteenth century political fragmentation, whether within the Holy Roman Empire or the German Federation, was reinforced through the economic circumstances of numerous traditions barriers, poor discourses network, primitive roads and the reduction of economic action to in accessible islands that were apart connected to local markets. Since Sheehan has pointed out, there was nothing particularly *German* in relation to the economies. R.C. Trebilcock has argued that the German pattern of growth was extremely dissimilar from that of the British 'prototype'.

Britain had faced an industrialization of low cost, a technology of low capital intensity, and had acquired both through recourse largely to the savings – personal, familial, or regional – amassed through entrepreneurs and their thrifty reinvestment of profits. Bank participation was generally employed, at mainly, in the provision of short-word working capital and rarely in relationship with extensive-word capital formation or share ownership. Banks were, in contrast, more significant for German industrialization. Indeed Germany was the principal case of 'moderate backwardness' for few scholars, that case in which banks supply crucial financial and entrepreneurial inputs.

Unlike Trebilcock, others have established secure affinities in the British and German paths of industrialization. Both were concentrated within a relatively brief and clearly marked era of years. Both were based on the classical sectors of coal, iron, engineering, and, to a lesser extent in the German case, textiles. The growth of the railways triggered a greater range of 'backward' and 'forward' linkages in Germany (on the metallurgical and mining industries, the employment buildings and the rate of capital formation) than the industry had done in England, at in relation to the similar periods of the nineteenth century.

German industrialization was also distinctive on explanation of the role performed through cartels. Cartels were clusters of firm that combined to manage prices and markets. They either lined firm's creation the similar range of products or those that occupied in dissimilar levels of the manufacture of the similar products. They began to emerge from the late 1870s, and in secure collaboration with the major banks, gave German industry a degree of concentration in the spheres of capital and labour that was unmatched anywhere else except for in Imperial Russia. They promoted rapid technological progress, a high rate of capital formation and an unrivalled supremacy in the export of manufactured products.

Agriculture and Industrialization: Britain, France and Germany

The contribution of the agricultural sector to British, French and German industrialization has varied in its chronology and content. Agriculture's contribution in this respect has been broadly assessed on four counts, namely whether it created a food surplus for the non-rural population; whether it helped

to widen home and foreign markets; whether it generated capital for industrial investment; and, whether it supplied a labour force for industrial employment.

The characteristics of the therefore-described 'agricultural revolution' in northern Europe tended to be same: they included the introduction of new crops like artificial grasses or roots, which preserved the soil's fertility and therefore abolished the earlier must for fallow periods. The earlier three-field organization, where each field followed a cycle of wheat or rye, barley or oats, was replaced through a cycle which both eliminated leaving few region fallows and included the farming of forage crops. More forage meant that a superior number of livestock could be maintained, which, in turn, produced more organic manure and ensured a higher yield for the crops.

English agriculture became the mainly productive in Europe throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, well before the advent of industrialization. But it is now increasingly established that it was not them but tenants and owner-occupiers who were in the forefront of the new land exploit patterns and technologies. Before in relation to the 1960, the average view on British agricultural transform assigned it to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, throughout the era of parliamentary enclosures, which were seen since its reason. Some jobs suggest that that the fastest development in agricultural output occurred *before* 1760 and this development was surpassed (or almost certainly doubled) in 1800-30, since agriculture became more capital-intensive.

The skill of British agriculture to sustain industrialization on an expanded food foundation has, however, been questioned. Addressing the phenomenon of 'A British food puzzle' in 1995, Huberman and Lindert pointed out that even since per capita income was growing from 1770 to 1850; food supplies per capita stagnated or even declined. This is the food puzzle. To match the demand from growing real incomes, domestic agriculture should have grown, they suggest, through 172%-228% in 1770- 1850.

But there was actually small gain in productivity in this era. This implies a decline in livelihood averages as food consumption fell throughout the era of the British Industrial revolution despite apparently growing real incomes. French agriculture increased markedly from 1815 to the early 1870s, the era throughout which rapid, continued development was seen to have occurred in both total and per capita agricultural manufacture in all areas of France. It grew steadily and rapidly sufficient to feed a growing population, a decreasing proportion of which was occupied in agriculture, and to meet the demand for industrial raw materials (barring raw cotton, which was hardly surprising or unique to the case of France). Productivity per part of capital employed in agriculture increased steadily during the nineteenth century.

Annie Moulin has elaborately argued a case for the consequences of the French Revolution having lain not in the making of a capitalist economy but rather in the consolidation for a century and a half (up to in relation to the 1950) of a organization of little-level peasant agriculture based on existence

and the intensive exploit of family labour. In excess of the nineteenth century (1815/24 to 1905/13), productivity per worker employed in French agriculture grew through 0.25% annually, against 1% in Britain.

The largest cause was apparently that the French economy retained a distant higher share of its labour supply in the countryside rather than relocating it to industry. There was a pressure of population on the land and the farming of soils of declining fertility. Yields per hectare cultivated in France were approximately 75% of the British stage for mainly of the nineteenth century. It has been argued that rural France provided small impetus since a market for industrial goods.

Overall, French cultivators saved to buy land rather than manufactured goods. There was, indeed, an enduring autarky in rural France. Until in relation to the 1870, notes Eugene Weber, 'several peasants bought only iron and salt, paid for all else in type and were paid the similar method, husbanded their money for taxes or hoarded it to acquire more land.' By mainly of the nineteenth century, the internal words of deal moved in favor of agriculture.

The French countryside provided relatively some workers for industry; this reflects the information that a majority of Frenchmen preferred to remain on farms. David Landes cites an estimate that since much since 55% of the labour force was in agriculture in 1789 and this was still true in 1886; through 1950, the proportion had fallen to one-third. Historians like Dunham and Kindle Berger have, however, approach to the conclusion that French industry had an adequate supply of labour in the nineteenth century.

The transformation of German agriculture had to await the emancipation of the peasantry. This procedure started with the legal reforms of 1807-21 and was mainly accomplished through 1830 in the western provinces and through 1840 in the eastern provinces. The legislation effected the abolition of seigniorial duties regarding the legal defense of peasants, the removal of burdensome feudal obligations and improved efficiency of manufacture through the exploit of wage labour. Agricultural manufacture increased more than three-fold throughout the nineteenth century, while population increased through a factor of 2.3.

The share of agricultural employment fell with industrialization. Germany was approximately totally self-enough in foodstuffs till in relation to the 1850 and German farmers produced a surplus of grain, wool and timber for export. After that, Germany was increasingly unable to feed herself: Germany became a net importer of wheat, oats and barley. But agricultural productivity went on growing, although not since rapidly since in industry and the craft deals.

The Capitalist Entrepreneur

An estate was a stratum in which all the three biggest benefits—privilege, authority, and prestige—were mainly determined at birth and, also, were fixed since *legal* inequalities. The aristocracy

constituted the dominant estate, stratified within it. The Church constituted a distinct stratum, but not determined through birth.

But even in the 'Third Estate', the stratum of urban tradesmen and artisans, the guild organization cautiously regulated the sharing of benefits. The contemporary bourgeoisie grew out of the Third Estate, since, for example, the growths preceding the French Revolution create extremely clear. It is extremely significant that one of the first demands of this new class was legal excellence of all – or at least of those a sure minimal stage of wealth. In other terms, the relation of an individual to the order of privilege should no longer be determined through birth or through royal favor but rather through his role and success in the manufacture procedure.

Max Weber placed the contrast flanked by estates and classes at the core of his theory of social stratification and Marx made this a key criterion in his analysis of what constituted a class. When Marx used the concept of class in political analysis, he held that a class necessarily have a sure degree of cohesion and sense of general purpose, since well since a general connection to the means of manufacture. Feudal estates were too internally stratified to possess this attribute. One extremely significant transform with capitalist industrialization has been the enormous expansion of the transitional strata.

Capitalist accountancy described for a secular bureaucracy, an army of mediators and clerks to stay descriptions, to attend to correspondence, to furnish the news necessary in order to take advantage, if possible before anyone else, of changed market circumstances. Therefore possibly the first visible entry of capitalism into the medieval city was made through the grammar school, where the elements of reading, script, and arithmetic were the largest substances of revise. The managed of paper became the spot of the new commercial bureaucracy. The institution that marked the turning point in the growth of the commercial city was the Bourse, or swap, which began to serve since a centre for big-level, impersonal commercial transactions in the thirteenth century.

The vital reason of this growth was undoubtedly technical. An ever-smaller portion of the labour force was required for the actual tasks of material manufacture, allowing the diversion of ever superior numbers of workers into administrative behaviors. There was also a massive expansion of the state bureaucracies. The rise of the capitalist firm since a new and immensely significant shape of economic institution has also encouraged the development of a bureaucracy. It has meant an isolation flanked by the legal ownership of property and the function of economic manages of the assets it entails.

It has been suggested that effective *manage* in excess of economic possessions rather than legal *ownership* of them is the defining criterion for the top capitalist class. Therefore Nicos Poulantzas, in *Classes in Modern Capitalism* begins through defining the bourgeoisie not in words of a legal category of property ownership but in words of 'economic ownership' (that is, real economic manage of the means of manufacture and of the products) and 'possession' (that is, the capability to

put the means of manufacture into operation). Through this criterion, the managers belong to the capitalist bourgeoisie proper.

In *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Max Weber makes it clear that a capitalist enterprise and the pursuit of gain are not at all the similar item. People have always wanted to be rich, but that has small to do with capitalism, which he specifies since ‘a regular orientation to the attainment of profit by (nominally peaceful) economic swap’. Pointing out that there were mercantile operations – extremely successful and of considerable mass – in Babylon, Egypt, India, China, and medieval Europe, he says that it is only in Europe, as the Reformation, that capitalist action has become associated with the *rational institution of formally free labour*. It described for a new kind of economic agent, the capitalist entrepreneur.

One of Weber’s insights that have remained widely carried is that the capitalist entrepreneur is an extremely distinctive kind of human being. Weber was fascinated through what he idea to begin with was a puzzling paradox. In several cases, men—and some women—evinced a drive toward the accumulation of wealth but at the similar time showed a ‘ferocious asceticism,’ a singular absence of interest in the worldly pleasures that such wealth could buy. Several entrepreneurs actually pursued a lifestyle that was ‘decidedly frugal’.

Was this not odd? Weber idea he had establish an answer in what he described the ‘this-worldly asceticism’ of Puritanism, a notion that he expanded through reference to the concept of ‘the calling’. This idea dates from the Reformation, and behind it lays the idea that the highest shape of moral obligation of the individual, the best method to fulfill his duty to God, is to help his fellow men, now, in this world. Weber backed these assertions through pointing out that the accumulation of wealth, in the early levels of Capitalism, and in Calvinist countries in scrupulous, was morally sanctioned only if it was combined with ‘a sober, industrious career’. For Weber, capitalism was originally sparked through religious fervor.

Without that fervor the institution of labour that made capitalism therefore dissimilar from what had gone before would not have been possible. Weber was well-known with the religions and economic practices of non-European regions of the world, such since India, China or the Transitional East, and this imbued *The Protestant Ethic* with a power it might otherwise not have had. He argued that in China, for instance, widespread kinship units provided the predominant shapes of economic co-operation, naturally limiting the power both of the guilds and of individual entrepreneurs. In India, Hinduism was associated with great wealth in history, but its tenets in relation to the afterlife prevented the similar sort of power that built up under Protestantism, and capitalism proper never urbanized.

Europe also had the advantage of inheriting the custom of Roman law, which provided a more integrated juridical practice than elsewhere, easing the transfer of thoughts and facilitating the understanding of contracts. For Max Weber, ‘rational restlessness’ was the psychological create-up

of Europe, the opposite of what he established in the largest religions of Asia: rational acceptance of social order through Confucianism and its irrational antithesis in Taoism; mystical acceptance of social order through Hinduism; the worldly retreat in Buddhism. Weber situated rational restlessness especially in Puritanism.

Such persons are 'enterprising' because they are liberated from strong collective ties, which enable them to seek new opportunities without the constraints of communal customs, traditions and taboos. This clearly involves a sure 'ego ideal', a strong discipline, and traits that Weber described 'inner-worldly asceticism.' This kind of individual is concerned with the affairs of this world, is pragmatic and geared to activity, since against the more contemplative or sensitive values. He is also self-denying, prepared for 'delayed gratification', since against someone who immediately spends all he makes.

Weber pointed out that it is this 'asceticism', rather than acquisitiveness, that distinguishes the capitalist entrepreneur. Joseph Schumpeter stressed the central role of the capitalist entrepreneur, rather than the stock of capital, since the incarnation of technological progress. In *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (1943), he sought to transform thinking in relation to the economics no less than John Maynard Keynes had done. Schumpeter was firmly opposed to both Marx and Keynes.

His largest thesis was that the capitalist organization is essentially static: for employers and employees since well since for customers, the organization settles down with no profit in it, and there is no wealth for investment. Workers receive presently sufficient for their labour, based on the cost of producing and selling goods. Profit, through implication, can only approach from innovation, which for a limited time cuts the cost of manufacture (until competitors catch up) and allows a surplus to be used for further investment. Two items followed from this.

First, capitalists themselves are not the interesting force of capitalism, but instead entrepreneurs who invent new techniques or machinery through means of which goods are produced more cheaply. Schumpeter did not think that entrepreneurship could be taught, or inherited. It was, he whispered, an essentially 'bourgeois' action. What he meant through this was that, in any urban habitation, people would have thoughts for innovation, but who had those thoughts, when and where they had them, and what they did with them were unpredictable. Bourgeois people acted not out of any theory or philosophy but for pragmatic self-interest.

This flatly contradicted Marx's analysis. The second element of Schumpeter's outlook was that profit, since generated through entrepreneurs, was temporary. Whatever innovation was introduced would be followed up through others in that sector of industry or commerce, and a new continuity would eventually be achieved. This meant that for Schumpeter capitalism was inevitably characterized through cycles of boom and stagnation.

Bourgeois Civilization

From the viewpoint of the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie emerged all since 'vulgar.' What did this mean? It meant, essentially, that these people insisted that economic success should count since much since noble birth, family virtue, personal honor, and proximity to the throne.

The term 'vulgar' derives from the Latin *vulgus*, denoting general, ordinary people, since against the patricians. This 'vulgarity' was morally shocking since much since it was politically threatening. The ideal of the bourgeois gentleman was deliberately counterpoised to the older, aristocratic, and ideal of the gentleman. The bourgeois extolled 'rationality' against the aristocrat's reliance on 'healthy instinct' and spontaneity. The bourgeois knew that his life-approach was a matter of self-farming; the aristocrat always whispered (falsely) that his was the result of genetic inheritance or, since he would say, of 'breeding.'

The bourgeoisie was, virtually from the beginning, a literate class; the aristocracy contained several individuals who were proudly illiterate. The bourgeoisie whispered in the virtue of job, since against the aristocratic idealization of genteel leisure. The deliberate display of wealth was an aristocratic rather than a bourgeois trait. Bourgeois civilization, mainly importantly for industrialization, was individuating at the core of its world-view. This prompted R.H. Tawney in 1921 to argue that capitalism had created *The Acquisitive Community*. This had the effect, he argued, of encouraging the wrong instincts in people, through which he meant acquisitiveness.

An extremely religious man (and a socialist intellectual), Tawney felt that acquisitiveness went against the grain – in scrupulous, it sabotaged 'the instinct for service and solidarity' that is the foundation for traditional civil community. His idea that in the extensive run capitalism was incompatible with civilization. Under capitalism, he wrote, civilization became more private, less was shared, and this trend went against the general life of men – individuality inevitably promoted inequality. The extremely concept of civilization so changed, becoming less and less an inner state of mind and more a function of one's resources. He also contended that capitalism was incompatible with democracy because the inequalities endemic in capitalism, made more visible than ever through the acquisitive accumulation of consumer goods, would ultimately threaten social cohesion.

SOCIALIST INDUSTRIALIZATION

The October Revolution and the Growth of the 'Socialist' Model of Economic Institution in the Soviet Union

With the coming of the October Revolution, entirely new sets of economic principles and policies were sought to be employed with the purpose of achieving a socialist state.

In this part, dissimilar stages of these programs have been discussed and also the type of impact it brought on the Soviet economy and community.

Significance

In such conditions, where there was no model of a 'socialist' economy before 1914, practices in Soviet Russia after the October Revolution were the first biggest big-level experiment with socialism in Europe and became a model of socialism. Through 1939, the largest characteristics of this 'model' were fundamental restrictions on private property, biggest state regulation of manufacture, fund and deal, and an organization of Scheduling which schematized the economy and provided flexible targets and goals.

Governments, since they evolved state manage of the economy, used public welfare since their reference point. The economy was frequently mapped, in order to indicate where state investment was necessary: initially by 'manage figures' and later by adjustable Plan figures. Hence, the economy, since it matured, was described an 'Intended Economy'.

The organization of 'Scheduling' was highly innovative. It was only feasible because relatively high manage in excess of dissimilar economic sectors made the mobilization of possessions possible on an unparalleled level, ignoring market pressures of demand and supply. Such manage in excess of the economy was strange in any economy before 1917, even in circumstances of War. The Bolshevik Party, which took authority in October, was the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party, which was duly, renamed the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik).

Its members were committed socialists and encouraged the notion that the Soviet economy was a socialist economy, and was an exemplar for socialism. Each step of economic reform was justified since a contribution to socialism. The Komintern, and Communist Parties in Europe took up the refrain. Socialist parties in France, Britain, Germany and Italy did not adopt Soviet technique when in authority. But as an extensive stint of socialist government was unusual anywhere else, the Soviet economy became the reference for what socialism was.

After 1945, the prototype was exported to Eastern Europe, whose experience added a new dimension to the model. Economists such since Maurice Dobb, encouraged such notions, since did CMEA economists such since Oskar Lange, W. Bruz etc. The Soviet Intended Economy was measured the archetype of socialist experiment. The Bolsheviks set out to give the benefits of industrial growth to since several people, in since presently a manner, in since short a time since possible.

Here, we shall trade with how the Soviet organization came to take form throughout 1917- 1989, and how it evolved in the CMEA countries. The levels of growth are significant, as all of them, at several times, have been defined since 'socialist'. First, the socialist initiative cannot speak for all initiative in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at this time.

Both in Russia and in Eastern Europe, sectors operated (however weak) which did not follow the priorities and logic of socialist experiment. Again, thoughts from the Soviet model were taken up and used through 'socialist' governments in France, Britain and Italy after 1945. Their initiatives necessity also is added to the economic record of European socialism.

Debates

Few debates in relation to the Soviet industrialization deserve attention.

- Was socialist industrialization on the Soviet pattern more concerned with socialism and justice than with economic development?

- Socialist historians such as Maurice Dobb have argued that Soviet industrialization came in relation to the by policies that had an eye to economic and industrial development since well since social justice. Thoughts of socialism, defined through the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, were significant in everything that occurred; and steps taken for development were a success. Few non-socialist historians such as Jasny have agreed that development was achieved, while others, such as Alec Nove, have argued that, even if there was development, the industrialization was inefficient and the weaknesses were the result of obsessions with socialist doctrines. E.H. Carr and R.W. Davies pioneered job that goes against this type of perspective. They showed how the Soviet leadership was divided on the meaning of socialism and evolved policy while adapting to troubles of development. Davies, however, disagrees with Carr that this was *generally* true. He feels that concerns with doctrine and politics became crucial in the 1930s in Soviet policy. In recent scripts in the Russian Federation, there is a division of opinion in relation to the how significant doctrine was in socialist industrialization. The debate is significant because it raises questions in relation to the whether Soviet socialism deserves attention since an experiment that took stock of what was convenient and useful for the country's population. Clearly one perspective runs that it was an experiment where policy makers lost a sense of what could lead to prosperity because they became wrapped up in Soviet politics and in thoughts in relation to the what was socialism.

- Was socialist industrialization on the Soviet pattern a product of Russian conditions and inapplicable for other countries or areas?

- A row of argument also runs that Soviet industrialization was not socialist as socialism could not be constructed in an underdeveloped country like Russia where industrial capitalism had been weak. V.I. Lenin, the leader of the October Revolution, himself did not believe it possible for Russia to build socialism without a revolution in the West. He was disturbed in relation to the prospects of constructing socialism in a country which was largely agricultural, where industrial and fund capitalism were characteristics of the late 19th century. Following this location, socialism in Russia is regarded since a travesty: economic experiment on a bad basis with socialist jargon thrown in. There are few troubles with this argument. It implies that socialist experiments cannot happen where there is no advanced capitalism: that socialist industrialization necessity post-date capitalist industrialization. In correspondence with Vera Zasulich, the Populist activist, in the 1870s, Marx conceded that Russia might be able to proceed to socialism, bypassing capitalism, as Russia possessed institutions which lacked capitalist orientation and which were deeply influential.

They were discussing the prevalence in Russian agriculture of the repartitioned commune, which prevented accumulation of land in peasant land tenure. Other questions can also be raised. What is adequate capitalism? Lenin wrote in 1891 that Russian agriculture was capitalist, and that the commune was in retreat. Did not this give little ground for socialist construction; even it was not the basis that Lenin wanted? Again, in countries which are backward even when capitalism has urbanized elsewhere, is full-blown capitalist growth always possible? Or will socialism have to finish off the occupation that capitalism was meant to achieve? Leon Trotsky suggested that this might be necessary. In the Soviet Union and later in Eastern Europe, were we dealing with such situations? These remain significant questions in economic history, and debates on 'growth'.

- Was Soviet socialism an instrument of a new ruling class in Russia and a Russian instrument to rule non-Russian territories of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe?

- This perspective has been raised through Leon Trotsky (*The Revolution Betrayed*), and the historian who has followed his thoughts mainly closely, Isaac Deutscher (in his biographies of Trotsky and Stalin). As it is somewhat a social question, it will be dealt with in the part on social growth under socialism. Certainly, since 13.3.8 and 13.3.9 of the next part indicate, Soviet economic growth registered a good trade of inequality. Also, in Eastern Europe, in the early stage and in the late 1970s, the Soviet Union was harsh in his treatment of 'fraternal' socialist countries. It remains a moot point however whether these 'inequalities' were substantial. Surely they came to be measured substantial when development itself was in a poor state (in the 1980s)?

- The Anders Aslund perspective

- The anti-Soviet economist has recently advanced the notion that Soviet manufacture was therefore incompetent that it does not deserve serious attention since development. This has been his answer to modern criticism of the post Soviet economy of the Russian Federation, where development rates have been negative (i.e. the economy has contracted). The argument runs that therefore much worthless manufacture took place in the Soviet economy and that shortages were therefore great that we cannot seriously talk of development. Aslund's perspective *may* hold good for a limited era (the 1970s and 80s) - although only with heavy qualifications. More significant, however, is an underlying assumption of mainly of his job i.e. that the Soviet economic organization was, in the extensive word, incapable of wealth-generation.

The Soviet Experience

The focus of these debates, that is the construction of a socialist economy in Soviet Russia (the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic until 1924, the USSR thereafter), occurred in five biggest levels: the era of workers' manage (1917- June 1918), War Communism (June 1918-March 1921), the New Economic Policy (1921-1927); the Intended Economy in its early stage (1929-1939);

the reconstruction of the Soviet economy (1945-56); the growth and crisis of a globally oriented socialist economy (1956-1989).

The subsistence of levels of growth indicates that there was no one sense of what a socialist economy should be. Thoughts changed, since the USSR moved to the state-controlled economy that was the spot of socialism from 1939 to 1989.

Backdrop and the Era of Workers' Manage

The era before the construction of socialism in Russia after the 1917 October Revolution was marked through the following characteristics: little-level farming in agriculture, an artisanal sector weakened through wartime inflation and military conscription, big concentrations of commercial agriculture in the Ukraine and South Russia, and big, heavily cartelized privately-owned industrial complexes in the Donbass (Ukraine), the Urals and the Central Industrial Area (the belt from Moscow to Petrograd).

Inflation was ubiquitous. Deterioration of infrastructure (railways, roads and canals) was clear. Government dominates in excess of pricing and manufacture were constituted under the Tsarist war attempt (before the 1917 February Revolution), operating by a series of committees made up of administration and officials. In the metals industry, for example, a committee set down manufacture quotas and pricing restrictions. Such committees sustained to exist at the time of the October Revolution.

The Provisional Government (February 1917 – October 1917) instituted severe restrictions on grain pricing and sharing. The Government also set up land committees to seem into the possibilities of redistribution of land in the localities. A lack of care in excess of strict budgeting led to spiraling inflation. Currency was printed with small respect to how much specie or other securities the government possessed.

The ruble depreciated rapidly, resulting in a deterioration of the market. The latter was already in a sad state as diversion of industry for production for the war economy had led to a decrease of goods accessible to everyday consumers. This in turn had discouraged manufacture for the market in the Russian countryside. The Bolsheviks formed policy to trade with all this in a territory which varied in mass throughout 1918-21. After the October coup, and limited violence, the Bolshevik government (an alliance of Left Socialist Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks, legitimized through sanction from the All-Russian Congress of Soviets), had reasonable manage in excess of the territories of the Tsarist Empire that were free from German job.

Following the elections to the Constituent Assembly in December 1917 and the dismissal of the Constituent Assembly in the following month, the situation changed. 'White' (pro-Tsarist) forces gathered in the region north of the Black Sea, to oppose Bolshevik power. After the Treaty of Brest Litovsk (March 1918), Bolshevik Russia lost big territories to Germany in the east, and also lost the

Ukraine (which became a German puppet state). The break with the Left Socialist Revolutionaries (March 1918) led to an enlargement of the opposition network in South Russia, where a Committee of the Constituent Assembly was shaped to symbolize the parliament that had been disbanded.

Thereafter a Civil War broke out which was supported through Western interventionist forces: a war which sustained until early 1920. Throughout the era, Russia west of the Urals passed out of the hands of the Bolsheviks, since did approximately all of the land of the Lower Volga and Central Asia. From 1920, the Bolsheviks recognized manage in Siberia and Central Asia.

The Revolution, State Capitalism and Workers' Manage

The largest watchwords initially followed through Bolshevik policy makers to trade with the economy were 'state capitalism' and 'workers' manage'.

Here, state capitalism meant the operation of industry, deal and fund with the collaboration of the old entrepreneurial class, but with intensive supervision through and participation from the state. This participation Lenin justified in his arguments in *State and Revolution*. Workers manage was an unspecific word: it did not indicate whether this meant manage of a factory through the factory workforce, or manage of a factory through a broader workforce which spanned an industry/several industries. The word did, however, clearly indicate few shape of workers' manage in excess of administration.

Following such watchwords, and wary of nationalization (which Bolsheviks did not think was necessarily socialist as it could be used since much through 'imperialists' since through socialists), the Bolsheviks first followed a policy of state take-in excess of only in limited regions. Where nationalization took lay, it was largely the consequence of initiatives through factories or the soviets. The soviets which mattered in this case were the urban soviets, collected of 'workers' and 'soldiers': bodies constituted with small reference to electoral lists or proper process, but acknowledged to have greater popular power than any other shapes of regional government.

Nationalization and sequestration also took lay in the countryside: but the level was smaller, and restricted to handling big estates which had escaped redistribution. The only case of outright state take-in excess of was the banks. Following refusal to cooperate with the Bolshevik government through the banking establishment (the State Bank and 50 or therefore other biggest private and joint stock concerns), troops took in excess of the State Bank premises (20th November 1917), and the largest banks in Petrograd and Moscow (November 27th and 28th).

This followed the declaration of the Central Executive Committee of the (VtsIK) of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets that banking was a state monopoly (27th November). Nationalized banks were merged into a National Bank later in 1918. Elsewhere, in agriculture, land was redistributed according to principles of excellence and labour (8th November 1917), except for in the case of big estates which were devoted to 'industrial' crops, which would pass to state manage under the

Government's Land Committees. In industry, through a VTsIK decree of 27th November, manufacturing units were placed under workers' manage, where workers' factory committees were to be responsible to an All Russian Council of Workers' Manage and the regional bodies on manage that constituted it.

Regulation of pricing of grain and other goods, however, was firmly sustained by the Committees set up earlier. Spontaneous nationalization of industry through workers, mismanagement under worker's managed and the emigration of employers and administration quickly took this situation to a new level. Beyond the average organizations of manage through special committees and the Komissariats, a new regulating and supervisory agency was created on 18th December 1917 – the All Russian Council for the National Economy.

Jointly with its regional mediators in law it assumed power in excess of manufacturing. Vesenka took in excess of committees which coordinated prices and industrial quotas, renaming them *glavki* (centres), which had greater administrative power than their precursors. Following the Treaty of Brest Litovsk (March 1918) and the onset of the Civil War, Vesenka ruled that the glavki manage of individual enterprises be increased (3rd March), and each 'centre' was required to appoint a commissioner and two directors to firms under it's manage. From March, Larin, the leading light of Vesenka, described for 'intended nationalization' and suggested biggest public economic projects.

The drift was reinforced through the essential rejection through senior Bolsheviks of Lenin's thoughts of 'state capitalism' moreover – a rejection represented in the failure of negotiations with the steel magnate Meshcherskii and the entrepreneurs Stakheev and Gukovskii to set up powerful trusts which included capitalists and an official interest. The trend attained its fulfillment in the decree of 28th June 1918 (through VTsIK) where every branch of industry was nationalized.

The overall running of industry was entrusted to Vesenka. During this workers' welfare was a biggest concern. After the October Revolution the VtsIK was quick to pass decrees on 11th November to set up the 8-hour day and the 48-hour week in industry, to specify limitations on the job of women and juveniles and forbid the employment of children under 14. Events of unemployment and sickness insurance were anticipated in decrees of 24th December and 22nd December 1917.

The All-Russian Congress of Deals Unions supported the events and the Deals Unions (which embraced whole branches of industry rather than, since in Western and Central Europe, a scrupulous deal), became mediators for the enforcement of the events. The circumstances of war made it hard to enforce the regulations, but they became a hallmark of the new order.

War Communism

The nationalization of industry (June 1918) marked the beginning of a regime of intensive state manage, which followed the era of 'workers' manage'. The regime was termed 'War Communism'

and urbanized since follows, covering industry in the core provinces of European Russia primarily, as other regions were in the hands of 'Whites' or 'Greens' until early 1920.

In agriculture, the era was characterized through efforts to encourage society farming in excess of private farming. The Bolsheviks had broken with the Socialist Revolutionaries after the treaty of Brest Litovsk and the assassination of Mirbach (March 1918). The latter were the largest supporters of private peasant farming in the government after October. After the break, the Bolsheviks tried to reshape agriculture through the formation of committees of poor peasants (kombedy) through a decree of June 1918.

These committees were to assist the gathering of cereals through labour detachments from the cities: a crucial function as peasant grain marketing had plummeted following currency depreciation and decline in industrial manufacture. The kombedy were also to spread propaganda in the countryside. The Bolsheviks also encouraged society farming by grants for agricultural associations, Soviet communal farms (sovkhozy), agricultural communes and other shapes. Through the end of 1918, when the poor response to the policy was apparent, Party conferences ceased to talk in relation to it.

Other characteristics of economic policy were disastrous for agriculture. To give food to the urban regions, brigades were sent to requisition grain at the prices recognized through the state. This took place often with no regard for the stock the peasant required throughout the subsequent season, and led to a steady worsening of the infrastructure for farming throughout 1919-20. In industry, enterprises increased throughout 1919-20. This was the result of efforts to remedy biggest troubles of the Civil War and catastrophic inflation.

Such troubles were: the out-migration of population from urban regions owing to poor food supplies; the collapse of any organization of credit and investment due to in excess of issue of paper money; poor supplies of essential raw material to industry. Here, where the supplies crisis was met through forced requisitions, Narkomfin and Vesenka handled other troubles through exploit of the glavki's powers to concentrate exploit of labour and ending payments flanked by nationalized industries. Through 1920 (when Soviet Russia's remaining bank, the National Bank, was abolished), Vesenka had all industrial payments referred to it or its mediators. Where possible, such payments would be adjusted against each other; and the outstanding referred to the Komissariat of Fund which would note it for future adjustments.

Rationing of food, clothes and fuel was average. Within such an organization, deal was declared a state monopoly, except for when it occurred by cooperatives or licensed traders operating a special region.

Differences in the Historian's Perspective on the Revolution and War Communism

Mainly European and US historians are agreed that the growth of socialist industrialization to this point followed a meandering course, in which willingness to job with capitalists was clear and

apparent. They have also stressed the subsistence of Tsarist practices and institutions by the era. Russian historians, however, have disputed this, arguing that the Bolsheviks always meant to set up rigid state manage in excess of the economy.

The new Russian scholars point to the doctrinaire obsessions of the era. Certainly, much of policy was justified through Lenin in words of the proletarian and socialist character of the new regime: therefore there is good reason for thinking that Lenin was not working from expediency. Bolsheviks like N. Bukharin also justified characteristics of what happened, such since the demonetization of the economy, since 'socialist'.

It is unlikely, however, that in circumstances of war, that inflexible doctrine was the lodestone of the new order, even if it was its reference point. Continuous version was the order of the day, and the idea that ideology guided everything comes from its recurrence in what was said: the information that little principle had to be followed since version took lay.

The New Economic Policy

Whatever such preoccupations, from 1921, perturbed through the low agricultural output in South Russia and the Ukraine, and the display of disenchantment in the middle of strong Bolsheviks throughout the Kronstadt uprising (March 1921), Bolshevik policy makers, it is agreed, introduced events to create the economy more flexible and performance-oriented. The transforms gave 'socialism' a new image: less centralized and less hostile to the practices of the capitalist economies. The urgency of reforms was demonstrated through the famine that swept south and southeast Russia throughout the summer of 1921. The New Economic Policy, which was set in motion in February 1921, sought to revitalize the market, which had approach to be associated with rationing, cooperative trading or black market operations. Dependence on requisitions for food supplies was abandoned. A tax in type was levied on cultivators, enabling peasants to gauge state necessities precisely, and set up an impression of what could be kept in reserve and how much could be sold on the market.

Later, this tax was transformed into a proper tax in cash, while government purchased grain on the market at specified rates. Encouragement to peasants to market grain was provided through currency reform - whereby gold rubles and later Chevrolets (gold and securities-backed currency) was put into circulation (1921-22). Inflationary pressure on the new currency was reduced by a return to budgetary orientation (rather than an orientation to requires of industry) and a proper organization of revenue collection, based on traditions dues, excise on a number of goods and taxation on sure professions. The making of a new banking organization (based on a State Bank which was recognized in October 1921) was designed to strengthen the new dispensation.

Private deal was legalized to improve the sharing of agricultural produce and other goods. A strong orientation towards everyday consumer demand was required of nationalized industry. Enterprises

were to proceed to an organization of *khozrchet*, i.e. to relate expenditure to income, rather than to rely on state subsidies. The power of the *glavkis* was weakened, and enterprises were required to shape trusts which would function independently.

Events were taken to encourage private enterprise, to create up for the weaknesses of state-run industry. A decree of 17th May 1921 revoked the decree nationalizing all little-level industry; through a law of 7th July 1921, permission was given for the institution of enterprises provided he employed less than 20 workers; and through a decree of 5th July 1921, arrangements were made for the leasing of state enterprises. The upshot of the new events was initial uncertainty and extensive-word recovery. Socialism was given a new image: of a mixed economy, with limits on capitalism, and run through autonomous state corporations (trusts), under the supervision of the *Vesenka*.

Teething trouble was apparent and suggested greater troubles. With the demand for industrial goods in 1922, a great increase in industrial prices took lay, jointly with a fall in prices for agricultural goods. This threatened the precarious interest shown through peasants in the market and was recognized since 'the scissors crisis'. Official intervention dealt with the problem on this occasion, but the extremely subsistence of the crisis indicated the poor stage of consumer goods manufacture at this time, since well since the dangerous consequences for dealings flanked by industry and agriculture should such poor manufacture persist. Again, in 1921-23, several industries were unable to adjust to *khozrchet* and had to curtail behaviors drastically.

In the case of few crucial sectors, the government intervened, but through and big trusts had to stand on their own feet, even however their access to the network of private deal was weak in the first years after the legalization of private deal.

Move towards Collectivization and the Intended Economy

A number of Bolsheviks were dissatisfied with the 'retreat' of the NEP. An exception was the economist Nikolai Bukharin (initially a great supporter of War Communism!). He argued for dependence on peasant consumption, imports where necessary and slow industrial development based on it. Again, A. Chayanov was uncertain that bourgeois forces were taking in excess of in the countryside, and pointed out that such impressions came from poor understanding of the 'peasant economy', where united family action gave an impression of great prosperity, although the property that was accumulated approximately it was quickly divided in the extensive word, since the family itself divided. L.N. Trotsky and E.I. Preobrazhenskii warned that the new dispensation would derail socialism, leading to dependence on rich peasants and the 'NEP bourgeoisie', i.e. the largest traders and entrepreneurs of the time. Their 'left opposition' persistently argued this location (and demanded the encouragement of revolution elsewhere since a solution to Soviet Russia's troubles).

They were ignored through Bolsheviks who were satisfied with the words of the NEP, and the industrial recovery it achieved. The 'left', hence, collapsed since a political force through 1927. The

sharp decline of grain supplies in 1928-29, at prices set through the state, however, changed the opinions of several Bolshevik leaders (except for Bukharin and his supporters). The phenomenon disturbed them since, from 1927, they focused on the First Five Year Plan for economic development, to go beyond industrial 'recovery'. How difficult and fast the targets were depended on who handled the plan - with politicians concerning them since necessary and possible, while economists measured them since possible, desirable but adjustable.

The poor availability of food at government rates boded an ominous future for the development of the industrial economy on the level Soviet politicians wanted. In some regions of the Urals and Siberia, the shortfall in grain procurements through the government led to requisitions on the War Communism model. But a more severe alternative was pursued in the following year. Faced with a repetition of the 1928 situation, if not worse, since grain prices soared on the private market, the CPSU Politburo decided to embark on strict regulation of agriculture by the Collectivization of agriculture.

Here, peasant farmers were grouped into communal farms (kolkhozy), which sheltered the territory of many peasant resolutions. The kolkhoz management took in excess of the land cultivated, since well since the inventory (machines, livestock, ploughs etc.), leaving the peasant a little plot, nearest to his house, which he was permitted to cultivate for his own personal exploit.

The cultivator was required to continue with his job, the variation being that his produce would be marketed through the kolkhoz management and he/she would receive a remuneration connected to the job put in. In mainly cases, the head of the kolkhoz management was a Bolshevik loyalist – frequently a 'worker' from the urban regions. Collectivization was resisted with force in the Ukraine and Kazakhstan (where independent peasant cultivation was strong, and where society cultivation was weak). Through 1932, however, the kolkhoz was the average institution of peasant land institution and farming.

By the communal farm, the government increased grain procurements. It was also able to set rock-bottom prices for agriculture, charge 'turnover' taxes when grain left the kolkhoz, and charge high taxes elsewhere, when agricultural products were sold. Thereby it provided reasonably priced food for workers in the factories set up under the First Five Year Plan, and ensured adequate revenue for itself, which could be invested in industrial construction. The peasant was therefore forced to invest in capital industry – a procedure which socialist theoreticians equated to the procedure of industrial capital accumulation that had taken lay throughout the Industrial Revolution in the West, albeit by the means of the market.

Sales of grain abroad also gave the government finances to buy machinery for industrialization under the First Plan, while the only gain to agriculture was the slow establishment of Machine Tractor Stations (MTS) which were intended to improve agricultural productivity. Inevitably, figures for industrial output for the First Plan were impressive (even if they fell short of Plan targets).

Further Growths throughout the Era of Recovery (1945-64)

Collectivization, the Intended Economy, nationalized banking and the prevalence of big trusts in industry and deal (often described 'kombinaty') were to be the hallmarks of Soviet socialism for the next fifty years.

The institutions came to symbolize economic socialism. The Soviet government undertook big projects within the framework of the organization (such since Common Secretary Nikita Khrushchev's 'Virgin Lands' scheme to increase land under farming). A biggest characteristic of the economy for the entire era was the exploit of revenue for arms industries and expansion of the armed forces with only a marginal eye to improvement of consumer goods. The mechanism of the Intended Economy made this possible.

Innovations did take lay. Few were undertaken with a fixed eye to communal enterprise; few were undertaken with an eye to a decrease of the burden on agriculture, and few bearing in mind the private sector that survived in agriculture. In the case of the burden on agriculture, for example, procurement prices were increased after 1952 to set right the anomalous nature of prices paid to the kolkhoz - which were often insufficient to meet the cost of delivery of communal farm products.

Taxes on private plots in agriculture were considerably reduced. Several experiments of the post 1952 era, however, with no attention to regional conditions, indicated often how the Scheduling organization could be misused. After 1956, for example, Nikita Khrushchev, the Party Common Secretary, disapproved of the farming of grasses (for fodder): and several meadows were dug up presently because of this disapproval. Efforts at decentralizing the Scheduling procedure by the making of 'sovnarkhozy' - in principle admirable for the increase of popular involvement - merely led to 'localism' in industrial policy.

This meant that the broad sense that planners had, since well since their knowledge, was wholly downplayed, and ridiculous examples of regional favoritism crept into economic growth.

On the 'Heroic' Stage of Socialist Industrialization

This last stage of socialist industrialization has attracted imaginative comment recently. Stephen Kotkin, for example, in his *Magnetic Mountain*, (University of California Press, 1995), proceeds distant beyond the location of Alec Nove and his sympathizers. Nove stresses the inefficiencies and bottlenecks of the intended economy, since well since the imaginative thoughts that went into it, while Kotkin regards such uninterested treatment, or a fixation with Bolshevik ideology, to be a limited perspective.

Providing a picture which goes beyond these perspectives, Kotkin's focus is Magnitogorsk i.e. the steel manufacture centre created throughout the First Five Year Plan in the high flatlands of the Urals, on the Ural River, through Magnetic Mountain. Kotkin treats the municipality since a

microcosm of Soviet life. He illustrates how this putative showcase for Soviet socialist livelihood came to be conceived; how the plans for its construction were executed and how 'the idiocy of urban life' was the consequence. The 'heroic', 'breakneck' construction of the factory intricate at Magnetic Mountain is reduced to a farce in Kotkin's history.

He points out that the site itself was deemed questionable and, despite later legend, the intricate got off the ground gradually. The reality was a shoddy plant where there were 550 stoppages of job in the first year alone and ultimate closure for complete reconstruction in November 1933. Expansion at Magnitogorsk, in the years to approach, followed a pattern general to the Intended Economy. Much of this held good for industrial expansion in recognized locations in the Ukraine and St. Petersburg.

It also held good for new locations such since Kuznetsk. There was often small choice of whether to go or not, and mobilization went beside the rows called through one laborer: 'Comrades, you're going to Magnitka. Do you know what Magnitka is?'/ 'No, we haven't a clue'/ 'unluckily neither do we, but you're going to Magnitka all the similar'. Social and family life in the municipality's cold and isolation degenerated into cards, drinking, abuse and delinquency, despite the attempts of the Komsomol and Party stalwarts.

The several 'clubs' for locals were characterized through lack of heating and other elementary facilities; poor urban discourses, appalling sharing arrangements for essentials (all intended with a lack of appreciation for regional necessities) left small time for recreation and civilization. The only hot marks in this mess were the Magnit cinema hall, the circus and a little regional theatre. When passports were introduced to restrict movements, a deal in false documents quickly ensued. In such circumstances, the lexicon of Soviet attainment was spread; the bruited of socialist achievements and the 'heroic' depiction of every venture compelled public wonder for what was often small bigger than a cloaca.

Equally, the labour attainment awards for Stakhanovites, the 'proper' classification and account of workers, and the 'proper' recording of worker biographies, providing the necessary words, gave the occupants of the socialist urban intricate their social identity. Since Kotkin points out, however, several failed to play their allotted role, presently since solid proletariat refused to place off rearing goats and cows, despite the exhortations of Party faithful.

The Private Sector

Imaginative however Kotkin's perspective is, it fails to detail the strength of private enterprise in the midst of this 'intended organization' or 'command economy'. In agriculture, this was crucial, since indicated in the following statistics of kolkhoz market sales (i.e. returns from the sale of produce from private plots in the communal farm). In industry also, however, there was a tendency for several trades to be made within the framework of the plan since several memoirs have recently pointed out.

The dynamic role of administration in the Soviet legroom is rarely discussed since yet, the assumption being that blind following of the plan was the order of the day. Soviet sources, who always congratulated themselves, give the impression that whatever the Party said was good sufficient. They rarely illustrate (except for in stray incidents) how intended manufacture worked, despite several obstacles, and how it also created a legroom for aggrandizement which gave the enterprise under socialist industrialization a dynamic of its own.

Spread of the Soviet Model in Eastern Europe

After the Second World War, Eastern European countries and the Baltic States adopted several characteristics of the Soviet model, although they initially favored extremely moderate adaptations of it as, unlike the case of Russia in 1917, the state had hitherto played a moderate role in the economy.

In the Baltic States, the assimilation into Soviet practice was quick, as Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia became members of the USSR. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the move came after the report of the Truman Doctrine, the initiation of the Marshall Plan and the formation (1947). After this the USSR encouraged countries under its political manage to adopt its own perspectives on economic growth. The Soviet model's crucial role in the area's economic growth was the result of the USSR's post-war military attendance in the area and its location since the largest recipient of reparations from Hungary and Rumania, who had supported the Axis powers.

In a departure from what occurred in the Soviet Union, however, approximately in all cases, in the shape of socialist industrialization that took lay, little-level farming played an significant section in agriculture, although collectivization was encouraged in the years after 1949 for a brief era, and several events were taken to hold such farming jointly in communal or cooperative enterprise. Hungary (and too little extent Rumania) was slightly exceptional. Here big state farms also had a biggest role in agriculture.

This was an outcome of the institution of agriculture in Hungary and Rumania before 1945, when big latifundia played a considerable section in agriculture. The share of such latifundia considerably passed on to the state. A decade-extensive experience of extreme diversities of Soviet-approach scheduling and state manage in these countries came under the aegis of the Cominform and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, acting in tandem since sources of pressure, in the era after 1949. A good trade of industrial output was sold to the USSR at reduced rates (sometimes connected to reparations, since in the case of Hungary and East Germany, but sometimes not, since in the case of Poland).

The 'Stalinist' experiment was subject to biggest attacks throughout the mid 1950s (throughout the disturbances in Hungary and Poland in 1956), but it was only customized in any meaningful manner after the approval to economic reform through the Soviet economist Liberman in the Soviet newspaper *Pravda* in September 1962. Here, the reform focused on: a reduction in intended targets;

a greater stress on profitability; economic rewards for efficiency; greater variety in pricing; greater industrial concentration, accompanied through decentralization. Stiffer dominants were reintroduced rapidly, however, after 1968 (and the move against economic reform in Czechoslovakia).

The only country which was able to uphold its reforms was Hungary, where, despite the ups and downs of the reform organization, imports of Western technology, comparative freedom of movement abroad and encouragement of little-level private industry became a permanent characteristic of the country through the late 1970s. In all countries, increase of Soviet oil prices in 1975 seriously destabilized the economies.

Hungary

With Soviet job, a Hungarian National Independence Front, comprising a number of radical and socialist parties shaped a Provisional Government (December 1944) which quickly moved towards economic reform. At the time, big-level private wealth dominated the economy.

In agriculture, there lived a number of latifundia or great estates that were commercially oriented and that were owned through aristocratic families. Smallholdings which belonged to peasant proprietors were divided: few were extremely little, others substantial and geared to the market. Industry was concentrated, with the Credit Bank and the Commercial Bank having biggest shares in excess of 60% of what there was, and a number of significant players running the significant manufactures. The reforms came in the following levels:

- In January 1945, workers manage was introduced in approximately all industry by a decree which gave biggest powers to factory committees.
- Through a decree of 17th March, the great estates were taken in excess of through the state, since were the holdings of the Catholic Church. Approximately all peasant farms were exempt from the decree. In relation to the 60% of the land was distributed - a big portion going to agricultural laborers and little-level proprietors.
- Despite the success of the non-socialist parties in the elections of November 1945, pressures from Soviet forces, the Communist and Socialist parties and a part of the Smallholders' Party forced by the nationalization of four of the country's main industrial enterprises.
- A Three Year Plan was adopted in July 1947. In the wake of the political crisis of 1947 (after the elections of August) in November 1947, nationalization of the biggest banks followed, since did the adoption of a Three Year Plan. On 25th March 1948, the nationalization of factories employing more than 100 workers took lay.

The implementation of the reforms fell to the Hungarian Working People's Party, which was created from a fusion of the Social Democrat and Communist Parties in June 1948. This party was

reconstituted in 1956 since the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, following the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.

Both before and after 1956, the party dominated the government and followed the model of the Soviet economy. In the era up to 1956, intensive industrialization was the order of the day, with a stress on capital goods industries. Hence, under the first Five Year Plan (1950-54), industrial manufacture increased through 130%, and machine industry manufacture through 350%. There was small growth of consumer industry, and collectivization of agriculture was encouraged.

After 1956, cooperativization in the middle of little-holders, rather than collectivization, became the goal of the socialist economy, and a greater diversification into consumer industry was noticeable. Under the New Economic Mechanism (launched on 1st January 1968), steps to develop a program of 'liberalization' were undertaken. These involved greater imports of Western technology and freer travel abroad and independence to biggest enterprises: events devised through Rezso Nyers, the country's best recognized 'reformist'. Increases of oil prices through the USSR led to a restoration of dominate on enterprises, and heavy subsidies to uphold low domestic prices (and Nyers' removal from the Politburo).

A return to a reform program began in 1977, with restrictions on private farmers relaxed in 1980 (they were permitted to acquire machinery), gradual division of big enterprises and license to little foreign firms to job in the country. Prices were permitted to rise in 1979 (to allow them to approach to world stages) and in 1982, the country joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Efforts to return to an organization of dominate and subsidies in 1985 led to the consolidation of a dissident radical cluster in the country under Imre Pozsgay. The cluster's power was felt when extensive-serving President Janos Kadar was forced to step down (22 May 1988), Pozsgay was admitted to the Politburo of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party in a prelude to Hungary's quiet revolution of 1989.

Rumania

Soviet troops were in job of Rumania from August 1945, although the Communists (the Rumanian Workers' Party) only formally recognized manage in excess of the government of the country after the abdication in 1947 of King Michael. Under job a number of steps were taken to adapt the economy to the Soviet model.

The largest levels of the version of the Rumanian economy to the Soviet model were:

- The dissolution of the largest Rumanian banks in August 1948 and concentration of financial behaviors in the National Bank of Rumania (later the Bank of the Rumanian People's Republic).
- The formation of a number of joint stock companies (Sovroms) based on Soviet and Rumanian government investments in several industries - iron and steel, where (the Resita institution was transformed into a Sovrom), petroleum, where the Sovrompetrol was shaped, insurance and

mining. Here the USSR took in excess of the German and Hungarian shares in the industries concerned through a law of April 1946. Throughout 1954-56, Soviet shares in industry were systematically transferred to the Rumanian state.

- The making of centers of manages for the mining industry in 1948 at Bai Mare (northern Transylvania) and Brad (Bihar mountains, central Transylvania).
- The promulgation of Land Reform Acts on March 22 1945 (largely involving the expropriation of properties in excess of 50 hectares) and March 2nd 1949 (which involved the confiscation of the land of property owners of more than 15,000 hectares). This intensified inter-war expropriation of big estates and redistribution of property. The largest beneficiaries were peasants (who dominated the wool and existence agriculture oriented economy of the Carpathian uplands and Transylvania; but, since in Hungary, superior holdings were directly controlled through the state also the commercial grain economy of the Banat and the cash crop belt of the Carpathian lowlands (Moldavia and Wallachia), where vineyards and market gardens are general.

The considerable power in Rumania of the National Peasants' Party throughout 1944- 45, and thereafter of peasant proprietors in common ensured that peasant ownership sustained to be a decisive characteristic of the Rumanian economy until recent times. Industry was dominated through state ownership; however, a little private sector (especially in deal) persisted even after big level nationalization of the trading tools. Investments under the Rumanian Five Year Plans were directed to oil-based industry, commercial agriculture and timber felling and export.

Poland

The Polish Committee of National Liberation undertook the application of the Soviet model of socialist economic growth to Poland. Shaped in 1944, this was the core of the post 1945 government. The largest characteristics of the socialist transition (eventually managed through the Polish United Workers' Party) were:

- The decree of 6 September 1944, which confiscated all landholdings above 50 hectares. This followed up legislation of the inter-war era which pushed by redistribution of great estates. Jointly with the confiscation of Church land ((1950), the 1944 measure increased the power of agriculture through peasant holdings, albeit to the advantage of richer peasants. Hence, while 65% of the land was held in allotments of under 10 hectares, in excess of 33% was still held in allotments of flanked by 10 and 50 hectares. Polish governments did not focus on collectivization after redistribution, except for a brief era throughout 1947- 53, when they encouraged communal farms, which only sheltered 10% of arable land through 1954, and maintained state farms. Collectives were allowed to dwindle after 1956 (in 1959 they only sheltered 1% of arable land). As state farms came to 15% of the arable land at their

mainly recent times. The government tried several events to induce communal action (for example the formation of Agricultural Circles in 1956, where members could rent machinery at reduced costs). These had hardly any effect.

- The formation of a Central Scheduling Office which organized a Three Year Plan (1947-49), and later a Six Year Plan for the economy. Mainly industrial manufacture and mining were transferred to state hands after 1945. Through 1949-50, 92% of industry was nationalized.

Call for reform through Polish economists such as Lange and Brus in 1956 included demands for flexibility in economic policy, encouragement of foreign investment and decentralization of industrial institutions. Demonstrations in favor of this intensification of the 'New Course' (initiated in 1953 through First Secretary Bierut after Stalin's death) merely led to a transformation in leadership in Poland (the selection of the 'moderate' Gomulka as head of the Party).

Reforms after 1962, led to price increases and a wager on increased investment in 'contemporary industries'. This in turn led to demonstrations against the effects of such events and to the ascendancy of Edward Gierk in the Polish Party.

Czechoslovakia

Soviet troops moved out of Czechoslovakia in November 1945. But a Jobs Council Movement began in 1945, which demanded nationalization of mines and industry, establishing workers' management. After initial reluctance through the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to accept this nationalization plan, it gave way gradually, and events in this vein were systematically undertaken, especially after 1947 and the report of the Truman Doctrine and the formation of the Cominform. The pattern of land redistribution and rapid state take in excess of industry was followed here since elsewhere:

- In March 1948, all estates of in excess of 50 hectares were confiscated, redistribution and cooperativization were initiated. Thereafter, all cooperatives were merged into communal farms through a law of 23rd February 1949, which was enforced with special severity after 1953.
- Through 1949-50, 96% of industry was nationalized, after initial restraint in this region (in 1948, 20% of industry was still in private hands). Under scheduling, stress fell heavily on heavy industry and munitions manufacture.

A program of economic reform was attempted under the encouragement of Alexander Dubcek and the economists Sik and Selucky (all of the Slovak republic) in 1968. This would have involved a degree of freedom to workers to demand wage increases, a freeing of prices and due allowance for the formation of private enterprises. The invasion through the Warsaw Pact of Czechoslovakia, however, forestalled the implementation of the program.

Bulgaria

Collectivization was more marked here in the earlier levels of economic reform, although peasant manufacture never ceased to be significant. Little plots engaged 13% of the arable land in 1975, and produced 25% of produce (dominating potato and fruit output). A commitment to big level industrialization urbanized in the late 1960s, when there was a move absent from traditional stress on food processing.

- Throughout 1945-48, landholdings were limited to 20 hectares, and holdings this stage were redistributed. Thereafter, smallholdings were merged into communal farms, and 50% of arable land was in these through 1953. All privately owned machinery and farm equipment was compulsorily acquired through the state, and a kulak defined since one owning in excess of 5 hectares. Proprietors owning in excess of 10 hectares had to sell 75% of their grain crop to the state (1950), while collectives had their delivery quotas reduced (1953).
- Through 1949/50, 95% of the limited industry that lived in the country was nationalized.

East Germany (German Democratic Republic)

Version to the Soviet model began late here, as a myth was maintained that East Germany would be united with West Germany in the extensive word, and radical alteration in the manufacture organization was not a good idea considering this. Nationalization of industry and deal, however, began extensive before the formal decision to embark on socialist construction through the Socialist Unity Party in 1952 under the direction of Walter Ulbricht.

Industry and deal in private hands (19% and 37% respectively) was taken in excess of through the state thereafter, and collectivization of agriculture begun and intensified (especially after 1958). The Liberman-sanctioned reforms took form in the GDR in the shape of the New Economic Organization that lasted from 1963 to 1970 (when dominates by Scheduling were intensified). Industrial manufacture grew through 5.8% flanked by 1960 and 1964, and 6.4% flanked by 1964 and 1970. Per capita development rate and increase in average of livelihood was of the order of 4.9% flanked by 1970 and 1975.

Abandonment of the New Economic Organization was marked through the dismissal of Gunter Mittag from the Council of State in 1971, and version to increased Soviet oil prices (after 1975) through increases in state subsidies of domestic prices.

Yugoslavia

An alternative variety of socialist industrialization, the case of the Yugoslav Federation was marked through a 'mixed economy', where, like the other East European cases, emulation of the Soviet model was clear, but where a big non-state sector grew up in excess of time. The following levels are noticeable in the Yugoslav model:

- 1946 - A nationalization law which made permanent government takeover of mainly German and Italian property in the country.
- Redistribution of land in German hands and of holdings in excess of 45 hectares to peasant proprietors. Peasant holdings were restricted to 20-25 hectares.
- Initiation of the First Five Year Plan. The USSR agreed to set up a number of joint ventures in shipping and air transport. But these were quickly closed down after the Yugoslavs measured these excessively favorable to the Soviet Union. Grants from UNRRA were extremely significant in this early stage.
- Slow move absent from the Soviet model, after the political break with the Soviet Union in 1948. This took time. Initially, the state favored collectivization by concentration of peasant households in Peasant-Worker Cooperatives, in order to manage grain marketing. But poor performance here and in nationalized industry under central direction led to the growth of self managed state enterprises (1950) and a decrease in interest in communal agriculture (although maximum holdings were reduced to a mass of 10 hectares). The average practice of by centralized investment was customized through the making of collective banks that had their own sphere of investment. After the First Five Year Plan, the scheduling organization was amended to involve less of the 'command approach' and permit greater cooperation flanked by state industry, independent of the central (and state) scheduling commissions. The trend was assisted through investment from the USA, although government stress on the growth of heavy industry and armaments industry persisted.
- Following Stalin's death, dealings with the Soviet bloc varied. Initially, improvements led to a big increase in deal with the CMEA countries. But continuous inflow of soft loans from the United States and good dealings with Western Europe led to the growth of many ventures in secure association with these countries: ventures which were not guided rigidly through the Scheduling organization. The significance of the state remained significant. Despite the subsistence of self-administration, collective banks etc., the Central Investment Fund controlled 70% of investment and industry bore spots of political manage. Spots of central manage included the focus of investment in heavy industry and the subsistence of 'political factories', i.e. factories which were set up with non-economic thoughts in mind.
- Associate membership of the Common Agreement on Deal and Tariffs (GATT) in 1960 led to pressure on the 1961-65 Five Year Plan and intensification of the move absent from central manage in the Intended Economy. Investment came increasingly from collective banks, and devaluation took lay to encourage foreign deal. Initially, to curb inflation and uphold characteristics of the old organization, a wage freeze was initiated. But this situation proved unworkable, led to a debate on the future of the economy, and intensification of the growth of private enterprise and decentralization after 1965 (in the therefore-described 'market oriented reforms').

- The new course (which involved the growth of a commercial banking sector), received great impetus in the 1970s with the greater inflow of foreign loans, and, after 1979, the country moved into a debt crisis in which the political crisis of the late 1980s took form, leading to the disintegration of the Federation.

Socialist Initiatives outside the Soviet Bloc

Efforts to rein in capitalism were general in a number of countries where socialists were powerful throughout the inter-war and post-Second World War era. In France, for example, under Leon Blum and the Popular Front (1936-38), efforts were made to manage capital transfers out of the country, and significant steps were taken to set up state manage in excess of the munitions' industry. Biggest reforms were introduced in the factories - where employers were compelled to give workers a minimum paid holiday each year, and where working hours were strictly limited.

In Britain, after the Second World War, the Labour government nationalized the coal and steel industries and introduced the 'welfare state' (i.e. the National Health Scheme, which reduced health costs dramatically, since well since the introduction of unemployment benefit to the out-of-job). The Labour governments of Harold Wilson (1964-70), extended cheap housing for the population by the agency of regional government, while socialist governments on the Continent introduced their own adaptation of the 'welfare state' by organizations of insurance. Much of this initiative was in imitation of the state-led model prevalent in the USSR (and Eastern Europe).

But in developing their own focus on 'insurance' (where the state, the employer and the employee contributed to a general fund), countries such since France, Germany and Italy urbanized their own variety of 'welfare' which involved a smaller role for the state. This dimension to socialism outside the Soviet bloc is what made it unique. Accepting capitalist enterprise and a limited lay for state initiative, it was strictly non-Leninist.

UNDERDEVELOPMENT

Meaning Of Underdevelopment

We live in an agonizing, inextricably intended bipolar world marked through severe deprivation and social exclusion on the one hand and affluence and opulence on the other. Eight hundred and eighty million are malnourished and millions go without schooling. On the other extreme, three richest people in the world have assets that exceed the combined GDP of 48 least urbanized countries. Such deprived people are wholly or partially excluded from full participation in the community in which they live due to lack of options, entitlement to possessions and lack of social-capital.

These reports can be analyzed if we understand the meaning of growth and underdevelopment. Economic growth may be defined since the procedure through which a traditional community employing primitive techniques and capable of sustaining only a low stage of income is transformed

into a contemporary, high technology, high-income economy. Such an urbanized economy exploits capital, skilled labour and scientific knowledge to produce wide variety of products for the market. Capital goods and human capital and relevant scientific knowledge play a biggest role since factors of manufacture in such a community. Broadly speaking, lack of growth may be defined since underdevelopment. World Bank has set the following growth goals:

- Reduction of poverty,
- Low mortality rates,
- Universal primary education,
- Access to reproductive health services,
- Gender equality,
- National strategies for sustainable growth.

Several underdeveloped countries are not in a location to attain these high objectives because of grinding poverty, low income and lack of possessions. It is hazardous to generalize in relation to the underdeveloped world. Although they resemble in several negative word- they are less industrialized, mostly non-European in descent, situated in tropical areas and several of them are former colonies yet they modify in cultural, economic and political circumstances.

They share wide-spread and chronic absolute poverty, high and growing burden of unemployment and underemployment, growing disparities in income sharing, low and stagnant agricultural productivity, sizeable gap flanked by urban and rural stages of livelihood, lack of adequate education, health and housing facilities, dependence on foreign and often inappropriate technologies and more or less stagnant occupational building. Despite these resemblances and general characteristics, there are significant variations in the middle of the underdeveloped countries in the mass of the country (in words of geography, population and economy), their historical development, their natural and human resource endowments, the nature of their industrial building and polity and other institutional buildings. Low income compared to the urbanized world economies is measured to be a biggest feature of underdeveloped areas.

Ghana and India with per capita income below \$785 are low-income countries; China flanked by (\$785-3125) is a lower transitional-income country while Brazil in the per capita income of \$3125-9655 range falls in the upper transitional-income category. However, per capita income is only a measure of standard income based on market valuations. It is not a complete indicator of incidence of poverty.

Few extra dimensions such since life expectancy, health facilities, and circumstances of employment, social-building and sharing of income necessity are taken into explanation to create a proper assessment of a country's economy. Mainly underdeveloped countries are characterized through

contrast flanked by luxury and squalor, skewed sharing of income, low productivity, high stage of unemployment and disguised rural/urban unemployment marked through surplus human labour who shares agricultural chores that are otherwise redundant.

Salient Characteristics of the Underdeveloped Countries

Although it is risky to generalize in relation to the therefore several underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, they share sure general socio-economic characteristics. We can classify these similarities for convenience into the following broad categories:

- Low stages of livelihood
- Low stages of productivity
- High rates of population development and Dependency ratios in the population
- Significant dependency on agricultural manufacture and primary product exports
- Dominance/dependence and vulnerability in International dealings.

Low stages of livelihood in the underdeveloped areas are manifested quantitatively in the shape of low incomes, inadequate housing, poor health, limited education, high infant mortality, low life and job expectancy. The economists exploit the Gross National Product per head since index of comparative well being of people in dissimilar countries.

Not only their per capita income is low in absolute words when compared to the wealthy nations but they also experience slower GNP development rates with some exceptions. Ghana and India are typical low-income countries. China has improved its location slightly. Another dimension of income is how it is distributed in the middle of the population. Despite relatively higher incomes, the Latin American countries also exhibit simultaneously chronic poverty. This poverty gets reflected in widespread malnutrition, lack of vital health services, high under-5 mortality rates and lower life expectancy.

The under-5 mortality in India and Ghana in 1996 was 107 and 109 respectively compared to the single-digit rates for the advanced countries. The situation in Brazil and China was bigger with mortality rates of 44 and 47 per thousand respectively. The stages of livelihood are functionally correlated to the low stages of labour productivity in the underdeveloped countries. The lack of complimentary in the middle of factors of manufacture like physical capital and expertise restricts labour output. Institutional factors also hinder manufacture.

One such factor is the social-exclusion of people in key region of life especially with regard to rights, possessions and connections. Other institutional inputs affecting manufacture are the land-tenurial organization, taxation organization, credit and banking building, educational programs, nature of administrative services, etc. The low stages of livelihood and productivity are self-reinforcing. They

are also the principal manifestations of underdevelopment. The underdeveloped countries have high population pressures on their possessions due to high birth rates and maternal fertility rates.

While few countries like China and Brazil have mainly succeeded in checking their population development (their total fertility rates in 1996 were 1.9 and 2.4 respectively) several others are still caught in the stage of 'demographic trap'---- a stage of declining mortality and persistence of high fertility. This has a biggest implication for the age-building of the underdeveloped areas, which are heavily burdened with children below 15 years. These results in fewer producers compared to consumers in these communities, a factor that also affects investment in productive capacities. Underutilization of labour, a key phenomenon in the underdeveloped world is manifested in two shapes.

It occurs since underemployment, or people working less than they would like, daily, weekly or seasonally. Another shape is disguised unemployment where people are nominally working full time but whose productivity is therefore low that their absence would have a smallest impact on total output. The underemployment in urban centers is reflected in preponderance of labour in informal sector i.e. people occupied in petty-trading, casual and irregular wage job, in domestic services of extremely little 'micro' (enterprises) in unregulated sectors.

This is in relation to the 60-70% in Kumasi (Ghana), 40-50% in Calcutta (India) and in relation to the 43% in Sao Paulo (Brazil). The sprawling slums in such underdeveloped municipalities are related to this phenomenon. The concentration of people on primary or agriculture manufacture or stagnant occupational building is another indicator of underdevelopment. This sector is characterized through primitive techniques, poor institution and limited physical and human-capital and hence, low productivity. In several sections of Latin America and Asia, it is also characterized through land-tenure organizations under which peasants generally rent rather than own their lands.

Although, several underdeveloped economies are not, strictly speaking, mono-crop economies or economies dependent on single crop exports for their foreign earnings; yet several such countries rely heavily on a little number of primary exports for the bulk of their foreign earnings. Ghana, for instance, depends on selling of Cocoa, timber and minerals to the West. Brazil, despite recent diversification, relies on Coffee and minerals since biggest export things. Another typical characteristic of underdevelopment is the dependence of these countries on rich, advanced nations in words of technology, foreign aid and private capital transfers.

Beside with the capital flows, the values, attitudes and average of activities of the advanced countries are also superimposed on them. The phenomenon of 'plunder through bureaucracy' to emulate western life approach and 'brain-drain' are a result of such cultural invasion. In 1997, International Bank for Reconstruction and Growth commitments amounted to \$14.5 billion since loans to the poorest countries. The grants and loans provided through the OECD countries and private capital flows are better than this amount. Much of this foreign investment is situated in mining or other

extractive industries, which removes non-renewable possessions at rates and prices that are not in the interest of sustainable growth. On the other hand, several of the underdeveloped countries side foreign-debt crises since a result of rising outflows required for dividends and repayments exceeding the new net borrowings at one point or the other.

Approaches to Understand Underdevelopment

In this part as suggested, talk about two biggest paradigms urbanized in order to understand the nature of underdevelopment.

The Neo-Marxist Dependency Model

This model is an outgrowth of Marxist thinking. It attributes the subsistence and maintenance of underdevelopment to the growth of world capitalist organization that divided the globe into the rich urbanized and poor underdeveloped countries. The world is dominated through an unequal authority and swap connection flanked by the 'centre' or the urbanized area and the 'margin' or the underdeveloped area. Sure clusters in the underdeveloped countries such since landlords, merchants, industrialists and state officials who enjoy high incomes, social-status and political authority constitute a little ruling elite.

They act since mediators in the perpetuation of international capitalist networks of in excellence and use. Surplus or the capitalist profits are transferred by several channels from the 'margin' to the 'centre'. While few argue for the impossibility of an underdeveloped country's immanent growth or the spontaneous, natural procedure of growth from within due to this unequal connection, others consider that intentional growth by deliberate strategic decisions is possible even however it may be determined through the requires and necessities of the regional elites. The economic activities of regional elites in the underdeveloped countries is marked through the conspicuous consumption, investment in real estates and extreme risk-aversion and the export of their savings to be deposited with foreign banks. These are rational responses from the standpoint of private advantage in the conditions prevailing in these countries.

Competition with the giant transnational corporations through the indigenous entrepreneurs is not simple. The states in such habitation have attempted to become capitalists themselves in order to fund their industrialization with the help of state-owned enterprises. However, unable to compete with more powerful foreign competitors and because of their servility to regional commercial, capitalist, bureaucratic and landed interests, the states only ended up in investing in infrastructure (largely transport and discourses) and tourism-industry. The neo-Marxist model also stresses how the export sector that serves require of foreign investors is connected to the growth of much of the tertiary sector such since banking, infrastructure and management.

To quote Andre Gunder Frank: ‘with the export industry came its satellite moons, now transformed into white elephants, and the people who economically and socially, but thanks to cultural liberalism also culturally, learned to ride on them.’

The Liberal Levels Model

This conceptual framework propounded through liberal and neo-liberal economists is based on the belief that what are now urbanized, contemporary communities were also in the earlier times traditional, backward and agriculture based communities. So, we should not place the blame for all the ills of underdevelopment at the doorsteps of such urbanized nations.

The American economic historian W.W. Rostow urbanized a ‘levels of development theory’ every nation necessity pass by the following levels:(1) traditional and stagnant low per capita level, (2) middle level when the pre-circumstances for development are laid down, (3) the ‘take off’ level or the beginning of the development procedure, (4) industrialized size manufacture and consumption level. The last level was supposed to be self-sustaining. Mainly of the liberal and neo-liberal economists emphasize that the underdeveloped countries can also generate enough investment through mobilization of domestic and foreign savings to accelerate their economic development.

It is argued that the largest obstacle to development in the underdeveloped countries was relatively low stage of capital formation. They might need a suitable dose of foreign aid or private foreign investment in order to take off. Therefore, capital investment was supposed to act like a growth vending machine.

In several Keynesian informed schemes, the economic growth of the underdeveloped countries is connected to the proper utilization of capital. The Harrod-Domar model and Ragnar Nurkse’s scheme are instances of this come. The structural and institutional factors affecting the growth are ignored in this model while the dynamic of growth by capitalist entrepreneurs is stressed. Even the transnational companies by their private investment, while reaping profits will diffuse technology, improve productivity and harness domestic savings. In short, private greed will produce public good. Others like Gunnar Myrdal, Raul Prebisch and Oswald Sunkel have raised doubts that foreign investment will automatically lead to growth. They consider that it will merely make ‘enclaves’ of growth bounded through the massive oceans of underdevelopment.

Attacking Underdevelopment: The Policy Options

Balanced Development

When economists first began thinking how policy could deliberately stimulate growth, a typical answer in the 1940s was that a simultaneous expansion of output in excess of a wide range of industries was necessary. Economists Paul-Rosenstein-Rodan and Ragnar Nurkse were the leading exponents of this view.

They argued that an in accessible expansion of output through one or two industries was bound to fail because there would be no increase in the purchasing authority elsewhere in the economy to buy the additional output.

They accentuated a balanced expansion of a big number of sectors, each therefore providing additional purchasing authority to help raise the demand for the output of the other sectors. However, the solution did not job in little countries where it was hard to obtain economies of level or the minimum efficient mass of firms. Secondly, even if an economy develops only some key sectors, it could discover markets for its products abroad.

Export-Promotion Strategy

This strategy demanded direct additional factor investments to be made in the sectors already occupied in export-manufacture. Another method was to explore the possibility of developing entirely new export sectors. The country might presumably have a relative advantage in these sectors. Efforts are made to tap foreign rather than domestic markets to give the additional demand. The proceeds from the exports could then be used to purchase the other needed inputs from abroad.

Import-Substitution for Achieving Industrialization

New industries are recognized to replace imports under this policy. The market for these industrial products is domestic. The elimination of few imports releases foreign swap for the purchase of needed inputs in the world market. This policy often needs imposition of protective tariffs and physical quotas to get the new industry started. There has been a considerable amount of debate in excess of the efficacy of policy options accessible.

Raul Prebisch, the Argentinean economist, argued in favor of import substitution on the ground that prices of commodities produced in the primary sector have deteriorated in relation to manufactured commodities and would continue to do therefore. Expansion of export of traditional goods could basically lead to further deterioration of words of deal. So, the underdeveloped countries in order to escape from their role since that of hewers of wood and drawers of water necessity attempt to develop their own capital goods and durable consumer-goods sector. It means that indigenous manufacture should supply domestic markets with such import substitutes.

Such a strategy needs direct intervention through the state in the shape of price-dominates and manage of distributive channels. The state bureaucracy also acquires authority to enhance or remove domestic monopoly locations of the manufacturing firms. The covered monopoly locations of the firms could also lead to inefficient manufacture. The export-promotion strategy, on the other hand, does not need severe import restrictions like high tariffs, quotas, import prohibitions and maintenance of an arbitrary swap rate. Through basically providing incentives to export-oriented firms such since adequate subsidies, these firms can easily obtain economies of level.

The underdeveloped countries may, however, side troubles when all of them start competing for the benefits of deal through exporting their labour-intensive manufactures. Such economies are also more prone to shocks generated through the international markets. The choice flanked by export-promotion and import-substitution is not absolute. Both may have a useful role to play in the drive to obtain industrial maturity. These policy options are still mainly section of traditional thinking on growth.

The emphasis, in all the schemes, is on raising the productive capacities of their economies through intentional growth alongside capitalism in order to ameliorate earlier lopsided growth. In recent years, a notion of 'human-centered growth' has gained ground, which sets the developmental goals in words of excellence of life. This is dependent not only on low stage of material poverty and low stages of unemployment but also on ideals such since comparative excellence incomes, accessibility to adequate education, health services and housing facilities, equal participation in democratic institutions, sustainability of growth and lack of any shape of open or disguised discrimination against any cluster.

Examining Few Economic Buildings in the Light of Underdevelopment

In this part we examine four economies from Asia, Africa and Latin America to concretely understand the nature of this phenomenon and efforts to overcome it.

The Indian Case

India symbolizes a typical case of underdevelopment. Its GNP per capita was \$72 in mid-1950s. It is still in the low-income range of below \$785 through the international averages. In other dimensions of excellence of life, such since life expectancy, health facilities and circumstances of employment, it lags behinds few of the other developing countries. Its manufacture and occupational building remain stagnant. While China reduced its under-5 mortality rate from 209 in 1960 to 47 per thousand in 1997, India could reduce its infant mortality from 236 in 1960 to 108 in 1997 per thousand only. Life expectancy in China is 70 years compared to 62 years in India.

Likewise, maternal mortality rate or the numbers of women's death per one lakh live births was 437 in India in 1996 while in Chinese case it was 115 only. This is an indicator of deprivation women suffer in India and of the poor health facilities we offer to them. However India inherited all the structural distortions created through colonialism, it also had sure advantages in excess of several other colonial communities.

India had a relatively strong industrial foundation and its capitalists had captured in relation to the 75% of market for industrial produce at the time of independence. The indigenous entrepreneurial class had also acquired manage of financial sector. There was also a broad social consensus to attain rapid industrial transition. However, the growing capitalism failed to absorb India's growing surplus

labour. Even at present, it only absorbs in relation to the 20% labour and this also includes the capitalist service sector.

India embarked on a strategy of import-substitution industrialization following Fledman-Mahalanobis model. It was proposed to produce a wide range of manufactures for the domestic market in order to reduce require for imported manufactures. It necessitated big investment in heavy industry and diversion of more possessions to the manufacture of investment goods in common and machine apparatus in scrupulous therefore since to reduce dependence on international sources of capital goods, intermediate and components. Exportable food and raw materials were taxed and the revenues therefore generated were employed to subsidize domestic manufacturing. The plan also stressed a big expansion of employment opportunities.

It was also meant to give a boost to the weak and nascent private sector. Possessions were made accessible for capital goods sector by foreign aid and investment and also by state loans and credits. The result was that public sector's share in the manufacture of reproducible capital increased from 15% in 1950-51 to 40% in 1976-77. The share of state enterprises in the net domestic product grew from 3% in 1950-51 to 16% in 1984-85. It created infrastructure and vital industrial foundation since a stimulus to the rapid development of private enterprises.

The organization of import and investment licensing led to monopolistic dominates often severing the critical link flanked by profitability and economic performance. It led to a spectacular rise of large Indian business with a marriage of convenience with foreign collaborators. The large industrial houses enjoyed the benefits of an infrastructure urbanized by revenues generated from indirect taxes on public. They also got subsidized power inputs, cheaper capital goods and extensive-word industrial fund from the public enterprises. Since a result of these benefits, the assets of 20 large industrial houses grew from Rs.500 crores in 1951 to Rs.23, 200 crores in 1986.

However, there was no dynamic structural transform in the Indian economy. Big numbers of people remain tied to underdeveloped agriculture despite 'green revolution'. In the urban centers, a sizeable number of people livelihoods in sprawling slums discover employment in the informal sector and petty distributive behaviors associated with it. The land reforms did not touch agrarian dealings and the vital in excellence in rural assets persists. So, there is only a restricted size market catering to require of urban and rural elites.

In these conditions, a shift out of Mahalanobis model became necessary, since the state could not discover sufficient possessions, within a mixed economy framework. The private enterprises establish the manufacture of 'nonessential' consumer goods more profitable. The state resorted to inflationary indirect taxation and deficit-financing in order to fund unprofitable public enterprises occupied in the manufacture of investment goods. The private sector now clamored for the dismantling of public sector on the ground that it was causing budget deficits, high inflation, high-wages and interest rates.

The effects of earlier industrialization had led to high government deficits, inflation and interest rates regime. For instance, the central government's budget deficit grew from 6.4% of GNP in 1980 to 8.9% of GNP in 1990. The government's domestic debt rose to 56% of GDP in 1991. India was secure to 'technological default' on its foreign debts since reflected in the foreign swap crisis of 1991.

At this point, the pace of 'liberalization' was speeded up under the IMF structural adjustment program. It meant easing of restrictions on imports and foreign investment, steps to create rupee convertible, a massive cut in sugar and fertilizer subsidies, deregulation of steel sharing and a curb on government's deficit through method of reduction in government's spending on subsidies and social-services. The largest strategy of this stage is export-substitution with minimum public sector intervention and unrestricted entry of foreign capital. Despite all these grand designs, there is no vital structural transform in the Indian economy. In relation to the 70% of our population continues to live at bare existence stage. In relation to the 76.6 million agricultural laborers earn in relation to the 1/10th of what an organized sector worker earns.

In the 1980s, the number of unemployed youths registered in government exchanges crossed 34 million or 10% of the total active population or the total number of productive people employed in the urban manufacturing sector.

The Chinese Experience

China was more unfavorably placed than India at the time of its 'liberation' in 1949. It lagged behind India in words of infrastructure and industrial growth. India and China initially followed the similar set of policy options especially centralized scheduling but in dissimilar institutional framework. China went for radical agrarian land reform program, therefore, creating a truly size market for consumption goods produced through a more labour-intensive industrial set-up compared to more capital-intensive Indian industries. China abolished landlordism in 1950, primarily to close the loyalty of poor peasants.

Under its land reforms, 46 million hectares or 113 million acres of China's 107 million hectares or 264 million acres of arable land was redistributed in the middle of the peasants to give in relation to the 300 million peasants land of their own. To accelerate economic performance of agrarian economy, commune organization same to the Soviet collectives was adopted therefore since to squeeze more labour out of the peasants. Collectives were granted more credits and other facilities than the individual peasants. After 1956, more intensive collectivization events were adopted.

The Chinese collectives were better than Soviet ones and also contributed to industrial manufacture. In relation to the 8% of male population was drafted to non-agricultural manufacture, thereby, rising the burden on women. The Great Leap Forward (1958) was designed to modernize Chinese agriculture through simultaneously developing industries with little-level ways in villages. It only led

to a series of bad harvests. The withdrawal of Soviet experts in 1960 led to further economic catastrophe. The 'Leap' was abandoned and more attention was paid to monetary incentives and market mechanisms since well since efficient, economical manufacture rather than aiming to maximize output at all costs. The Cultural Revolution (1966-69) involved transfer of manufacture-decisions from ministries and experts to a cluster of revolutionary guards. Millions of skilled workers and experts were sent to job on farms for ideological causes.

It led to another drastic decline in the industrial manufacture, foreign deal and development rate of GNP. Initially, China also adopted Fledman-Mahalanobis kind Keynesian economic strategy of growth. The largest industries urbanized under scheduling were fertilizers, machines, vehicle, oil and electric authority, whereas textile, food-processing and steel manufacture grew rather gradually. Big-level irrigation projects in Hunan and Fujian, water conversancy and electric authority-generation on the Grand Canal in Hubei province were also launched. Another aspect of China's economic growth was huge transfer of in relation to the 15-19% of agricultural population from land to the industrial sector. The result was a high proportion employed in industry compared to the stage of industrial growth and co-subsistence of contemporary mechanized sector with partly rural, little-level handicraft manufacture. After the failure of the Great Leap Forward, China realized that an in excess of-populated and very poor country could not afford high rates of savings and investment needed to stay the import-substitution strategy in lay.

In a pragmatic shift, regional governments were given more roles in resource allocation and financial administration of the economy. In order to ensure the interior supply of inputs and finished products for the better enterprises, simultaneous development of little enterprises in little cities and villages was accentuated. Another shift to a more market-friendly strategy that provided a stimulus to the foreign capital came after 1978. The procedure of reform started with de-collectivization under which user rights with respect to land were transformed through allowing independent decisions on investment and land-allocation to peasants and through permitting sale of a big output in the open market. This resulted in a sharp increase in agricultural manufacture but had an adverse impact on the employment and utilization of surplus labour. Another aspect of this market friendly come has been to give incentives to direct foreign investment especially in the special economic zones to maximize their utility.

The ethnic Chinese capital, not multinationals, dominated these behaviors and China favored launching of export drive without liberalizing imports. Entry of foreign investors was favored in new regions and not in the core industrial regions. Since a result, the Chinese industrial development increased from 11% per annum throughout 1970-80 to 16% per annum throughout 1990-97. The direct foreign investment in China rose from \$11.16 billion in 1992 to above \$40 billion in 1996. There was, however, only gradual erosion of state manages rather than a quick retreat from scheduling.

The Chinese state-owned enterprises were reformed. The 15th Congress of Chinese Communist Party decided to corporative the state-owned enterprises. Several of them have been converted into share-holding companies. However, several of the vital components of a 'pure' market economy are still in their incipient level in China. Government guided investment mechanisms, a state controlled banking organization and dominant state-owned enterprises still run in a framework molded primarily on the previous intended economy. The Chinese economic reforms have raised incomes, created considerable private wealth and reduced the incidence of chronic poverty. However, declining profits, growing unemployment, idle capability, unrepeatabe debts of state enterprises and environmental costs due to in excess of-dependence on coal in China's fuel exploit are few of the accompanying benign effects. However China has slightly improved its location from low-income to lower transitional-income cluster (\$786- 3125 per capita income), it still suffers from the signs of underdevelopment.

However, its record in achieving extra ordinary transition in health, nutrition and educational accessibility has been universally acclaimed. It has also substantially raised life expectancy and lowered infant-mortality besides taking effective public activity to ensure access to nutrition, health facilities and social support. In comparison to India's elitist, urban-biased schooling, China's thrust has been towards universalization of primary education; however it also has its own privileged urban schools financed through the national government since well since private schools. However, the disparities in education and health services flanked by areas, gender and crossways social clusters and classes are less marked.

Ghana's Debacle

Ghana appeared since a nation-state in 1957 with an optimistic note through merger of British Gold Coast colony and British Togoland. Ghana inherited a big foreign reserve of \$190 million, adequate infrastructure and an efficient colonial trained bureaucracy. With the richest and the best educated of black African territories, it set out to industrialize with the advice of few best growth economists in the Western world under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah.

Nkrumah intended a large push of 'unbalanced development' in order to build a big industrial foundation to supply much of the Africa. The launching of large Volta River Project, a massive scheme of a big dam for irrigation and hydro-electric authority generation, and linked with it Valeo Aluminium Smelter; showed small real scheduling. American companies (Kaiser-90% and Reynauld-10%) financed the project. They gained massive concessions such since assured authority supply at the lowest rate in the world for their aluminum smelter, five years tax exemptions, thirty years exemptions on import-duty on its inputs, and the right to import their own alumina rather than develop Ghanaian bauxite industry. The state, which had to bear the debt-costs, could not generate sufficient revenues from the scheme however it sold authority to Benin and Togo.

The government tried to give the required impetus to industrial development. It provided 35% employment in its public sectors in 1965 and government spending was 26% of total GNP in 1961. However, the state bureaucracy itself was an artifact of colonialism and rarely development oriented. The state officials lacked the necessary techno-managerial skills. Despite Africanization of bureaucracy, it retained old colonial privileges and prerequisites of offices, therefore creating a new breed of privileged elite. The state officials engaged locations less to perform public service than to acquire personal wealth and status. Ghana's economy was distorted towards the export of some primary products especially Cocoa, timber and minerals to the west.

The collapse of prices of Cocoa in 1960s led to Ghana's bankruptcy. Even in good years, the Ghanaian peasants gained small since they bartered their produce with the manufactured products on the international market of unequal swap. Moreover, in a bid to diversify economy and to meet requires of capital to fund its import-substitution, Cocoa crop was one of the biggest sources of government revenues. Profits were squeezed from agricultural sector to fund state-run industries, welfare program and food subsidies. State Marketing Boards were invested with monopoly rights to market Cocoa and they gave peasants less than the prices accessible in the international market.

Another problem in Ghana was that 95% of the raw materials for import-substituting industries such as manufacturing, bus and truck-assembly, oil refining, textile, steel and batteries had to be imported. Ghana's largest import oil itself consumed 18% of its foreign swap earnings in 1984. Separately from it, increasingly more and more of foreign swap earnings had to be used through foreign debt-servicing since Ghana's external debt in 1998 was \$6202 million. Another aspect of Ghana's growth was unequal distribution of costs and burden in the middle of its population of whatever 'symbolic modernity' was achieved in an ocean of poverty and traditional agricultural sector. The Railways and discourse facilities are concentrated in municipalities of Southern Ghana like Accra and Kumasi.

The principal avenue of social mobility in Ghana's community or the higher education is available to the privileged parts only. The growing economic uncertainties led to political instability. Nkrumah was ousted in 1966 and succeeded through a series of military regimes sandwiched flanked by occasional civilian rules. Cedi, the currency of Ghana, was devalued many times flanked by 1967 to early 1980s to overcome the financial crisis but it did not produce the desired effects. The provisional National Defense Council, which took in excess of authority in 1981, tried initially to insulate Ghana from external pressures and negotiated more favorable contracts with transnational corporations under threats of nationalization. It also tried to manage inflation, which was extremely high throughout 1975-80, through manage of domestic prices especially of Maize, cooking oil and Cocoa.

However, unable to manage smuggling and informal markets, it carried the structural adjustment program of IMF in 1983. Now it favored a neo-liberal economic policy with a populist tinge. The

prices paid to Cocoa farmers were increased through 67% and incentives were given to the farmers to plant new Cocoa trees, pesticides were made accessible and price-dominates were removed. The state enterprises or *para statals* were privatized. Through 1995, one hundred and ninety five state enterprises were sold to the private bidders, several of them to the transnational corporations. More and more multinationals were encouraged to invest.

The key question, however, is whether this structural adjustment has actually improved Ghana's economic location. The economy has been stabilized; there has been an increase in cocoa-manufacture through 65% flanked by 1983 and 1990 and there has been improvement in timber, bauxite, and manganese and diamond manufacture leading to a rise in export-earnings. The budget deficits have been reduced from 47% of GDP in 1982 to 0.3% of GDP in 1987. There have been many surpluses as than. However, there is still no 'takeoff' into the level of sustainable growth.

The country's economy is still dependent on the exports of Cocoa, timber and minerals. Ghana's foreign-debt is growing; however there is no influx of direct foreign investment into productive industries. The dismantling of state enterprises and welfare schemes has led to growing unemployment in the middle of professionals and industrial workers. The general man sides undue hardships due to removal of subsidies on food and other key things. The accessibility to health and educational services is becoming harder due to 'user charges' or charges levied on citizens for these public services at the point of exploit. Ghana, with a per capita income of \$379 in 1998, continues to be one of the low-income underdeveloped areas despite its effort to overcome chronic poverty and underdevelopment. The development-promoting effects of some heterogeneous industrial projects on the other sectors of economy have been insignificant.

Ghana is still section of an organization of dependence that links external pressures of international financial institutions and transnational corporations with internal procedure of underdeveloped possessions and primitive technology characterized through self-reinforcing accumulation of privilege on the one hand and the subsistence of marginal social clusters on the other.

The Brazilian Economy

In the middle of the four economies examined through us, Brazil had an advantage of higher incomes. Its income grew five times throughout 1928-55 and again doubled throughout 1955- 73. Its economy dedicated in tropical agriculture especially coffee and there was ample scope for the expansion of farming compared to India and China. Brazil doubled the numbers of its farms and increased its cultivated region through 124% flanked by 1950-70.

However, rural economic building differed substantially from Asian agriculture. In India and China, it is fragmented and heavily congested dwarf holding of peasants, which predominates rural life. In Brazil, like several other Latin American countries, *latifundia* or big land holdings exist face through face with *minifundia* or little peasant holdings. There are several big *latifundia* of more than 400

hectares or 1000 acres especially in northeast Brazil. Contrary to what several economists would consider, manufacture on these farms is less efficient due to poor utilization of land-possessions. Such a concentrated sharing of land-ownership is accompanied through a feudal kind social-institution in which the masses of little producers are dependent on the benevolence and goodwill of the big landowners. The ownership of *latifundia* besides economic benefits also confers social status and political authority. Brazil also attempted import-substitution industrialization same to China and India in order to develop its economy. The state played a key role since a banker and the owner of public enterprises.

In relation to the 70% of investment finances from government banks and one-third of the assets of the 50,000 main firms in 1970s were owned through the state. The transnational companies also played a key role in its economy; since the Brazilian state turned absent from state to state borrowings to private investors and International Bank Consortia. However, the outflows required for dividends and repayments soon exceeded the new net borrowings.

Since the prices of its biggest export commodity, Coffee, started to decline, Brazil was not able to meet its foreign debt obligations, leading to foreign-debt crisis. As government was not willing to curtail flows of finances into unviable public sector utilities and key industrial enterprises, the situation also led to massive public deficits. The big budget deficits led to hyperinflation, with inflation hovering flanked by 100-200% per annum in 1980s. Inflation became one of the apparatus for the government to raise revenue. Deficits could be cut only through wage-cuts and removal of subsidies on vital foods, electricity and fares, etc.

But these events would result in higher prices and wage-increase demands, again fuelling inflation. If not cut, the deficits would still continue to fuel inflation. Brazil seems to be on the verge of overcoming the stigma of underdevelopment since it falls into upper-transitional income cluster of nations with per capita income of \$ 3126- 9655. Post-War industrialization led to a large urban expansion in municipalities like Sao Paulo, Meddelin and Monterrey.

Investment in import-substituting industries and in infrastructure was concentrated in such big municipalities. Internal population development and migration both contributed to the expansion of municipalities. The total urban population increased from 19% in 1950 to in relation to the 66% in 1980. The agricultural labour force also declined through 29% throughout the similar era. However, this was not due to any vital transform in the occupational building. Faced with the foreign debt crisis, the industrial output in Brazil grew only 1.1% per annum throughout 1981-90 compared to higher industrial development rates of 8.5 to in excess of 9% per annum flanked by 1950-73.

Actually, the shift in the labour force was illusory since the informal sector was the biggest absorbent of rural migrants. Instead of leading to transformation of the productive building, it resulted in urban unemployment, poverty and development of slums putting undue stress on urban services. Another aspect of Brazilian community that requires examination throughout this transition is the nature of

demographic trends. The demographic transition theory, there was a lag flanked by decline in mortality and fertility even in Europe. The similar set of socio-economic transforms that led to reduction of mortality later led to reduction in fertility.

However, public health events in underdeveloped countries reduced mortality at a level at which socioeconomic growth was lower than it had been in Europe. However, birth rates sustained to be extremely high. This led to population explosion and a 'demographic trap' because the age-building in these countries was such that age-dependency ratio is higher. A high dependency ratio is viewed since a biggest threat to economic development because it drains possessions absent from productive investments and puts intense pressure on social services such since education and health. Neo-Malthusian economists connected high birth rates to the lack of potential for economic growth. The structuralisms stressed institutional obstacles to growth such since unequal sharing of wealth particularly land and other productive possessions, political authority of elites, historical roots of colonialism and faulty industrialization policies of postcolonial stage.

Population development will have no affect on aggregate saving and investment due to size poverty. They whispered that growth was the best contraceptive. Brazil had high birth rates till 1960, 42 per thousand but it declined to 30.6 per thousand throughout 1980-85.

The age dependency ratio also declined from 86.8% in 1960 to 68.7% in 1985. There has been further decline from 1990s since the standard annual population development declined faster from 2.45 in 1980s to in relation to the 1.4 in 1990s. The under-5 mortality, which is another indicator of growth also declined from 176 per thousand in 1950s to 110 in 1980-85 to 44 per thousand in 1996. However, these standard indices conceal the information that higher risk, lower-income and educational cluster in slums may have higher infant-mortality. It seems that population development is not the primary or even a significant reason of low stages of livelihood, gross inequalities of income or the limited freedom of choice.

Moreover, the problem of population is not merely one of numbers but of the excellence of human-life. However, we may safely conclude that rapid population development does serve to intensify the troubles associated with the underdevelopment especially those troubles that arise due to huge population concentrations in a some urban conglomerates.

REVIEW QUESTIONS

- Define the features of commercial capitalism.
- Define Capital and Capitalism.
- Discuss the role of technology in the process of capitalist industrialization.
- How different was the experience of other countries under the hegemony of Soviet Russia in terms of socialist industrialization?
- Write a short note on the nature of employment in an underdeveloped economy.

CHAPTER 5

Expansion of Europe

STRUCTURE

- Learning Objectives
- Conquest and appropriation
- Migrations and settlements
- Imperialism
- Colonialism
- Decolonization
- Review Questions

LEARNING OBJECTIVES [MH]

After reading this chapter, you will get acquainted with the:

- Understand the conquest and appropriation
- Study different patterns of immigrations, socio-economic and political changes brought out by them and how they have affected world history, particularly during modern times.
- Focus on the stages of imperialism and see how these stages correspond with the rise and expansion of capitalism.
- Process meant to the economy and society in the colonies.
- Phase of the 20th century when the erstwhile empires gave way to the emergence of new nation-states or led to the independence of former colonies.

CONQUEST AND APPROPRIATION [MH]

The Age of Sail [h]

Western naval supremacy in excess of the oceans was the first step in the procedure of European expansion. The superiority of the Western navies especially since regards extensive-range bulk transport was one of the principal factors behind the successful establishment of maritime empires in the extra-European world. The unlimited oceanic range of the Western ships gave them what could be termed since global reach. Oceanic transportation at per tone and per person was cheaper than any other comparable shape of transportation. European superiority in scientific knowledge, naval technology and finally naval artillery enabled them to control the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans. The Indian Ocean includes one hundred and forty thousand square miles of water which lie flanked by Asia and Africa, from the Cape of Good Hope to the Malay Archipelago.

It covers in relation to the 20% of the earth's hydro legroom. But for the occasional appearance of the Portuguese, Dutch and the French navies, the Indian Ocean flanked by the seventeenth and the

early twentieth centuries remained under British manage. The Royal Navy with its ocean going battleships recognized what could be termed since 'sea manages'. In 1786, a foundation was recognized at Penang at the northern entrance to the Straits of Malacca. With the capture of the Straits of Malacca in 1759 and Singapore in 1824, British manage in excess of the eastern come of the Indian Ocean was complete. In 1622, the British captured Ormuz, dominating the entrance to the Persian Gulf. Therefore the British secured manage in excess of the western come to the Indian Ocean. Security of the western approaches of the Indian Ocean required manages in excess of Egypt.

In 1801 an expedition was sent to Egypt against Napoleon's Army. The Transitional East appeared since the soft underbelly of British manages of the Indian Ocean area. Through the early 1800s, the Russian Empire had expanded into the Caucasus and had engaged a long tract of north Persia. This raised the fear of an eventual Russian push to the Gulf. Therefore, southern Persia came under the British sphere of power. Aden fell in 1839 to a British naval expedition launched from Bombay. However few of the Afro-Asian regimes maintained navies, these were coastal craft. Hence, the Afro-Asian states could not challenge the maritime supremacy of the Western naval powers. The passing of manage of the Indian Ocean from Asian to European hands was a matter of great political and economic importance.

The Arabs lost manage in excess of the spice deal flanked by South East Asia, India, Egypt and Arabia. The maritime powers also enabled the European trading companies to set up coastal enclaves in mainly of the territories whose shores lapped the Indian Ocean. These coastal enclaves became the foundations from which the Europeans expanded. For example, the Dutch Navy aided the VOC (Dutch East India Company) which was founded in 1602 to set up manage in excess of the Ambon islands and finally in excess of Indonesia. And the Royal Navy allowed the East India Company to set up an empire in South Asia.

Throughout the second half of the seventeenth century, the West European powers were constructing battleships (two deckers) displacing 1,100-1,600 tones and armed with 24- pounder (11 kg) guns. Firepower was enhanced through the replacement of the bronze cannons with iron cannons. Advances in cast iron manufacture resulted in the production of cheaper and more dependable guns. In contrast, the South Asian ships' planking was sewn jointly and not nailed since in case of the European ships. The Indian ships were sewn with coir. It was the similar with the Chinese junks and the Arab *dhow*s. The Afro-Asian navies were no match against the firepower generated through the European ships. In 1839, two British frigates defeated 29 Chinese war junks close to Hong Kong. Frigates were built for speed and hardiness.

A frigate was an extensive and fairly low ship carrying its largest battery of 18-pounders on a single deck with 13-14 ports on each face according to whether it was a 38 or 36 gun ship. After 1814, frigates with forty 20-pounder guns were launched. The frigates accepted six months provision. This meant that they could sail anywhere in the world without requiring touching any port. The frigates

were built of oak, the largest beams being at least a foot square in cross-part, and the planking four to five inches dense. The masts and spars were of pine from the Baltic. The European ships' crews were continued through difficult biscuits and beef.

Occasionally they had pork pickled in wine. In addition, they also had cheese, onions, garlic and fish. The officers had access to dehydrated fruits. However, due to lack of fresh vegetables and inadequate intake of vitamins, the crew suffered from scurvy. An anti-dote against scurvy was the introduction of limejuice. Besides technology, in theory also the Afro-Asians were lagging behind the maritime European powers.

Theorization and conceptualization of warfare is a basic factor which differentiated the West Europeans from the Asians. From the late fifteenth century, the advent of printing brought in relation to the increase in the number of treatises on combat manuals and several other related technological subjects. Printing made possible transmission and version of knowledge during a wide area. Separately from the manuals coming out from the German presses, the woodcuts also depicted in a pictographic manner the several manners of combat. One of the aspects of the theoretical jobs produced throughout Renaissance was the application of geometrical figures and representations.

Diagrams were used for elucidating theories since well since for analyzing the dissimilar levels of scrupulous great battles.

The eighteenth century European states recognized naval schools where mathematics beside with Newton's *Principia* was taught. But non-European powers did not set up naval academies for educating and training the officers and sailors. Let us turn the focus on non-European navies.

The Non-European Navies [sh]

The Mughals had a riverine navy which mannered marine warfare against the zamindars of Bengal and the Magh pirates in the Chittagong area throughout the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. Aurangzeb realized that he needed a powerful navy for demanding the power of the high sea through the 'hat wearers'. When Aurangzeb was thinking of setting up an ocean going navy, his *Wazir* Jafar Khan told him that there was sufficient money and timber accessible but adequate number of skilled men was not accessible for directing the naval enterprise.

The Siddis who were allied with the Mughals had ships of 300 to 400 tones equipped with cannon. But these ships were no match against the European men of war. The firepower of the Mughal ships was inadequate even against the Asian ships. The Kingdom of Arakan made boats of strong timber with a difficult core.

And against them, balls thrown through the *zamburaks* and little cannons mounted in the Mughal ships proved ineffective. The Marakkars were descendants of Arab merchants who came to India in the seventh century AD. Later they became admirals of the Zamorins of Calicut. In 1498, Vasco da

Gama arrived at Calicut on the Malabar Coast. In the similar year, eight ships sent through Zamorin encountered a single Portuguese caravel.

A caravel had a triangular sail and weighed in relation to the 200 tones. The bronze cannons of the Portuguese ship made mincemeat of the Indian ships which tried to fight with arrows, swords and lances. Shivaji set up the Maratha navy in 1659. The mainly well-known Maratha admiral was Kanhoji Angre (1669-1729). Kavindra, the court poet of Shivaji, paid tribute to the European maritime superiority in his epic poem *Sivabharata* in the following terms: 'And almost invincible in faring on the high seas.' The shipwrights of Konkan constructed the Maratha ships. They were mostly illiterate. They could not put on paper the plan of the vessel to be constructed.

For modernizing his fleet, Kanhoji hired Portuguese deserters. Kanhoji's naval establishment did include few colorful characters. John Plantain a pirate from Jamaica got tired of his deal and decided to settle in India. He took service with Kanhoji. Another Dutch man became a Commodore in Angria's service. In 1699, Kanhoji's fleet was collected of 10 grabs and 50 gallivats. Few of the grabs were of 400 tones each. The grabs had two to three masts. They were built to operate in shallow water. The grab was extremely broad in proportion to length, narrowing from the transitional to the end where instead of bows; they had prows, projecting like those of a Mediterranean galley.

Each grab had 16 guns and 150 armed men for boarding the enemy vessels. The gallivats were smaller ships. Each gallivat of 120 tones had 6 guns and 60 armed men. Few of the crews were armed with muskets. Each gallivat had in relation to the 50 oars and they could attain a speed of four miles an hour. These ships accepted 6-pounder guns. The guns were lashed to the deck of the ships with ropes. Therefore, when the guns fired, the vessel recoiled with it. The Maratha ships, instead of depending on firepower generated through the broadsides since was the case of the European men of war, fought somewhat like the Roman ships. The Maratha ships were incapable of row activity on the high seas. Kanhoji's ships were fast and maneuverable in coastal water but helpless in the open sea and in the ocean.

The Maratha naval tactics comprised of sending a number of gallivats with 200 to 300 men in each who were armed with swords. They boarded from all quarters simultaneously attempting to overpower the crew. However, such techniques were of no exploit against the firepower of heavy sturdy European ships. In 1739, a single Portuguese frigate defeated Sambhaji Angria's squadron of 17 vessels. Gheria, the Maratha naval headquarters finally fell to the bombardment of British battleships.

Transforms in British Naval Authority [sh]

While the Royal Navy protected the British sea rows of discourses, the Company's marine took care of coastal security. Through 1934 it had been rechristened since the Royal Indian Navy. The East India Company recognized its first trading post at Surat in 1607. In 1661, the island of Bombay

shaped section of the dowry brought through Catherine of Portugal on the occasion of her marriage to King Charles II of England. It was engaged through the British three years later. This island was leased to the Company for an annual rent of 10 pounds.

Through 1686, Bombay superseded Surat since the largest depot of the East India Company. Foundations were required for conducting extensive range maritime operations. Fort William functioned since a significant foundation for both the Company's marine since well since the Royal Navy. Fort William stored medicines, gun carriages and guns for the ships. In 1805, the Court of Directors and the British government agreed that the possession of Ceylon would not only raise the security of Company's territories in southern India but would also strengthen British hold in excess of the Bay of Bengal. When Ceylon and Pondicherry were lost, the French Navy establishes that Mauritius was too distant absent for operating approximately the subcontinent. The lack of a maritime foundation close to India hampered French maritime operations.

This in turn choked the supply of men and materials to the French Army under Count de Lally. After the defeat of Lally in the late eighteenth century, there was no European military competition to the East India Company's army in the Indian subcontinent. The British naval supremacy in the coastal waters of India also formed land warfare in favor of the Company. In 1765, the Mysore Navy possessed 30 war vessels and a big number of transport ships. In 1768, the desertion of the naval commander Stannet resulted in the destruction of mainly of the ships of Mysore. In 1779, six British vessels sailed for Bombay under Edward Hughes, a British Vice-Admiral.

The similar year also witnessed the arrival of six French vessels to Mauritius under Count D'Orves. D'Orves' escorts and the troopships carrying French soldiers who were supposed to cooperate with Haidar Ali sailed from Mauritius. The entire fleet was commanded through Commodore Suffern. While Suffern suffered from lack of a foundation in India, his rival Hughes had ample reserves of guns, ammunition, timber, spars, canvas, rope, provisions and water accessible at Madras. When Hughes' fleet anchored at Madras for refitting, the shore batteries guarded the British fleet. In February 1779, Suffern with ten warships escorting 20 troop transports entered the Bay of Bengal. Avoiding Hughes' nine ships, Suffern disembarked the troops who aided Haidar in capturing Cuddalore.

Throughout the Second Anglo-Mysore War, a British fleet under Hughes destroyed the fleet of Haidar in Mangalore and Calicut. Then the British fleet threatened Cuddalore. After the destruction of Baillie's force and retreat of Biggest Munro to Madras, the Madras Presidency requested for military aid to the Bengal Presidency. In response, the Bengal Presidency sent European infantry, European gunners, and guns with carriages, plus numerous barrels of gunpowder to Madras through sea. And these troops took section in the successful battle of Porto Novo against Haidar. In 1786, Tipu recognized a distinct Board of Admiralty with headquarters at Seringapatnam. Tipu's effort to get aid from France was unsuccessful.

And, the Mysore Navy could achieve small against British sea authority. After the defeat of Tipu, there were no more naval challenges from the indigenous powers. In the 1790s, the duties of the Bombay Marine were since follows: defense of deal, suppression of piracy and convoy of transport. In 1791, each of the Company's ships averaged 750-800 tones with a crew of 101 men. In the 1830s, the core of the British Indian navy was collected of many iron steamers. One typical steamer was Indus which was 304 tones with a 60 horse authority engine and manned through 52 crews. Of the crews in relation to the half were Europeans and the rest Indians. The armament consisted of a 3-pounder brass gun, and a 12-pounder 4.5 inch howitzer. In 1863 a marine survey department was started which aided naval discourse beside the hitherto uncharted waters of the Indian Ocean.

In 1884, the duties of the Royal Indian Marine also involved transport of troops and survey of the coasts and harbors. In 1848 when Mulraj the *Diwan* of Multan revolted, the Second Anglo-Sikh War broke out. And then the Company's navy practiced what could be categorized since 'Littoral Warfare'. The Indus Flotilla transported men, guns and stores 800 miles up the Indus to within a mile and half of Multan. Throughout the siege of Multan, the two steamers moved above the municipality and severed all water discourse flanked by the fort held through Mulraj's men and the rebel chieftains in west Punjab. The steamers protected the British bridge, pontoon boats and the commissariat boats carrying grain for the Company's troops.

These steamers were also employed in evacuating the wounded British officers back to Karachi. Another steamer with its two 10-inch mortars provided firepower support. The Company's marine also provided a force of 100 ratings and seven officers who participated in the siege of Multan fort. Naval authority came to the aid of the British throughout the crisis of 1857 Mutiny. Towards the end of May 1857, steamers brought white troops from Madras to Calcutta. The Royal Navy also brought reinforcements from Britain and Crimea into India throughout 1857-58. Military operations in India were dependent on adequate supplies of mules and horses.

Supremacy in excess of the sea enabled the Raj to import war animals from abroad. Special mules were bought at Argentina and were brought into India. Horses were brought from England and Australia into South Asia. Sea authority enabled the British government in India to project authority in several sections of Asia. The Company was able to put jointly a bureaucracy capable of launching far amphibious operations. Thanks to the Royal Navy's supremacy in the Indian Ocean, the Raj's troopships faced no threat. Throughout the Dutch War of 1795, it was decided to send troops from India to Malacca. Ships were chartered to carry Indian cavalry and infantry to China throughout the nineteenth century.

The Company's sea going steamers proved their worth throughout the Burma Wars. A squadron consisting of four steam frigates and two sloops all armed with 8-inch guns since well since 32-pounders provided firepower and logistical support to the Company's army invading Burma in the early 1820s. The frigate's fire silenced the Burmese guns in Rangoon and allowed the Company's

troops to land. The steamers of the Bengal Marine and ships of the Royal Navy transported in relation to the 6,000 men from Madras to Rangoon. One of the principal causes for the annexation of the Arakan throughout the First Anglo-Burma War (1824-26) was the must to ensure manage in excess of the eastern portion of the Bay of Bengal.

Burma teak was highly valued through the Royal Navy and the British merchantmen. And this was a contributory factor for the Second Anglo-Burma War throughout 1852-53. In 1891, the Royal Navy assumed responsibility for the Australian Station. In the seventeenth century, the Portuguese in East Africa faced little opposition from the Omani naval authority. Secure cooperation flanked by the gunboats and land columns aided French conquest of Senegal and Western Sudan. And naval manage of upper Niger facilitated the conquest of Western Sudan in the 1890s.

Especially the emergence of shallow draught steamboats equipped with guns enabled European penetration into the interiors of Africa by the rivers. The British penetration into southern Nigeria by the Niger delta involved exploit of naval vessels to shell villages and ferry troops and supplies. The African canoes made of wood could traverse the lagoons. The light guns lashed with ropes on the canoes could not be aimed properly. Therefore the African canoes had no chance against the steel guns and steel hulls of the European steamers.

European Penetration in the New World [h]

Warfare in North and South America before the coming of the Europeans was constrained through the low stage of technology and religious and magical elements. Intertribal warfare was not that lethal. In the distant north of North America from AD 1000 onwards, the Palaeo-Eskimos of the eastern Arctic retreated before the eastward migration of the sea faring Neo Eskimos. They used harpoons for hunting whales.

In addition, they also used sinew backed bows, dog sleds and fortifications made of stone. In the later sixteenth century, they settled in the Labrador coast. In Ontario and in St. Lawrence Valley the American tribes were cultivation societies. The villages were fortified with palisades.

Bruce Lenman claims that in the early eighteenth century, the Dutch and the French through introducing gunpowder in the middle of the American tribes raised the stage of organized violence. The original occupants of the New World did not exploit iron. Mainly of them employed Stone Age technologies. The Aztec warriors of Mexico armed with bronze tipped arrows and obsidian (a glass like object shaped through volcanic eruptions) rimmed wooden clubs were no match against the steel helmeted firearms equipped Conquistadores. Obsidian broke easily in get in touch with the iron swords of the Spaniards.

Hence, Hernan Cortes with 500 Spaniards and 14 cannon was able to defeat the Aztec Empire repeatedly flanked by 1519 and 1521. Likewise flanked by 1531 and 1533, 168 Spaniards supported through four cannon defeated the Inca Empire in Peru. This was possible because the Incas used

clubs with semi circular bronze ends that lacked a sharp edge. They broke easily in get in touch with the iron shields of the Spaniards.

The Incas tried to stem the European tide of conquest unsuccessfully through throwing stones from slings and rolling down boulders from the slopes of the hills. At the siege of Cuzco in 1536, 200,000 Inca soldiers were defeated through 190 Spanish soldiers. The detection of gold and diamond led to long Portuguese colonization of Brazil in the seventeenth century. The settlers pushed ahead with the aid of bayonet and volley firing techniques. Forts were constructed for resisting and harassing the raiding parties of the Indians.

In addition to the technical gap, the American tribes suffered further due to their civilization of warfare. While European warfare aimed at killing the enemy, 'native' American warfare was aimed at capturing the enemy through wounding him. The objective of the victors in American warfare was not to annihilate the enemy but to exploit him for religious sacrifice or since captive laborers. For the Red Indians capturing scalps and the captives was proof of victory. But, the European settlers came and appropriated the tribes' land and livestock.

In North America the European come to war was particularly brutal. For example in 1687, the Governor of Quebec launched a campaign against the Westerly Iroquois people. Villages were burnt, corn destroyed, livestock slaughtered and graves were pilfered. Again the 'native' Americans had never seen horses. The war horses imported from Europe not only provided mobility to the European soldiers but also caused a grave psychological shock in the middle of the Indian tribes.

Gradually the Indians were concentrated into smaller and smaller areas recognized since reserves or sanctuaries, since if they were animals. Lack of food and disease reduced their numbers substantially and continuous immigration from Europe changed the demographic balance in favor of the white settlers. The French towards the end of the seventeenth century realized that without Indian allies it was impossible to conduct colonial warfare successfully in North America. In 1712, the French allied with the Ottawa and Potawatomie attacked the Fox tribe. The missionaries under French tutelage played a significant role in playing off the several North American Indian tribes against each other.

The linear secure order tactical formations of the Western infantry however useful in the plains of Europe, was not extremely successful in the midst of the jungles of North America. The Indian tribes of North America, who were allied with the European powers throughout the seventeenth century, taught the Europeans many tactical lessons like marksmanship, scouting, looking for cover and concealment in the jungles. Cooperation with the Indians was essential even in Central and South America. In 1520 Cortes had to retreat from the Aztec capital of Tenochtitlan. In 1521, he retook the municipality with Spanish soldiers equipped with cannon and arquebuses who were supported through 25,000 Indian allies.

Cortes' conquest of the Aztec Empire would not have been possible without the support of the Tlaxcalans who provided warriors and supplies. Again Diego de Almagro, the leader of the Spanish

forces was able to defeat Emperor Manco Inca in the Andes only through co-opting Manco's brother Paullu and his followers.

The Collapse of Afro-Asian Regimes and Western Penetration into Australia [h]

In India, unlike in America, Australia and Siberia, demography aided the defenders. After all, the South Asians were not swamped through numerically larger number of white settlers and European colonists. In 1700, Asia contained 70% of the world's population. India in 1700 had 180 million people which meant in relation to the 20% of the world's population.

Besides human possessions, Asia's economic authority also remained impressive. In the beginning of the eighteenth century, Asia remained the world's centre of artisan manufacture and reported for a massive volume of world deal. However, economic potential and demographic possessions did not necessarily generate great military authority. For explaining European military superiority in excess of Afro-Asia in common and India in scrupulous, mainly of the historians followed Edward Gibbon's emphasis on gunpowder weapons. Larger institution of the polity and military technology assisted expansion of British authority in eighteenth century Asia.

Geoffrey Parker asserts that the military balance changed in favor of the West because of the Military Revolution which unfolded flanked by 1500 and 1750. The Military Revolution on land actually was an amalgamation of two revolutions. The first involved a Revolution in Siege Warfare due to the emergence of *trace Italienne* (star formed scientific fortress architecture) and siege artillery. Then a Revolution in Field Warfare occurred due to the rise of firearms equipped infantry supported through field artillery.

Another feature of the Military Revolution was continued development in the mass of the European armies. The late sixteenth century witnessed Europe's new method of creation warfare which involved bastioned fortifications, scientific gunnery and disciplined infantry tactics. All these resulted in a battlefield revolution. Jeremy Black writes that European military innovations like the bayonet, flintlock musket, grape and canister firing field artillery opened up a biggest gap in capacity flanked by firearms equipped European armies and their non-European opponents. One of the chief aspects of the firearms equipped European infantry was that the men were drilled in the approach of the Roman legions.

Larger administrative and political capacity generated effective tactical discipline on the section of the Western forces. Black continues that from the sixteenth century onwards, European forces acquired an edge in keeping cohesion and manage in battle much longer than their adversaries. And this permitted more sophisticated tactics in moving units on the battlefield and more effective fire discipline. The gunpowder revolution in Europe recognized contemporary state buildings that in turn were able to sustain costly firepower armies. The Western advantage in military techniques and infrastructure rested on foundations of European economic, social and institutional transforms.

From the mid-seventeenth century, the impersonal bureaucracy pushed the semi-independent military entrepreneurs (feudal knights and mercenaries) to the periphery. John Keegan asserts that through the fifteenth century gunpowder allowed the French monarchy to cow down the refractory chieftains therefore giving birth to a centralized state building backed through a fiscal organization. After 1550, amour penetrating firearms used through the infantry in the state's payroll drove the feudal cavalry from the field. And the artillery of the king destroyed the forts of the semi-independent knights. Artillery was therefore costly that only the monarchy could uphold it.

The Europeans were well advanced in the field of international fund. The international credit network continued the Western military behaviors crossways the globe. Compared to the Western warfare, the backwardness of the Afro-Asians was apparent in the theory and weapons of warfare since well since concerning the institutions supporting organized violence. The Afro-Asian armies lacked any regular cohesive institution. Soldiering was a section time job of the cultivators and pay was irregular.

Professional standing armies were away in pre-colonial Afro-Asia. Hence, the Afro-Asian soldiers were indiscipline. In battles, the Africans and the Asians fought since aggregates of individuals and not since cohesive bodies of soldiers. Raiding and counter raiding before the monsoon constituted the principal way of fighting in the middle of the non-European rulers. For example the Maratha force was mostly collected of light cavalry intended for levying tribute rather than for organized conquest.

Asian warfare was characterized through the exploit of elephants and inadequate cohesion in the middle of the mounted arm throughout hand to hand combat. In the seventeenth century, the African and Asian way of warfare proved ineffective against the European warfare which was characterized through the exploit of bayonets, flintlocks, pre-fabricated paper cartridges, standardization of artillery's ball, ball weight and firing processes. However, a point of caution is necessary. To win in Africa and Asia, the British had to imitate non-Western techniques of conducting grand strategy. This meant carrying on negotiations and intrigues with partners within the enemy coalition simultaneously while conducting field operations.

Then the Indians since horsemen and sepoy of the British led Sepoy Army and land revenue of the Bengal Presidency enabled Britain to conquer India. In the first half of the nineteenth century, in relation to the 220,000 sepoy and horsemen fought for the British both inside and outside India in areas since distant since Africa and China. Warfare in South-East Asia was also lagging behind the kind of organized violence practiced through the West. In pre-colonial Philippines, warfare was characterized through little level seasonal raids rather than pitched battles involving sizeable number of soldiers.

In the Indonesian Archipelago, pre-European warfare was characterized through headhunting. The combatants fought with sword and javelins. Prisoners were sold after the campaign. Occasionally

destruction of plantations and villages also occurred. Bloody clash resulting in total destruction of the enemy force and permanent conquest were trends introduced through the Europeans. In 1788, the British recognized a foundation in Australia.

In the early 1790s, they explored the coast of New Zealand. Initially, the British were interested in Australia since a foundation for the furtherance of the East Indies and China deal. The Admiralty was interested in the timber and flax of New Zealand and Norfolk Islands to furnish naval stores for the Royal Navy's vessels operating in the East. Free resolution in Australia through the white settlers started from the 1820s. Throughout the early era, the initial settlers were soldiers, marines and convicts.

In Australia there were in relation to the 700 tribes. Initially they tried to fight the British through by magic and charms. But these techniques were obviously of no exploit against the invaders. Aboriginal warfare was merely an extension of the hunt. It accentuated ambush and skirmishing.

They lacked knowledge in relation to the sophisticated tactical organizations for conducting open warfare. The aborigines were wiped out through the British mounted musketeers. Further, the aborigines had no immunity against the diseases introduced through the British. Smallpox, measles, influenza and tuberculosis proved deadly to them. However, the Maori tribesmen of New Zealand opposed the British boldly. Flanked by 1845 and 1872, the British had to rally 18,000 white soldiers against the Maoris.

Siberia was a massive area occupied through little numbers of itinerant and semi-itinerant tribes. They were occupied in hunting and fishing. The Russian merchants were interested in fur produced through this area. In the first half of the seventeenth century, Russia conquered Siberia through a systematic construction of a chain of forts. Since the Russians crossed the Ural Mountains, they entered the West Siberian Plain occupied through the Tartars.

Tobolsk on the bank of the river Ob was founded in 1587. In the Central Siberian Plain, Turukhansk on the bank of Yenisey came up in 1619 and Yakutsk on the bank of the river Lena was founded in 1632. The Manchu dynasty of China opposed Russian advance in the Distant East. The Russians equipped with cannons defeated the Manchus in the Amur Valley. The farthest points were Nizhne Kolymsk and Okhotsk founded in 1644 and 1648, respectively. The Chukchi and Koryak tribes of Kamchatka were finally subdued in the eighteenth century.

From the defeated tribes, the Russians demanded heavy *iasak* (tribute) in furs. The nature of warfare in Africa was also limited and backward. Throughout the second half of the eighteenth century, the West Africans used firearms for acquiring slaves rather than creating a strong empire. European drill and discipline were alien to the Africans. The indigenous military organization lacked staff, logistical tools, regular subdivision and a command building. There was no concept of regular payment and drill in the African armies.

Hence, the African armies were incapable of maneuver in the field of fire. In 1847, the *Amir* of Algeria fielded 50,000 poorly armed and indisciplined irregular troops against 108,000 French troops. In the final analysis the Africans had no machine guns, rifles and steel barreled field artillery of the European armies. European technological superiority seemed excessive both in set piece battles since well since in siege warfare. The frontal assault of *assegais* (spears) equipped Zulus were easily suppressed through the musket equipped British redcoats. The Africans missed the breechloader revolution.

Throughout 1873-4, the British armed with snider rifles easily dealt with the Ashantis equipped with muzzle loaders. In 1898 at the Battle of Omdurman, the Mahdis' *jihadi* supporters equipped with spears and swords were wiped out through Kitchener's riflemen. In 1891, the 95-mm French siege guns reduced the Tukolar fortresses to dust. Non-military technologies like semaphore and telegraph also aided command and manage of the European armies. While through the 1850s mainly of Asia was under the Europeans, even since late since 1876 less than 10% of Africa was under the Europeans.

This was due to lack of surface discourse in the jungle - filled continent and the prevalence of diseases which hampered operations of the European armies in the 'dark continent'. In West Africa, half of the white soldiers died within three months of their arrival. The death rate in the Gold Coast (in West Africa) in 1823-6 was 668 per 1000 each year. Malaria and yellow fever were the chief killers of the white men. The final seal on African independence was because, writes Bruce Vandervort, the failure of the several African tribes to set up and sustain an anti-European coalition. And this allowed the European powers to recruit Africans for expanding and maintaining their empires. The British recruited African infantry from the Gold Coast. And the Portuguese in Angola used the Africans since light infantry. Finally, the French used Senegalese since sharpshooters.

MIGRATIONS AND SETTLEMENTS [MH]

Migration in History [h]

Almost certainly human beings (*homo sapiens*) first surfaced in Central Africa. Several thousands of years ago, India and Africa were connected through a land bridge. Therefore, from Central Africa, few marched into India. These migrants in history are recognized since Dravidians.

They introduced agriculture and the art of constructing municipalities in the subcontinent. The landmass recognized since Gondwanaland moved up in the northerly direction due to transforms in plate tectonics. This resulted in breaking up of the land relationship with Africa and crushing of the Tethys Sea which became the Himalayas. In relation to the 50,000 years ago, the people from South East Asia settled in Australia.

They reached Australia through island hopping in little canoes. Or almost certainly a landmass linked Australia with South East Asia which in later times broke up and now constitutes the Indonesian

archipelago. At that time, the sea stages were much lower than at present. The aborigines of Australia moved further east and occupied New Zealand and Polynesia. Approximately 35,000 BC, the hunters from Siberia crossed the Bering Straits and moved into Alaska.

They migrated down south into Chile. The descendants of these early migrants are the 'native Americans' whom the Europeans of the post-Columbian period encountered. Approximately 3000 BC a cluster of people in Central Asia speaking what philologists call Indo-Aryan language moved into India, Persia (Iran) and in the area beside eastern Mediterranean. In India they are recognized since Aryans. In Persia they are recognized since Indo-Iranians.

And in the Balkans they are recognized since Dorians who founded the Greek Culture. The Germans also trace their ancestry to the Indo-Aryan clusters settled in Central Europe. Extensive before Columbus, the Vikings in their long ships exposed Greenland and also made a landfall in Newfoundland. However, big level migration from Scandinavia to Iceland, Greenland and North America did not happen. Rather the Scandinavians and the Goths moved south into central and southern Europe. Demographic expansion pushed the Goths further south into the Roman Mediterranean.

German (Teutons and the Goths) tribal invasions had occurred before 100 BC but became more systematic after 350 AD. The Germans attacked the Western Roman Empire due to growing demographic pressure and the riches that could be obtained through plundering the rich Roman provinces of Gaul (France), Spain and Italy. Why did these migrations take lay? Scholars have pointed out a number of factors that motivated these migrations. Let us seem at few of them.

Economy [sh]

The lure of fertile land, pillage and plunder since well since prospect of deal also encouraged migrations and resolutions. Greece was full of mountains and ravines. Fertile agricultural land was scarce and quite constricted. The land hunger of the Greeks encouraged municipality states like Corinth to inhabit Sicily and South Italy where Greek municipalities like Tarentum, Regusia, etc came up approximately 400-300 BC. The Greeks exported wine and olive oil and imported wheat especially from the Black Sea area.

Because the waiting authority of the triremes was little, throughout the night every Greek ship had to create a landfall beside the coast. The maritime deal circuit moved crossways the straits of the Dardanelles hugging the shoreline of Asia Minor. And the prospect of monopolizing maritime deal with Anatolia (Turkey) and the Danubian principalities encouraged Athens to set up colonies beside the coast of Asia Minor. Before the Greeks, when the Achaemenid Emperors of Persia engaged Tyre, the chief municipality of the Phoenicians, size migration of the latter occurred. The Phoenicians were the best mariners and mainly aggressive traders of the ancient world.

They founded the municipality of Carthage in Tunisia in North Africa. The Phoenicians also founded colonies beside the Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts of Spain. Carthage colonized Sardinia and Corsica. Afghanistan is full of ragged mountains. Few of the tribes survive even now through practicing rustic nomadic.

The deficit economy of the Afghans forced them to migrate to India with their families in the medieval period. Since military laborers the Afghans took service with the Delhi Sultans and the Mughal Emperors and settled in India especially in the fertile plains of Rohilkhand and Bihar.

Climate [sh]

Climatic transforms also generated big level migration for subsistence. The gradual desiccation of Central Asia pushed the steppe itinerant tribes into Southern Asia and Eastern Europe. Due to the drying up of the heartland of Eurasia and falling water table, the horse riding nomads attacked the sedentary culture. The Chinese described them *hsung-nu* (horse people).

One cluster of Central Asian nomads recognized since Huns migrated west beside with their families. They attacked India, Persia and both the Eastern and Western Roman Empires. Few of the Huns settled in present day Rajasthan, Gujarat and Sindh. In India the descendants of the Huns were recognized since Scythians who after intermarriages came to be recognized since Rajputs. Extensive before the Huns, Persia encountered intrusion of the Central Asian nomads in the shape of Scythians and Parthians.

Beside with the Huns, Sarmatians and Avars (other branches of the Central Asian nomads) also attacked both the Eastern and Western Roman Empires. Few of the Central Asian tribes settled in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The present day Magyars of Hungary were descendants of the Huns. Rising cold in Scandinavia also encouraged Viking migration in the late medieval age. The Vikings settled in Denmark, England, and Normandy province in France and also in south Italy.

Through sailing beside the rivers of Russia, the Vikings also reached the Eastern Roman Empire or the Byzantine Empire. Few Vikings settled in the trans-Caucasus area.

Civilization [sh]

Besides economy, climate, demography and technology, civilization has also been a significant determinant of migration and resolution. In 1400 China's maritime technology was equal to that of West Europe. Throughout 1405-33, China had maritime dealings with South East Asia. A Chinese fleet under Admiral Cheng Ho came unto East Africa through sailing beside Sri Lanka.

The Chinese junks also visited the shores of Australia and the Pacific coast of North America. But, Confucian China held itself to be culturally and politically larger to its neighbors. China looked down upon the nearby nations since barbarians who were fit only to pay tribute to the Chinese Emperor. Cheng Ho's voyages were motivated through a quest for tribute and for luxuries and

curiosities for the Chinese court and not through a desire to extend China's knowledge in relation to the rest of the world or to set up permanent maritime deal dealings and overseas resolutions. Commerce and merchants engaged a low location within the Chinese Empire.

In contrast, the merchants in early contemporary Europe were assertive and wealthy. Cheng Ho's voyages were not followed up through the Ming dynasty which retreated into its self-imposed isolation till the mid-seventeenth century. Therefore Confucianism in a method discouraged detection and resolution of the overseas areas. Again, the Romans whispered that the world was in the form of a square and if anybody were to sail beyond the straits of Gibraltar into Atlantic, he would fall into hell. This discouraged a Roman breakout from the constricted inland Mediterranean Sea into the western direction.

Associated with civilization is the factor of religion. Driven through poverty and the zeal of Islam, the Arabs in the seventh century burst out of the desert of Arabia and settled beside the coast of North Africa, Asia Minor and *Ajam* (Iran and Iraq).

The European Expansion: 1400-1800 [h]

The period of size migration of the Europeans in the extra-European world was preceded through what could be categorized since the 'Age of Detection'. The latter word refers to intensive maritime exploration of the oceans through the European mariners. For the first time, Ferdinand Magellan circumnavigated the globe throughout 1519-22. The sturdy European cogs could cross the Atlantic frequently.

Relying on a new capability for extensive aloofness voyaging the Europeans charted out the coastal characteristics and principal outlines of the biggest landmasses of the globe therefore creating a new sort of knowledge which previously did not exist. According to the thinker, the age of detection was continued through the invention of printing press. William Caxton first printed books in 1470s. Printed pamphlets and books beside with sophisticated techniques of map creation disseminated knowledge in relation to the new worlds. This occurred throughout the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries.

The mastery in excess of the seas and the development of European geographical knowledge enabled the Europeans to manage the commerce of the non-European world. This also aided the expansion of European territorial manage in the non-European world. The principal motive behind Europe's expansionist drive was the search for deal. Europe saw itself since the poorer neighbor of Asia and Africa. This was because of the exaggerated travelers' tales and the nature of products which reached Europe.

Africa and Asia exported gold, jewel, silk, carpets, spices and porcelains to Europe. All these created the notion in the middle of the Europeans in relation to the luxury, wealth, skilled artisans and thriving craft industries in Afro-Asia. The Indonesian archipelago was well-known for spice. Cloves

were grown in the Moluccas, nutmeg and mace in the Banda islands and pepper in Sumatra. Sri Lanka was well-known for cinnamon and South West India (Malabar Coast) produced pepper.

Due to inadequate fodder, the animals in Europe had to be slaughtered before every winter. There were some fruits and vegetables accessible at that time. And the principal diet of the Europeans remained meat. Spice was used to add flavor to the stale and salted meat. Spices were also used in the cakes, drinks and confectionary. Extremely some European products were in demand in the East. Coarse woolen goods produced in Europe had no takers in the East.

The Europeans needed gold in order to pay for goods brought from Asia and for coinage which was required to sustain Europe's internal deal. This 'gold famine' encouraged the Europeans to explore and deal overseas. The Europeans also searched for fish at ever rising distances from Europe's shores. Dehydrated salted cod shaped a biggest thing of Portugal's deal with the rest of Europe. In search of fish, the Portuguese moved west of North West Africa and in the North Atlantic where the detection of Azores in the 1430s gave them a strategic foundation for further reconnaissance of the mid Atlantic.

Before Cabral's detection of Brazil, the Portuguese had mannered reconnaissance of the shores of South America. Spain, from its foundations in the Caribbean islands, dispatched repeated expeditions in search of a circuit to the East Indies for receiving spices. Instead of the Italian municipalities which were mainly interested in maritime deal, it was the West European powers which took the lead in oceanic voyages. This was partly because the Italian galleys were suited for calmer waters of Mediterranean than the rough seas of the Atlantic. Again the geographic location of Spain, Portugal and Britain is more suited than Venice and Genoa for undertaking exploration of the Atlantic.

The Italian municipalities were more interested in continuing their traditional lucrative deal with Asia by Levant rather than to engage in the risky Atlantic ventures especially when economic returns from such explorations remained uncertain. Initially the European enclaves in the newly exposed lands were forts and ports. In Asia the indigenous potentates were quite powerful. The Ottoman Empire, the Ming Empire and the Mughal Empire were formidable entities. In such a scenario, the Europeans establish themselves in the role of supplicants and observers rather than since conquerors and settlers.

As indigenous resistance in the New World was weak, the European coastal enclaves quickly expanded into large territorial empires. Unlike the commercial empires of the Italian municipality states, Spain went for a territorial empire. The mobile sheep herders of southern Spain and the cattle herders of Andalusia joined the ranks of conquerors and functioned since soldier-settlers. Militant Christianity enabled them to consider that they were bound to win and bring the heathens into the fold of Christianity.

The search for the mythical Christian King Prester John who would aid the Europeans in their thrash about against the Muslims also encouraged the voyages of detection. Finally the search for a circuit

to India was section of the Spanish program of *Reconquista* i.e. the crusade against Islam. This was because the Muslim Ottomans controlled the land circuits to Asia.

Migrations to South America [sh]

Columbus establishes gold in Hispaniola which in turn attracted more European settlers. Returning to the West Indies in 1493, Columbus brought 1500 settlers with him including farmers and craftsmen to colonize Hispaniola. Another 2500 arrived in 1502.

They were expected to shape a self-enough society. But, the Spanish conquerors, greedy for gold and contemptuous of manual labour, had no intention of tilling the land. The Crown of Castile granted them legal authority to command the labour of the regional populace. Several Indians died due to harsh treatment at the hands of the settlers. The search for labour resulted in the conquest of Puerto Rico in 1508, Jamaica in 1509, and Cuba in 1511. Cuba, settled through Diego de Valazquez, started yielding gold from 1511 onwards.

The aggressive land hungry conquerors then moved on to the mainland of America. In 1519 an expedition of in relation to the 600 men with 16 horses, 14 cannons and 13 muskets arrived under Hernan Cortes on the Gulf coast of Mexico from Cuba. In 1428 the Aztecs defeated the municipality state of Atzcapotzalco and recognized an empire that extended from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Coast. However, the Americans' stone edged swords and fire hardened arrows were no match against the steel swords and cannons of the Europeans. The Spanish were able to defeat Montezuma in 1521.

The interior was full of thick rain forest, large rivers, riparian swamps and mountain ranges. Pachauti Inca in 1438 defeated Chimu and controlled northern Peru. He recognized a dynamic centralized state. Topa Inca (1471-93) conquered northern Chile and northern Argentina. His successor Huyana Capac (1493-1525) conquered Ecuador. From the core region of Peru, the Incas extended their dominion up to Ecuador in the north and Maule River in Chile in the south.

At heights flanked by 9000 and 13000 feet the Incas recognized an empire which from north to south extended up to 2175 miles. The empire was held jointly through an impressive road organization. Their municipalities were built of solid dressed stones. The capital was Cuzco. Huyana Capac founded a second capital at Quito. In 1531 Francisco Pizarro invaded Peru with 180 men and 27 horses.

At that time, the Inca Empire was passing by a succession crisis. Atahualpa and his half brother Huescar were dominant in the northern and southern parts of the empire respectively. Atahualpa commanded 65000 men. Nevertheless hand held firearms and cannons gave victory to the little European forces. Almagro traversed Bolivia and penetrated into Chile before returning to Cuzco in 1537. Almagro's reconnaissance in force was followed through Pedro de Valdivia who in 1541 founded the municipality of Santiago and settled Spanish cultivation societies.

Approximately 1572, the Inca resistance came to an end in Peru. Through 1600, Portugal was controlling Brazil, West Africa plus the seaboard of China. And the Spanish American Empire extended from Texas to Chile. The Araucanians in Central Chile and the Muras in Central Amazonia tried to check the aggression of the Europeans unsuccessfully. The Maya Culture (also recognized since Itzas) extended beside Guatemala and Yucatan. In 1523 Pedro de Alvarado attacked the Mayas at Guatemala.

The Mayas lacked political unity. Fighting was going on flanked by the Cakchiquel and Quiche. This internal division allowed Alvarado to subdue both. Nojpeten, the capital of the Maya people fell to Spanish attack in 1697.

Migrations to North America [sh]

From Mexico, the Spaniards expanded north into the southern portion of North America. In 1781 the Yuma rebellion thwarted Spanish expansion beside the Colorado Valley into Arizona. Due to pressure on the Great Plains, the tribes like Comanche and Utes started moving south and exerted pressure beside the northern part of the fledgling Spanish frontier. These tribes were mounted on horses and equipped with firearms supplied through the French.

Through 1790 the Spaniards expanded in California. The North American tribes practiced rudimentary hunting and fishing. The British in North America after settling down became fishermen, farmers, traders, etc. The early English resolutions in Americas were at Jamestown and Virginia. In 1760 fighting broke out flanked by the British and the Cherokee whose hunting land in east Tennessee and west North Carolina were under pressure due to the advancing frontier of British-American manage and resolution.

In 1608, the French settled in Quebec. In 1699 Pierre Le Moyne founded Fort Maurepas in Biloxi Bay, Mobile was set up in 1702 and New Orleans in 1718. The French also consolidated their location on St. Lawrence in 1701. French missions were already recognized at Cahokia in 1699 and in Kaskaskia in 1703 on the upper Mississippi. Fort St. Charles came up on the Lake of the Woods in 1732 followed through another fort at the southern end of Lake Winnipeg.

In 1732 the French recognized a garrison post to check the Chickasaws. Fort La Reine in 1738 was recognized on the Assiniboine River. Fort Bourbon in 1739 expanded French attendance to the northwest shore of Lake Winnipeg and Fort Dauphin recognized French attendance on the western shore of Lake Winnipegosis. In 1748 Fort St. Jean was rebuilt to strengthen the French location close to Lake Champlain. A new wagon road connected the fort to Montreal.

In 1750 the French erected Fort Rouille (Toronto). And Fort La Corne in 1753 came up close to the Forks of the Saskatchewan. In the south the French expanded from Louisiana. The Natchez tribe approximately New Orleans was crushed through the French. In the sixteenth century, flanked by 1000 and 2000 Iberians migrated to the Americas annually. Throughout the 1630-40s, the Europeans

were attracted towards West Indies due to availability of land in simple words which was used for growing tobacco, indigo and cotton.

In 1640 the population of Barbados was 30000 or 200 per square mile. St. Kitts' population in the similar year was 20000. In the transitional of the century, the shift was towards big level sugar plantations. Flanked by 30000 and 50000 white migrants arrived in Jamaica in the first half of the eighteenth century. And they took to farming. Several French immigrants went to West Indies especially Saint-Domingue.

The Spanish Americans took to cultivation, ranching and mining of valuable metals. The Americas exported hides, tallow and sugar. In the 1540s the Spanish exposed the silver mines at Potsoi (Bolivia) and Zacatecas (Mexico). There was a higher percentage of Spaniards in Central Mexico and Peru than in Columbia and Ecuador. The Cuiaba goldfields in the interior of Brazil were exposed in 1719. In the 1760s in relation to the 5000 Portuguese migrated to Brazil annually. They totaled in relation to the 400,000 through the end of the eighteenth century.

In 1763-4 in relation to the 9000 French colonists were shipped to Cayenne in South America. Several of the European settlers were wage laborers, peasants and indentured servants. In Latin America the indigenous population was mostly rural and the Spaniards and the Portuguese were disproportionately present in the biggest cities. In North America also the mass of the European cities went on rising. Philadelphia was intended in 1680 and had a population of 2500 in 1685; 4000 in 1690; and 25000 in 1760.

The English and French Approaches to Migration [sh]

The rise of European population in British North America was greater than in New France because the British were willing to accept people of all religious backgrounds. Through contrast, the French colonial policy was to set up Catholic colonies in North America. Therefore, the Huguenots (French Protestants) went to British North America.

An Act of Parliament in 1697 which allowed people to seek job outside their own parish if they accepted a certificate made the poor mobile and encouraged their migration to America and West Indies since indentured labors. In the seventeenth century English migrants dominated emigration from the British Isles to the New World. But, in the eighteenth century there was long emigration from Scotland and Ireland. Lack of economic opportunities in Scotland and Ireland encouraged migration in North America. Flanked by 1643 and 1700, the population of Massachusetts increased from 16000 to 60000 and that of Connecticut from 5500 to 20000, and that of Virginia from 15000 to 60000.

Through the end of the seventeenth century, the population of New York increased to 20000. The total population of the English mainland colonies at the end of the seventeenth century was above 200,000 which were greater than the French colonies. Through 1666 there were only 3200 French in

New France. Throughout the 1660s and the 1670s the French government provided money to the settlers. Especially the immigration of the orphans was subsidized.

Fur dominated exports from Quebec, a principal French colony. The French minister Colbert wanted to develop the St. Lawrence Valley since a source of food and industry which would complement the fishing off Newfoundland. Grain, fish and timber were exported from New France and Newfoundland to the West Indies. Through the end of the seventeenth century, while the number of French occupants was in relation to the 10000, there were in relation to the 210000 Europeans in British North America.

In 1740 while New France had only 56000 occupants of French origin, British North America had in relation to the one million people of European backdrop. Flanked by 1608 and 1759, only 11370 French settled in New Canada. New Amsterdam had become New York which was taken through the British in the second half of the seventeenth century in the aftermath of the Second Dutch War. Under the Plantation Act of 1745 it was possible for all except for the Catholics to become eligible for naturalization after seven years in a British colony. After 1730 since readily cultivable land grew scarcer in Maryland, Pennsylvania and Virginia, the colonists expanded beside the Shenandoah Valley, James River and Roanoke Gap and then moved into the Carolinas.

Flanked by 1730 and 1775, the white population of North Carolina rose from 30000 to 255,000. The combined population of the blacks and the whites (but not the Red Indians) in Georgia was 23375 in 1770 and 33000 in 1773. In the middle of the early migrants there were more men than women. Therefore, several Spaniards and Portuguese took Indian women since wives or concubines. Their offspring were recognized since *mestizos* and they settled mostly in the middle of the coastal areas.

Through the 1690s in sure regions such since the Chesapeake Bay, the percentage of American born occupants rose which meant a bigger balance of men and women. The product of European-indigenous American marriages helped the European settlers since translators and also played a biggest role in deal. Such intermarriages were extremely general in the frontier communities at Hudson Bay and in West Africa. In the eighteenth century tension broke out flanked by the *peninsulares* (natives of Spain) and the *criollos* (creoles, American born descendants of Spanish settlers). The Germans and the Dutch were minor players in the entire project of overseas expansion. After the Thirty Years War, several poor people from North Germany went to the New World. The Germans were concentrated in Pennsylvania. In North Carolina, Swiss and German immigrants recognized New Bern which became the capital of the colony in 1770. In relation to the 30% of the colony's population were of German descent. But, immigration from Germany fell because they were more interested to settle in Russia.

The Russians unlike the West European maritime powers expanded the frontiers of Europe in East Asia through overland migration. Since the *Tsarist* Empire expanded into that Crimea and Siberia, mainly of the Russians were concentrated in the urban regions. Throughout the reign of Peter the

Great, the Russians started exploiting the mines. The Russian population in Siberia rose from 100,000 in 1701 to 700,000 in 1721. Mining and metallurgy urbanized first in the Urals and then in the Altay area creating concentrations of people that had to be fed and protected.

The Aleuts of Aleutian Islands clashed with the Russians in mid-eighteenth century who were searching for fur. In 1766, the Russians by cannons destroyed indigenous resistance in the Fox Islands.

A Biological Invasion [h]

In the tropics mainly Europeans died or could not sustain self-replicating populations. But, in temperate America where some Europeans went they flourished demographically. Some Dutch agricultural settlers went to South Africa.

Few Europeans also settled in the area approximately the Cape of Good Hope. But in common the Europeans failed to settle in Africa in considerable numbers. Tropical diseases like malaria and yellow fever checked the Portuguese migration in Africa. Yellow fever went with the European mariners from West Africa to West Indies. And in the eighteenth century, it caused devastating mortality in the middle of the European soldiers and settlers in these islands. In Jamaica, white death rates were higher than those of the slaves.

Disease brought through the Europeans devastated the indigenous population of the New World. In 1492 the population of the Americas was in excess of 50 million. Even the Caribbean islands supported one million 'natives'. But, indigenous population declined drastically under the Spanish rule due to a combination of enslavement, disease and demoralization of the Indians. The indigenous population of the West Indian islands—the Arawaks and the Caribs—were more or less extinct through mid-seventeenth century. Before 1519 the population of Central Mexico was 20 million.

In the course of the sixteenth century the population declined through 90%. Malaria introduced through the Europeans in the Americas was one of the chief killers of the 'native' population. In Peru the Indian population declined through 40%. After 1704, influenza and smallpox caused rapid decline of the Maya people. Throughout 1743-9, half of the indigenous population of the Amazon Valley fell victim to measles and smallpox. Due to smallpox, the Indians sustained to die in big number in North America.

Simultaneously rising migration from Europe enabled the British to increasingly outnumber the 'natives' beside the seaboard of Atlantic. Smallpox wiped out half of the Cherokee in North America in the late 1730s. However, in South Carolina the Cherokee sustained to outnumber the Europeans even in 1730. The Europeans transformed the ecology of the New World which in turn accelerated the decline of the Indian population. The Indians of Mexico and Peru depended on the farming of maize, potatoes, beans, etc. They had some domesticated animals.

Through the 1490s, the Europeans introduced pigs, sheep, goats, cattle and horses from Europe to the Americas. British cattle were introduced into Virginia. They multiplied rapidly and the agricultural lands of the Indians were changed into grazing and rustic land. Horses spread during North America by deal and theft. Gradually North American tribes like the Apache and the Comanche adopted the horses. The European traders beside the St. Lawrence Valley also introduced horses.

Therefore forest and agricultural land were replaced through large ranches. Instead of allowing the Indians to grow their vegetable crops, the Spanish introduced sugar plantations, cotton, tobacco and vineyards. The Europeans introduced timber and dyewood in Brazil which were exported. Citrus

fruits brought from Spain were introduced in the New World in the early sixteenth century. The Spaniards brought banana in 1516 to West Indies from the Canary Islands.

Actually the Portuguese had introduced banana in the Canary Islands from tropical Africa. For feeding the slaves yam was grown. Guinea yams entered West Indies from Africa. In the seventeenth century a larger shape of yam came to Africa from India. From West Africa it was introduced to West Indies. Wheat was introduced in the sixteenth century in favored highland regions of the American tropics like the Puebla Valley in Mexico.

In the seventeenth century the English and the French settlers introduced wheat in temperate North America. Thanks to the intrusion of the Spaniards, the edible dogs of Mexico became extinct. The aboriginal community in Australia was not a surplus producing economy. The aborigines were highly fragmented. From the linguistic point of view, they were divided into 700 tribes. In Australia smallpox, measles, influenza and tuberculosis since well since general cold mostly wiped out the aborigines. In 1791, the aborigines approximately Richmond died due to smallpox.

In 1789 and in 1829 a wave of smallpox killed 6% of the Wiradjuri people beside the Murrumbidgee River. Throughout 1847-8, the influenza epidemic finished them off. Warfare also reduced the indigenous population. Flanked by 1725 and the 1780s, the Portuguese wiped out the Paiagua tribe beside River Paraguay. In 1780-1, due to intensive collection of taxes, the last descendant of the Inca ruler Tupac Amaru led an uprising. The rebellion was crushed and in relation to the 100,000 people died. The European victory in excess of the Tuscaroras in the 1710s resulted in the decline of the latter's numbers from 5000 to 2500. From 1715 onwards mainly of the Yamasee were killed and enslaved through the colonial militia. Flanked by 1712 and 1738, the French repeatedly attacked the Fox tribe of Illinois-Mississippi area.

The Fox numbering 10000 were reduced to some hundred. John Sullivan's pacification campaign against the Iroquois in 1779 resulted in widespread destruction of villages and 160,000 bushels of corn. The Colonial Militia and the mounted police in Australia were in charge of suppressing the aborigines. To give an example, in 1860 at Queensland in relation to the 4000 aborigines were killed.

Forced Migration and Slavery [h]

The expulsions of the Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula due to *conquests* and the Africans Death left southern Portugal thinly populated. Therefore, Portuguese overseas colonies required cheap labour. In the Canary Islands the indigenous people recognized since the Guanches were conquered and driven to extinction. Catastrophic mortality in the middle of the 'native' Americans following the arrival of the Europeans generated search for cheap labour for working in the estates, plantations and mines.

The Europeans imitated the farming and consumption of sugar from the Arabs. Columbus introduced sugar in West Indies in 1493. Extremely soon sugar plantations became general in Brazil. Slaves

were required for the collection of cacao and other forest products in Amazon. Virginia and Maryland required slaves for working in the tobacco farming.

The resulting slave deal altered the demography through initiating a biggest movement of the Africans from Africa to South America, West Indies and the southern states of North America. Flanked by 1680 and 1860, the loss of population due to slavery from West Africa was a small in excess of 10%. Slaves were acquired from Africa either through raiding or by contacts with the African rulers. Prisoners in inter-tribal wars within Africa were enslaved. At times the African rulers occupied in wars which could be categorized since slave hunts.

The slaves were sold to the European traders in return for guns, gunpowder and European clothes. And the African potentates used the guns for acquiring more slaves for selling to the Europeans. Therefore a vicious 'gun-slave' cycle urbanized. Deal and slavery at dissimilar moments of history had been general in other areas also. To bridge in excess of the unfavorable deal balance, Charlemagne's Empire exported white women who became slaves in the households of the Muslims in the Arab Empire.

And Akbar sold prisoners of war to Kabul for buying horses. Throughout the fifteenth century, African slaves were transported to Lisbon for sale. Founded in 1575, Luanda in Angola became the leading port by which slaves were shipped to Brazil. Congo was a basic source of slaves. Flanked by 1450 and 1500 in relation to the 150,000 African slaves were taken to Europe and mainly of them went to Portugal. Then the slaves from Africa were transported to the islands of Madeira and Sao Tome.

In 1515 African slaves for the first time were sent to the Americas. Spain sent the African slaves to Hispaniola in the Caribbean and started getting slave grown American sugar. Direct big level trans-Atlantic traffic in slaves started from 1532. The British transported more slaves than the French. Flanked by 1691 and 1779, British ships transported 2,300,000 slaves from the African ports. The slave ships used to sail from London, Bristol and Liverpool. The British slave ships supplied slaves to the British resources in North America and in the Caribbean colonies. The British also supplied slaves to the colonies of the other powers. In the sixteenth century in relation to the 367,000 African slaves were sent to the Americas.

Flanked by 1700 and 1763, the number of slaves in British North America rose from 20000 to 300,000. In the eighteenth century, the French colonies obtained 1,015,000 slaves and in 1788 the French West Indies contained 594,000 slaves. Throughout the 1780s, the French West Indies colonies received 30000 slaves annually. Through 1580, there were 60 sugar mills in Brazil. And the population amounted to 20000 Portuguese, 18000 Indians and 14000 slaves. Through 1600, there were in relation to the 100,000 African slaves in Eastern Brazil.

Angola supplied 2 million slaves in the eighteenth century mostly to Brazil. Mainly of the Africans transported since slaves in the eighteenth century went to Brazil and West Indies, and less than a fifth

went to North America. The Portuguese moved slaves into the sugar plantations of Northeast Brazil and from 1710s into the gold and diamond meadows of Minas Gerais. In the late eighteenth century the slaves were used in the sugar and coffee plantations close to Rio De Janeiro. In mainly cases the number of black slaves exceeded the number of white colonists. Barbados had only some hundred blacks in 1640. Through 1645, there were in excess of 6000 blacks and 40000 whites.

In 1685, there were 46000 blacks and 20000 whites (bond or indentured servants and free). In 1687 Saint Domingue contained 4500 whites and 3500 blacks. Flanked by 1766 and 1771 Saint Domingue received 14000 slaves annually. And throughout 1785-9, the number of slaves received rose to 28000 annually. In 1789 there were only 28000 whites, but 30000 free blacks and 406,000 slaves. On Montserrat in the West Indies, 40% of the 4500 occupants in 1678 were black. The percentage of the blacks grew to 80% of the 7200 people in 1729. Through 1700, the French islands had only 18000 whites but 44000 black slaves. In 1730 the African slaves outnumbered both the Cherokee and the Europeans in South Carolina. Flanked by 1730 and 1775, the number of blacks in North Carolina rose from 6000 to 10000.

Gradually American born slaves dominated in the Chesapeake. In 1763 at Louisiana there were 5000 blacks and 4000 whites. The long scope of slavery in the New World becomes clear when compared with the extent of slavery in the ancient world. Athens in 400 BC had 60000 slaves who constituted in relation to the 30% of the municipality-state's population. Roman Italy flanked by 225 BC and 31 BC possessed flanked by 600,000 to 2,000,000 slaves. And the total population of Roman Italy (including slaves) in that era was 10 million.

In relation to the one million slaves worked in the *latifundias* (big estates of the senators) of Italy. In 1800, in relation to the 15% of the 800,000 population in Venezuela were slaves. Brazil flanked by 1800 and 1850 had flanked by 1,000,000 to 2,500,000 slaves. The slaves amounted to 33% of the population of the country. Slavery was rampant in the southern states of USA. Flanked by 1820 and 1860 the number of slaves rose from 1,500,000 to 4,000,000 which represented in relation to the 33% of the populace.

Finally Cuba flanked by 1804 and 1861 possessed in relation to the 80000 to 400,000 slaves who amounted to in relation to the 28% to 30% of the total population. Statistics does not give any glimpse of the picture at the micro stage especially when emotions and sensibilities of the slaves were concerned. Individuals were taken absent from their societies and families in Africa. Several died while being captured. In the port cities and in the ships while being transported crossways the Atlantic, they were crowded jointly in hazardous conditions. In relation to the 10% of the slaves died while being transported crossways the Atlantic. Hacking down sugarcane was a backbreaking task. Slaves existed in deplorable circumstances. They were less well fed, housed and clothed than the white population. Since a result, the slaves were more vulnerable to disease. *Uncle Tom's Cabin* remnants the best account of a black's life in the New World. The slaves migrated to the cities where

manage in excess of them was weaker. Few of the skilled slaves in the cities enjoyed a life approach which was higher than the European peasants. Few white settlers were also coerced through the state to migrate overseas.

The British government was concerned due to the growing crime rate after the War of Spanish Succession (1702-13). This, writes Jeremy Black, resulted in the Transportation Act in 1718. This Act allowed for transportation not only since section of the pardoning procedure in cases of capital offences but since a penalty for a wide range of non-capital crimes including theft of property. Flanked by 1720 and 1763, the Parliament passed another 16 Acts that recognized transportation since a penalty for crimes of perjury and poaching. Flanked by 1718 and 1785, in relation to the 50000 convicts were sent from Britain to America and West Indies.

Of these 50000 'undesirable' persons, 30000 from England, 13000 from Ireland and 700 from Scotland were sent to America. The shipboard mortality was 14%. It is to be noted that this rate was higher than the rate of mortality of the slaves throughout trans- Atlantic voyages. Mainly of the convicts settled in Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania. After considering transportation to Africa, Australia was founded since a penal colony in 1788.

Besides the criminals Parisian vagrants were seized in 1749 and were sent to Cayenne. Several prostitutes were also sent absent from France. In 1767 'reformed' prostitutes were sent from Britain to aid in populating Florida.

IMPERIALISM [MH]

Definitions of Imperialism [h]

- There is no one average definition of imperialism. Let us seem at few often used ones. Imperialism refers to the procedure of capitalist growth which leads the capitalist countries to conquer and control pre-capitalist countries of the world.
- Imperialism is the organization of political manages exercised through the metropolis in excess of the domestic and foreign policy and in excess of the domestic politics of another polity, which we shall call the margin (countries at the margins of the economic hierarchy).
- The word imperialism is used to designate the international practices and dealings of the capitalist world throughout the separate level of mature capitalism that begins in the last quarter of the 19th century

In this context four significant feature characteristics of imperialism are:

- Sharp increase in international flow of commodities, men and capital,
- Interdependent set of dealings flanked by countries at dissimilar stages of industrial growth,
- Advanced and larger technology in imperialist countries, and

- Competition flanked by advanced capitalist countries

Empire Versus Imperialism [sh]

It is significant to distinguish flanked by empires and imperialism. There were several empires in history but empire in the period of capitalism is imperialism. What was new in relation to the imperialism in the contemporary period? What made it dissimilar from earlier expansions of empire? In earlier eras the motive was exaction of tribute.

Under capitalism the economies and communities of the conquered or dominated regions were transformed, adapted and manipulated to serve the imperatives of capital accumulation in the imperialist countries placed at the centre of the economic hierarchy.

Imperialism Versus Colonialism [sh]

The distinction flanked by imperialism and colonialism is equally significant. The history of imperialism is dissimilar from the history of scrupulous colonies. Imperialism is a specifically European phenomenon whereas colonialism is the organization prevalent in the colonies. It can also be argued that as European imperial history had a vital unity – so to revise an empire in isolation would be pointless.

When we revise imperialism we look at the impact of empire on the metropolis, whereas colonialism refers to the impact on the colony. The advantages of the empire to the mother country ranged from the colonial wealth which financed the industrial revolution to the development of larger military technology, mechanisms of manage such since the army and bureaucracy and discipline such since anthropology.

Manners of Imperialism [h]

Imperialism can be both formal and informal. Formal imperialism involves annexation and direct rule while informal empire means indirect rule through regional elites who are independent legally but politically dependent on the metropolis. Likewise, there are three broad kinds of empires which have either lived in a linear chronology, one succeeding the other, or also co-lived with each other at a scrupulous historical juncture. These kinds are:

- Trading empires which took the initiative in early conquests but eventually lost out in the period of industrial capitalism, such since Portugal and Spain
- Industrial empires with full-fledged colonies, such since Britain and France
- Industrial empires without, or with some, formal colonies, such since Germany

At the similar time, it is significant to keep in mind dissimilar historical levels by which capitalist expansion took lay leading to the formation of empires.

The changing nature of imperialism was dependent upon the levels of capitalist growth. Broadly speaking capitalism may be said to have gone by five levels, mentioned below:

- End of 15th to mid 17th Century — rise of commercial capital and rapid development of world commerce
- Mid 17th to latter 18th Century — commercial capital ripens into a dominant economic force
- Late 18th Century to 1870s — the period of industrial capital
- 1880 to World War I — rise of monopoly capital, division of globe, etc.
- Post World War I — socialism, decolonization, rise of multinational corporations

In this sense levels of imperialism coincide with levels of capitalism

Level of capitalism	Imperial Powers
● Merchant capitalism	Portugal and Spain
● Industrial capitalism	Britain, France and Netherlands
● Fund capitalism	ritain, USA and Germany

The history of the European colonial empires falls into two overlapping cycles. The first began in the 15th Century and ended soon after 1800, the second in the late 18th Century lasting into the twentieth. Throughout the first cycle America was significant since a colony—in the second Africa and Asia.

Theories of Imperialism [h]

The theories of imperialism can be grouped into two broad kinds, economic (J.A. Hobson, Hilferding, Rosa Luxembourg and Lenin) and political (Schumpeter, Fieldhouse, Gallagher and Robinson).

They can also be distinguished since metro centric (Schumpeter, Lenin, Hobson) and pericentric (Gallagher and Robinson, Fieldhouse). Let us seem at these apart.

The Economic Explanations [sh]

The economic explanations offered through Hobson, Hilferding, Rosa Luxembourg and Lenin had a general characteristic — a political agenda. Hobson’s purpose was to alert the British public to “the new plutocratic phenomenon that was hijacking British foreign policy” — to the expansionist agenda that was extracting a heavy price from the ordinary people merely to satisfy the financial capitalists

who cared for nothing except for maximizing returns on their investments. Hilferding was a German Social Democrat who was Fund Minister and paid with his life for being anti Nazi.

Rosa Luxemburg, born in Poland, was a fiery revolutionary Social Democrat leader in Germany. Vladimir Lenin, the prominent Bolshevik leader and maker of the Revolution in Russia in 1917, wished to convince the Russian people that World War I was an imperialist war which they would do best to keep out of. In *Imperialism* (1902) Hobson explains imperialism since an outcome of the capitalist organization. The key concept used is under consumption. Industry looked for foreign markets since it cannot discover domestic markets for its goods, wages being low.

With biggest industrial powers competing for foreign markets there was a race for colonies which would serve since captive markets. Under consumption also leads to over saving since domestic investment does not create sound economic sense when there is small purchasing authority. Here again colonies serve since channels for investment. Therefore Hobson concluded that "...the dominant directive motive" behind imperialism "was the demand for markets and for profitable investment through the exporting and financial classes within each imperialist regime." He dismissed other motives since secondary, be it authority, pride and prestige or "deal follows the flag" or the mission of civilizing the natives.

Rudolf Hilferding, in his job, *Das Finanzkapital, (Fund Capital)* published in 1910, demonstrated how large banks and financial institutions in information manage industrial houses in this last level of capitalism, bigger recognized since fund capitalism. Monopoly capitalists looked to imperialist expansion since a method of ensuring close supplies of raw materials, markets for industrial goods and avenues for investment. Since each large European authority was a monopoly capitalist, economic competition soon became political rivalry, which in turn escalated into war. Rosa Luxemburg's revise titled *Accumulation of Capital* (1913) highlighted the unequal connection flanked by the imperial powers and the colonies. The European powers gained captive markets and secured profitable avenues for investment.

In contrast, the colonies were merely suppliers of raw materials and foodstuffs. In *Imperialism, the Highest Level of Capitalism* (1916) Lenin argued that advanced capitalist countries invest in backward countries because the limits of profitable domestic investment have been reached. To invest at home would need growth of the economy and bigger average of livelihood for workers, neither of which was in the interest of the capitalists. Lenin's argument was that imperialist interests place behind the rivalries flanked by European powers that culminated in World War I. His intention was overtly political – to expose the capitalist designs and convince the people of Russia that they should not participate in the War.

Non-economic Explanations [sh]

Schumpeter's *Imperialism and the Social Classes* (1931) broke absent from the leftist paradigm which situated imperialism and capitalism on the similar grid. In his scheme, imperialism and capitalism were seen since clearly distinct phenomena. Imperialism was atavistic, generated through pre-capitalist forces (pre-contemporary in essence).

In contrast, capitalism was contemporary, innovative and productive and did not require manage on a territory in order to prosper. Whereas the writers on the left saw imperialism since an economic organization, for Schumpeter, "Imperialism is the objectless disposition on the section of a state to unlimited forcible expansion." However, the problem with the usage of a conceptual attribute like 'disposition' is that it can not be empirically tested and can, so, never be proved or disproved. Gallagher and Robinson (*Africa and the Victorians*) questioned the general interpretations of contemporary imperialism on two counts. They understood the distinction flanked by pre 1870 and post 1870 imperialism to be invalid.

Also, imperialism of free deal or informal imperialism was seen to be since significant since formal imperialism. Political expansion was a function of commercial expansion - "deal with informal manage if possible; deal with rule when necessary." Gallagher and Robinson's account of imperialism was *pericentric*. In their view imperialism was a procedure driven through pressures from the peripheries - Asia, Africa and Latin Africa. The scramble for colonies was a preemptive move through European powers to inhabit whatever territory they could in Asia and Africa therefore since to stay out rival nations.

This view questioned the traditional Eurocentric account of the scramble for colonies in words of the great conflicts of European diplomacy or the great thrusts of expansionary financial capitalism. Field house advanced a political account for imperialism. The new imperialism was the extension into the margin of the political thrash about in Europe. At the centre the balance was therefore nicely adjusted that no biggest transform in the status or territory of any face was possible. Colonies became a means out of this impasse.

For the British this "impulse" meant protecting the circuit to India by Egypt and the Suez Canal which necessitated manages in excess of the headwaters of the Nile and a predominant location in North Africa. For the French and Germans the impulse meant acquiring "spaces in the sun" to demonstrate national prestige. Field house concluded: "In short, the contemporary empires lacked rationality and purpose: they were the chance products of intricate historical forces operating in excess of many centuries and more particularly throughout the era after 1815." Colonialism became a "move" in the European game of balance of authority. Doyle exploits the word 'colonialization of the diplomatic organization' to define the growths flanked by 1879 and 1890. Bismarck acquired colonies in the early 1880s in the hope that a colonial quarrel with England would set up German credibility in France.

France had to be compensated with colonies and overseas adventures in lieu of her loss of Alsace Lorraine. Competition for colonies led to a rift flanked by England and Italy and Italy went in excess of to the face of Germany. To sum up this part, an entire range of theories and explanations have been offered for imperialism and are now accessible with us. These can broadly be classified into economic and non-economic explanations.

The economic account includes the factors pertaining to overproduction and under consumption (Hobson), necessities of fund capitalism (Hilferding), unequal swap flanked by the imperial powers and the colonies (Rosa Luxembourg), and the highest level of capitalism (Lenin). The non-economic explanations have looked at imperialism since a pre-contemporary atavistic force (Schumpeter); or have offered a pericentric view concentrating on the growths in the colonies rather than the metropolis (Gallagher and Robinson); or have seen it merely since an expression of political struggles within Europe (Fieldhouse).

Levels of Imperialism [h]

The previous part was a discussion of the dissimilar *methods* in which imperialism has been understood and defined through scholars. In this part let us look at its growth by several levels.

Mercantilism and Early Trading Empires [sh]

What enabled Europe to become the world leader? If we looked at the world in 1500 Europe's dominant location could not be taken for granted.

The Ottoman Empire, China under the Mings and India under the Mughals were at the similar level of growth. They suffered from one biggest drawback, however, and that was their power through a centralized power which did not give circumstances conducive to intellectual development. In contrast, the competition flanked by dissimilar European powers encouraged the introduction of new military techniques. For instance, the extensive range armed sailing ship helped the naval powers of the West to manage the sea circuits. This increased military authority combined with economic progress to push Europe forward and ahead of other continents.

The development of trans - Atlantic deal was spectacular. It increased eightfold flanked by 1510 and 1550 and threefold flanked by 1550 and 1610. Deal was followed through the establishment of the empires and churches and administrative organizations. The Spanish and Portuguese clearly designed their empires in America to be permanent. The goods obtained from America were gold, silver, valuable metals and spices since well since ordinary goods like oil, sugar, indigo, tobacco, rice, furs, timber and new plants like potato and maize.

Shipbuilding industry urbanized approximately the biggest ports of London and Bristol in Britain, Antwerp in Belgium and Amsterdam in the Netherlands. The Dutch, French and English soon became keen rivals of the Spanish and Portuguese. This competition encouraged the progress of the

science of navigation. Improved cartography, navigational tables, the telescope and the barometer made travel through sea safer. This strengthened Europe's technical advantage further.

The story of science and technology enabling European power in deal with other regions has been told in the previous two Units of this Block. The detection of America and of the circuit to the Indies via the Cape of Good Hope had great consequences for Europe. It liberated Europe from a confined geographic and mental cell. The medieval horizon was widened to include powers from Eastern cultures and Western peoples. Discoveries, deal and conquests, which followed them, had practical consequences.

Every colony or trading centre was a new economic incentive. America was a market and American bullion increased the supply of money circulating in Europe and intensified existing economic and social growths. The volume of deal with America increased. For four centuries America satisfied the hunger for land in the middle of Europeans. Gold and silver stimulated exploration and conquest and attracted immigrants, who were followed secure on their heels through missionaries.

American colonies were set up through individuals; the state, patriotism and missionary impulse played small section. Before 1815 Spain and Portugal were the pre-eminent imperial powers. Their primacy place not only in the information that they were the first discoverers but that they worked out four of the five models for effective colonization which were typical of the first colonial empires. Both made massive profits from their colonies. Portugal had a massive empire in Asia and then in America and Brazil.

Colonial revenues brought in the equivalent of 72,000 pound sterling in 1711. This was approximately equal to metropolitan taxes. One special characteristic of the Portuguese empire was that she made no distinction flanked by her colonies and the metropolis. No distinct colonial department was set up till 1604. France, like Spain and Portugal, accepted out expansion in the Americas – in the areas of Canada and Latin America.

This was undertaken through individual Frenchmen supported through the Crown with the aim of ensuring supplies of groceries and rising naval authority. The task of setting up the empire was accepted out through the chartered companies. This worked to the advantage of the state since it was at a minimum cost. After 1660s the colonies became royal resources and royal mediators headed the government. French colonial government was since authoritarian since that of Spain.

France was then an absolute monarchy and ruled colonies without giving them any constitutional rights. Regional management and law in the colonies were modeled on those prevailing in France. Her colonial empire suffered from too much state interference. France made no fiscal profits on her colonies, in sharp contrast to Portugal. This was despite the information that more than two fifths French exports in 1788 were to colonial governments. Through 1789 France lost mainly of her colonial resources in America and India to Britain.

The crucial weakness was her inferior naval authority. Few of the Western states urbanized their colonies in the tropics, in India, Africa, Latin America and Australia. The Europeans did not settle in Africa, they were content with slaves, gold dust and ivory. The colonies were crucial to the British economy; they supplied raw materials and were markets for metropolitan products. The French minister, Choiseul, regretted that ‘in the present state of Europe it is colonies, deal and in consequence sea authority, which necessity determines the balance of authority upon the continent.’ Of the five large European powers, France, Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia, Britain soon appeared since the leader.

She had several advantages — the first was an urbanized banking and financial organization. Her geographical site at the westward flank of Europe helped her to uphold an aloofness from the continent when she wished. The mainly significant factor, which gave Britain an edge, was that it was the first country to undergo the Industrial Revolution. This enabled it to control Europe and to acquire colonies. In Bernard Porter’s terms, she was the first frogspawn egg to grow legs, the first tadpole to transform into a frog, the first frog to hop out of the pond.

The first empires represented European ambition, determination and ingenuity in by limited possessions rather than European predominance during the world. “Christendom is also the proper perspective from which to view the religious drive behind the Spanish justification for empire.” Doyle further sums up Spanish and British empires: “Spain and Britain focused on deal in the east, on resolution and manufacture in the west, and neither acquired colonies for immediate causes of national security.”

Decline [ssh]

The old colonialism had its natural limits. Flow of valuable metals declined. Through the late 18th Century Spanish and Portuguese authority declined and they lost their colonies. Dutch monopoly on shipping ended. Colonial rivalry flanked by France and Britain ended in Britain’s preeminence. Britain was now the world leader in empire, fund and deal. Since Eric Hobsbawm put it, “Old colonialism did not grow in excess of into new colonialism. It collapsed and was replaced through it.” Let us sum up the discussion therefore distant.

Europe’s conquest of America, Africa and Asia from the sixteenth century was possible only because of her mastery of the seas. In this the countries on the Atlantic seaboard, Portugal, Spain, France, Britain and Holland, had an obvious advantage because of their geographical site. Europe’s power was disastrous for other peoples: the indigenous populations in the Americas were wiped out and twelve million Africans were made slaves flanked by 1500 and 1860.

Europe benefited vastly in this period when merchant capital controlled the world economy. Institutions such since the contemporary state and bureaucracy and the scientific revolution in knowledge laid the foundations of the contemporary world.

Industrial Capitalism—Imperialism of Free Deal [sh]

Hobsbawm defines the Industrial Revolution in Britain since that rare moment in world history when the world's economy was built approximately Britain; when she was the only world authority, the only imperialist, the only importer, exporter and foreign investor. The account of Britain since the workshop of the world was literally true in the transitional of the nineteenth century when she produced mainly of its coal, iron and steel.

The Industrial Revolution was followed through the single liberal world economy (in the 1860s perhaps because of the monopoly of Britain) and the final penetration of the undeveloped world through capitalism. The early British industrial economy relied for its expansion on foreign deal. Overseas markets for products and overseas outlets for capital were crucial. The cotton industry exported eighty per cent of its output at the end of the nineteenth century. The iron and steel industry exported forty per cent of its output in the mid nineteenth century.

In return Britain bought dedicated regional products such since cotton from the US, wool from Australia, wheat from Argentina, etc. Britain's deal also increasingly became greater with the empire. In cotton Latin America reported for thirty five percent of British exports in 1840. After 1873 the East absorbed in excess of sixty per cent of British cotton exports. Therefore there were sound economic causes for Britain opposing these regions being opened up to others.

Through 1815 Britain had already become the preeminent world authority, combining naval mastery, financial credit, commercial enterprise and alliance diplomacy. The following decades of British economic hegemony were accompanied through big-level improvements in transport and discourses, through the increasingly rapid transfer of industrial technology from one area to another, and through an immense increase in manufacturing output, which in turn stimulated the opening of new regions of agricultural land and raw material sources. The age of mercantilism was in excess of and with it tariff barriers stood dismantled. The new watchword was free deal and this brought international harmony rather than great authority clash. Europe's military superiority sustained.

The improvements in the muzzle loading gun, the introduction of the breechloader, the Gatling guns, Maxims and light field artillery constituted a veritable firepower revolution, which the traditional communities could not withstand. The decisive new technology was the gun, the symbol of European superiority in the armament factory. Since Hilaire Belloc said, "Whatever happens, we have got the Maxim gun, and they have not." In the field of colonial empires, Britain brooked no rivals. The empire grew at a standard annual rate of 100,000 square miles flanked by 1815 and 1865. One cluster of colonies comprised those acquired for strategic and commercial causes like Singapore, Aden, Falkland Islands, Hong Kong and Lagos.

A second cluster was that of settler colonies, such since South Africa, Canada and Australia. With the spread of industrial capitalism require grew for colonies since markets for manufactured goods

especially textiles and suppliers of raw materials such as cotton and food grains. The colony appeared since a subordinate trading partner whose economic surplus was appropriated by deal based on unequal swap. This international division of labour condemned the colony to producing goods of low value by backward techniques.

Late Industrializes and Colonial Powers [Ssh]

Through the 1860s the other countries like Germany and United States, were catching up with Britain in industrialization. In 1870 the figures for share of world industrial manufacture were 13 percent for Germany and 23 per cent for the United States.

The extent of the declining power of Britain in the middle of the super powers can be understood through the table given below.

Table: Per Capita Stages of Industrialization Comparative to Great Britain in 1900 = 100

		1880	1900	1913	1928	1938	Rank in 1938
1	Great Britain	87	100	115	122	157	2 nd
2	United States	38	69	126	182	167	1 st
3	France	28	39	59	82	73	4 th
4	Germany	25	52	85	128	144	3 rd
5	Italy	12	17	26	44	61	5 th

In 1900 Britain was the unquestioned world leader. Her empire extended to twelve million square miles and a quarter of the world's population. The race for colonies speeded up from the 1880s with the entry of Germany, Italy, US, Belgium and Japan into the race for colonies. These rivalries flanked by the powers led to a race for new colonies since each authority sought to create close her markets, raw materials and investments. Backward areas were annexed in order to manage their raw material supplies.

Malaya gave rubber and tin and the Transitional East gave oil. Empire was a cushion in a difficult world. These imperialist rivalries which carved up the world into colonies, semi colonies and spheres of power also divided Europe into blocs armed to the teeth, the logical corollary of which was World War I. World War I ended in the defeat of Germany and the Ottoman Empire and redivision of colonies in the middle of the imperial powers, who were henceforth described trustees. The Depression of 1929 brought a transform in the attitude of imperial powers. Gone were the days of Free Deal; protectionism was the new catchword.

Fund Capitalism [sh]

Levels of capitalism and imperialism could overlap, since in the case of industrial capitalism and financial capitalism, where one did not replace the other, it was superimposed on it. The informal empire of deal and fund was added to the empire of industrial capital. Several biggest transforms took lay in the world economy after 1860. Industrialization spread too many countries of Europe, the US and Japan with the result that Britain's industrial supremacy in the world came to an end. For Britain this was a setback.

She exchanged the informal empire in excess of mainly of the underdeveloped world for the formal empire of a quarter of it, plus the older satellite economies. The application of scientific knowledge to industries led to an intensification of industrialization. Contemporary chemical industries, the exploit of petroleum since fuel for the internal combustion engine and the exploit of electricity for industrial purposes urbanized throughout this era. Moreover, there was further unification of the world market because of revolution in the means of international transport. Capital accumulation on a big level took lay because of the growth of deal and industry at home and extended use of colonies and semi colonies.

This capital was concentrated in some hands. Trusts and cartels appeared and banking capital merged with industrial capital. Outlets had to be establishing for this capital abroad. Significant export of capital had been there even before the level of predominance of fund capital. Through 1850 Britain's capital exports were 30 million pounds a year.

In 1870-75 this was 75 million pounds. The income from this came to 50 million pounds, which was reinvested overseas. This financed the deal with the colonies, wherein massive quantities of raw materials were procured and equally massive quantities of industrial goods sent out. Since Paul Kennedy puts it therefore evocatively, the world was the Municipality of London's oyster. The stranglehold of monopoly capital can be gauged from the statistic that through 1914 European nations controlled in excess of 84.4 per cent of the world.

Capital was concentrated in and channeled by first, the Municipality of London and then New York, the centers of the international network of deal and fund. The metropolitan country also used empire for political and ideological ends. Jingoistic nationalism and glorification of empire acted to reduce social divisions in the metropolis. Bipan Chandra notes that the slogan —'the sun never sets on the British empire' — generated prides in the middle of British workers on whose hovels the sun seldom shone in real life. Each country justified its empire in dissimilar methods — for instance, the "civilizing mission" of the French and the pan — Asianism of Japan.

Flanked by 1870 and 1913 London was the financial and trading hub of the world. Through 1913 Britain had 4000 million pounds worth abroad. Mainly international deal was routed by British ships at the turn of the twentieth century. After World War I Britain lost this location to the US. The US became the biggest dominant capitalist economy.

She was now the world's main manufacturer, foreign investor, trader and banker and the US \$ became the average international currency. From the mid-twentieth century onwards, decolonization gathered pace, since did the rise of multinational companies, international donor agencies and the whole gamut of mechanisms of international economic power. This procedure is generally recognized since neo-colonialism.

The Empire on which the Sun Never Set [h]

Let us take Britain and her empire, especially India, since a case revise to assess the advantages accruing to the mother country from her imperial resources. Bipan Chandra attracts our attention to the simultaneity of birth of the Industrial Revolution and the British Empire in India, which, interestingly, was not merely coincidental.

The conquest of Bengal in 1757 enabled the systematic plunder of India and the Industrial Revolution took off approximately 1750. The drain of wealth or the unilateral transfer of capital from India after 1765 amounted to two to three per cent of the British national income at a time when only in relation to the five per cent of the British national income was being invested. In the 19th Century India appeared since a biggest market for British manufactures and supplied food grains and raw materials. Opium from India was sold in China, enabling Britain's triangular deal with China. Railways were a biggest region of investment of capital. Britain's international balance of payments deficit was handled through the foreign swap got from Indian exports. British shipping grew in leaps and bounds on the back of it are managed in excess of India's coastal and international deal. India played a crucial role in the growth of British capitalism throughout this level. British industries especially textiles were heavily dependent on exports. India absorbed 10 to 12 per cent of British exports and almost 20 per cent of Britain's textile exports throughout 1860-1880.

After 1850 India was also a biggest importer of engine coaches, rail rows and other railway stores. Moreover, the Indian army played a significant role in extending British colonialism in Asia and Africa. During this level the drain of wealth and capital to Britain sustained. England was particularly keen on the Indian empire since it provided a market for cotton goods; it controlled the deal of the Distant East with her export surplus (opium) with China. The House Charges (India's payments for getting "good" management from Britain) and the interest payments on the Indian Public Debt were significant in financing Britain's balance of payments deficit. India strengthened Britain's location since an international financial centre. India's deal surplus with the rest of the world and her deal deficit with England allowed England to square her international resolutions on current explanation. Also India's monetary reserves helped Britain. Hence in India even the free traders wanted formal manage! The projection of India since the brightest jewel in the British crown played a significant role in the ideology of imperialism. The British ruling classes were able to stay their political authority intact even when it was being with class clash. Therefore the pride and glory

underlying the slogan of the sun never sets on the British Empire were used to stay workers contented on whose slum dwellings the sun seldom shone in real life.

India also played a crucial role in one other, often ignored, aspect. India bore the whole cost of its own conquest. India paid for the railways, education, and a contemporary legal organization, growth of irrigation and detailed penetration of management into the countryside. Lastly once the thrash about for the division of the world became intense after 1870 India was the chief gendarme of British imperialism. She provided both the material and the human possessions for its expansion and maintenance. Afghanistan, Central Asia, Tibet, the Persian Gulf region, Eastern Africa, Egypt, Sudan, Burma, China and to few extent even South Africa were brought or kept within the British sphere of power through virtue of Indian men and money.

The British Indian army was the only big level army contingent accessible to Britain. It is so not a surprise that the British Empire in Asia and Africa collapsed once Britain lost manages in excess of the Indian army and finances.

COLONIALISM [MH]

Approaches to Colonialism [h]

There are largely two approaches to the understanding of colonialism. The successful liberation movements of the 1960s and the Cuban and Algerian revolutions led to a plethora of scripts on colonialism. Andre Gunder Frank's biggest contribution was followed through those of C. Furtado, Theodore Dos Santos, Paul Prebisch, Paul Baran, Samir Amin, Immanuel Wallerstein, Arghiri Emmanuel and F. Cardoso. According to the dependency school a colony would continue to be economically dependent even after achieving political freedom, since extensive since it remnants a section of capitalism – since the capitalist class was incapable of undertaking the task of growth.

Wallerstein's *world organizations* come divided the capitalist world into the centre, margin and semi-margin, flanked by which a connection of *unequal swap* prevailed. The *core economies* of the centre produced high value products and had strong states. The margin was constrained through low technology and low wages, the state was weak since was the capitalist class and the economy was dominated through foreign capital. The countries on the semi-margin, like India, were marked through greater manage of the state in the national and international market.

Economic nationalism was the hallmark of such states, which were able to negotiate a stronger location for themselves in the world organization. Cultural characteristics of colonialism were highlighted through Amilcar Cabral, Franz Fanon and Edward Said. Bipan Chandra analysed colonialism in words of colonial building, colonial modernization, levels of colonialism and the colonial state.

What is Colonialism? [sh]

Colonialism is since contemporary a historical phenomenon since industrial capitalism. It defines the separate level in the contemporary historical growth of the colony that intervenes flanked by the traditional economy and the contemporary capitalist economy. It is a well structured entire; a separate social formation in which the vital manage of the economy and community is in the hands of a foreign capitalist class. The shape of the colonial building varies with the changing circumstances of the historical growth of capitalism since a world wide organization.

It is best to seem upon Colonialism since a specific building. What took lay throughout colonialism was not merely the imposition of foreign political power on a traditional economy, since argued through few scholars. Nor was it merely the outcome of a massive confidence trick that relied on the docility, cooperation or disunity of the colonized, buttressed through the racial arrogance of their bigger-armed white governors. The view that 'Empires were transnational institutions that were created to rally the possessions of the world' (Hopkins, 1999) is also incomplete; it focuses on the metropolis, not on the colony. Neither was a colony a middle economy which, given time, would have eventually urbanized into a full blown capitalist economy. It is also incorrect that the colony suffered from "arrested development" because of its pre-capitalist remains.

Several apologists, for instance, Morris D. Morris, portrayed colonialism since an attempt at modernization, economic growth and transplantation of capitalism which could not succeed because of the restricting role of custom in the colonies. Colonial economy was neither pre-capitalist nor capitalist, it was colonial, i.e., a hybrid making. Colonialism was distorted capitalism. Integration with the world economy did not bring capitalism to the colony. The colony did not develop in the split image of the mother country –it was its other, it's opposite, non-developmental face. Colonialism did not develop social and productive forces, rather, it underdeveloped them, leading to contradictions and a movement forward to the next level.

Definition [sh]

Colonialism is the internal disarticulation and external integration of the rural economy and the realization of the extended reproduction of capital not in the colony but in the imperialist metropolis. Colonialism is a social formation in which dissimilar manners of manufacture coexist from feudalism to petty commodity manufacture to agrarian, industrial and fund capitalism. Unlike capitalism, where the surplus is appropriated on the foundation of the ownership of the means of manufacture, under colonialism surplus is appropriated through virtue of manage in excess of state authority.

When one understands colonialism since a social formation rather than since a mode of manufacture, we are able to see the primary contradiction since a societal one, rather than in class words. Therefore we have a national liberation thrash about rather than a class thrash about against the

colonial authority. The primary contradiction in community is the national one, not the class one; the thrash on against the colonial authority is political.

Vital Characteristics of Colonialism [sh]

One vital characteristic of colonialism is that under it the colony is integrated into the world capitalist organization in a subordinate location. Colonialism is characterized through unequal swap.

The exploitative international division of labour meant that the metropolis produced goods of high value with high technology and colonies produced goods of low value and productivity with low technology. The colony produced raw materials while the metropolis produced manufactured goods. The pattern of railway growth in India in the second half of the 19th Century was in keeping with the interests of British industry. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, the Indian nationalist leader, called this since decorating another's wife. The colony was articulated with the world market but internally disarticulated.

Its agricultural sector did not serve its industry but the metropolitan economy and the world market. The drain of wealth took lay by unrequited exports and state expenditure on armed forces and civil services. Foreign political power is the fourth characteristic of Colonialism. So, unequal swap, external integration and internal disarticulation, drain of wealth, and a foreign political power may be understood since the four largest characteristics of colonialism.

The Colonial State [h]

The colonial state is integral to the structuring and functioning of the colonial economy and community. It is the mechanism through which the metropolitan capitalist class dominates and uses the colony. The colonial state serves the extensive word interests of the capitalist class of the mother country since an entire, not of any of its sections. Under colonialism all the indigenous classes of the colony suffer power.

No class is a junior partner of colonialism. Therefore even the uppermost classes in the colony could begin to oppose colonialism since it went against their interests. It is useful to keep in mind that large landlords led the anti-colonial movements of Poland and Egypt. This is a biggest variation flanked by colonies and semi-colonies, where there are compradors, native classes that are section of the ruling class. The role of the colonial state was greater than the capitalist one. The state itself was a biggest channel of surplus appropriation.

The metropolitan ruling class used the colonial state to manage colonial community. The colonial state guaranteed law and order and its own security from internal and external dangers. It suppressed indigenous economic forces hostile to colonial interests. The colonial state actively fostered the identities of caste and society therefore since to prevent national unity. The state was actively involved in reproducing circumstances for appropriation of capital, including producing goods and

services. Another significant task is the transformation of the social, economic, cultural, political and legal framework of the colony therefore since to create it reproductive on an extended level.

There is an explicit and direct link flanked by the colonial building and the colonial state. Therefore it is simple to politicize the thrash about against colonialism. Since the mechanism of colonial manages lies on the surface, it is simple to expose the links with the industrial bourgeoisie of the house country. The state is visibly controlled from abroad and the isolation of the colonial people from policy and decision creation is apparent. The colonial state relied on the entire on power and coercion rather than leadership and consent. However, it functions too little extent since a bourgeois state with rule of law, property dealings, bureaucracy and constitutional legroom within which colonial discontent was to be contained. We shall talk about this in detail with reference to India.

Levels of Colonialism [h]

There were three separate levels of colonialism. Few countries went by one or two levels only. India went by only the first and second levels, Egypt only by the third level, and Indonesia the first and third level. These levels lasted in excess of two hundred years.

The shapes of subordination changed in excess of time since did colonial policy, state and its institutions, civilization, thoughts and ideologies. However, this did not mean that levels lived in a pure shape. The older shapes of subordination sustained into the later levels. The levels were the result of four factors:

- The historical growth of capitalism since a world organization;
- The transform in the community, economy and polity of the metropolis;
- The transform in its location in the world economy and lastly;
- The colony's own historical growth.

First Level: Monopoly Deal and Plunder [sh]

The first level had two vital objectives. In order to create deal more profitable indigenously manufactured goods were to be bought cheap. For this competitors were to be kept out, whether regional or European. Territorial conquest kept regional traders out of the lucrative deal while rival European companies were defeated in war. Therefore the feature of the first level was monopoly of deal.

Secondly, the political conquest of the colony enabled plunder and seizure of surplus. For instance, the drain of wealth from India to Britain throughout the first level was considerable. It amounted to two to three per cent of the national income of Britain at that time. Colonialism was superimposed on the traditional organizations of economy and polity. No vital transforms were introduced in the first level.

Second Level: Period of Free Deal [sh]

The interest of the industrial bourgeoisie of the metropolis in the colony was in the markets accessible for manufactured goods. For this it was necessary to increase exports from the colony to pay for purchase of manufactured imports. The metropolitan bourgeoisie also wanted to develop the colony since a producer of raw materials to lessen dependence on non-empire sources.

Increase of exports from the colony would also enable it to pay for the high salaries and profits of merchants. The industrial bourgeoisie opposed plunder since a shape of appropriation of surplus on the ground that it would destroy the goose that laid the golden eggs. Deal was the mechanism through which the social surplus was to be appropriated in this level. In this level transforms in the economy, polity, management, social, cultural and ideological building were initiated to enable use in the new method. The slogan was growth and modernization. The colony was to be integrated with the world capitalist economy and the mother country.

Capitalists were allowed to develop plantations, deal, transport, mining and industries. The organization of transport and discourses was urbanized to facilitate the movement of huge quantities of raw materials to the ports for export. Liberal imperialism was the new political ideology. The rhetoric of the rulers was to train the people in self-government.

Third Level: Period of Fund Capital [sh]

The third level saw intense thrash about for markets and sources of raw materials and food grains. Big level accumulation of capital in the metropolis necessitated search for avenues for investment abroad. These interests were best served where the imperial powers had colonies. This led to more intensive manage in excess of the colony in order to protect the interests of the imperial authority. In the sphere of ideology the mood was one of reaction.

Require for intensive manage increased. There was no more talk of self government; instead benevolent despotism was the new ideology according to which the colonial people were seen since children who would require guardians forever. A biggest contradiction in this level was that the colony was not able to absorb metropolitan capital or increase its exports of raw materials because of overexploitation in the earlier levels. A strategy of limited modernization was implemented to take care of this problem but the logic of colonialism could not be subverted. Underdevelopment became a constraint on further use of the colony.

The third level often did not take off. Colonialism had therefore wrecked the economies of few colonies that they could hardly absorb any capital investment. In several colonies the older shapes of use sustained. In India, for instance, the earlier two shapes sustained, even in the third level.

Colonialism in Dissimilar Territories [h]

Therefore distant you have seen the common pattern of colonial expansion spread in excess of three levels. In the next two parts as suggested, take up specific case studies of colonies.

Africa [sh]

The conquest of Africa took lay in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Till since late since 1880 only 20 per cent of Africa had approach under European rule. With the spread of the Industrial Revolution to other countries of Europe rivalries increased since did the search for colonies.

The emerging industrial powers looked for a lay in the sun. A continent of in excess of 28 million square km was partitioned and engaged through European powers through a combination of two strategies, treaties and conquest.

Three Eras of Conquest [ssh]

The first stage, 1880-1919, was one of conquest and job. The colonial organization was consolidated after 1910. The second stage, 1919-35, was that of the independence movements. The third level was from 1935 onwards.

Within forty five years the colonial organization was uprooted from in excess of 94 per cent of Africa. Colonial rule lasted for a hundred years on a standard. British territories in Africa consisted of Nigeria, Gold Coast, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Tanganyika, Nyasaland, Uganda, North and South Rhodesia and South Africa. Algeria, Morocco, Cameroon, French-Congo, Tunisia, and Madagascar were few of the largest French colonies.

Impact [ssh]

The impact of colonialism in Africa was tremendous. The self enough African economies were destroyed, transformed and subordinated through colonial power. Class differentiation in African community occurred since a result of the impact of colonial power. The links of African countries with each other and with other sections of the world were disrupted.

European powers reduced the economies of Africa to colonial dependencies by the authority of fund capital. The loans for the Suez Canal enmeshed Egypt in debt. There are dissimilar interpretations of the impact of colonial rule. The imperialist school of idea would have it that Africans welcomed colonial rule. Social Darwinism justifies colonialism through arguing that the power in excess of the weaker races was the inevitable result of the natural superiority of the European race. Both colonial rulers and latter day apologists have presented colonial rule since a blessing.

It is said that contemporary infrastructure, health and education would not have reached the colony had it not been section of the colonial organization. Other scholars, like D.K. Field house, have called the effects since “few good, few bad”. The primary motive behind colonialism was of course

satisfying imperial interests. The positive effects of colonialism, if any, were byproducts; they were clearly not consciously designed. The negative impact was massive and in all spheres, with extensive lasting legacies.

For instance, ethnic conflicts which paralyze several sections of Africa today are rooted in the arbitrary superimposition of territorial boundaries on an essentially tribal community.

Egypt [sh]

Egypt was under the defense of both France and Britain. She became an agrarian and raw material appendage of the metropolitan countries. Two levels of colonialism were merged into one in Egypt. Britain urbanized Egypt since a supplier of cotton for her textile industry. Through 1914 cotton constituted 43 per cent of agricultural output. It reported for 85 per cent of exports in 1913. Being a single crop economy was disastrous since Egypt became dependent on imports for her essential food supply.

The manage of foreigners in excess of cotton was total, from owning or controlling the land it was grown on, the cotton processing and cotton cleaning industry and the steamships it was transported in. There was not a single mill in Egypt. Egypt was also a precious field of investment of banking capital. Five per cent capital went into industry and construction, 12.36 into deal and transport and 79 per cent into public debt, mortgage and banks. Egypt was enmeshed in indebtedness since a result of use through foreign powers.

The First World War showed up the use of Egypt fully. Her natural possessions, manpower and economy were harnessed to the war attempt. Crops were seized through the army. The British Treasury took in excess of the gold reserves of the National Bank of Egypt. Egypt became a British protectorate in 1914.

South-East Asia [sh]

Colonialism in South-East Asia lasted five centuries, from the late fifteenth to the mid twentieth century. Even after the heyday of the spice deal, South-East Asia remained significant since a supplier of vital raw materials like oil, rubber, metals, rice, coffee, tea and sugar. The impact of colonialism in this area was considerable, even on countries like Thailand, which did not formally become colonies. Traditional shapes of government disappeared, trading patterns were disrupted and the rich cultural customs of these areas were destroyed.

India [h]

India has generally been measured a classic colony. A revise of colonialism in India can tell us a great trade in relation to the functioning of colonialism in common.

First Level [sh]

In the first level both the objectives – the monopoly of deal and appropriation of government revenues – were rapidly fulfilled with the conquest first of Bengal and sections of South India and then the rest of India. The East India Company now used its political authority to acquire monopolistic manage in excess of Indian deal and handicrafts.

Indian traders were ruined while weavers were forced to sell cheap. The company's monopoly ruined the weavers. In the next level cheap manufactured goods finished them. The drain of wealth was admitted to through British officials. In the terms of the Deputy Chairman of the Court of Directors, "Our organization acts extremely much like a sponge, drawing up all the good items from the banks of the Ganges and squeezing them down on the banks of the Thames." The colony did not undergo any fundamental transforms in this level.

Transforms were made only in military institution and technology and at the top stage of revenue management. Land revenue could be extracted from the villages without disturbing the existing organizations. In the sphere of ideology too there was respect for traditional organizations in contrast to the denunciation of traditional values in the second level. The respect with which Sanskrit was held through British Ideologists like William Jones was in sharp contrast to Macaulay's later dismissal of traditional studying since not being sufficient to fill a bookshelf of a good Western library.

Second Level [sh]

The period of free deal saw India emerge since a market for manufactured goods and a supplier of raw materials and food grains. Import of Manchester cloth increased in value from 96 lakh sterling in 1860 to 27 crore sterling in 1900.

Traditional weavers were ruined through this competition. Rather than industrialization, decline of industry or deindustrialization took lay. In the transitional Gangetic area, the weight of industry in the living pattern of the people was reduced through half from 1809-13 to the census year 1901. Estimates through Sivasubramaniam indicate that in the last half century of British rule per capita income in India remained approximately stagnant. Dadabhai Naoroji calculated per capita income at Rs.20 per annum.

Railway expansion was undertaken and a contemporary post and telegraph organization was set up. Management was made more detailed and comprehensive therefore that imports could penetrate the villages and raw materials could be taken out easily. Capitalist commercial dealings were to be enforced. The legal organization was to be improved therefore since to ensure upholding the sanctity of contract. Contemporary education was introduced to produce *babus* to man the new management. Westernized habits were expected to increase the demand for British goods. Transformation of the existing civilization and social institution required that the existing civilization be denounced.

Orientalism, through depriving people of the authority to revise their own words, was an appropriation of the procedures through which people understand themselves. The new ideology was one of growth. Underdevelopment was not the desired but the inevitable consequence of the inexorable working of colonialism of deal and of its inner contradictions.

Third Level [sh]

The third level is rightly recognized since the period of fund capital. A massive amount of capital was invested in railways, loans to the Government of India, deal and to a lesser extent in plantations, coal mining, jute mills, shipping and banking in India. In this level, Britain's location in the world was constantly challenged through the rivalry of new imperialist countries.

The result was further consolidation of it's manage in excess of India. Manage had to be strengthened to contend with competition from rival imperialist powers. Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, wrote:

- Other channels of investment, outside of India, are gradually being filled up, not merely through British capital, but through capital of all the wealth producing countries of the world; and if this be therefore, then a time necessity soon approach when the current of British capital, extruded from the banks flanked by which it has extensive been content to meander, will want to pour in excess of into fresh channels, and will, through the law of economic gravitation, discover its method into India, to which it should be additionally attracted through the security of British institutions and British laws.

Reactionary imperialist policies characterized the viceroalties of Lytton and Curzon. All talk of self government ended and the aim of British rule was declared to be permanent trusteeship in excess of the child people of India.

Loosening of Links [ssh]

The biggest spurts in industrial investment took lay precisely throughout those periods when India's economic links with the world capitalist economy were temporarily weakened or disrupted. In India's case, foreign deal and the inflow of foreign capital were reduced or interrupted thrice throughout the 20th Century, i.e. throughout the First World War, the Great Depression (1929-34) and World War II.

But since the links were not disrupted, merely loosened, what took lay was only industrial development, not industrial revolution.

BRITISH COLONIAL STATE [H]

That the British wielded brute force to uphold their rule in India and to crush opposition is well recognized. Extremely often, the state did not actually repress; the extremely information that it had the capability to do therefore was sufficient to include revolt. Hence, the British measured the maintenance of a big, disciplined, efficient and loyal army to be a prime must, for the armed forces remained, in the ultimate analysis, the final guarantor of British interests. But generally, for the sustained subsistence of their rule and for the perpetuation of imperialist power, they relied on a variety of ideological instruments.

It is in this sense that the British colonial state in India was in however limited a method, a hegemonic or semi-hegemonic state. Its semi-hegemonic foundations were buttressed through the ideology of *pax Britannica*, law and order, the British official since the *mai-bap* of the people, since well since through the institutions of the ideological, legal, judicial and administrative organizations. The impression of the unshakable foundations of British rule, the aura of stolidity and common prestige of the Raj contributed towards the maintenance of imperial hegemony. The prestige of the Raj, through showing the futility of efforts to overthrow it, played since crucial a role in the maintenance of British rule since the armed might behind it. The prestige of the Raj was extremely mainly embodied in its much vaunted 'steel frame', the Indian Civil Service (ICS), and, more specifically, in the district officer, who represented power in the countryside: "At the centre of the 'benevolent despotism' that British rule in the subcontinent adopted stood the steel frame of the Indian Civil Service... and in scrupulous the figure of the district officer himself, the physical 'embodiment of Government' crossways the Indian countryside..." A state building of this type, based on "semi-hegemonic foundations", described for sure specific policies in the political sphere. A reliable social foundation for the state had to be secured on the one hand; on the other, strategies had to be devised to limit the social reach and effective clout of the anti-imperialist forces. Active cooperation of 'native allies' in running the country was gained through a variety of techniques, ranging from the handing out of occupations, favors and locations of few power to concessions to the 'legitimate' political demands of the loyalist and liberal parts.

Since regards the snowballing of anti-British discontent, it was sought to be neutralized through confining it within the constitutional arenas created through the political reforms. Constitutional concessions were frequently made, however under pressure, to the demands raised through the anti-imperialist forces.

Colonialism or Colonialisms? [h]

If we seem at British and French colonial rule it is clear that they are informed through dissimilar perspectives however often the reality on the ground amounted to the similar. Few scholars point to this information of the similar reality on the ground to argue that all colonialisms were the similar. For instance, historian D.A. Low disagrees with the view that there were dissimilar patterns of

colonialism on the ground that British and French colonies achieved independence at the similar time. In this part the subsistence of dissimilar patterns of colonialism is discussed. Wallerstein would have it that there was a vital paternalism which ran by the philosophies of all the colonial powers.

But this vital paternalism expressed itself in extremely dissimilar shapes, depending on the history and national character of the colonial powers. From the beginning there was a sparseness and economy in relation to the British colonial policy. The British used trading companies to acquire colonies, insisted that colonies be self-sustaining and varied the political building in each of the colonies to suit regional requires. “This, then, is the classic contrast flanked by Africa’s two colonial powers, Britain and France: Britain – empirical, commercial, practicing indirect rule, keeping Africans at aloofness, verging on racism; France – Cartesian in its logic, seeking glory, practicing direct management, acting since apostle of fraternity and anti-racism. Anyone who travels in both British and French Africa will see the grain of truth in these generalizations. The flavor of life *is* dissimilar; the two colonial governments *have* produced two dissimilar civilizations.

And yet, anyone who travels there well knows the severe limitations of these generalizations.” In practice the variations were not therefore clear. The French often supported chiefs where they were powerful rather than rule directly. Since for ‘empiricism’ versus ‘Cartesian logic’, this comparison is more the stuff of polemics than of analysis. To contrast motives of money and glory looks even more dubious. For the British were surely proud of their empire, and the French surely profited through theirs. Since for ‘racism’ and ‘fraternity’, it may be that French paternalism was based on the exclusive virtue but universal accessibility of French culture and British paternalism on the equal virtue of all customs but the unique accessibility of British civilization. Nevertheless, in practice, there were similarity degrees of political, social and economic discrimination in two settler territories like Kenya and Algeria, and there were similarity ideologies in the middle of the settlers.

There was also similarity absence of legal discrimination in non settler British and French West Africa; however until 1957 the exclusive white clubs of both regions barred Africans since members or since guests. There were variations also concerning the role of the civil service. In Britain civil servants were nonpartisan whereas in France junior civilians were political. But after independence this made small variation. No clear distinction can be made flanked by French direct rule and English indirect rule which allowed traditional institutions to survive when we seem closely at the actual working of management.

Field house has shown that after 1929 and especially after 1932 attitudes and practices came closer jointly.

DECOLONIZATION [MH]

Kinds of Decolonization [h]

There are broadly four kinds of decolonization:

- Self government for white settler colonies since it happened in Canada and Australia

- Formal end to empire followed through independent rule since in India
- Formal empire replaced through informal empire or neo-colonialism since in Latin America
- Mere transform of imperial masters — in Indo-China when the French reluctantly left, the US moved in.

Approaches [h]

The explanations of decolonization have been classified since follows:

- The nationalist come
- International context come
- Domestic constraints come

The Nationalist Come [sh]

In the nationalist view indigenous resistance and anti imperialist thrash about led to independence. The primary factor behind the end of empire was anti-imperialist movements — the metropolitan response only convinced the nature of this confrontation, not the outcome. The nationalist come the resistance movements of the colonial peoples determined the pace of decolonization. Colonial rule became unviable once the clusters which continued it withdrew support, often under nationalist pressure or power. The British imperialists presented the unraveling of empire since an orderly and rational procedure but the messy reality was much less constant and unavoidable, since John Darwin has pointed out. In short, distant from an intended withdrawal from empire, there was the irreversible erosion of location since imperial powers struggled to retain authority through one means or another, conciliation or repression.

For instance, in India, from the 1930s onwards, there was a swing of the pendulum from repression to conciliation. This had demoralizing consequences for the officials who had to implement both poles of policy. The similar set of colonial officials who put the nationalist leaders in jail throughout the civil disobedience movement in 1930-34 had to serve under them throughout the era of formation of provincial ministries of 1937-39. The similar dilemma racked officialdom in 1942 and 1946 - officials were demoralized since they feared that the leaders they had given harsh punishment to in the War years, and particularly to include the 1942 revolt, would soon be their political masters in the provinces in 1946. Whatever few of the metropolitan-centered descriptions may suggest, the development and growth of a vigorous nationalism was approximately invariably the principal propellant of continued progress towards the ending of colonial rule.

International Context Come [sh]

The come highlighting the international context of decolonization, empires could not survive in the new world order after the Second World War.

Since John Darwin put it, in the Cold War period “colonial empires emerged since quaint survivors of a prewar age, to be quickly dismantled lest they be knocked to pieces in the turbulent wake of the superpowers.” The changed international climate was reflected in the Atlantic Charter issued through the Allies throughout the War which described for the independence of colonial peoples. The United Nations Common Assembly went a step further in 1960 in its Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. It sharply condemned colonial rule since a denial of fundamental human rights in contravention of the UN Charter. The myth of European invincibility was shattered through the Japanese takeover of South East Asia throughout World War II, especially the British desertion of Singapore in 1942. Yet decolonization was not the inevitable result of World War II – however its pace quickened.

This international come attributes the end of empires to the opposition of the US and USSR to ‘old approach imperialism’. The US and USSR had nothing to gain from the older imperial powers, such since Britain and France, retaining their colonies. They had everything to gain from the end of empire since this enabled these two emerging superpowers to set up their power in excess of the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. For instance, US neo colonialism replaced France in Indo-China, Japan in Korea and Britain in Pakistan, one of the two successor states of British India. The USSR treated Eastern Europe, Cuba and Mozambique, in the middle of others, since small more than ‘colonies’.

Western Cold Warriors were quick to dub this since ‘socialist imperialism’, much to the chagrin of self respecting socialists, for whom the extremely term imperialism was anathema.

Domestic Constraints Come [sh]

The metropolitan or domestic constraints approach focuses on how the colony became too large a burden on the mother country. From being the proverbial goose which laid golden eggs a time came when it was not worth expending money and men on it. British colonialism, it is argued through Holland, ‘became dysfunctional to the operational requirements of the metropole.’ In this account the end of empire is seen since a political choice made under pressure of domestic constraints and calculations of national interest. The mother country’s will to rule slackened once empire became too much of a nuisance, financially, militarily and in international dealings. Historians John Gallagher and other scholars in the imperialist custom argued that British imperial interests in India were declining, that India no longer fulfilled its role in the maintenance of imperial interests in the meadows of either defense or commerce or fund and that, in information, in excess of the years it had become a liability for the British.

Gallagher and Anil Seal argued that throughout the Second World War Britain footed the bill for India's defense necessities. Aditya Mukherjee has conclusively contradicted this view and demonstrated that British imperial management intensified substantially throughout the war and the economic use of India increased manifold – “the colony, distant from ceasing to pay, was subjected to a greater and mainly blatant appropriation of surplus by currency manipulations, forced loans, big military expenditures and numerous other unilateral transfers.” B.R. Tomlinson is critical of the theory which sees decolonization only since a technique through which formal empire became informal in the interests of maximizing advantages to Britain. He concedes that there was an Indian angle to the end of empire, separately from transforms in the metropolitan and world economies, but the Indian factor in his view was not nationalist pressure, but discontent with the ever-rising financial burdens imposed through the colonial government on its subjects. The end of the Second World War established Britain in a severe economic crisis and a war weary British populace wished to get rid of empire since quickly and painlessly since possible.

This theme of receiving rid of empire is suggested through the extremely title of R.J. Moore's book on Attlee and India – *Escape from Empire*. Another factor was the post war expansion of the welfare state. Decolonization gathered pace once social reform became a priority and empire began to be perceived since a drain on possessions. Politicians who were in favor of withdrawing from empire became the flavor of the day.

It was no accident that the British public elected the Labour Party to office in 1945 despite Churchill, a Conservative Party prime minister, having presently won the war for them. The new understanding was that the Labour Party was appropriate for national reconstruction, which was requiring of the hour. Another domestic constraint was that suppressing colonial revolts, be it in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus or Aden, was no longer viable. This was the argument given through Prime Minister Attlee against reassertion of power in India in 1946: “In the event of a breakdown of the management or a common alignment of the political parties against us are we prepared to go back on our policy and seek to reestablish British rule since against the political parties and uphold it for 18 years? The answer necessity clearly be no because

- In view of our commitments all in excess of the world we have not the military force to hold India against a widespread guerilla movement or to re-conquer India.
- If we had, pub. [public] opinion in our Party would not stand for it.
- It is doubtful if we could stay the Indian troops loyal. It is doubtful if our own troops would be prepared to act.
- We should have world opinion agst. [against] us and be placed in an impossible location at UNO.

- We have not now the administrative machine to carry out such a policy either British or Indian.’’

The argument, that the costs of coercion became too high, clearly has no foundation. One can illustrate that extremely high costs were indeed tolerated. Therefore there are several troubles with the Domestic Constraints Come. One biggest problem, of course, is that it seems for the reasons of decolonization, not in the colony but in the metropolis. A direct instance of this come is the assertion made through historian David Potter:

- An account for the end of colonialism is unlikely to be establishing within the boundaries of the subject country. Historians have therefore distant been unable to explanation satisfactorily for political measures like the end of colonialism because, quite basically, they have not been looking in the right lay.

This is overly Eurocentric. This come refuses to acknowledge the powerful political initiatives taken in the colonies and explains independence (in other terms decolonization) merely since an internal political arrangement within the metropolitan countries.

The Period of Decolonization [h]

The twentieth century was the period of decolonization. At the end of the twentieth century the world was no longer Eurocentric. The twentieth century had seen the decline and fall of Europe, which had been the centre of authority, wealth and western culture at the beginning of the century. In the first decade of the twentieth century the nationalists posed a challenge in Asia and Africa.

They were encouraged through the skill of Japan, a little Asian country, to inflict a crushing defeat on Russia, a European authority, in 1905. Few of the well recognized leaders of the national movements were Sun Yat Sen in China, Arabi Pasha in Egypt and Bal Gangadhar Tilak in India. These movements were led, in this level, through transitional class English educated elites whose demand for a say in the running of their countries was changing into a demand for independence.

The First World War [sh]

The First World War further fuelled nationalist discontent. The War attempt had meant increased use of colonies for raw materials, manpower and taxes and nationalists naturally questioned why the colonies should bear this burden. In 1919 when a new international order was emerging in Europe the national movements in the colonies underwent a transformation in a size direction.

In India this transform was wrought through Gandhi; China had the May 4th Movement; in Turkey Kemal Ataturk rose to authority; and in Indonesia the national movement reached a membership of 2.5 million. This stage also saw the deepening and spread of movements in Philippines, Burma and

Ceylon. Variations appeared flanked by the old imperial powers like Great Britain and the newer ones like the US and Japan, on whether the old order should continue at all, and if therefore in what shape? This stance of the newer world powers encouraged nationalists greatly. The old imperial powers were undergoing a decline in their location.

Britain's location since the global authority par quality was challenged through other powers from the late nineteenth century onwards. Through the beginning of the twentieth century Britain lost her commercial preeminence. But decline in imperial authority did not mean collapse of empire since the interest of imperial powers in their colonies did not wane. In information empire had to be maintained at any cost, including severe repression, such since the brutal gunning down of innocent men, women and children in Jallianwala Bagh in Amritsar in India in 1919. In the years after the Russian Revolution the procedure of colonial emancipation and decolonization went much further.

In the non western world countries either went by revolution or the prophylactic decolonization through empires doomed in a period of world revolution. Revolution, then, did transform the world if not quite in the method Lenin expected. Anti-imperialist action was fuelled because of the world wide Depression of 1929. In the economic sphere, the Depression furthered the trend to set up regional manufacture, which had begun after the First World War when imperial powers made their colonies industrially self-enough. Japan had encouraged limited industrialization in Korea and Manchuria and Britain in India.

Bipan Chandra has called the impact of the Depression since the loosening of links flanked by the colony and the metropolis, which encouraged independent capitalist development in the colony.

World War II [sh]

World War II showed up Great Britain since a second fiddle to the US in the Anglo- American alliance. After 1945 the US and Russia became the two superpowers. Where earlier London held this location, now the world was no longer its oyster, to exploit Paul Kennedy's evocative phrase. Since a US official put it, it is now our turn to bat in Asia.

Since the Russians were equally keen to have a global role, a bipolar world appeared. Britain had been one of the large three in the war. But for her, victory in the war did not bring with it consolidation of authority. The war had overstrained the British economy vastly and it needed American help to stay going. The US propped up her economy with the Lend Lease offer. But it was few years before the British withdrew from India and later Palestine and even then this was presented since preserving more significant regions of imperial interests elsewhere. Outwardly Britain remained a large authority, second only to the US. In the third world the Second World War had caused great upheavals, political and economic.

Within years of the end of the War several colonies gained independence, but often after protracted conflict, encouraged through the imperial authority, on the contentious issue of sharing of authority,

leading to partition and civil war. Several regions of troublesome clash in the 1970s and 80s, Transitional East, Cyprus, South Africa, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, were legacies of British decolonization. In India the imperial authority delayed in handing in excess of authority on the specious ground that it necessity awaits agreement flanked by the societies on how authority was to be transferred. Specious in retrospect because when they left, they left any which method.

Gandhi appealed to them to leave India, to anarchy if require be. He understood that agreement could not be brokered through a partisan broker. Once the colonial authority left, he whispered, the two societies would, like siblings dividing ancestral property, agree or agree to disagree. At worst, civil war would result but even that fire would be purifying.

Decolonization or Decolonizations? France and Britain [h]

Was there decolonization or were there since several decolonizations since there are colonial powers or even colonies? Since we have seen, however there is a wider pattern of decolonization – it was generally a mid twentieth century phenomenon under the impact of the national liberation movements – there are also significant variations flanked by, for instance, French and British decolonization. The French had no mechanism like the British Commonwealth to ease the transition of colonies to independence. Assimilation remained the imperial ideal. The French Union was federal only in name and the National Assembly sustained to be sovereign.

If we seem at British and French India, a variation that strikes one is the extensive and protracted negotiations for transfer of authority in French India in contrast to the method the British quit India. Seven extensive years after the attainment of Indian independence from British colonial rule the de facto transfer of authority in the French Indian enclaves took lay in 1954. This was connected to the political growths in Indo-China, measured to be one of the more significant regions under French imperial manage. However, much water was to flow under the bridge and eight years lapsed before the French Indian enclaves achieved de jure independence from French colonial rule in 1962. This time approximately the association was with the political growths in Algeria, a colony crucial for France.

The milestones of 1954 and 1962 were the culmination of an extensive and protracted thrash about for independence waged through the nationalists in the French colonial enclaves in India. A revise of British and French colonialism in a relative perspective in the specific context of decolonization is very revealing. Whereas the liberation of India from British colonial rule set off a chain reaction of independence in other British colonies, such since Burma and Ceylon, France sustained to cling to its colonial resources. It had the second main colonial empire in the world and was keen to stay Indo-China and Algeria and Morocco even if others saw this since beyond their means. It did not even give up its five colonial enclaves in India with grace, possibly because of their strategic link with Indo-China.

In this, there was a similarity with His Majesty's Government's short-lived effort to retain the Andaman and Nicobar Islands since a basic link on the Suez-Singapore circuit. France refused to see the script on the wall in Indo-China. Following an armed revolt in 1930 and peasant revolts led through communists in 1930-31, the French executed almost 700 nationalist and communist leaders. They made it plain, through the exploit of repression, that Vietnamese ambitions of independence would not be tolerated. Through 1945 there were popular revolts against the French in several sections of Vietnam, which then came under communist manage, with the help of the quite extraordinary Vietnamese guerrilla army.

The French were conclusively defeated in the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. In contrast, the British were interested in preserving their empire in India but when a non violent size agitation fashioned through Gandhi steadily eroded their authority, they saw that they did not have the wherewithal to uphold rule and preferred a graceful withdrawal to a messy holding on. Indian independence in 1947 was followed through independence in Burma in 1948 and Ceylon in the similar year. Malaya gained independence nine years later. In Africa the British were willing to grant independence except for where there were big numbers of white settlers since in South Africa and Kenya.

Ghana gained independence under Kwame Nkrumah in 1957. Togo, Camerons, Somalia and Nigeria became independent in 1960. In 1964 all seven British East and Central African colonies, Somaliland, Tanganyika, Uganda, Zanzibar, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia became independent. Botswana and Swaziland followed in 1966. Britain was not willing to hand in excess of authority in Kenya because of white settlers there and hence got embroiled in suppressing a protracted and violent revolt, such since the Mau Mau.

The French colonies of Morocco and Tunisia gained independence in 1956. In contrast, independence was totally ruled out for Algeria since it was seen since an integral section of France. This short sighted policy was to lead to a bloody war, since in Vietnam. In Africa regional autonomy was granted in 1956 but the colonies were placed in a union, termed the French Society, strictly controlled through France. Eight colonies in French West Africa, four in French Equatorial Africa and Madagascar gained independence in 1960.

Therefore there were three dissimilar policies followed through the French in Africa. They were anxious to avoid a repetition of what happened in America in their other settler colonies, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In Africa regional people were given representation in legislative bodies. Once India became section of the Commonwealth, which was earlier White, the road was clear for Africa. "Therefore, the pace of constitutional growth in British non-settler Africa was rapid and marked through a minimum of violence and antagonism." In contrast to the British acceptance of national independence since a legitimate objective, the French did not consider in the legitimacy of nationalism for colonial subjects "the French concept of constitutional advance was to attract

colonies closer to France, not push them farther absent.” This policy was reconsidered only after the Second World War.

French Africans were elected to legislative bodies in France. The British associated Africans with regional bodies whereas the French associated Africans with French bodies. African political parties were extensions of metropolitan parties or attached themselves to French parties. At the end of World War II French colonies started on a radically dissimilar path of growth from that of the British colonies. Yet fifteen years later they had arrived at the similar point since the British – viz., national independence. What had happened to create the French pattern conform to the British pattern? There were two factors that convinced a transform in the French pattern of constitutional growth.

The first was the measures in Ghana; the second was the growths in North Africa and Indo-China. Tunisia and Morocco became restive, since did Togo and the Cameroons. After their defeat in Indo-China in 1954 the French took decisive steps towards independence of Algeria, l’Afrique noire and Madagascar. The variation flanked by the British and the French was that one extensive carried the path to independence while the other did it late and with the greatest difficulty. But these were not the only variations. The British sought to uphold power in their colonies after the end of empire through encouraging their ex-colonies to follow the Westminster model of parliamentary government with its multi party organization.

The French did not care what shape of government was adopted; their concern was with cultural rather than political power. The British and French differed in their come to superior political federations. The French opposed federations in French West and Equatorial Africa since the nationalists were behind them whereas the British worked towards federations since they would be useful in the post-independence situation. However, since the overall trend was towards unitary buildings within states, variations in British and French attitudes eventually made small variation. There were variations flanked by the British and French perceptions of the role of the civil service.

In Britain civil servants were nonpartisan whereas in France junior civilians were political. However, this made small variation after independence. Not all agree with the view of the particularity of the British approach of transfer of authority, that it was intended, phased and orderly. It is pointed out that in practice transfer of authority in several British colonies was patchy, disorderly, reluctant and enforced. A transitional view is that they were pushed beside the path of self-government.

In the terms of Dennis Austin, “it was a peculiar and distinctive characteristic of British colonial rule to have always contemplated its end: the colonial governments went (we might romantically say) consentingly to their fate, but they had also to be pushed in that direction and they were pushed primarily through regional measures within the colonial territories which obliged the Colonial Office and regional colonial governments similar to introduce reforms at a pace which, in the post-war years, began to quicken beyond all earlier calculations.” In sharp contrast, independence was dismissed since impossible at the French African Conference in Brazzaville in Algeria in 1944:

- The aims of the civilizing labors of France in the colonies exclude all possibilities of growth outside of the French imperial organization; the eventual formation even in the far future of ‘self-governments’ in the colonies necessity be dismissed in the Roman not the Anglo-Saxon sense.

Yet, the outcome of these extremely dissimilar policies of the British and French was the similar. Widespread economic and political discontent in Africa led to the uniform collapse of empire crossways British and French colonies. This seriously questions the view that French and British Africa were poles separately. Under pressure from a continent-wide ‘wind of transform’, in the terms of the British Prime Minister, Macmillan, colonial empires collapsed in Africa flanked by 1957 and 1964 like “the proverbial line of dominoes”, in the terms of D.A. Low. Also, it is extremely interesting that Common de Gaulle’s account of decolonization is a common systemic one which does not distinguish flanked by British and French patterns:

- The comparative weakening of England and France, the defeat of Italy and the subordination of Holland and Belgium to the designs of the United States; the effect produced on the Asians and Africans through the battles fought on their soil for which the colonizers needed their support; the dissemination of doctrines which, whether liberal or socialist, equally demanded the emancipation of races and individuals; and the wave of envious longing aroused in the middle of these deprived masses through the spectacle of the contemporary economy – since a result of all these factors the world was faced with an upheaval since profound, however in the opposite direction, since that which has unleashed the discoveries and conquests of the authority of old Europe. (*Memoirs of Hope*)

Indian Independence: A Case Revise of Decolonization [h]

India selects itself since a case revise. It was the classic colony. Its size movement was the greatest the world has seen. Indian independence had an amazing demonstration effect.

The attainment of independence in India triggered off a wave of same growths crossways Africa and Asia. When did the realization dawn upon the imperial authority that the end of the fabled empire, on which the sun never set, is close to? At the end of the War, when the British authorities in India evaluated their location in the context of the post-1942 situation, it was clear to them that the hegemonic foundations of their rule were fast crumbling. Even erstwhile loyalists were deserting and the Indian Civil Service (ICS) was reaching a breaking point. The common consent of the people to British rule had diminished and the open, military repression of the 1942 movement had contributed greatly to this.

Even liberal opinion in the country had shifted, gradually but steadily, absent from the British and towards the nationalist forces. The Civil Service was deemed to be at breaking point through the end of 1943. The problem of declining recruitment, which had plagued the ICS ever as the end of the

First World War, had reached alarming proportions through the Second World War. Through 1939, its British and Indian members had achieved parity. Overall recruitment was first cut in order to uphold this balance and then stopped in 1943.

Through August 1945, the number of British officials was down to 522 and Indian officials up to 524. Besides, the men coming in were no longer Oxbridge graduates from upper class families, several of whose fathers and uncles were 'old India hands' and who whispered in the destiny of the British nation to govern the 'child people' of India. The new officials were increasingly grammar school and polytechnic boys for whom serving the Raj was a career, not a mission. However, the largest factor in the debilitation of the ICS was not manpower shortage but the slow, invidious decline of its prestige and power. Here the erosion of power had been taking lay in excess of the years, when the growing nationalist forces had been sought to be contained through a policy of conciliation mixed with repression.

But the strategy of the national movement, of a multifaceted thrash about combining nonviolent size movements with working of constitutional reforms, proved to be more than a match for them. When non-violent movements were met with repression, the naked force behind the government stood discovered, offending the sensibility of the government's supporters; whereas if government did not clamp down on 'sedition', or effected a truce or conceded provincial autonomy under the Government of India Act, 1935, British government was seen to be too weak to wield manage and its power and prestige were undermined. The impact of the nationalist movement on the bureaucracy was not only indirect, by weakening morale under pressure from size movements and ministries. The permeation of nationalist sentiment in the middle of the Indian element of the services, especially the subordinate services and even the police, directly affected their loyalty and reliability. Even earlier, throughout the provincial ministries of 1937-39, the tendency of Indian officials to seem up to the Congress was evident, but, through 1945, the Indian services were assertively nationalist.

For instance, railway officials in east U.P. decorated their stations in honor of Nehru and Pant and in one example detained a goods train for three hours to enable Nehru to create a speech and then travel through it. In the Central Provinces the clerical staff voted for the Congress at the elections and more interestingly, wanted this to be recognized. The British, of course, preferred to see their feelings since merely the tendency of the natives to worship the growing and not the setting sun. Through 1945, nationalist feeling had reached the army, which was otherwise, too, in a state of flux.

Politicized elements had entered the army, especially the technological services, under the new recruitment policy, which was liberalized because the cautiously selected men of the 'martial races' did not suffice. The soldiers who fought in Europe and South East Asia and liberated countries from fascist manage, returned house with new thoughts. When the issue of the Indian National Army (INA) prisoners came up, the army authorities exposed that army opinion was not clamoring for punishment, since initially expected, but predominantly in favor of leniency. The Commander-in-

Chief's opinion had changed through February 1946, when he stated that "any Indian officer worth his salt is a nationalist". It was increasingly clear to the British that the old foundation of British rule would not continue for extensive, and a new building would have to be devised, if rule was to continue.

Later, in mid-1946, several officials, including the Viceroy, were to argue that in the side of such an eventuality the entire nature of British rule could be transformed to one of strong, autocratic power, replenished through new officials, which could then uphold British rule for 15-20 years. Even then, their argument was turned down, but in early 1946 this option was not even proposed. In late 1945, when the British saw the imminence of collapse, they sought to avert it through offering constitutional concessions. They could not take the risk of the concessions being rejected, for, if that happened, a size movement would follow which they might not be able to include.

With the require being to avoid a contingency of negotiations breaking down, the concessions had to be of object, which mainly met the demand of the Congress. And therefore, faced with the Congress demand of Quit India and with the big majority of people affirming it, the Cabinet Mission went out from England in 1946 to negotiate the setting up of a national government and set into motion the machinery for transfer of authority.

It was not an empty gesture like the Cripps Mission in 1942; they designed to keep till they succeeded in securing few agreement. The reality was that they could not afford failure, for failure would lead to a humiliating surrender before a size movement or would necessitate a vital transform in the character of British rule from semi-hegemonic to repressive and autocratic. The first was obviously to be avoided at all costs; the second was also not likely to appeal either to the Labour Government that was in authority or to British and American public opinion, which was still conditioned through the pro-democratic and anti-Fascist euphoria of the War years. Since a result the outcome was somewhat contradictory.

Although the British expressed a political wish to transfer authority to a United India, they actually ended up partitioning India into two countries. However it was meant to be a smooth, peaceful transfer of authority from British to Indian (and Pakistani) hands legitimized through an Act of British Parliament, a turned out to be a violent and brutal procedure leaving millions of people dead and homeless.

REVIEW QUESTIONS [MH]

- How were the technological advancement and innovation in warfare strategies responsible for the European conquests overseas?
- What were the social, economic, climatic and cultural factors behind migrations during different phases of history? Describe briefly.

- What are different theoretical explanations for imperialism? Discuss briefly.
- Define basic features of colonialism. How is it different from imperialism?
- What do we broadly understand by decolonization? What are the different theoretical models to understand it?

CHAPTER 6

International Relations

STRUCTURE

- Learning Objective
- Nation-state system
- International rivalries of twentieth century
- Unipolar world and counter-currents
- Review Questions

LEARNING OBJECTIVE

After reading this chapter, you will get acquainted with the:

- Understand the nation-state system
- Main features of the modern world, including the formation of nation states, the expansion of Europe, technological changes, and the incorporation of the whole world into one international system.
- Explain the concepts of unipolar world and countercurrents

NATION-STATE SYSTEM

The Historical Context

Feudal organizations of land tenure were done absent within countries of West Europe engaged through France. Therefore also were citizens granted excellence before law? The continuity of a government was now increasingly connected to a written constitution. The Code Napoleon seemed to have left a considerable impact and this could be connected to the idea of liberty. France had kept Europe occupied in approximately continuous warfare for almost 2 decades now, therefore one could hardly talk of fraternity existing flanked by dissimilar political entities, but Europe was never going to remain the similar after the French Revolution and the wars thereafter. The representations of the revolution were to be the mainly enduring, ideological characteristics in 19th century. Europe.

Nationalism and concept of the nation state led to several significant transforms in the map of Europe. Transforms already made in the frontier through the Napoleonic wars and the imposition of peace words on France through the victorious Allies opened up a tremendous diplomatic exercise. It was further complicated through Napoleon's second bid for authority when he reclaimed his location from 20th March to 22nd June 1815 that is till his defeat at Waterloo. Presently a year before Napoleon's return, on 9 March 1814, Austria, Britain, Prussia and Russia decided to restore the Bourbons to the French throne. On 12 April 1814, Napoleon through signing the treaty of

Fontainebleau formalized his abdication and was given the island of Elba, his imperial title and an annual income of 2 million francs. Alongside, diplomatic decisions were taken to uphold the territorial integrity of many European countries.

The allies i.e. England, Russia, Austria and Prussia decided to meet in Vienna on 10th Oct 1814, to seem into further territorial troubles like those of Poland. German states were united into a federation and France had to go back to her territorial resources of 1792. The final treaty of Vienna was signed on 9th June 1815 (after dealing with Napoleon's final bid for authority) some days before the battle of Waterloo where Napoleon was finally defeated through the combined armies of Austria, Russia, Prussia and Britain. On 20th Nov 1815, a second treaty of Paris was signed and France had to go back to her frontiers of 1789 which meant returning territory to Piedmont and Switzerland.

A war indemnity of 70 million francs was imposed and an allied army of job beside her borders was stationed. The allies also signed the Quadruple Alliance to guarantee each other's sovereignty, to ensure "repose and prosperity" of nations for the peace of Europe. Balance of authority and peace of Europe had been rudely shaken through France in the first decade of the nineteenth century therefore the task of restoring this balance by diplomatic exercises fell on the large four—Austria under Metternich the Foreign Minister, Britain under Castlereagh, again the Foreign Minister, Tsar Alexander I of Russia and the Prussian foreign minister. Peace was no doubt the largest aim of these powers but each country had its own specific ambitions. For instance, Prussia had its eyes on Saxony, since Russia had on Poland, Austria wanted a continuing power on Northern Italy and Britain wanted to firm up her several maritime and colonial rights in several regions. Conflicting ambitions were bound to complicate matters since would the principles of legitimacy be constantly under challenge.

Napoleonic wars had significantly distributed the authority equations in several states. For instance, the Holy Roman Empire had been dissolved and several states had therefore become independent of Austria. A new German Confederation was therefore recognized with 39 states—which although under the Austrian emperor, now had more significant shapes of independence like non-interference of the confederation in internal affairs. There was however to be no representative government since yet. Countries like Austria were compensated with Lombardy and Venetia, Tuscany and Modena. Naples of Sicily went to Spain. Geneva went to Switzerland and Britain added to her overseas resources through taking Ceylon and Cape of Good Hope (from Holland) and Trinidad from Spain.

The Ideological Concerns

The Congress of Vienna so restored territorial rights to biggest powers and therefore put the clock back. Can we say that the peacemakers in Vienna were ignoring the principles of liberation and nationalism and reconfirming the reactionary hereditary states of the old rules in their retrospective countries? Throughout the Napoleonic wars, states had fiercely defended their people, their frontiers,

their identity and therefore national heroes and national representations became a significant section of the general man's subsistence. The 19th century citizen with significant constitutional rights also urbanized strong nationalistic loyalties and the concept of the nation state therefore struck deep roots in the body politic of nations. The French Declaration of Rights 1789 said—"The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation." Nation state loyalties were bound to the political rights of the people.

Universal suffrage did not approach to West Europe till 1870 and in East Europe till 1919. Therefore it was largely the educated, urbane transitional class who pursued the ideologies of nationalism and liberalism and built movements approximately them. Several 19th century philosophers guided a highly teleological course towards nationhood through linking it with a general race, a general language or general folk customs. This could become problematic when proclaimed nationalistic political boundaries intervened with ethnic nationhood giving rise to aggression and destruction. In Europe, after the Congress of Vienna, such conflicts would take on alarming proportions in the Habsburg, Russian and Turkish empires. Several empires would therefore have to have their boundaries reworked.

Nationalism could therefore act since a means of breaking up empires or of bringing jointly people who were increasingly identifying themselves through a general language, civilization or religion. Italy and Germany are two significant instances of how language, folk civilization and general historical memories lead to extremely strong nationalistic feelings helping to build the two people into sovereign, united and independent nation states through 1870. The Sultan of Turkey was the nominal head of the Balkan Peninsula which was occupied through dissimilar ethnic clusters like Bulgarians, Croats, Serbians, Montenegrins, Romanians and Greeks. All these clusters would soon be clamoring for independence.

Likewise, the Poles, Ukrainians and Finns would be challenging independence from the Russian empire. Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks would also gradually start challenging sure political rights. Therefore ethnic nationalism would become a very significant political issue leading to several new movements in the future. Nationalist movements in Europe were largely confined to the educated clusters. Language was extremely often besides religion, the mainly significant means of identifying with each other. Hungarian, Romanian and Croatian words for example were established since words to write in, rather than in the previously dominant words. Beginnings of nationalistic sentiments in universities and student circles in the urban regions, supported often through gentry clusters were however confined to little numbers. A number of revolts took lay in Italy, Spain, Greece and Belgium at this time. The agenda was mostly few sort of democratic rights or nationalistic independence.

Local Differences in Europe

In the era flanked by 1818 and 1825 many conferences were held in Europe where autocratic rulers of Russia, Prussia and Austria expressed fears in relation to the revolts seen since threats to peace & tranquility. Britain preferred to uphold a location of neutrality & non-interference. Participating countries in the conferences also maintained locations when it came to supporting or opposing the revolts. Instances below would clarify the point—when revolts in Italy took lay they were put down through Austria. Yet revolutionary clusters were allowed to thrive in few of the democratic countries. If the revolts happened to threaten monarchical rule, they were suppressed, Britain supported Belgium's full claim for independence from Holland—the new ruler was Leopold, uncle through marriage to Victoria.

Likewise, although nationalities like Serbs, Romanians, Bulgarians, Albanians, Montenegrins, Bosnians and Greeks were struggling for independence from the Ottoman Sultan, countries like Austria, Russia, France and Britain had little interest at stake in the Ottoman Empire. Britain's naval power in the Mediterranean could be threatened through the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Russia, however, as the 1820s had been thrusting forward energetically in the Balkans, often intervening on the face of Greece, Serbia and Romania therefore threatening the continuity of the Ottoman Empire. French ambitions deepened the crisis, because French naval attendance in the straits of Gibraltar led to disagreements with Russia which had taken it upon herself to protect the 12 million Orthodox Church members within the Ottoman Empire.

This annoyed the Turks who were further enraged when Russian troops entered Moldavia and Wallachia to support Rumanian claims. This led to approximately a state of war, with France and Britain helping Turkey against Russia. Neither Austria nor Prussia came to Russia's aid. The Crimean War ended in September 1855 after 2 years with the fall of a Russian naval foundation on the Black sea described Sevastopol. Casualties in the Crimean War were secure to 500,000 out of which 300,000 were Russians.

The Treaty of Paris signed on March 30, 1856, guaranteed integrity of the Ottoman Empire; the Sultan in turn promised a policy of religious tolerance and the Black Sea was demilitarized. Nationalistic aspirations clashed with territorial ambitions of better powers and armed conflicts in these regions would continue by the nineteenth century. Approximately this time the nationalist ideology was becoming the mainly significant political creed in the middle of transitional class liberals in Greece fighting monarchical rule or Italian nationalists led through Mazzinni, trying to inspire the people of Italy towards a united nation free from Austrian dominance. Republicanism, civil liberties, adult suffrage and other characteristics of liberalism were becoming the mainly significant subjects of political debate in several sections of Europe. In France the Bourbons had been restored, but the rulers from Louis XVIII to Charles X to Louis Philippe were under consistent pressure to set up constitutional monarchies.

Revolutionary, transitional class political institutions sustained to fight for political rights including the right to vote which they did not have. The 1830 and 1848 revolutions in France represented precisely these struggles for democratic rights. In another monarchical state that is Austria, the Chancellor Metternich was the largest upholder of the conservative organization, which fell only throughout the 1848 revolution in that country. Metternich had been totally indifferent to the nationalistic sensibilities of dissimilar ethnic clusters within the Austrian empire and he whispered only in the hereditary principle of monarchical rule. He felt that transitional class urban nationalism was disturbing the aristocratic tranquility in politics and community. The 1848 revolutions took on dissimilar shapes in France, Italy, Prussia, Austria and Belgium.

Reactionary politics and conservatism was not however simplistically replaced through republicanism. Louis Philippe was replaced through Louis Napoleon in France. Metternich was replaced through Schwarzenberg in Austria. However the transitional class revolutionaries had at least fought against the status quo and against aristocratic rule since never before.

Rulers would now be more conscious of liberal principles and new states like Greece, Belgium and Serbia came up since a result of the revolutions of 1830 and 1848. In Russia and several other East European countries however, absolutism sustained to thrive. After 1848, the Unification of Italy and that of Germany were significant political measures and a total vindication of transitional class nationalism. In Italy, Mazzini, Cavour, Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel II were instrumental in forming the Italian State. The vision of a united, liberal republic based on democratic values and popular sovereignty led to the founding of young Italy, an institution which spread these thoughts in the middle of the transitional classes.

The thrash about for unity and republicanism would also involve outside powers like France, Britain and Russia who were supportive, critical of misgovernance or tolerant towards a united Italy. Piedmont was a significant centre of thrash about under Cavour the Prime Minister of the Piedmontese ruler Victor Emmanuel. Cavour turned to Napoleon III for help against Austria after 1849. Austrian troops were sent to protect her interests. In the ensuing armed clash, Milan fell to the Piedmontese forces and this led to withdrawal of Austrian troops from Northern Italy. Through 1860, other sections of Italy including Parma, Modena, Tuscany, Savoy, Nice, Lombardy and the eastern sections of the Papal States merged with Piedmont. Rome and Venetia were engaged in 1870 to complete the unification procedure.

However the newly shaped Italian state was not to be ruled through a popular republic since envisioned through Mazzini but through elite which was obviously from the privileged class. German unification was since much a political since a cultural procedure. The formation of the German state was not simple. There were a number of non-German speaking people in South and West Prussia, Bohemia, Moravia, Slovenia; and Schleswig—Holstein was ruled through Denmark

and Hanover through England. Therefore several solutions were measured. Prussia nursed ambitions since the leader of a future united Germany.

Bismarck, appointed Minister – President in 1862, was a conservative and would favor monarchical rule. Under Bismarck, Prussia went to war with Austria and forced Austria to surrender Schleswig Holstein, Hesse-Cassel and he also made peace with South German states like Baden, Bavaria and Wurttemberg. Austria withdrew from any involvement with the German Confederation. Prussia also went to war with France in 1870 when France tried to close Luxembourg and Belgium and opposed Prussia's support for a Hohenzollern candidate for the Spanish throne. This war led to a new nationalist wave sweeping by the South German states since well. This would obviously help in the procedure of unification. The war ended with the treaty of Frankfurt in February 1871 through which Alsace Lorraine was ceded perpetually to Germany and France also had to pay an indemnity of 5 billion francs. In January 1871, the German empire was proclaimed at Versailles. The dominance of Prussia was obvious in excess of the rest of Germany, presently since Piedmont seemed to have dominated the procedure of Italian unification.

The Role of Economic Growth

In the era under review industry and empire can be measured since the mainly significant characteristics of European political, economic and cultural life. Formation of nation—states like Germany and Italy in the 1870s was a significant step towards redefining imperial places which were earlier engaged primarily through Britain, France and Spain.

The world economy of capitalism from mid 19th century onwards was a conglomeration of national blocs or national economies which had appeared with the growing number of nation states. These states protected their industrializing economies against competition from other nations. Therefore these nations also became rival economies. Domestic markets became the chief concern of national industries.

Broadening profit margins was not simple. Depression in the 1890s had seen a fall in prices worldwide. Capitalist concentration was a significant growth in this era. Big enterprises went by significant transformations flanked by 1880 and 1914. This era inevitably saw the hunt for more profitable investment and more markets. This led to the clamor for colonies outside the regions traditionally dominated through Britain. There was a gradual decline of Britain and growing attendance of the U.S and Germany. Populations increased through leaps and bounds. In Germany the increase was from 45 to 65 million and in the U.S.A. from 50 to 92 million. Britain being smaller was not the only cause for her being left behind in the aggressive stride towards industrialization.

The world economy was becoming increasingly global because on one hand urbanized nation states were growing fast and on the other hand, the un-urbanized countries supplied goods to the capitalist nations depending on what they produced mainly, like coffee, bananas or beef. Britain sustained to

control the international capital market till the 1st World War. In 1914, France, Germany, U.S.A., Belgium and Netherlands, Switzerland and others had 56% of the world's overseas investments and Britain alone had 44%. Yet pluralism was a fast growing feature of the world economy. Two significant and similarity growths were taking lay in this era.

Governments were under rising pressure to adopt social welfare policies and to defend economic interests of voters who were facing challenges of economic concentration. At the similar time, economic competition and economic rivalry flanked by nation states led to imperialism of the 20th century and to the genesis of the 1st World War. The world had approach closer jointly than ever before by more intricate economic transactions, a growing network of transportation and with technical advancement came the growing require for raw materials like oil, rubber, copper and valuable metals. All this meant that imperialism would grow in directions it had never done before. Remote undeveloped countries in Africa or Asia supplied a lot of the raw material.

Sugar, tea, coffee, cocoa and tropical fruits were also in great demand now and large business grew approximately these products leading to the development of gigantic companies in the west who now had basic business interests in the undeveloped world. Markets in these regions were another motive which drove the western nations to seem for colonies. Political prestige was not distant behind since a significant motive especially for countries like Germany and Italy. Britain and France had already recognized themselves since old colonial powers. The ideological and political content of nationalism from the 1880s till the 1st World War acquired new, culturally aggressive dimensions. A superior number of entities would now start staking their claims since 'national'. Therefore nationalism beside with other ideologies like Marxism and socialism gave Europe new words of political articulation and brought up concerns which had never disturbed the men and women of the 19th century.

Imperialism and Nation-State Organization

Sticking to the nationalistic energies prevalent in Europe at this time taking new form and flourishing since movements in several sections of the continent, we can identify a number of nationalities like the Finns, Slovaks, Estonians, Macedonians etc expressing themselves since unified clusters. In the 1890s, the Gaelic League for the Irish nation, the Hebrew for the Jews and the Baltic words through the turn of the century were gaining prominence too. Approximately such sensibilities including sense of legroom or territory, an 'imaginary' society of the nation grew.

The state was an integral section of that nationhood reaching every stage of the citizens' socio-economic, political and cultural subsistence. According to the thinker, the 'nation' was the new civic religion of the states. The significant linkage flanked by the state and nationhood also led to further divisions within already formulated nations because several clusters within these entities felt alienated and struggled for their own identity. After 1870, imperialism was not only because of

factors related to economies and capitalism but also political concerns which prompted nation states to protect their overseas territorial interests in an aggressive manner which included interventionist territorial claims, general patriotic pride in empire structure and backing often given through large entrepreneurs and industrialists. From 1880s for example, European powers divided up approximately the entire of Africa amongst themselves in what historians have described 'Scramble for Africa'.

Economies and politics were blurred which became blurred in these contexts. Disraeli, the British Prime Minister was promoting and popularizing imperialism in a large method in Britain. Victoria was now Empress of India. It seemed like a psychological booster. Conservative ideologies were tying up patriotism to imperialistic triumphs. Bismarck the German Chancellor had also launched an imperialistic crusade for a 'lay in the sun'. France was creation colonial claims in Africa in the middle of other spaces. Her sense of prestige had to be nurtured vis-à-vis the powerful German empire. At the Congress of Berlin 1878, there was common agreement in the middle of nations like France and Britain, to protect the Ottoman Empire and the Austro Hungarian Empire from Russian ambitions in the Balkans.

Meanwhile, the issue of Alsace Lorraine remained a sore point flanked by France and Germany and France was eagerly looking for allies. Dealings flanked by Germany and Russia were also not good. In 1890, Bismarck was removed from Chancellorship and Germany had meanwhile moved closer to Austria—Hungary with the signing of the Dual Alliance in 1879. This made Russia feel in accessible. Russia and France came jointly in an alliance concluded in 1894. Britain and France also struck trades since distant since colonial claims were concerned with Britain acquiring Cyprus throughout the Congress of Berlin 1878 and also encouraging France to further its Moroccan interests. This was also meant to counter German pressure on Morocco.

Therefore the two traditional colonial rivals decided to embark on the Entente Cordiale in 1904. Italy supported the French in Morocco. Germany sustained to challenge the French there. France however was eager to recover her lost prestige throughout her defeat in the Franco Prussian War 1870-71 and therefore reached multiple agreements concerning colonial claims with Russia, Britain and Italy. Meanwhile, after Russia's humiliating defeat at the Russo- Japanese War 1904-05, Russia was eager to reach agreements with Britain in 1907. Germany's territorial gains flanked by 1890 and 1914 were actually quite meager although Bismarck's successors began a rather aggressive expansionist policy. Bismarck had been more conscious of maintaining good dealings with Russia, Italy and Austria and had indeed in accessible France.

Now at the turn of the century the maze of alliances was going to give the seed bed for future military alliances. 1890-1912 was the era when Germany establish herself increasingly in accessible because France was reaching agreements with Britain, Russia and Italy; receiving her colonial policy sorted out and tilting the European balance of powers in her favor. Austria was also losing her pre-

eminence after the unifications of both Germany and Italy. Austria had also lost to France in 1859-60 and to Prussia in 1866, therefore not much remained of the Habsburg Empire. Austria turned more towards the Balkan problem and thereby clashed with Russia and Serbs supported Slavic interests in the Balkans.

This led to inevitable ups and downs flanked by Russia and Austria flanked by 1860 and 1914.

After Russia had imposed Treaty of San Stefano on the Turks, Austria was additionally disturbed to see Russia supporting Bulgarian claims. Austria meanwhile laid its claims on Bosnia—Herzegovina. The Congress of Berlin had ratified Austria's claim—this had alienated Russia and in 1879 when Austria and Germany signed the Dual alliance, Russia felt all the more threatened. In 1907, the Serbs publicly adopted a settlement challenging independence of Bosnia from Austrian power. In 1908, matters got worse when Austria annexed Bosnia—Herzegovina. Germany supported Austria in this. Serbia established this annexation in 1909 since if to uphold good dealings with Austria but Serbia nationalist institutions were fast coming up in support of Serbia's expansion with Bosnia. Russia was supporting the Slavs in the Balkan area who were clamoring for independence from either Austria or the Turkish Empire. Russia's diplomatic isolation in the 1890s since a result of the Dual Alliance and subsequently her humiliating defeat in the Russo-Jap War made her more vulnerable. She had finalized a treaty with France in 1894.

She also wanted to settle variations with Britain which in turn was receiving disturbed through the growing naval authority of Germany. All this led to the signing of the Triple Entente flanked by Britain, France and Russia. Afghanistan was now conceded through Russia since a British sphere of power since was a section of Persia. Although the entente was not a military alliance, nor was it targeted against Germany, yet it led to rival alliances being shaped through Germany and Austria—Hungary. This gives us an idea in relation to the how the alliance organization solidified on the eve of the World War. In 1899 at The Hague, peace conferences were held—war seemed a separate possibility in early 1900s and a massive network of military alliances was in the procedure of being finalized. From 1908-09, the Bosnian Crisis was exacerbated because Serbia, much to the annoyance of Austria, sustained to push for Bosnian independence. Germany was behind Austria and this aggravated the situation.

Europe got divided into rival military camps and disputes tuned in to what Hobsbawm calls 'unmanageable confrontations'—beyond manage of respective national governments. In 1882, when Germany, Austria and Italy had signed the Triple Alliance, it was already a significant step towards solidification of rivalries; however Italy in 1915 went in excess of to the anti-German camp. The Triple Entente firmed up the anti-German bloc. The international authority game in these years was marked through a very significant growth—namely, the widening of political interests outside one's own immediate areas. The world was now a level where authority games were played. For example,

naval authority through the beginning of the 20th century was no longer the prerogative of Britain. Through 1897, Germany had built a big fleet.

Also, Britain was no longer the sole economic authority approximately which the world economy revolved. A worldwide industrial capitalism had appeared and there was growing competition for manage of the world market and manage of dissimilar areas. Diplomatic rivalry led to the formation of blocs and when the Franco—German conflict in excess of Morocco erupted into the Agadir crisis (when Germany sent a gunboat to seize the south Moroccan port of Agadir) and Austria annexed Bosnia followed through Italy's job of Libya in 1911 and with Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece pushing Turkey out of the Balkans through 1912, these multiple crises culminated in the crisis of 1914. On 28th June 1914, a Serbian student terrorist Gavrilo Princip assassinated the Austrian heir to the throne Archduke Franz Ferdinand who was visiting Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. Within five weeks, Europe was plunged into a World War.

A freshly energized wave of patriotism swept in excess of nations in Europe the moment the war began. Liberal, labour and socialist opposition to the War notwithstanding, the number of volunteers went up phenomenally through the next some weeks. Nationalism came to the forefront since the overwhelming ideology of this period driving men & women to sacrifice for their country. Nations were at war with each other, putting behind them the tranquil years of the 19th century liberal utopia and the bourgeois sense of security. Now crisis would be followed through crisis, revolutions would dramatically transform the social hierarchies never to be reversed again and the existing moralities would be severely challenged. Bourgeois liberalism would itself undergo drastic transforms and the ideology of nation and nationalism, a product of 19th century Europe, would henceforth extend to multiple political clusters. States after the First World War, given the status of nations, would no longer be confined to the old, 'urbanized' world.

Nation-State Organization and International Dealings

After the defeat of Germany and her allies in 1918, President Woodrow Wilson of the United States succeeded in having a charter for a League of Nations included in the Treaty of Versailles—the peace treaty with Germany. The covenant of the League of Nations which shaped Section I of the Treaty of Versailles, was signed on June 28, 1919 and came into effect on January 10, 1920. On 14th Feb 1919, President Wilson had already presented to the Paris Peace Conference, a plan for a League of Nations, declaring it since a guarantee of peace against aggression. The armistice had commenced on Nov 11, 1918 but the peace conference of the victors began in Jan 1919.

England, France, the U.S, Italy and Japan constituted themselves into a Council and the League was included into the Treaty. Wilson became Chairman of the League Commission. Members comprised the victorious powers and on vote of 2/3rd of the Assembly, any independent state, dominion or colony, could be a member. Article X of the Covenant read 'The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve since against external aggression the territorial integrity of all members. In

case of any such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means through which this obligation should be fulfilled.’ The articles’ meaning was uncertain and its implementation might be slow. The Treaty including the League Covenant was however not ratified through the American Senate. Without the U.S., the League could not pursue communal security since originally conceived.

However, the ‘common association of nations’ that President Wilson had described for in the last of his Fourteen Points—meant that henceforth diplomacy would proceed more or less under the dictum laid down in the first of these Fourteen Points that is ‘frankly and in public view’. Wilson had set sure utopian averages of cooperation and the pre-subsistence of general interests in the middle of nations. But this was not always practically possible. However, without expecting the League to have been instrumental in altering the fundamental activities of individual nations flanked by 1919 & 1939, it is significant to keep in mind that the League was more the creature of its members rather than a higher body imposing codes of activities. If the largest function of the League was to prevent war, it failed to do therefore. The respect due to international law and to territorial status recognized through the allied powers could be open to confusion and the League ultimately proved a weak and ineffective institution.

Ten years later, the Kellogg—Briand peace pact signed at the instigation of the U.S proclaimed the illegality of war since a political instrument. Bringing in relation to the imposing transforms through peaceful ways was beyond any International institution in this era. When Japan encroached into Manchuria and was condemned through the League, she left the institution. Germany left the League when there were variations in matters of disarmament. The Italian invasion of Ethiopia was another example when the League was unable to exploit effective sanctions. The more powerful member nations were generally unwilling to exploit force to settle acts of aggression through other states. International law seemed ineffectual in several situations. Emotions and desires were overwhelmingly forceful energies which made mainly attempts to uphold peace flanked by nations unsuccessful in the extensive run.

INTERNATIONAL RIVALRIES OF TWENTIETH CENTURY

The Great War of 1914-1918 and Consequences of the Peace

The first decade of the 20th Century saw much talk of war flanked by the ‘great powers’ of Europe and a recurrence of crises reflecting their insecurities and unsatisfied ambitions. That decade also showed that chief decision makers of the time lacked the ability and the will to sustain the subtle diplomatic practices that had supported peace in Europe for many decades previously despite confliction colonial ventures. Mainly importantly, a ‘balance of authority’ organization of shifting affiliations, five roughly equal and frequently consulting powers on the continent with Great Britain enjoying maritime supremacy, avoiding commitment, and playing ‘balancer’, had given method to a bipolar configuration.

On one face stood a united Germany, already the mainly powerful land authority militarily and economically, allied with the big and outwardly confident empire of Austria-Hungary since also with Italy. On the other face stood France, bitter in enmity in excess of its defeat and loss of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany in 1871, seeking security through allying with Russia in 1892 and forming an 'entente cordiale' with its traditional rival Great Britain in 1904. Both faces amassed armaments, which were becoming more lethal since advancing technologies of explosives, metal design, petroleum fuel, and shipbuilding, were applied to them. Military chiefs (notably Alfred von Schlieffen of Germany) intended strategies that relied on swift mobilization, rapid offensive strike, and inevitable escalation, which compressed the time for political decision creation and diplomatic manage of crises. Newspapers stimulated feelings of danger, deprivation, and patriotism in public opinion, which came to think of war since possible, even desirable. Crisis was inherent in the several disputes, rivalries and insecurities infesting Europe.

Briefly, Austria-Hungary was fearful of Russia to its east, especially since restive Slav minorities in its provinces looked to Russia for support in carving out autonomy or even statehood for themselves. Austria was also irked through Serbia to the south, reading insolence into its leadership of Slav unification and drive toward an outlet to the Adriatic Sea. Germany had territorial ambitions beyond its eastern frontier in regions controlled through Russia. Also, Germany was jealous of British navel supremacy and colonial resources and aspired to parity, supremacy, and equal status in world affairs. Germany feared encirclement through Russia and France and therefore clung to Austria-Hungary and suggested partnership to Great Britain. But suspicion rather than partnership characterized Anglo-German dealings; even however their kings were cousins. Traditional British fears of Russian expansion, growing power in the Ottoman Empire, and engineering skills manifested in widening the Kiel Canal connecting the Baltic and North Seas, structure new battleships, and constructing the Berlin-Baghdad Railway.

Russia too had ambitions that augured clash with both the Ottoman and the Austria-Hungary Empires, and a massive, if cumbersome, military machine. Russia was disquieted through Japan's growing authority to its east but aimed for gains in Europe, backing Serbia in the Balkans, even since Germany urged on Austria to chastize Serbia. Military and naval expansion, mobilization plans, and a tightening of the hostile coalitions built a momentum for war in excess of-riding arguments for peace emanating from deal, industry and good sense. International crises erupted in excess of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, Morocco in 1911, and the Balkans in 1912, but were defused through negotiation and restraint. These qualities were not conspicuous after the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand through a Serb terrorist in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914. Austria delivered an ultimatum of 15 distant reaching demands to Serbia on July 23, challenging a response in 48 hours.

Serbia sent a conciliatory reply but also mobilized, since did Russia, and then France. Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on July 28. The British government toyed with the idea of neutrality but when Germany sent its armies crossways Belgium to attack France, Great Britain was obliged through its earlier guarantee of Belgian neutrality to summon its fleet to activity and declare war on Germany on 4 August 1914. However few European states remained outside the initial circle of clash, the guns of August ultimately sounded distant and wide. Five empires were occupied and colonial troops were brought into the fray since one whole generation of European young men massacred each other to a stalemate. The jubilation with which troops and publics had greeted war declarations in expectations of early victory was soon buried in mud, disease, poison gas, rockets, submarine warfare, and battles in excess of some hundred yards that proved insanely costly in human lives.

More than nine million men in the armed forces were killed beside with five to six million civilians. The anti-war poetry and prose of that catastrophe still lives. The 'Great War', since it was recognized before the Second World War made this the First, accepted on for more than four years, with neither face on any front willing to accept defeat or negotiate peace. The Russian Revolution of 1917 brought a cease-fire on the eastern front in December with Russia losing substantial territory and monies to Germany in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The US declared war on Germany only on April 6, 1917 but the entry of American troops, aero planes and fresh supplies in 1918 nullified German gains on both fronts. An armistice was declared on November 11, 1918 and a peace conference opened in Paris on 18 January 1919.

US President Woodrow Wilson was a dominating figure of the peace conference therefore that his moralistic 'fourteen points' were included into the resulting treaties, which transformed the map of Europe on the principle of 'self-determination of nations', and recognized a League of Nations to maintain the peace on the principle of 'communal security'. The distant reaching consequences of the peace, so, were territorial, economic, and political. A 200 page Treaty of Versailles signed with Germany contained a 'war guilt' clause ascribing full responsibility for the war to Germany. Germany was punished territorially and financially. Alsace-Lorraine was restored to France. The port of Danzig was made a free municipality and a Polish Corridor ran by the eastern provinces of Germany.

Rearmament of any type was forbidden, since was fortification of the Rhineland or union with Austria. Colonial resources were detached and unspecified amounts demanded in reparations. The Habsburg Dynasty was dismissed and its Austria-Hungary Empire dismantled. Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland became independent. Austria ceded South Tyrol, Istria, the Dalmatian coast and few Adriatic Islands to Italy, and its southern Slav provinces of Slovenia, Croatia, and Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina to Yugoslavia. Other territorial transfers took from Bulgaria and added to Romania.

The Ottoman Empire too was abolished with the Treaty of Sevres, 1920; Turkey became a republic, its Arab provinces were placed under British or French mandate. British and French colonial resources remained intact and were augmented through mandated territories; nationalist unrest grew therein, spurred in section through evaporation of the European myth of civilization superiority. Territorial transforms failed to solve the vital troubles of insecurity in Europe, dividing the continent into 'satisfied' but weakened powers such since Britain, and dissatisfied or revisionist states, including Germany and Russia, now the Soviet Union. Moreover, the principle of 'self-determination' was hard to implement and sowed the seeds of continuous disputes in excess of borders and treatment of minorities in eastern and central Europe. These little new states were equally fearful of Germany to their west and Russia to their east and relied on France, itself vengeful on Germany but too weak to act without Anglo-American support, which was not forthcoming. The League of Nations proved unequal to the task of maintaining peace, not least because the US repudiated Wilson in 1920, withdrew into isolation, and played no section in the League.

Neither Germany nor the Soviet Union was initially a member. Settlements, treaties, plebiscites, and declarations outlawing war – such since in the short existed Kellog-Briand Pact of 1928 – or embracing disarmament – since attempted in Disarmament Conferences held in 1922, 1925, 1933 – did not amount to institutional strength as they lacked the backing of authority and commitment. Moreover, the League's principle of communal security mistakenly assumed that all powers would have the similar perceptions of aggression and be equally willing to bear the costs of opposing a great, or even a minor, authority. Therefore, the League could take no effective activity against Japan in 1931, Italy in 1935, or Nazi Germany in successive violations of the Treaty. The economic consequences of the peace compounded the high cost of the war to reason inflation and unemployment, undermine currencies, and disrupt trading patterns, leading to the Great Depression of the 1930s. At the core of an intricate procedure place the problem of reparations claimed through the victorious allies from Germany and the related problem of allied war debts to the US.

Neither the amounts nor the sharing of reparations were fixed through treaty, and uncertainty fostered exaggerated expectations of Germany's capability to pay, varying pressure on it to do therefore with discernible variations flanked by Britain and France, and a growing resistance to pay on the section of Germany, which borrowed heavily from the US. As payments could be made only in goods, services, or gold, transfers of the big amounts involved served ironically to strengthen Germany's productive capability, to undercut employment and domestic prices – especially of agricultural produce – in creditor countries, to contract world markets, and to destabilize all currencies and swap rates. A bubble of false prosperity burst in the US with the Wall Street crash of October 1929. Austrian banks collapsed in May 1931. Britain was forced to abandon the gold average for the pound sterling in September. A World Economic Conference held in 1933 failed to

stabilize the situation and acute hardship was experienced in China, Japan, and during Europe, inevitably weakening liberal political institutions everywhere.

The revival of economic nationalism and the abandonment of blocs based on gold, sterling, the dollar, the spot and the yen followed. Through the 1930s it was apparent that the largest political expectations of the peace had been belied. A world-wide organization envisaged in the League of Nations had *not* replaced the European authority organization in international dealings. The dominance of the great powers had *not* given lay to a democratic international organization with greater participation through smaller states, which sustained to feel insecure. Regional or local alliances had *not* been superseded through common and automatic cooperation in service of communal security. Notwithstanding declarations of intent, the world had *not* been made safe for democracy, war had *not* been outlawed, and many disarmament conferences had *not* achieved their objectives. The peace resolutions ending the First World War ushered in what came to be described the 'twenty year crisis' leading to the Second World War.

The Rise of Extremism and Reasons of the Second World War (1939-1945)

Russia was the first great authority to collapse under the strain of the Great War, which demoralized its peasant army and hastened the disintegration of the Tsarist regime. From the beginning of 1917 Russia experienced a tremendous domestic political and socioeconomic upheaval with many factions struggling to gain exclusive authority. In October- November 1917 the Bolsheviks led through Vladimir Lenin replaced a coalition of socialists in the Kremlin and immediately sued for peace with Germany. The Bolshevik Revolution affected every aspect of Russian life and also had profound effects on the rest of the world, mainly immediately in Europe and on international dealings.

The western allies pressured Russia to remain in the war and assisted 'White' Russians opposed to the Bolshevik in southern, northern and Siberian provinces while civil war raged until 1920, without success. On the other hand, Lenin's expectations of an early communist revolution in Germany were not fulfilled; however there was a rash of radical socialist uprisings in several sections of Central Europe in 1919. Avowed Bolshevik aims of fostering world revolution aroused acute anxiety in all capitalist communities that lasted in excess of the next seven decades. The ideology of revolution and its accompanying propaganda of workers rights crossways national borders became an instrument of the Communist Third International, which replaced the Second International in 1920, since well since that of the Soviet Union. At the similar time, Lenin wanted Russia to have normal dealings – including credits and deal – with the western powers, which did not then recognize the Soviet Government, and to regain its lay in world councils, from which it was just excluded. Announcement of a New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921 enabled a commercial agreement with Britain but *de jure* recognition was not forthcoming from Britain, France or Italy until 1924 and from the US only in 1933.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union and Germany establish themselves likewise ostracized through the Peace Treaties, and burdened with reparations or debts; the two countries signed the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922 resuming diplomatic dealings, cancelling financial claims on each other, and providing mainly favored nation treatment for deal, but including no defense provisions. Soviet diplomacy in Europe, Asia and toward colonial dependencies was based on the self-interest of the Soviet state since well since the ideology of communist revolution and did not mesh with recognized Western practices of the time. Moreover, Stalin's assumption of authority in 1928 and the means he adopted to ensure his supremacy and implement his policies of economic transformation in the 1930s – such as the forced collectivization of agriculture and purges of the Communist Party – were extreme through any definition, and made the Soviet synonymous with 'totalitarianism' in the western lexicon. Totalitarianism was not confined to the Soviet Union and surfaced to varying degrees in the 1920s and 1930s in Italy, Japan, Spain, and mainly totally in Germany. Considerable scholarship has been devoted to exploring the roots of totalitarianism, which eradicates individual liberty in the name of the state, but for purposes of this part it is enough to mention the following five: contemporary instruments of size discourse and mobilization; populist nationalism; widespread unemployment and economic distress that is not ameliorated through liberal institutions; exaggerated fears of enemies, both external and internal, and 'encirclement'; the emergence of a hero figure or 'leader' challenging total authority and commanding total obedience. Benito Mussolini recognized a Fascist regime in Italy in October 1921 when dissatisfaction with parliamentary democracy was high, and the peace resolution was unpopular for having brought only limited gains. Italy's territorial ambitions in southeastern Europe were opposed through France, an uncompromising upholder of the Treaty resolution, and Italy's bid to increase its North African colonies through occupying Ethiopia in 1935 antagonized Britain since well since creating a crisis in the League of Nations, which was unwilling to enforce meaningful sanctions against Italy under Article 16.

Mussolini had approach to admire the more efficient Adolf Hitler and signed a pact with him to make a 'Berlin-Rome Axis' in 1936. Their first collaboration was to assist militarily Francisco Franco in overthrowing a newly shaped and fragile Republic in Spain governed through a left-oriented coalition described the Popular Front. Japan's modernization drive as the late 19th century led it to graft what it measured the best of America, Britain, and Germany on to its own homogenous and disciplined community, to alliance with Britain in 1902, a victory against Russia in 1904, the annexation of Korea in 1910, and a self-image of being the leader of Asia. However it received the Shantung province of China (formerly controlled through Germany) in 1919, Japan's other '21 demands' were not met at Versailles. Japanese officials felt that they did not receive equal treatment in the Naval Disarmament Conferences of 1922 and 1927, or in the Council of the League of Nations. Japan's assertiveness was externally expressed in expanding its commercial and industrial reach into Western markets, the Manchurian province of northern China, by Southeast

Asia, and into the western Pacific basin where it rivaled the US. Internally, Japan's civilian and parliamentary government came under rising strain; especially since economic depression deepened, and soon passed under management of a militaristic clique of army and naval officers.

However Japan's depredations in China aroused verbal protests from other powers, neither the US nor the Soviet Union were members of the League, which published a condemnatory statement, and Britain was unable to act alone. Japan announced its withdrawal from the League in 1933 and joined an Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany and Italy in November 1937. Germany was penalized through the 1919 peace treaties but not destroyed; it remained potentially the strongest authority in Europe. Germany harbored several grievances that few people in Britain and the US measured legitimate and was the leading proponent of 'revisionism' even while it strove in the 1920s toward acceptability in world councils and democracy at home under the Weimar Constitution. That constitution could not withstand the strain of coping with economic depression. The Nazi Party had eliminated all opposition, especially of the Communists and the Socialists. We require not elaborate here the causes and ways through which the Nazis recognized management in excess of a people measured to be cultured and advanced, however several scholars have done therefore, but emphasize the information that Hitler led a 'resurgence' of Germany on an explicit ideology of 'Aryan' racial purity, virtue and superiority, reunification through 'self-determination' of the German race, *lebensraum* or 'livelihood legroom' for them, and cancellation of the 1919 peace treaties. Further, other countries, big and little, even while creating paper pacts to safeguard their own security, were therefore frightened of Soviet Bolshevism that they extensively turned a blind eye to the internal brutalities of the Nazi regime, such as the genocide of Jews and Gypsies, and 'appeased' rather than opposed German transgressions of the peace resolution.

Germany abrogated the disarmament clauses of the Treaty in December 1933 and proceeded to build an army, air force and navy machine oriented to the future that virtually overran Europe in 1940-41. Germany recovered the Saar area through plebiscite in January 1935, overturned the free municipality status of Danzig flanked by 1934 and 1936, and remilitarized the Rhineland in March 1936. Hitler's timing and estimate of feeble resistance in each case proved more accurate than that of his more careful advisers. Hitler also brought in relation to the an *Anschluss* (Union) with Austria – where a Nazi party had gained strength as 1934 – in March 1938 and then create a bid for Czechoslovakia, first launching a propaganda barrage in relation to the ill-treatment of the German minority in the Sudeten province. France was committed through alliance to the security and integrity of Czechoslovakia but would not act without British support. The British Government of Neville Chamberlain did not feel justified in risking armed clash with Germany on the issue of what he described a 'far' province. Months of negotiation and rising tension culminated in a four authority conference of Britain, France, Germany and Italy in Munich on 29 September 1938 renouncing war and permitting German military job of mainly of Czechoslovakia.

Less than one year later, having first protected his eastern front by a pact with the Soviet Union on 23 August 1939, Hitler ordered the invasion of Poland and declared war on Germany. The Second World War was a 'total' war, unprecedented in its destruction of military and non-military assets and people, and truly world-wide in its scope. Its outbreak in Europe in September 1939 was preceded in August 1937 through the Sino-Japanese War and succeeded in December 1941 through the entry of the US against both Japan and Germany. The war in Europe ended with Germany's surrender on 10 May 1945 and in Asia with Japan's surrender on 15 August 1945. The reasons of this war have been expounded and explored repeatedly through dissimilar people, and at dissimilar times, with varying and often disputed interpretations of specific measures and the actual intentions of key players. Nevertheless, few generalizations can be drawn from the massive body of archival and documentary material accessible on the subject. Mainly importantly, the peace treaties of 1919, coupled with the Russian Revolution of 1917 and a fundamentally weak League of Nations, did not resolve the vital troubles of security in Europe.

Deep seated ambitions, fears, insecurities, and mistrust there were bound to conflict politically and militarily in the absence of habits, institutions, and mechanisms to facilitate the peaceful settlement of clash. Nor did the then existing international organization create provision for the growing authority of Japan, which eventually brought the US into the war. Beyond the underlying systemic weakness, specific reasons are stressed differently through dissimilar people and include both design and blunder on the section of decision-makers. Largest interpretations are since follows: Nazi Germany in common and Adolf Hitler in scrupulous was primarily responsible for the war and deliberately prepared for it, whether or not he designed the exact timing of its outbreak or expected its ultimate scope. Britain and France were equally responsible for the war because their leaders had appeased Hitler's ambitious demands instead of checking them, had neglected to build an anti-fascist alliance, and had encouraged an eastward expansion of Germany therefore since to attract the Soviet Union into war. The US was at fault for not participating in the League, for being isolationist and ambivalent in relation to the Germany in the 1920s and 1930s, and then for encouraging Britain, France and Poland to resist without clearly warning Hitler.

Poland was at fault for not forming a general front with the Soviet Union and then for not submitting 'peacefully' to German demands. Mussolini was blamed for support and encouragement of Hitler, before joining the Western allies in 1943. The Soviet Union was responsible for propagating the idea of an 'inevitable' clash flanked by communism and capitalism/fascism, but mainly of all for entering into a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany in August 1939 and therefore giving it a 'green light' for attack on Poland while simultaneously annexing many territories itself. This temporary alliance was reversed when Hitler ordered an invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 and his armies advanced toward Moscow and other municipalities before being halted at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-43. In East Asia and the Pacific militarist Japan took on an aggressive role with all its

neighbors to build an Economic Co-Prosperity Zone, antagonizing the US, another Pacific Ocean authority that tried to deny Japan access to oil and other raw materials.

When Japan destroyed section of the US fleet anchored at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii on 6 December 1941, and Hitler declared war on the US on 11 December 1941, the US entered a new global war against both Japan and Germany, which ended only with their ‘unconditional surrender’ in 1945.

The Cold War

Within two years of the end of the Second World War the chief victors had fallen out with each other, the Soviet Union was ranged against Britain and the US in an armed truce, and the division of Europe into two antagonistic spheres became apparent. That divisive rivalry soon extended in excess of the rest of the world, despite attempts made through few newly independent countries, such since India, to remain unengaged in it and shape ‘nonaligned’ movements of their own. The Cold War defined all international dealings until its sudden end in 1989-91, brought in relation to the through the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the USSR. Considerable research into the origins and course of the Cold War continues to be mannered – facilitated through declassification and availability to scholars of relevant governmental archives in the protagonist countries – and few common approaches are general in the literature beside with variations on details and attributions of blame. The Cold War differed from the First and Second World Wars because ideological clash flanked by the US and USSR, flanked by capitalism and communism, infused and sharpened all other sources or their rivalry, even when ideological motivations were missing from their policies or practices. From this point of view the origins of the Cold War place in the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the image of communism since a militant faith determined to produce world revolution and liquidate non-believers by a combination of internal subversion and external pressure that was held through several American policy-makers from the 1920s onwards. US policies of ‘containment’ since well since President Reagan’s depiction of the Soviet Union since an “evil empire” in the 1980s grew out of that mindset.

For their section, Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders depicted ‘bourgeois capitalism’ in equally extreme and condemnatory words since oppressive, imperialist, bent on encircling and destroying ‘progressive forces’, but ultimately doomed to be buried under Socialism. Therefore, two universalistic but contradictory blue prints on how to organize domestic and international order were in opposition during the Cold War, partially customized through Soviet and Chinese offers of ‘peaceful coexistence’ made in the mid-1950s, attempts toward détente made in the 1960s and 1970s, and the US-China rapprochement in the 1970s and 1980s. The Cold War also originated in and reflected conflicts of tangible interest flanked by the two biggest victors of the Second World War, the US and the USSR. Conferences flanked by their leaders, and including British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, were held in Teheran (November 1943), Yalta (February 1945) and Potsdam

(July 1945) to set out post-war territorial and international arrangements. The supreme authority of the US in 1945 was apparent in its economy that reported for in relation to the 50 per cent of total world GNP, its superiority, and its technological prowess seen in the detonation of two atomic bombs in excess of Japan to end war in the Pacific. The USSR had lost 20 million men in war casualties and almost the similar number in related measures and suffered the devastation of industry and in relation to the one third of its territory, but its armies controlled eastern and central Europe into the centre of Germany since well since the Balkans and its prestige overall was extremely high. Stalin insisted that Soviet security demanded a zone of friendly, communist dominated, states beside its perimeter, and seemed to have won US President F.D. Roosevelt's agreement to this at Yalta.

But Allied understanding broke down flanked by American insistence on applying the principles of 'free elections' and 'free markets' during post-war Europe and Soviet ways of achieving complete manage successively in the Baltic states, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania. Defeated Germany was divided into four job zones, since was its capital Berlin located within the Soviet zone. The occupying powers differed on several subjects including de-Nazification, reparations, the German-Polish border, currency and economic policies, and transit rights. The American, British and French zones were soon fused and when the Soviet Union made an effort to cut western road access to Berlin, the municipality was kept supplied through a year extensive Anglo-American air-lift in 1948-49. No written agreement resulted therefore that a same crisis in excess of Berlin sustained throughout the subsistence of two German states until 1990: the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the west and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the east. The 'German problem' place at the heart of the Cold War, with no unanimity of opinion anywhere on key questions of reunification, neutralization, rearmament; measures provided their own answers in excess of the years. Mutually reinforcing fear and suspicion could be seen on the one hand, in Soviet convictions that the US designed to renege on promises made at Yalta and exploit a rearmed Germany against the USSR, and on the other hand, in American convictions that the Soviet Union designed to manage all of Germany and advance into since much of Europe and the rest of the world since possible. To forestall such an eventuality by a policy of 'containment' of communism became the prime foreign policy objective of the US.

The US took many distant-reaching events in pursuit of this objective. In March 1947 President Truman announced a 'doctrine' for opposing communism. All Latin American countries committed themselves to joint protection against internal and external communist subversion in the Rio treaty signed with the US in 1947. In June 1947 Secretary of State John Marshall launched a plan of huge economic grants (\$17 billion flanked by 1948 and 1952) to 16 non-communist European counties conditional on their removing barriers to economic integration. The formation of a six-member European Coal and Steel Society in 1952 led, by successive hard steps, to one of the mainly extraordinary attainments of the 20th century, namely, the making of a European Union (EU) in 1992.

This body adopted a general currency in 1999 and aspired to general foreign and security policy. Extensive before that, however, a North Atlantic Treaty Institution (NATO) was shaped in April 1949 under US leadership and including Canada to give defense and security for the West. Turkey joined in 1952 and the FRG was included in 1955 at the similar time since the central and eastern European countries were brought jointly in the Warsaw Pact time under leadership of the Soviet Union. Confrontation flanked by these two military alliances armed with increasingly sophisticated conventional and nuclear weapons was the central characteristic of the Cold War.

However both faces almost certainly overestimated the aggressive intentions of the other, fear of their capabilities spurred an arms race and sharpened the sense of danger of imminent nuclear clash in excess of many decades, especially at times of crisis such since in excess of Berlin in 1948 and 1961, the Hungarian nationalist uprising of 1956, the Taiwan Straits in 1958, or the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962. Gradually, however, nuclear weapons came to be seen since non-usable and the territorial status quo in Europe was carried through both faces, even when challenged through internal measures such since the ‘Prague Spring’ of 1968. A European détente was initiated and in 1975 all the European states beside with Canada, the US, and the USSR came jointly in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) affirming the status quo since well since the require to protect human rights. The Cold War came to Asia first when the proclamation of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949 was interpreted since a grievous ‘loss’ in the US, (sole occupying authority in Japan and chief supporter of a Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan). The Chinese leader Mao Zedong saw the US since his chief adversary and decided to “lean to one face” in alliance with Stalin’s USSR. In June 1950 the partitioned peninsular nation of Korea erupted in war and the US led United Nations forces against communist North Korea forces assisted through PRC ‘volunteers’. The Korean War ended in a stalemate and an armed armistice in 1953 that created a demilitarized zone beside the 38th similarity. Communist North Korea, in alliance with neighboring PRC, seemed to freeze in time even since substantial US forces were stationed in South Korea and remains there to the present time.

The Eisenhower Management in the US deployed its Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan Straits and prevent open clash flanked by the PRC and ROC. The US also announced a doctrine of ‘huge retaliation’ – that is, possible exploit of nuclear weapons – to deter communist expansion, supported the French in Vietnam against nationalist forces led through communist leader Ho Chi Minh, and erected two multiparty alliances to confine the Sino-Soviet bloc within continental Eurasia. A defense pact setting up the South East Asia Treaty Institution (SEATO) was signed on 8 September 1954 through the US, Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. The Soviet Union and PRC did not effort to replicate the Warsaw Pact in Asia but each stepped crossways the Western row of containment through conducting an active diplomacy of political support, deal, economic assistance, and arms supplies with several neighboring and/or

nonaligned states such as Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, and North Vietnam. There was no easy dichotomy in Asia, however, and the picture was greatly complicated through local rivalries since well since the rift flanked by China and the Soviet Union that became public knowledge in the early 1960s and almost erupted in war in 1969. The mainly dangerous crisis of the Cold War took lay in October 1962 in excess of the issue of Soviet missiles placed in the Caribbean island of Cuba. There a popular revolution led through Fidel Castro had displaced the military regime of Fulgencio Batista in January 1959 and US backed efforts through Cuban emigres to overthrow Castro had failed.

The Soviet post-Stalin leader Nikita Khrushchev decided to protect Cuba against American invasion through positioning nuclear missiles in Cuba. The US President John F. Kennedy reacted in anger to their detection through a reconnaissance aircraft on 10 October 1962, challenging removal of the missile foundations and ordering a naval blockade of Cuba on 18 October. No other episode of the Cold War has received such microscopic scrutiny from historians and re-enactments through prominent participants of the time, partly because every facet of American-Soviet competition intersected in it: conflicting ideologies, the nuclear arms race, dealings with allies and newly independent states, domestic political linkages with foreign policy, public and private diplomacy exemplified in United Nations leaders, neither of whom could afford to public ally step down. Through mid-November the crisis was in excess of. Soviet missiles were withdrawn from Cuba and few months later American Jupiter missiles were withdrawn from Turkey; Castro remained in authority and threats of open invasion were ruled out; Kennedy won a victory with dignity and without war; the Soviet Union was not humiliated. Mainly importantly, both faces were shocked through realization of their own vulnerability and moved towards avoiding direct confrontation in regions of peripheral interest and framing rules for conducting the nuclear arms race such as the Incomplete Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty of 1972. If the two biggest antagonists in the Cold War avoided direct confrontation after 1962 they did not eschew participation in local conflicts through providing materials, training and sometimes active military assistance to their respective favorites or 'clients'.

For instance, American involvement in the Vietnam War began in support of an anti-Communist but weak South Vietnam facing insurgency backed through communist North Vietnam in the early 1960s. A central security premise of US policy in Asia at the time was the subsequently ridiculed 'domino theory' that the toppling of one non-communist government inevitably would lead to successive falls and expanding communism. A biggest US bombing campaign from the air in the mid and late 1960s was accompanied through the introduction of superior and superior number of American combat troops on the ground, where they were bogged down in a quagmire of guerilla warfare, and an enlargement of the war zone into Cambodia and Laos. Vocal opposition to the Vietnam War within the US and its allies, since well since strategic thoughts in relation to the détente

with the Soviet Union, led US President Nixon to create a dramatic rapprochement with China in 1971-72 and extract American troops from Vietnam in 1973. Not surprisingly, a reunification of Vietnam through the communist North followed soon after in 1975. The US underwent considerable self-questioning and loss of confidence in the mid-1970s and earlier bipartisan consensus on national security policies was fractured.

Through a coincidence of time, possibly, the Soviet Union enjoyed an era of continuity and self-confidence under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev in the 1970s and emerged to expand its political and military power in South and Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, West Asia, Africa and even Latin America. Without direct Soviet participation too, measures in what had approach to be described the Third World, such since the assertiveness of the Institution of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973 and after, the development of the Non Aligned Movement, clash within the former Portuguese colonies in Africa, and the Islamic Revolution in Iran of 1979, militated against Western interests. The Soviet Union used the 'Brezhnev Doctrine' to justify military intervention to protect a communist (or leftist) government outside its own borders – since in Czechoslovakia in 1979. American reactions, and the election of Republican Ronald Reagan since president in 1980, ushered in a 'New Cold War' of proxy clash fought through government forces and Islamicist Mujahedin in Afghanistan, in Nicaragua flanked by Sandinista government forces and rightwing 'contras', and in El Salvador and other Central American countries flanked by rightwing governments and left-wing guerilla fighters. None of these wars, or the several other conflicts erupting at the time during the Third World, fitted tidily into the rigid dichotomy of the 1950s, and the bipolar international organization itself had been customized through a war less amenable to easy analysis than the original Cold War. The costs of sustained clash, however, were likewise high, especially since the nuclear arms race flanked by the US and the USSR was renewed, and contributed directly to the economic undermining of the Soviet organization and the end of the Cold War.

The Nuclear Arms Race and Attempts to Manage Proliferation

Spectacular advances in scientific knowledge in the first half of the 20th century included theoretical and experimental detection of how to split the atom, the negligible particle of a chemical element. It was no simple task, however, to learn how to release atomic (nuclear) power however a controlled chain reaction of fission in the element uranium, and throughout the late 1930s leading scientists in America, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, possibly Japan, and Russia apart worked on the problem. In 1942, after the US had entered World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the Manhattan Project, a costly program with many sites and several scientists and engineers, to build nuclear reactors and fabricate an atomic weapon since soon since possible and before Germany could do therefore. Project Y headed through Robert Oppenheimer at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, New Mexico, successfully tested one such device at Alamogordo on

16 July 1945 when he saw “a thousand suns”. Truman conveyed this news to his allies Churchill and Stalin at Potsdam where they were conferring after the defeat of Germany, and also made the decision to exploit two remaining bombs on Japan which had not yet acknowledged defeat.

An atom bomb equivalent to 15,000 tons of TNT named “Small Boy” was dropped on Hiroshima on 6 August and a superior one named “Fat Boy” on Nagasaki on 9 August. The resulting death and destruction by the effects of blast, fire, heat, and radiation distant exceeded anything experienced before, even throughout long ‘carpet bombing’ of municipalities throughout the war. Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945. Statements compiled soon after, since well since later statements on the effects of nuclear tests in the Pacific Ocean and elsewhere, give incontrovertible scientific proof that the exploit of nuclear weapons in any clash would be catastrophic for all life on earth, to say nothing of culture since we know it. Yet, an integral section of the Cold War was the nuclear arms race, primarily flanked by the US and the USSR that tested its first atomic weapon on 26 August 1949. Even after both had agreed to strategic arms limitations and reductions in the 1980s and 1990s, their arsenals remain formidable.

The 2001 estimates the US possessed 7,206 strategic nuclear weapons, 1,670 non-strategic nuclear weapons and flanked by 1,000 and 2,000 other nuclear weapons, while the figures for Russia in the similar categories are given since 5,606; 3,800 and 10,000. The destructive authority of a single such weapon, often considered in words of megatons or one million tons of TNT, was sufficient to wipe out an whole municipality and exceed the total of all conventional bombs dropped in the Second World War. Adding to the several complexities of the super authority arms race was the information that despite strenuous attempts, the US did not extensive retain its nuclear monopoly, and after the Soviet Union, others too tested and produced their own nuclear weapons: Britain in 1952, France in 1959, China in 1964, Israel almost certainly and in secret in 1968, India in 1973 however it did not weaponries until after 1998, and Pakistan in 1998 or perhaps in 1987. Iraq, Iran and North Korea also have been widely suspected of having nuclear weapons ambitions and possible capacity. None of these states amassed big arsenals of nuclear weapons, reliably estimated in 2001 since totaling 410 for China, 348 for France, 185 for Britain, in relation to the 200 for Israel, flanked by 80-150 for India and flanked by 30-50 for Pakistan. Nevertheless, the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of size destruction continues to be a serious problem in modern international politics. Few of the profound questions raised in the atomic age are the following:

- Are scientists obliged to refrain from ethical judgments in relation to the exploit to which their discoveries may be put through governments?
- What is the proper connection flanked by technological possibilities of creating weapons organizations and political decision creation on national security?
- Did nuclear weapons serve to uphold continuity in Europe however balances of authority throughout the Cold War, and would they produce continuity or instability elsewhere?

- What were or are the economic and psychological costs of constructing national security policies on the foundation of nuclear authority with their implicit threat to all culture and all life?
- Is it possible to manage the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other states, and perhaps to non-state clusters, without nuclear disarmament through everybody?

Since it is apparent, more than one answer has been offered, and will continue to be offered through thinking persons. In this part we confine our interpretation of the historical record to distinct three separate strands: the role of nuclear weapons – and successive levels of their sophistication – in the security policies of the super powers throughout the Cold War fueling an arms race, perceptions of aggressive intention on either face, and heavy reliance on the military component of state authority, created a spiral of competitive interaction expressed in electoral rhetoric in the US in relation to the therefore-described ‘missile gap’ and increased military spending and arms accumulation in both states that is described the ‘arms race’. Scholars learning the American-Soviet arms race, since well since arms races that have occurred flanked by other rival pairs of states, seek to explain reasons and suggest methods of controlling such ultimately self-destructive activities. Bruce Russett writes that while international hostility and conflicts in excess of spheres of power suffice to begin and uphold high stages of military spending, domestic powers are equally significant.

In the context of the US since well since the USSR he stresses bureaucratic politics, organizational dynamics and inter-service rivalry in obtaining budget allocations, technical momentum in developing (or matching) new and larger weapons organizations such as inter continental missiles (ICBMs) and multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs), and pressures generated through mutually reinforcing networks within community and the economy that came to be described the “military-industrial intricate”. He also notes that the arms race did not proceed in a regular spiral but with occasional upward spurts and some periods of significant reduction. American and Soviet nuclear doctrines necessity be added to the factors producing an arms race throughout the Cold War and these require more detailed analysis that can be attempted here. Extremely briefly and broadly speaking, in the first decade of the Cold War the US relied on its air and nuclear superiority to counter Soviet conventional and ground superiority in Europe and threatened ‘huge retaliation’ against any attempted transform in the status quo; in the 1960s it relied on ‘flexible response’ and the making of an invulnerable ‘second strike’ capability based on a triad of air, land and sea based missiles aimed at a range of targets including municipalities to ‘deter’ any possible ‘first strike’ through the Soviet Union; in the 1970s the US aimed for continuity in the status quo by arms manage negotiations and détente; and then in the 1980s occupied in a military build-up that included deployment of intermediate range missiles in Europe to reassure Western Europe of American commitment to its defense, and a new Strategic Defense Initiative, what Reagan described ‘Star Wars’. The theory of ‘deterrence’ – itself a word capable of flexible interpretation but based on the

assumption of two roughly comparable hostile powers with general conceptions of what constituted 'rational activity' – was central to American strategic doctrine during. In the absence of open debate it was harder to decipher Soviet military doctrines and objectives beyond security, equality, excellence of status and continuity or assess the role of deterrence theory in Moscow.

It can be seen, however, that what kept the Cold War from becoming hot was Mutual Assured Destruction. However the Soviet Union in its search for strategic parity and possible and strategic or tactical superiority more or less kept pace with US weapons innovations, and initiated breakthroughs in few regions such as orbiting satellites in legroom, Reagan's initiatives in the 1980s influenced the new reformist Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that his country could neither afford the arms race economically nor sustain it technologically. Meanwhile, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 had brought the dangers of a nuclear swap shockingly secure to decision makers, and the US and USSR moved toward arms manage events beginning with the Incomplete Test Ban Treaty (banning atmospheric tests) signed on 5 August 1963. Arms manage negotiations were extended exercises in bargaining and clash administration, not attempts to bring in relation to the disarmament or clash settlement, therefore that perennial Cold War disputes in excess of Berlin, Korea, Taiwan, remained unsettled and the multiplication of weapons organizations sustained. Moreover, few organizations were kept on hair trigger alert therefore that accidental conflagration easily could have been flared since is well documented through Scott Sagan.

Arms manage events were designed to reduce risks, to remove incentives for first strike through either face, and to stabilize the arms race approximately notions of strategic parity and balance. There were lengthy and often vituperative disagreements on what constituted balance or equivalence in force buildings and weapons organizations, since well since in excess of the technology and credibility of verification. The details of these debates, since also the agreements eventually reached, were extensively accounted at the time therefore that it is not necessary to repeat then here. The biggest bilateral nuclear weapon treaties signed through the US and the USSR/Russia are since follows:

- 26 May 1972: Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I)
- 03 July 1974: Threshold Test Ban Treaty
- 18 June 1979: Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II)
- 08 December 1987: Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty
- 31 July 1991: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I)
- 03 January 1993: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II)

Notwithstanding significant reduction in nuclear arsenals promised in START I and II, and a

– developing nuclear weapons raised acute anxiety in world capitals. Events were undertaken to prevent and check that kind of ‘horizontal’ proliferation, notably the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) negotiated in excess of three years and opened for signature through states on 1 July 1968 with an initial validity of 25 years. With 135 initial and 187 current signatories, the NPT is the main multilateral treaty on record and was indefinitely extended in 1995. The NPT specifically describes a nuclear-weapon state (NWS) since one that had manufactured and exploded a nuclear device before 1 January 1967, therefore recognizing two dissimilar categories of states, and makes dissimilar necessities of them. Article 1 stipulates fully that NWS undertake not to transfer any nuclear explosive device, or any encouragement to or means of manufacturing them, to any non-nuclear weapons state (NNWS). Article II of the NPT obliges non-nuclear explosive devices.

This explicit bargain flanked by NWS and NNWS was struck only when it was agreed that the treaty would set up the norm that no state should have nuclear weapons embodied in Article VI stating that the parties to the treaty undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith to “common and complete disarmament under strict and effective international management.” Also the treaty recognized the role of the International Atomic Power Agency (IAEA) created in 1954 to foster the swap of scientific and technological fact on the peaceful exploits of atomic power while ensuring that none of it was used to further any military purpose. In addition to the NPT the US and others took further events to discourage and prevent proliferation. Few industrialized and nuclear capable countries such since the FRG, Japan, and Sweden were in the NPT since NNWS. Other potential proliferators, such since Argentina and Brazil, were persuaded or pressurized into signing local bans on nuclear weapons. Increasingly stringent limitations have been placed on deal and transfers of any materials or technologies that could be used for military purposes through suppliers, clusters such since the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Supplies Cluster founded in the 1970s, the Missile Technology Manage Regime (MTCR) of 1987 and the Warsaw Guidelines of 1992. Domestic legislation and vigorous surveillance in few countries as the 1970s, notably in the US, raise extremely high barriers to transfers of doubtful materials and technologies, and “counter proliferation” tactics devised to discourage potential proliferators. International public opinion rose against nuclear weapons after the end of the Cold War. Former republics in the Soviet Union, Kazakastan and Ukraine relinquished nuclear weapons.

South Africa terminated its nuclear weapons program at the time of creation a transit to democracy. The US and Russia agreed to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion on the Nuclear Weapons Case in July 1996 and held that the exploit of nuclear weapons would violate humanitarian law. In September 1996 a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature and negotiation for a multilateral treaty on a cutoff of manufacture of fissile material for nuclear weapons was in procedure. The proliferation clock was ticking again through the end of the century. The CTBT required the 44 states, judged to

be nuclear capable to sign and ratify it before coming into force; India objected to being numbered one of the 44 and did not sign, and however President Clinton signed in 1999 the US Senate did not ratify the treaty. India, and Pakistan, openly tested nuclear weapons in May 1998 and moved toward their deployment; US pressures on them to “roll back” their programs failed.

It also became apparent that few state signatories of the NPT, and few private companies within signatory countries, had previously violated prohibitions on transfers of technology and materials to the then NNWS such as Pakistan; and North Korea not only threatened to withdraw from the NPT but boasted of having manufactured weapons. At the heart of the proliferation dilemma, however, is the issue of equity. The NPT created a hierarchy of states, privileging the NWS on condition that they sincerely move toward the abolition of nuclear weapons. Their failure to do therefore and their adoption of counter-proliferation events (including growth of new kinds of nuclear weapons) raised suspicions that they wanted a perpetual freeze of hierarchy. In the terms of Richard Butler, former head of the UN Special commission to disarm Iraq, “it is basically beyond any concept of civilization to uphold the security of any state or person on the foundation of the threat of size destruction of others. It is inevitable that since extensive since the threat exists, others will seek to defend against it through events of a same type. The consequences of such activity and reaction are an endless spiral of proliferation.”

Decolonization and Non-Aligned Movement

The Second World War brought in relation to the dissolution of European empires in Asia and Africa, beginning with the independence of the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma in the mid-1940s, Ghana in 1956, and mainly of Francophone Africa in the early 1960s. The procedure of decolonization was neither easy nor rapid and was only completed in the last decade of the century, when South Africa threw in excess of its apartheid regime, and when Britain returned Hong Kong and Portugal returned Macao to China in 1997 and 1999 respectively. One immediate effect of decolonization was the multiplication of state members in the international organization. Another immediate effect was to widen the agenda of the international organization, especially that of the United Nations General Assembly of which the newly independent states were members, to include subjects of interest to them such as decolonization, racial equality, and economic growth. A third effect was to alter the functioning of the international organization somewhat, absent from the *realpolitik* of authority play toward norms of equity, international law, universal participation and legitimization of communal activity through the UN.

Attempts of multiple parentages to therefore reform the international organization were delayed, diffused, and incomplete no doubt, but none the less discernible in the latter half of the 20th Century when the Cold War was at its height. For instance, a victory for the principles of decolonization and self-determination was seen in passage of UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV):

Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, on 14 December 1960 and its virtual elevation to international law. Decolonization came to be associated with the growth of a Nonaligned Movement (NAM) because significant countries such as India, Indonesia, Egypt, and Ghana gained their independence at a time when the world was riven in two blocs through the Cold War and they naturally wished to assert their diplomatic and ideological independence not only from their former colonial masters, but from that scrupulous clash, which was not their own. Since Jawaharlal Nehru announced in 1946, “We propose since distant since possible, to stay absent from the authority politics of clusters, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster level.” In much the similar method a newly independent USA had declared its non-involvement in the Napoleonic clash of early 19th Century Europe. And in same fashion Yugoslavia’s President Tito asserted the independence of a communist state from the Soviet bloc in 1948. Initially, so, nonalignment denoted the foreign policy orientation of a scrupulous state disassociating itself from the biggest international clash of the time, and easily was confused with neutrality or neutralism, negative words often used to denigrate such assertions of independence.

Nonalignment was always dissimilar from neutrality or neutralization, however, because nonalignment was a freely chosen location and not imposed through others since in the case of neutralization, because nonaligned states never claimed to be strictly equidistant from the two super powers and tolerated cynical allegations of manipulating Cold War rivalries for their own benefit, and because nonalignment, since Nehru often explained, demanded an active participation in the international arena and not the passive withdrawal of a neutral. These positive characteristics of a nonaligned location became apparent in the course of the Korean War (1950-1953) and UN debates in relation to the have conduct and end. First, the Korean War raised anxiety in relation to the prospects of international peace, seen since a prerequisite for the independence and self-growth of new states, and therefore led to India’s successful efforts to mediate variations flanked by the opposing faces on the disposition of prisoners of war and condition for armistice, since well since several exhortations to peace and ‘zones of peace’. Secondly, Asian and Arab members of the UN cooperated in drafting mediatory settlements and establish an affinity in mutual concerns for accelerating decolonization and emphasizing economic and social growth in the functioning of the UN in excess of the ideological and military clash of the super powers that dominated the agenda. The first Asian-African Conference was held at Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955 in the middle of high representatives of 29 states to believe troubles of general interest and talk about methods and means of reaching fuller cooperation. This conference is regarded since a precursor to NAM; its final communiqué heralded future final communiqués of NAM summit meetings in stressing the require for economic and cultural cooperation, human rights and self-determination, attention to the troubles of dependent peoples, and promotion of world peace and nuclear disarmament.

But there was no agreement at Bandung on what was one criterion of nonalignment that is, abstaining from membership of (Western sponsored) military alliances, because few states, including the Philippines and Pakistan, hoped to gain security from such alliance. The following year President Nasser of Egypt, Prime Minister Nehru of India, and President Tito of Yugoslavia met at Brioni to review international growths and reaffirmed their commitment to the principles laid down at Bandung since well since the require to persevere in settling international troubles and creating an atmosphere of peace. Through the late 1950s the word 'nonalignment' was in usage, since also the French word *Tiers Monde* and its Anglicized shape Third World, denoting a cluster of countries in contradistinction to the First World of capitalist liberal democracy and the Second World of command economic scheduling. However not synonymous the words 'newly independent', 'nonaligned', 'developing countries', and 'third world' came to be used more or less interchangeably. The first Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries was held at Belgrade in September 1961 and issued a passionate appeal to the US and USSR to "suspend their recent war preparations" and "resume negotiation for a peaceful resolution" of outstanding variations flanked by them. The final communiqué noted the weakening of imperialism and reaffirmed support to UNGA Settlement 1514.

In addition, the communiqué described for common and complete disarmament and urged participation of nonaligned states in all world conferences on disarmament, denounced the establishment of foreign military foundations since a violation of sovereignty, advocated policies of peaceful coexistence, and described attention to specific troubles, such since racial apartheid in South Africa and the rights of the Palestinian people, to be tackled in conventionality with UN principles. The 25 leaders assembled at Belgrade denied "any wish to shape a new bloc" but agreed to convene same meetings every three years and tried to specify criteria (such since non-acceptance of foreign military foundations) for invitees. NAM was launched and steadily gained members. 92 heads of state or government met at the Havana summit in 1979 and 114 at the Kuala Lumpur, 13th summit of 2003.

Meanwhile, NAM criteria had been therefore enlarged that there was small parallel in the middle of members beyond their comparative weakness in the international organization both political and economic. The goal of economic independence and self-reliance proved to be more elusive than that of legal independence. Third World members of the UN conferred and often voted jointly since a cluster (the G-77) in the Common Assembly and new agencies such since the UN Conference on Deal and Growth (UNCTAD) in the 1960s to attempt and redress adverse words of deal and gain concessions for their exports in more urbanized and affluent markets. Thoughts in relation to the revising the whole international organization of economic dealings were aired at the NAM Summit at Lusaka in 1970 and presented since a manifesto at the Algiers Summit three years later, before being adopted at a special session of the Common Assembly in 1974 since a Program for Activity for the

establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). It was no coincidence that demands for an NIEO were launched concurrently with the first dramatic oil-price hike and demonstration of the Institution of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) bargaining authority with industrialized economies dependent on imports of cheap power.

For a time it emerged since if a fundamental shift of economic and so diplomatic authority absent from the industrial North toward the pre-industrial South were possible. The reforms demanded under NIEO fell under five largest heads since follows:

- Reforms in the words of deal and pricing for primary products and commodities, and bigger access to the markets of the advanced industrial countries by preferences.
- Reforms in the biggest international economic institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund, to benefit developing countries.
- Recognition of the growing problem of Third World debt and events to alleviate it.
- Greater economic assistance and technology transfers to developing countries.
- Recognition of sovereign rights to direct national economic policy and manage the behaviors of Multi-National Corporations.

The charter of demands for socio-economic justice was addressed to the advanced industrial countries of the First World but had small tangible effect on their policies; however the rhetoric of several statements such since those of the Commissions on South-South cooperation echoed that of NIEO. The Second World Socialist countries claimed to be a “natural ally” of NAM but disclaimed responsibility for the injustices of the capitalist international economic organization or the means to redress them. The victory of conservative leaders with difficult ideology in the West, especially Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the US, was certainly a setback to the reason of international social justice, and a blaze of militarism accompanied the New Cold War of the 1980s. Once again nonalignment was denigrated since ‘immoral’ and ‘anti-American’ and UN voting records of NAM members scrutinized and sometimes penalized. NIEO demands had not been met through the end of the 20th Century and few troubles, such since Third World debt, had become more acute, even since rising globalization and the rules of the World Deal Institution presented new challenges to all countries, including those belonging to NAM. In advocating an NIEO, NAM also addressed its own members in exhorting them to increase cooperation and exchanges of fact and technology in the middle of themselves and improve them abroad.

These exhortations had only limited effect, largely because the economies of the newly independent countries remained firmly connected to those of the metropolitan ‘core’ of advanced industrial countries, and the ruling elites of the former frequently were dependent on the explicit or tacit approval of the latter in order to remain in authority. Their skill and willingness to implement the

NIEO charter within their own countries was correspondingly weak. Linkages flanked by 'margin' and 'core' were apparent in Latin America and inspired the neo-Marxist theory of *dependencia* to explain modern international dealings; practical instruction on how to end the cycle of dependence without revolution, however, was mainly confined to creation declarations in international conferences. Lack of means was a ready account for the paucity of South-South cooperation. But even when financial means were accessible, since from petrodollars generated through successive oil-price hikes, they were directed more toward arms purchases from and investments in the West than toward assisting broad-based economic growth in oil-importing countries of the South. Other weaknesses of NAM deserve attention. Mainly stemmed from the varieties of its members, drawn since they were from every continent and so lacking the general perspectives of a geographically contiguous area, and having leaders of varying ideological leanings and practical experience in governance. Several members were racked through internal divisions and conflicts since well since through authoritarian governments.

India was for extensive an unusual democracy in the Third World. Each member had its own definition of national self-interest, and of nonalignment, that did not coincide with another's definition strongly sufficient to produce an alliance or even a coalition capable of joint activity, except for at the stage of declaration and, it necessity be added for few, in lending moral and material assistance to the anti-apartheid forces of democracy in South Africa throughout the 1980s. Even the troubles of the Arab people of Palestine that featured in every NAM summit document inspired no substantive general activity beyond granting membership to the Palestine Liberation Institution, and drafting settlements criticizing Israel and Zionism (predictably offensive to the US). Typically, NAM comments on significant regions of clash, including Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Central America in the 1980s, were drafted through members from that scrupulous area and paragraphs put into a collage of the final report to await the next summit meeting. Institutional underpinning was slight, derived from the diplomatic missions of members at UN headquarters in New York. The weaknesses of NAM, in short, stemmed from the administrative, diplomatic, economic, financial, institutional, and political weaknesses of the individual members themselves.

These were mainly apparent in cases of civil clash that racked mainly of Africa, and of clash in the middle of member states, such since flanked by Iran and Iraq for years of bitter war during 1980-1988, and perennial disputes flanked by Pakistan and India, that NAM could neither prevent nor seriously effort to mediate. NAM still lacks the mechanisms and authority to resolve conflicts; but then, therefore do other states and international institutions. The strengths of NAM arose from the courageous attempts of its founding leaders to come questions of international peace and security from the point of view of the superior good of humanity, to give representatives of distanced and newly independent states opportunities for free discussion of issues and interaction with each other that were not easily accessible elsewhere, and to articulate principles that might not have been

matched through practice but pointed toward a more equitable and humane international code of conduct produced through authority politics. It is for this cause, possibly, that NAM did not disappear with the end of the Cold War, since was expected through those who judged it relevant only to bipolar military-security configuration. Instead, NAM continues to grow and transform its role with the demands of the day, while reaffirming the realities of varieties and pluralism in the modern world.

The End of the 20th Century and Issues in International Dealings Theory

For those who see the Russian Revolution of 1917 since the mainly significant event of the 20th Century, the unexpected dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked not only the equally unexpected termination of the Cold War but the end of century itself. Measures of the 1990s illustrated dilemmas, issues, and troubles that also control the first years of the 21st Century.

These stemmed both from the end of a bipolar balance of authority international organization that had lent few predictability to world politics as the end of the Second World War, and from the collapse of a great multi-ethnic superpower with a command economy. The 1990s also saw the breakdown of civility and governmental power in many states, such since Yugoslavia and more than one in Africa, that were not caused through transforms in the international organization since such and evoked muddled responses from it, but which stimulated debates inside and outside the UN in relation to the ethnic identity, displacement of peoples, and therefore on. It is hard to generalize in relation to the international rivalries at the 20th Century's end than at its beginning and we confine ourselves to a brief overview. When an ailing Brezhnev passed absent in November 1982 the internal troubles of the Soviet Union had been severe for a decade or more, however concealed through the aura of a superpower from the outside world, including US intelligence agencies. Brezhnev was succeeded through men of his own generation, first through Yuri Andropov, who died in February 1984, and then through Konstantin Chernenko, who died in March 1985.

Neither had the time nor power to effort internal reform or external initiatives. The credit for doing therefore belonged to the next Common Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 54 year old Mikhail Gorbachev, who came to be called since "the man who changed the world" in five years. Gorbachev saw the imperative of revitalizing a stagnant Soviet economy and the close to impossibility of doing therefore without loosening state manage that had corrupted management, introducing open debate to stimulate initiative, and reducing defense expenditures then amounting to an estimated 25 per cent of GNP. But the latter was unfeasible while the Soviet Union was occupied in a debilitating war in Afghanistan and faced a vociferously hostile Reagan Management that was raising the US defense budget above \$400 billion a year, albeit less than five per cent of American GNP. Gorbachev simultaneously launched three campaigns and mannered them personally. One was externally directed to set up good dealings with world leaders, especially in the West beginning with

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and to restructure dealings with other Socialist states on the foundation of independence rather than the Brezhnev Doctrine of intervention.

Another campaign was to promote the idea of *perestroika* – meaning reform and an all-embracing modernization therefore since to improve economic performance and livelihood circumstances of the people – in the middle of Soviet officials and the public throughout his several tours approximately the country. And a third campaign was also internal, to introduce *glasnost* – meaning openness – in distribution fact with the frequently alienated intelligentsia, and reaching economic and political decisions on the foundation of information's rather than secretly fabricated statistics. *Perestroika* and *glasnost* amounted to a reversal of Soviet policy and practice of in excess of 60 years and needed active support from Party and State *apparatchiks* (functionaries) at every stage in order to succeed. Not surprisingly, well entrenched, highly placed *apparatchiks* collectively recognized since the *Nomnclatura* offered the greatest resistance to *perestroika* and *glasnost*. Gorbachev's vocal attacks on the organization and Party he had inherited, especially at the 27th Party Congress of February 1986, merely strengthened their opposition to modernization or democratization, while the habits of dependence and obedience to power in the common population were not easily overcome. *Glasnost* too made the task of reform from above more, not less, hard, partly because it delegitimized the exploit of coercion, and partly because it provided no adequate response to the catastrophic meltdown of a nuclear reactor at the Chernobyl authority station on 26 April 1986, the worst nuclear accident in the world. Gorbachev wrote in his Memoirs (1995) that he laid the foundation for *perestroika* in the years 1985- 1988 and expected democratization to take lay peacefully in the next stage.

In information, his reforms sparked a type of uncontrolled revolution leading to economic chaos, political fragmentation, and self-assertion through superior and smaller 'national clusters – including Russia itself – that unraveled the Soviet Union in 1991. Before that happened, however, Gorbachev's diplomacy assisted through Foreign Minister Eduard Shevarnadze, brought an end to the Cold War. The Cold War was called earlier since being an ideological clash flanked by communism and capitalism, a territorial clash in excess of manage of Central Europe epitomized in the division of Germany, and a authority thrash about flanked by the US and USSR played out through proxy on all continents but mainly of all in the arms race. Gorbachev's economic reforms moving the Soviet Union absent from its state controlled 'command' model toward a mixed and even a market economy obviously diminished ideological clash, since did his public advocacy of universal 'democratic' values reiterated on the occasion of his summit meeting with US President George Bush at Malta in December 1989. Meanwhile, unrest in the Socialist states of Eastern Europe caused Gorbachev concern, but he did not go back on his principle of non-interference therefore that demands for transform were no longer met through repression backed through Soviet arms. Instead,

elections in Poland brought Solidarity to authority in lay of the Communist Party. Hungary embraced a multiparty organization and opened its border with Austria in May 1989.

The regimes in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and later Romania collapsed. Gorbachev wrote that when he visited Berlin for a meeting with GDR leaders in October 1989 he was reminded “of an overheated boiler with the lid tightly closed”. On the night of 8 November the crises came to a head with massive crowds gathering at the Berlin Wall and tearing sections of it down with their hands; the checkpoints to West Berlin were opened to allow for an exodus. The future of Germany, in one or in two states, was a hard question to resolve against the backdrop of 20th Century wars, the growing weight of Germany and the crucial importance of German-Soviet dealings to the continuity of Europe. Gorbachev had met FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl for the first time in October 1988 when they both agreed in Moscow to promote links flanked by NATO and the Warsaw Pact and establish they could do business with each other. But Kohl’s ten point plan for the rapid unification of Germany put forward in November 1989 dismayed Gorbachev since well since British and French leaders. Complex consultations in the middle of concerned parties worried in relation to the possible instability followed, and all questions were then refereed to a body consisting of the four occupying powers – Britain, France, the US and the USSR – plus the two German states. Soviet delegates were not able to achieve their objective of effectively neutralizing Germany by membership of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and no one anticipated the practical difficulties of reunification.

But finally, skilful diplomacy resulted in all accepting a re-untied Germany within NATO, at the similar time renouncing forever possession of WMDs and formally committed to “good neighborliness, partnership and cooperation.” More than one explanation has been published detailing interchanges flanked by Moscow and Washington flanked by 1985 and 1991 that brought in relation to the end to the Cold War and produced significant agreements on arms manage after tough negotiations. All these descriptions illustrate the importance of individual personalities and their interaction with each other in creation initiatives possible, the cleavages that lived *within* each face flanked by hardliners who scorned any diminution of hostility and new thinkers hoping to bridge the chasm of mistrust by compromise, and the consistent negative power of domestic politics and media coverage in each country on the progress of bilateral negotiations. Without discussing these common propositions affecting all international dealings, we outline the largest measures in US-USSR dealings flanked by 1985 and 1991. The New Cold War of the 1980s intensified danger not only because of heightened clash in Asia, Africa, and Central America, but because of the introduction of new and more lethal nuclear weapons into superpower arsenals and the deployment of few in Europe, since well since Reagan’s proposed Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) that threatened continuity of the 1972 ABM Treaty through taking the arms race into legroom. The principal Soviet and US interest was to reduce the threat posed through these weapons to their respective countries but the chasm of mistrust flanked by them was immense. Despite their skill to communicate with

each other since human beings, the two men could reach no agreement beyond the desirability of meeting again.

They did therefore next at Reykjavik, Iceland, on 11-12 October 1986 and bargained seriously in relation to the eliminating offensive ballistic missiles from their arsenals within ten years, and all other nuclear weapons too. Their respective advisers were appalled through this unplanned leap their leaders had made, and relieved when negotiations failed because Reagan refused to relinquish SDI. (He also ignored the six-continent initiative launched through Argentina. Nevertheless, Reykjavik was a turning point in new thinking; it made possible the INF Treaty of December 1987 eliminating few species of missiles from Europe and opening the method for reductions in all classes of nuclear weapons subsequently agreed to in START I and II in July 1991 and January 1993. Gorbachev's state visit to Washington D.C. in December 1987 was a public dealings triumph for him and the beginning of a personal rapport with then Vice-President George Bush that was accepted forward into the next some years.

For instance, the US and the IMF tried to assist marketization of the Soviet economy – however the actual impact of their attempts is controversial. Gorbachev was acutely aware of internal economic troubles since he introduced *perestroika* and reduced costly external commitments. Therefore, on 9 February 1988 he announced specific steps for a political resolution in Afghanistan by the UN, including the withdrawal of Soviet troops in excess of the following year. Multilateral resolution of the Cambodia problem and UN supervision of elections followed soon after, since also resolutions in Angola and Namibia with active UN participation. Gorbachev quickened the pace of normalizing dealings with China and received a warm welcome in Beijing in May 1989, an event overshadowed for the international media present to cover it through the unrelated pro-democracy student demonstrations taking lay in Tiananmen Square at the similar time and their subsequent repression through force. Also, the Soviet Union was diplomatically active throughout the crisis caused through Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990; it could not persuade Saddam Hussein to withdraw peacefully and joined the rest of the Security Council in sanctioning military activity against him. A extensive-standing Soviet objective was advanced in October 1991 when it co-sponsored with the US an international conference on the Transitional East convened at Madrid to set out a program – or 'road map' since it was described – to resolve clash flanked by Israel and Palestine.

But success abroad could not conceal failures and fissures at home, especially on the 'nationalities problem' constituting dealings flanked by Moscow at the centre and constituent units or Republics of the federated USSR, since well since flanked by dissimilar ethnic clusters in each constituent Republic. There were several anomalies in the massive multi-ethnic expanse of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev had no new thinking to offer on those subjects; he showed a preference for centralized and ethnic-Russian power. But once 'national' urges to recover language, religion and identity were stirred at the grassroots, a momentum grew. The Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

exploded in resentment against Russians and the CPSU, tacitly helped in their drive for independence through the US, which had always refused to recognize them since section of the USSR. Corruption in Uzbekistan led to an insurrection there in 1986, followed through problems in Kazakhstan and during the Trans-Caucasian area including Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, and later Chechnya. An attempted coup against Gorbachev in August 1990 failed, but his leadership was noticeably depleted. Meanwhile, the revival of Russian national feeling – in contrast and subsequent opposition to Soviet feeling – was also strong, and owed much to the ambitions of Boris Yeltsin, possibly, who became President of the Russian Federation in 1990 and successor to Gorbachev in 1991.

The Soviet Union was officially dissolved in December 1991, replaced in name through the Commonwealth of Independent States. Fourteen new states became members of the United Nations. Yugoslavia, a conglomerate state created through the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, had survived the death of its unifying leader Josip Broz Tito in May 1980 but faced intensifying tensions flanked by the more and the less economically urbanized republics and shrinking possessions fueled animosity in the middle of dissimilar ethnic and religious clusters. Croatia and Slovenia declared independence in 1991 and Slobodan Milosevic became leader of a nationalistic Serbia determined to build a ‘Greater Serbia’ out of the remaining units of multi-ethnic Yugoslavia at the cost of minority clusters, including the Muslims of Bosnia and the Albanians of Kosovo. Atrocities that came to be described ‘ethnic cleansing’ led to military clash, expressions of international alarm, and an inadequate United Nations intervention in Bosnia in 1991-92 that was replaced through a NATO force in late 1995.

Neither force could restore peace or prevent massacres and population transfers that resulted in an ethnically-partitioned Bosnia reflected in the final Dayton peace agreement. Further clash flared in Kosovo and US led-NATO forces mannered 11 weeks of air strikes on Serbia and its capital on Serbia and its capital Belgrade in 1999 before stationing peace keeping troops in Kosovo. Milosevic was displaced and taken to side trial for ‘crimes against humanity’ at the International Tribunal in The Hague. The OSCE subsequently attempted to outline a local strategy for dealing with crisis prevention and post-clash rehabilitation in Europe. The internationally publicized Yugoslavia episode illustrated many trends noticeable also in other sections of the world at the end of the 20th Century but not discussed here. Extremely briefly, five of these trends were since follows:

- Rising economic integration, or globalization, while welcomed in several prospering quarters, also quickly transmitted economic troubles crossways national frontiers and caused societal stress. Yugoslavia suffered from Western Europe’s economic slow down and unemployment in the 1980s. In 1997 a financial crisis caused through rapid transfers of capital spread from South Korea by all of Southeast Asia, undercutting the dynamism hitherto displayed through the ‘Asian Tigers’ and affecting world deal negatively.

- The breakdown of central governmental power in multi-ethnic states was accompanied often through inter-ethnic clash and the commitment of atrocities that sometimes amounted to genocide. The Bosnian horrors viewed on international television were equaled or exceeded through ‘humanitarian crises’ in several sections of Africa, particularly in Rwanda in 1994 when the Hutu massacred the Tutsi people in their thousands, but also in Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan, and Zaire.
- Crises often hit international headlines too late to be prevented or supervised through multilateral diplomacy. Since an association of sovereign member states, the UN did not possess the institutions, the fund, or the mechanisms to meet the challenges posed through human disasters and failing states. Nor did local institutions such as the EU or the OAU. The inability of concerned persons to put potential crises high on the international agenda sometimes was an unavoidable tragedy, since in Rwanda.
- The issue of protecting human rights received rising international attention in the aftermath of the Cold War and the Tiananmen Square event in China, with nongovernmental institutions playing significant roles in the attempt both domestically and internationally. No world-wide consensus was reached, however, on what constituted violation of human rights or how such violations were best remedied. There was even less agreement on the legitimacy or modality of ‘humanitarian intervention’ encroaching on traditional notions of state sovereignty.
- In the absence of effective UN or EU activity the US took the lead in Bosnia and Kosovo. An image of the US as a ‘hyper authority’, the ‘indispensable authority’, gained currency in the 1990s when it was the only remaining super-authority, but also triggered expressions of preference through several world leaders for a multi-polar international organization. Therefore, apparent strains urbanized flanked by the US and its closest allies in Europe, Japan, since well with its more recent and problematic partners, Russia and China.

The last decade of the 20th Century seemed to justify it being described the ‘American Century’. American military spending was more than the next 15 military budgets added jointly, US military authority was overwhelmingly larger to that of every other country and truly global in its reach. The US economy showed more dynamism than those of Europe or Japan and American corporations were at the core of the international economy.

The US attracted more immigrants per year from all in excess of the world than any other country. American universities were global centers of revise and research. American popular civilization expressed the difficult authority of the US. American triumphal in the collapse of socialism and simple victory in the Gulf War of early 1991 was apparent in calls for a New World Order, and succinctly expressed in the title of Francis Fukuyama’s celebrated book, *The End of History*, which argued that there were no viable alternatives to capitalistic democracy left in the world. American

hegemony in excess of the international organization at the end of the 20th century emerged to be even greater than it had been 50 years earlier (when it reported for almost 50 per cent of World GDP in contrast to the current approximate 20 per cent) or that of Great Britain one hundred years earlier. One result was widespread resentment of the US, not merely in the middle of newly independent developing countries that experienced difficulty to having their voices heard in Washington DC, but also in the middle of well-recognized great powers, and other permanent members of the UN Security Council, many of which complained of American heavy handedness in diplomatic approach. While no one state or cluster of states was able or willing to make a counter balance to the US, there was much talk in world capitals in relation to the 'multi polarity' providing a more widely acceptable foundation than 'hegemonic continuity' for world order. As big swathes of the world were infected with transnational crime, drug trafficking, insurrection, terrorism, and destruction of the natural habitation in the last decade of the 20th Century, no one could pretend that world order prevailed or that American authority alone was enough to set up it.

Within the US there were several references to the illusionary or transient nature of a unipolar world and speculation on how a growing authority, such since China, could be accommodated or transforms in the international organization be brought in relation to the peacefully. At the similar time, Samuel Huntington, an eminent political scientist, seemed to predict protracted clash flanked by the Judeo-Christian West and other biggest cultures such since the Islamic or Sinic, in his widely read *Conflict of Cultures*.

UNIPOLAR WORLD AND COUNTER-CURRENTS

What is an Organization?

The building and norms of the world polity are products of policies *chosen* through states and other actors that create the world organization and its several subsystems. At the similar time the building and norms of the world political organization powers the activities of the subsystems comprising it. Theorizing based on organizations brings jointly two fundamental approaches to International Dealings (IR) theory. The first is focused on actors and the interaction that takes lay flanked by them, whether they are individuals, clusters of people such since nations, or bureaucratic units.

This come has been termed *reductionist* because its focus is the growth of explanations or theory at the stage of the individual participants or units. The second come spaces emphasis on the buildings that give the framework within which such interactions take lay. The structural come efforts to explain how the buildings within which the actors exist affect the interactions flanked by the actors, and how and why transforms in the building take lay. This structural come has been termed *holistic* or *systemic* because it is based on the growth of explanations at a more micro stage of analysis. In an organizations framework, transform or continuity can be generated at any stage (from micro to macro) in the world polity.

Such transform or continuity-generating forces can also approach from or be processed by factors not fully encompassed through the political organization, namely, ethnic/cultural, religious groupings, economy, ecological habitation and the physical universe. Growths in any of these “non-political” meadows will affect, sometimes profoundly, the circumstances of life, perceptions, and values of the similar persons who construct, operate and change the world’s political organization and subsystems.

Characteristics of the Organizations Theory

The world polity should first of all be viewed since the global configuration of governance – meaning the enforceable rules, and the rule-creation and rule-implementing procedures and institutions. It includes not only the prevailing configuration of governance but also attempts directed towards changing the prevailing configuration. Since such the world polity is appropriately conceived of since a subsystem of the world’s social organization. Other subsystems, at this stage of analysis, would be the world economic organization, the humanity centered ecological organization, the world’s pattern of civilizations, and therefore on. The world polity, viewed since an organization, it includes several political subsystems:

- The ‘nation-state organization’ (often referred to since the “international organization”) of official government to government dealings in the middle of countries including numerous local and functional intergovernmental agencies.
- The rapidly proliferating “transnational” institutions and political movements operating beyond the direct manage of national governments (the transnational actors may be political subdivisions of the nation states since well since non-governmental clusters or persons)
- The internal or domestic organizations of politics and government of each nation-state, comprising their own subsystems: provincial and regional governments, party organizations, interest cluster institutions etc.
- The individual since political actor.

An essential characteristic of the proposed theory is that the several organizations and subsystems, although analytically discrete, are open to one another: reasons and effects typically move laterally from subsystem to subsystem, but also vertically from one stage to the next, even leaping in excess of stages. Yet each organization or subsystem has its own partially unique configuration; and few of them since a matter of policy, may attempt to restrict the extent to which they are open to power from other organizations. It may be theoretically valid, so and often analytically useful, to heuristically treat them since closed organizations. But, with rising mobility of persons, objects and fact, the *interpenetrability* of the several organizations that create up the world’s political organization would look to be a more useful premise of a common theory of the world polity.

The premise of open organizations is constant with the analytic strategy advanced through James Rosenau for understanding the turbulence of the modern period. We require, he advises, to “examine world politics in such a method since to exploit labels that do not automatically accord larger status to nation-states.” We should operate from the assumption that “sub-national and supranational sovereignty-free actors may be since relevant since sovereignty bound actors, conceiving of entire organizations and sub-organizations since the cast of characters at the macro stage that, beside with the individuals at the micro stage act out global dramas.” This conceptual frame, says Rosenau, “facilitates inquiry into the conflicts that divide collectivities and the attempts they necessity create to bridge the issues that distinct them.”

What is Systemic Theory?

A systemic theory presumes that how authority is distributed in the middle of states — or what is described the systemic building — affects how states behave. The idea is that how states behave is a function of what the international arena seems like. An organization with one dominant authority (unipolarity) is likely to function differently from one in which there are two dominant powers (bipolarity) or more than two dominant powers (multipolarity). How the actors relate to each other and the connection flanked by the building and the actors – mediators – (the building-agency connection) shapes a critically significant section of the quest for an understanding of transform at the systemic, holistic stage.

What is a Domestic Political Account of Foreign Policy in Systemic Words?

This depends on an implicit contrast to “systemic” or “structural” explanations. What we count since a domestic theory can modify depending on the method we conceive of systemic theories: (1) those that envision states since unitary and purposive actors that believe what other states will or might do, or (2) those that, in addition to this, do not believe aspects of scrupulous states since relevant to the account offered.

Is Systemic Theory, a Theory of Foreign Policy?

Yes: international political outcomes are the direct, even if sometimes unintended, result of individual states’ foreign policy choices; if the theory explains tendencies, it necessity help explain choices. For Kenneth Waltz, systemic theories are not theories of foreign policy “through definition.” A domestic theory would be one in which (a) at least one state is represented since non-unitary, and pursues a suboptimal foreign policy due to the interaction of the actors within the state, or (b) either include this or explain variations in foreign policies through referring to regime kinds or scrupulous foreign policy goals. If one adopts the broader understanding of systemic theory, the scope for domestic politics to matter is greatly reduced.

It is limited to cases where a state pursues a foreign policy that is suboptimal. Systemic analysis itself incorporates domestic factors. Domestic theories trace an individual foreign policy to information's in relation to the political organization rather than solely, or at all, to its international location. Elaborating further, James N. Rosenau words the international organization since having entered a period of "cascading interdependence" based on rapidly changing patterns of interaction in the middle of such phenomena since "resource scarcities, subgroupism, the effectiveness of governments, transnational issues, and the aptitudes of publics." Cascading interdependence distributes authority in an erratic fashion in the middle of state entities and numerous sub-organizations at several stages.

In the post-Cold War world, an overwhelming amount of scholarly attention has been directed at quantifying, evaluating and predicting the trajectory of American authority. Words like primacy, unipolarity, empire and hegemony have been used to capture the essence of the United States status in the international organization. A definition of the word unipolar will be since follows: "the preponderant power or power in excess of others, or, the social, cultural, ideological, or economic power exerted through a dominant state/cluster." Not only does the United States possess an unprecedented amount of authority comparative to other states in the organization, but it also exhibits a preponderant power in excess of other states crossways all realms of interaction, including the making of international institutions.

Defining Unipolarity

The concept of polarity in the international organization is used to define the sharing of authority capabilities crossways states. Polarity is a descriptive word that shows the building of the organization by a portrayal of the concentration of difficult authority capabilities in the organization. The three largest differences in polarity are unipolarity, bipolarity and multipolarity. However it is significant to recognize that even within each kind of polarity there exists difference. For instance, John Mearsheimer has distinguished flanked by balanced multipolarity and unbalanced multipolarity, which depend on the degree to which authority capabilities modify in the middle of multiple great powers.

Polarity is an organization-stage concept that relates to the sharing of authority, real or perceived, in the international organization. Unilateralism and multilateralism are choices in relation to the policies that states adopt within a given international organization. Charles Krauthammer and Robert Kagan are what might be described unipolar unilateralists. They see the sharing of authority in the international organization since essentially unipolar. They also embrace unilateral policies since the means through which the United States necessity protect its interests and act for the greater good of humanity.

Krauthammer recognized the “unipolar moment” in his seminal article of 1990 and later came to see unipolarity since an enduring characteristic of the international order. John Ikenberry and Joseph Nye are same to Krauthammer and Kagan in that they perceive the international organization since essentially unipolar. Ikenberry essentially updates hegemonic continuity theory to post-Cold War circumstances, arguing that by restraint and the judicious exploit of international institutions, the US can perpetuate its special status in the international organization, forestalling the formation of hostile coalitions or the rise of a new hegemon. Nye acknowledges few elements of multipolarity in the international organization – he argues that international dealings has become a three stage game involving military, economic and therefore-described soft authority, with the US enjoying unipolar dominance only on the first stage – but he is concerned that a shift to crossways-the-board multipolarity would be destabilizing. American foreign policy can and should job to preserve US military dominance by the judicious exploit of soft authority.

Traditional realists such since John Mearsheimer reject both the neoconservative and liberal views of the unipolar world order. They argue that the international organization is inherently multipolar. Any unipolar imbalance can only be momentary, since competing authority centers inevitably rise and seek to counterbalance the dominant authority. Mearsheimer also argues that US policy necessity be unilateralist for the easy cause that all great powers pursue essentially unilateralist policies. For William Wolforth, unipolarity is, a building in which one state’s capabilities is too great to be counterbalanced. Unipolarity is a very useful word for capturing the current state of the international organization, which is marked through an overwhelming and unprecedented concentration of authority in both the military arsenal and the economic strength of one nation. In other terms, the word unipolarity defines a heavily skewed sharing of authority in favor of one state.

Structure on this understanding, unipolarity can take more than one shape. The traditional understanding of unipolarity, it can be present when there is one great authority in an organization full of minor powers. Other alternative shapes of unipolarity could be present in an organization that contains one superpower with all great powers or one superpower with all minor powers. The key to understanding unipolarity is in the degree to which authority capabilities are concentrated in the hands of a single dominant state. Unipolarity implies neither the absence of all politics in the middle of great powers nor the absence of all authority balancing in the middle of lesser powers nor certainly the settlement of all global troubles.

It does not mechanistically determine a specific strategy on the section of the biggest powers. It basically creates incentives for strategies that diminish if not eliminate two biggest troubles that bedeviled international organizations of the past: struggles for global primacy and competitive balancing in the middle of the biggest powers. The US follows a strategy of maintaining a preponderance of authority globally and deep engagement in the security affairs of Europe, Asia and the Transitional East. It has adapted rather than abandoned the central institutions and practices it

fostered throughout the bipolar period, expanded the North Atlantic Treaty Institution (NATO) to central Europe, strengthened its military alliance with Japan, and taken on a great several other less heralded new security commitments in regions formerly under the grasp of the Soviet Union. While unipolarity captures the essence of the sharing of authority in an organization, it does not capture the amount of power exerted on others in the organization. Even in a unipolar organization, the dominant state can choose to demonstrate small or no desire to manage both the internal and external affairs of states approximately the globe. In other terms, unipolarity is a necessary, but not enough condition for the status of global hegemony.

The Debate on Excess of Unipolarity

For realists, the debate in excess of the building of international politics is primarily centered on two explanations of world order: balance of authority theory and balance of threat theory. Both theories have dissimilar predictions and policy prescriptions for US activities in the post-Cold War world. Within the realist debate in relation to the emerging building of international politics, many commentators have suggested new configurations of world authority.

Few commentators have cited the erosion of US primacy since proof of a changing international organization. For example, Samuel Huntington has proposed that transforms in post-Cold War international politics reflects a uni-multipolar organization with one superpower and many biggest powers. It has been argued that the waning of 'American hegemony' has given rise to the local authority centers of Europe and East Asia. However, despite the devolution of US authority globally, the shift towards multipolarity is many decades from now. The extent to which post-Cold War international politics remnants unipolar will depend on the careful exercise of US preponderance and its skill to convince other states of its evident 'benign intent.' In a widely cited essay Christopher Layne argues that America's unipolar moment will be short-existed, since smaller states will inevitably balance against it, leading to a new multipolar period.

Likewise, other commentators consider that at least the building of the economic world is multipolar. For example, the former US president, Bill Clinton had proclaimed at a summit in Tokyo in 1993 that "we now live in a tripolar world, driven through the Americas, Europe and Asia." The durability of unipolarity has been particularly questioned through neo-realists. For neo-realists, unipolarity is the least stable of all buildings because any great concentration of authority threatens other states and reasons them to take activity to restore a balance. Other commentators suggest that a big concentration of authority jobs for peace, and they doubt that US preponderance is fragile and easily negated through the actions of other states. Despite this, several analysts argue that unipolarity is an 'illusion', a 'movement' that will not last extensive, or is already giving method to multipolarity.

Kenneth Waltz is instructive in his response to unipolarity. Waltz points out the inevitable recurrence of balancing against hegemonic powers:

- Balance-of-authority theory leads one to anticipate that states, if they are free to do therefore, will flock to the weaker face. The stronger, not the weaker face, threatens them, if only through pressing its preferred politics on other states.

For Waltz, structural transform affects the activities of states, compelling them to balance and thwart even a 'benign hegemon' such as the US. Despite Paul Kennedy's assertion that, "it basically has not been given to any one state to remain permanently ahead of all the other states," the real question is how extensive will international politics remain unipolar? For Waltz, polarity is the concentration of authority in the middle of the biggest states. "Poles" are those states with unusually big concentrations of all underlying elements of authority. The US is the only state today- and indeed, the only state in contemporary international history- that excels markedly and measurably in all the relevant authority capabilities: military, economic, technical and geopolitical. The authority of the US is not unlimited, but it is unprecedented.

It also describes for 40 per cent of economic manufacture, 40 per cent of technology manufacture and 50 per cent of total research and growth expenditures. No state in history could do this and leading states tended to be either great commercial and naval powers or great land powers – never both. Those who see the world since multipolar and embrace genuinely multilateral policies include Michael Lind, who has described for an attempt to revive a concert of great powers, since well since David Calleo and Charles Kupchan, both of whom also embrace a shape of multipolar multilateralism, albeit one that is highly Eurocentric. Lind argues that the US should concentrate on working with the other biggest powers in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the G8, and come that will spare the US the require to choose flanked by a reflexive multilateralism that subordinates US interests to the rule of little and weak countries and an arrogant unilateralism that spaces the US at odds with the rest of the world. Calleo and Kupchan see the European Union (EU) since evolving into a great authority counterpart of the US, one that is neither weak nor necessarily a threat to US interests. Calleo sees a stronger EU since the natural partner of a chastened and more modest US in structure a "cooperative multilateral organization based on rules with an effective balance of authority to sustain those rules," while Kupchan heralds the "return of a world of multiple authority centres" in which Europe is America's only close to-word biggest competitor. Coral Bell and Michael Mastanduno argue that the durability of unipolarity rests on balance of threat theory. Balance-of-threat theory proposes that states will not balance a dominant authority if its activities are perceived since benign and non-threatening.

Following this, a dominant authority is supported if it exercises its authority to promote shared interests and institutions that subvert anarchy and competition. In contrast, states that exercise unfettered authority and engage in predatory activities are likely to trigger balancing coalitions. The grand strategy of preserving unipolarity was enunciated in the Defense Scheduling Guide (DPG) of

1992. The paper stated that the US “necessity uphold the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a superior local or global role.” The conclusion of the DPG reflected official views in relation to the unipolarity. For example, in 1991, the Pentagon’s Director of Net Assessments defined a ‘manageable’ world since one in which there lived no threat to America’s superpower role. Clearly, from the point of view of US officials, the post-Cold War organization is unipolar. For Huntington, international primacy is “the skill of one actor to exercise more power on the activities of more actors with respect to more issues than any other government.” Kenneth Waltz argues that the skill of the US to exert international power is determined through its dissimilar sources of authority. For Waltz, mass of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capacity, military strength, political continuity and competence rank high since significant sources of authority. The strategic direction of the 1992 DPG was driven through a desire to preserve US primacy. In addition to maintaining US primacy, the DPG envisioned the US seeking to prevent the rise of challenges through promoting international law, democracy and free-market economies.

The Future of Unipolarity: Balance of Threat versus Balance of Authority

To preserve its dominant location, the US, acts through reassuring and integrating potential challengers into security and economic institutions. As the end of the Cold War, US security policy has tended to conform to the predictions of the balance-of-threat theory. US officials have sought to preserve US preponderance by attempts to convince countries like Japan and Germany to remain *incomplete* great powers, and to integrate potential great powers like Russia and China into an American led new world order. It necessity be mentioned here that neither balance-of-threat nor balance-of-authority commentators suggest that unipolarity is indefinite, but rather have dissimilar views since to how extensive unipolarity will last. Balance-of-threat theory, first advanced through Stephan Walt, points to the durability of the ‘unipolar movement.’ Walt suggests that the balancing activities of states may be overcome, provided that the foreign policy of the dominant state is moderate and is seen through other states since preferable to the rivalry of a multipolar world. Likewise, Mastanduno proposes that, “unipolarity will not be preserved forever, but balance-of-threat theory implies that it may be sustainable for a meaningfully longer era than balance-of-authority theorists expect.

In contrast to this, balance-of-authority theory, urbanized mainly explicitly through Kenneth Waltz, argues that unipolarity will be transformed into multipolarity through the early decades of the twenty-first century. In Waltz’ analysis he attracts on the historical activities of states to moderate asymmetric of authority in the middle of nations and to balance what he words “American hegemony.” Balance-of-authority theory suggests that attempts to preserve unipolarity are bound to be futile and likely to be counterproductive. In the case of other biggest powers Layne suggests that:

- ...a policy of attempting to smother Germany's and Japan's great authority emergence would be unavailing because structural pressures will impel them to become great powers regardless of what the US does or does not do.

In the current unipolar world the rise of new powers to balance the US (like China) is not a foregone conclusion. US statecraft in the post-Cold War world has asserted a *limited* hegemony in excess of political-military matters. US officials emphasize multilateral coalitions and decision-creation procedures in excess of unilateralism, even in cases of military intervention.

The logic of balance-of-threat theory is instructive here. States that engage in self-binding and exercise their authority in a benign manner are unlikely to trigger balancing. The benign exercise of authority gives rise to trust and shared interests and institutions that underwrite continuity and negate competition flanked by states.

Challenges to the Unipolar World

The post-Cold war period has been dominated through the US and the international organization is unipolar. The comprehensive authority of the US has encouraged a commitment to multilateral decision-creation, deal liberalization and the stated global ideals of liberal norms. The building of international politics reflects the preferences and interests of the US – the world's only superpower now evolving into a hyper-authority.

This unipolar organization is in all likelihood the prime determinant for the foreseeable future. The US has sought to legitimize its primacy in political-military matters by a combination of 'benign hegemony' and 'multilateral rule-creation' rather than forceful unilateralism. To uphold its primacy in international affairs, the US has followed the prescriptions of balance-of-threat theory in promoting limited American hegemony. However, the skill of the US to convince other states in relation to the intentions is possibly the mainly studied aspect of the international organization today. Contrary views to this 'unipolar moment' are reflected in the growing opposition to 'globalization' and a formalized building of free deal since exemplified through the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO is an institution that is much loathed in developing countries and seen since a vehicle promoting the interests of the industrialized countries at the expense of the big majority of people who create do with small.

The emergence of the WTO paradoxically highlights the emergence of a 'supra state' that by its policies can wreck the livelihoods of people by its policy prescriptions. The increased role and reach of non-government institutions and the growing awareness and empowerment of big populations spread crossways all the continents is finding its expression in the World Social Forum (WSF) umbrella institution that champions the voices of the unheard. The WSF is increasingly vocal in its opposition to policies enunciated through the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary

Fund (IMF) under the garb of ‘structural adjustment’ that denies developing countries the chance of arriving at a consensus of what growth paradigm to adopt and instead forces an agenda that suits the industrialized nations of the West. This come of undermining the sovereignty of a nation-state through adopting economic events is facing growing resistance.

The panacea of ‘globalization’ benefiting the whole world with its aims of ‘shared prosperity’ are increasingly coming under secure scrutiny since big sections of the world still remain impoverished and strife-stricken.

REVIEW QUESTIONS

- What was the role of nationalism in defining the modern international relations?
- What was the ideological and economic impetus behind the emergence of modern international relations?
- What do we mean by Cold War? How did it affect world politics?
- What is the theoretical debate around the idea of unipoarity?
- What are the possible future directions in the present scenario of a singular dominance of the world by U.S.A.?

CHAPTER 7

Revolutions

STRUCTURE

- Learning Objectives
- Political revolution: France
- Political revolution: Russia
- Knowledge revolution: printing and informatics
- Technological revolution: communications and medical
- Review Questions

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After reading this chapter you should be able to explain:

- Explain the political revolution in France
- Explain the Political revolution in Russia and will go into details of the Revolution and also on the 19th century social conditions of Russia that led to it.
- Describe the development and expansion of education in Europe.
- Discuss the major breakthrough that occurred in the field of medical sciences both prior to and during the course of the 20th century

POLITICAL REVOLUTION: FRANCE

French Revolution and the Emergence of New Political Civilization

In recent years, scholars have broadened the era of the French Revolution to approximately the last three decades of the eighteenth century when revolutionary politics had begun to take form. The making of new political rhetoric and the growth of new symbolic shapes of political practice transformed modern notions in relation to the politics, which became an instrument for reshaping community. People of France had a strong belief that they could set up a new national society based on cause and natural law according to the spirit of enlightenment, without reference to the traditions of the past. Such high ambitions demanded new political practices for their realization. Since Francois Furet suggests, France by revolution invented democratic civilization and revealed to the world one of the vital shapes of historical consciousness of activity.

If the Revolution invented new buildings and upset the old ones, it also set in motion new forces to change the traditional mechanisms of politics. The Revolution took in excess of an empty legroom and then proliferated within that. For Furet, the French Revolution was essentially a political

phenomenon. It led to a profound transformation of political communication involving new but powerful shapes of political symbolism and experimented in radical shapes of political activity which was unprecedented and unanticipated. In the political dialogue flanked by communities and their states, the Revolution tipped levels in favor of community against the state. The ancient regime was dominated through the king; the Revolution turned it into people's attainment.

From the 'kingdom of subjects' France became a nation of citizens. The old community was based on privilege; the Revolution recognized equality. The Revolution created an ideology of a radical break with the-past. Everything -the economy, community and politics acquiesced to the force of new ideology. The revolution marked the transformation of the discursive practice of the society, a moment in which social dealings were reconstituted and the connection flanked by individual, society and state radically transformed. Since the Revolution progressed, it coined new vocabulary of politics and civilization.

It accumulated its own representations and religious overtones and provided new definitions of patriotism and war. For Robespierre, the well-known Jacobin leader, the revolution became a war of liberty against its enemies. Its intensity, its reforming zeal and its war against privilege made it' since McMamers writes a fort of forcing house where in the ideals of the future, and their perversions, were brought to early maturity. It should also be borne in mind that the Revolution in France was not pre-intended. The overthrow of the government was followed through intense confusion and opened the gates of political communication and contestations. In this situation, sure type of actions and arguments took on meanings that often went distant beyond what the actors or leaders designed.

The emergence of modern political civilization destroyed the absolutist monarchy and brought in relation to the political order under which the nation lived since a communal body. Several attempts were made to reconstitute the meaning of public right and redefine the nature of social order. According to the thinker, the three strands of communication in the late eighteenth century were - justice, will and cause. The emergence, elaboration and interpretation of these three communications defined the political civilization that appeared in France and provided the ideological framework to the subsequent transforms. These communications provided grounds for the abolition of feudal building in France. Therefore, the Revolution had begun a new period but its ideologies and institutional framework gradually urbanized since a consequence of debates and struggles within since well since outside France.

The Thoughts of Liberty, Excellence and Fraternity

No doubt, the thoughts like liberty, equality, fraternity and *therefore* on had lived sometimes in an extremely confused or abstract shape in several communities but in France, throughout the revolutionary period, these became the guiding principles for me law makers. The American Revolution of 1776 had also declared all men born 'free and equal'. The Congress of the

representatives of the thirteen colonies had asserted that all men are born equal and have sure natural rights which are inalienable and cannot be taken away. But the American Constitution remained silent on the significant question of slavery and postponed the demand for extension of the franchise to them.

The slavery issue had divided the American nation throughout the Civil War (1861 - 1865). In France, these thoughts became the defining concepts that had impact not only upon the western culture but also worked their way into the history of 19th and 20th century Europe, America and Asia. Through liberty, the revolutionaries meant the right to act within the world with responsibility to no one but oneself. It was an idea that remained dear to those who made the French Revolution and one which pervaded the reforms. The Revolution founded a potent new custom of liberty. Protestants, Jews and Free Thinkers gained toleration both in France and in the French dominated areas. The first official document of the French Revolution - the Declaration of the Rights of Man - stated the thoughts of liberty and excellence and attempts were made to embody them in the new regime to shape the chief theme of the French politics in the nineteenth century.

The Concept of Republican State

The idea of a Republican state was not the product of the French Revolution since there lived several republican states in the ancient world- in Greece, Rome and in India. But the French Republic was based on a modern ideological platform. It was created with the support of a liberal constitution and popular foundation. The world 'republic' has become inseparable from the Revolution with two high points:

- The year 1789 when the sovereignty of the monarch was replaced through the sovereignty of the nation; and
- The 1792 when the monarch was deposed and the liberal republic was recognized.

Interestingly, in the French custom, the term 'republic' has retained a powerful emotional importance even though its institutional buildings remained weak. The principle of republic was subverted through persons of despotic traits on several occasions. Modern politics can be said to have begun in the revolutionary decade, giving birth to words like 'right' and 'left'. The French Revolution had divided the people flanked by liberals and conservatives.

The liberals generally moved towards republicanism with wide suffrage, individual rights, freedom of speech and expression, and election of the head of the State. The conservatives resisted transform and laid stress on discipline, duties and social hierarchy. The unprecedented challenge of the Revolution crystallized the political thinking of the conservatives. Several of them opposed reforms based on the thoughts of the Enlightenment.

Both these ideologies played a determining role in popular movements creating a sharp and antipathy division in nineteenth century Europe. The French exported the idea of republicanism against the English preference for monarchy and conservatism. The Republic in France is now firmly recognized. The "Marseillaise" is no more a battle song but her national anthem and the Fourteenth of July is the national holiday, remembered since the Republic Day. Therefore 'the currents of turbulence and ideological dissidence which flowed mainly strongly after 1789', 'forced ruling clusters to reconstitute the ideological foundations of the state and partially to modernize it'. They drew from a variety of sources, especially the Enlightenment. It was this shift in the foundation and building of traditional states that led to the popularity of new principles like republicanism and liberalism.

Contemporary Views on Representation

Robespierre whispered that the sovereign people, once their institutions were recognized, would do for themselves all that they could do well and their delegates would *carry* out what the people could not do. The supporters of Rousseau, however, faced troubles because the *social contract* stated that 'person who gives it representatives is no longer he'. Citing the English practice, Rousseau argued that the English people were free only at election time. In information, the *social contract* of Rousseau offered an abstract antithesis of the political and social order of the ancient regime.

The corporate community of orders and Estates was rejected in this job and was to be replaced through a community based on excellence of individuals bound through the general status of citizenship. To achieve the freedom of the citizens, Rousseau transferred sovereignty from the monarch to the body of citizens since an entire. It is not the individual's will but the common will of the entire body of citizens that prevails. Rousseau's definition of social contract suggests that the sovereignty therefore created by a communal will could neither be alienated nor represented. Sovereign power of a monarch conferred through the people did not express the common will but only that of a scrupulous person. Once this common will is lost in this method, it dissolves into a multiplicity of individuals who discover themselves subject to the will of another. The social contract of Rousseau, so, offered a definite repudiation of representation since incompatible with the spirit of the common will.

The supporters of the Revolution felt that for a big state like France, Rousseau's principles had to be customized. Sieyes, one of the mainly significant leaders of the liberal revolution, concluded that the people can neither speak nor act, except for by their representatives. This view met objections from the Right, particularly from the nobles who subscribed to the distinction of Orders. Later on, in the era of Terror, Sieyes' view of representation met with opposition from the Left. The spread of Rousseau's thoughts, the popular participation, and deteriorating economic conditions created a demand for direct democracy, where deputies could be recalled from the Sectional Assembly of Paris

and new representatives nominated, where people could intervene in state affairs through insurrections and the management of popular justice could be introduced. Keith Michael Baker traces the roots of the social theory of representation to the days of Louis XIV's reign when a cluster of reformers gathered approximately the Duc De Bourgogne challenging the restoration of traditional provincial estates. But it was the Physiocratic scripts of Mirabeau and Quesney which transformed these thoughts into a contemporary theory of representation of community and social interests.

Mirabeau in his job *L'Ami des hommes* (The Friend of Men) recognized the rights of property since the fundamental law of every community. He suggested the decentralization of management by the making of provincial assemblies collected of property owners. Till this level, the proponents of the social theory of representation proposed assemblies but this were not meant to give voice to political will of the nation. It was concerned with the rational representation of social interests. The theory of representation was given a contemporary content by the political debates of 1788 and 1789. It was reworked and changed from few of its earlier meanings when the deputies revolted against the old order based on the traditional force of representation, and justified their activity through an appeal to the principle of common will. Sieyes' *Qu'est-ce que be TierEtat?* (What is the Third Estate?) Provided solutions to few of the thorny troubles raised in political debates.

He legitimized the Revolution of the deputies in the name of national sovereignty and this led to the effective transformation of the Estates-Common into a National Assembly. There was the fusion of the idea of the common will with the concept of representation, achieved in the course of constitutional debates that took lay in excess of formation of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. The French Revolution brought in relation to the fundamental transformation in the concept of representation, thereby contributing to a vibrant shape of democracy. The traditional perception of representation had situated unity and identity in the person of an absolute monarch. Rousseau had suggested that it could be establish only in the body of the citizens taken since an entire. For Sieyes, an intricate contemporary community could achieve unity only in the national assembly. But it was distant from a complete solution.

Instead, it introduced tensions into revolutionary communication. Yet, it provided an ideological basis to the contemporary concept of representative government - an ideal that convinced therefore several liberals of the nineteenth century. Although, the French theorists had provided the idea of the 'sovereignty of the people' they could not change it into reality for a number of causes. The effective instrument needed to translate thoughts into practice was a coherent party organization. Throughout the revolutionary period, there was hardly any political party. One does talk of the Girondins and the Montagnards since the parties of those days but in reality these were more like shifting clusters based on friendship or personal loyalties without party institution.

They hardly represented public opinion or contested on separate ideology. Besides, the French democratic experiments were accepted out in the mainly adverse circumstances, when French had

plunged into war in 1792. The Revolution drifted absent from its original ideals into another level - the era of Terror and it is commonly called since the beginning of 'totalitarian democracy' under Robespierre. Although he was fully aware that the revolutionary dictatorship would be a temporary experiment and not the end of the democracy, his interpretation of Rousseau and common will was conveniently used through dictators of the contemporary era to justify their actions.

POLITICAL REVOLUTION: RUSSIA

The Russian Revolution is the communal word for a series of revolutions in Russia in 1917, which dismantled the Tsarist autocracy and led to the making of the Russian SFSR. The Emperor was forced to abdicate and the old regime was replaced through a provisional government throughout the first revolution of February 1917 (March in the Gregorian calendar; the older Julian calendar was in exploit in Russia at the time). In the second revolution, throughout October, the Provisional Government was removed and replaced with a Bolshevik (Communist) government. The February Revolution (March 1917) was a revolution focused approximately Petrograd (now St.

Petersburg). In the chaos, members of the Imperial parliament or Duma assumed manage of the country, forming the Russian Provisional Government. The army leadership felt they did not have the means to suppress the revolution and Nicholas II, the last Emperor of Russia, abdicated. The Soviets (workers' councils), which were led through more radical socialist factions, initially permitted the Provisional Government to rule, but insisted on a prerogative to power the government and manage several militias. The February Revolution took lay in the context of heavy military setbacks throughout the First World War (1914–18), which left much of the Russian army in a state of mutiny.

An era of dual authority ensued, throughout which the Provisional Government held state authority while the national network of Soviets, led through socialists, had the allegiance of the lower classes and the political left. Throughout this chaotic era there were frequent mutinies, protests and several strikes. When the Provisional Government chose to continue fighting the war with Germany, the Bolsheviks and other socialist factions campaigned for stopping the clash. The Bolsheviks turned workers militias under manage into the Red Guards (later the Red Army) in excess of which they exerted substantial manage. In the October Revolution (November in the Gregorian calendar), the Bolshevik party, led through Vladimir Lenin, and the workers' Soviets, overthrew the Provisional Government in Petrograd.

The Bolsheviks appointed themselves since leaders of several government ministries and seized manage of the countryside, establishing the Cheka to quash dissent. To end Russia's participation in the First World War, the Bolshevik leaders signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany in March 1918. Civil war erupted flanked by the "Red" (Bolshevik), and "White" (anti-Bolshevik) factions, which was to continue for many years, with the Bolsheviks ultimately victorious. In this

method, the Revolution paved the method for the making of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1922. While several notable historical measures occurred in Moscow and St. Petersburg, there was also a visible movement in municipalities during the state, in the middle of national minorities during the empire and in the rural regions, where peasants took in excess of and redistributed land.

Backdrop

The Russian Revolution of 1905 was said to be a biggest factor to the February Revolutions of 1917. The measures of Bloody Sunday triggered a row of protests. A council of workers described the St. Petersburg Soviet was created in all this chaos, and the beginning of a communist political protest had begun. World War I prompted a Russian outcry directed at Tsar Nicholas II. It was another biggest factor contributing to the retaliation of the Russian Communists against their royal opponents. After the entry of Ottoman Empire on the face of the Central Powers in October 1914, Russia was deprived of a biggest deal circuit by Ottoman Empire, which followed with a minor economic crisis, in which Russia became incapable of providing munitions to their army in the years leading to 1917. However, the troubles were merely administrative and not industrial since Germany was producing great amounts of munitions whilst constantly fighting on two biggest battlefronts.

The war also urbanized weariness in the municipality, owing to a lack of food in response to the disruption of agriculture. Food had become a considerable problem in Russia, but the reason of this did not lie in any failure of the harvests, which had not been significantly altered throughout war-time. The indirect cause was that the government, in order to fund the war, had been printing off millions of ruble notes, and through 1917 inflation had made prices increase up to four times what they had been in 1914. The peasantry were consequently faced with the higher cost of purchases, but made no corresponding gain in the sale of their own produce, as this was mainly taken through the middlemen on whom they depended. Since a result they tended to hoard their grain and to revert to existence cultivation. Therefore the municipalities were constantly short of food. At the similar time growing prices led to demands for higher wages in the factories, and in January and February 1916 revolutionary propaganda, aided through German finances, lead to widespread strikes.

The outcome of all this, however, was a growing criticism of the government rather than any war-weariness. The original fever of patriotic excitement, which had caused the name of St. Petersburg to be changed to the less German sounding Petrograd, may have subsided a small in the subsequent years, but it had not turned to defeatism and throughout the initial risings in Petrograd in February 1917, the crowds in the streets clearly objected to the banners proclaiming "down with the war]]". Heavy losses throughout the war also strengthened considerations that Tsar Nicholas II was unfit to rule. The Liberals were now bigger placed to voice their complaints, as they were participating more fully by a variety of voluntary institutions. Regional industrial committees proliferated.

In July 1915, a Central War Industries Committee, recognized under the chairmanship of a prominent Octobrist Guchkov, included ten workers' representatives- in which the Petrograd Mensheviks agreed to join despite the objections of their leaders abroad. All this action gave renewed encouragement to political ambitions and in September 1915 a combination of Octobrists and Kadets in the Duma demanded the forming of a responsible government. The Tsar rejected these proposals. He had now taken in excess of the location of commander-in-chief of the armed forces and throughout his absence at his headquarters at Mogilev, he had left mainly of the day-to-day government in the hands of the Empress who was intensely unpopular, owing to her German origin and the power that Rasputin, an unsavoury monk, was idea to exercise in excess of her. All these factors had given rise to a sharp loss of confidence in the regime through 1916. Early in that year, Guchkov had been taking soundings in the middle of senior army officers and members of the Central War Industries Committee in relation to the a possible coup to force the abdication of the Tsar.

In November, Pavel Milyukov in the Duma openly accused the government of contemplating peace negotiations with Germany. In December, a little cluster of nobles assassinated Rasputin and in January 1917 the Tsar's uncle, Grand Duke Nicholas, was asked indirectly through Prince Lvov whether he would be prepared to take in excess of the throne from his nephew, Tsar Nicholas II. None of these incidents were in themselves the immediate reason of the February Revolution, but they do help to explain why the monarchy survived only some days after it had broken out. Meanwhile, the Social Democrat leaders in exile, now mostly in Switzerland, had been the glum spectators of the collapse of international socialist solidarity. French and German Social Democrats had voted in favor of their respective governments. Georgi Plekhanov in Paris had adopted a violently anti-German stand, while Helphand supported the German war attempt since the best means of ensuring a revolution in Russia.

The Mensheviks mainly maintained that Russia had the right to defend herself against Germany, although Martov (a prominent Menshevik), now on the left of his cluster, demanded an end to the war and a resolution on the foundation of national self-determination, with no annexations or indemnities. It was these views of Martov that predominated in a manifesto drawn up through Leon Trotsky (a biggest Bolshevik revolutionary) at a conference in Zimmerwald, attended through thirty-five Socialist leaders in September 1915. Inevitably Vladimir Lenin, supported through Zinoviev and Radek, strongly contested them. Their attitudes became recognized since the Zimmerwald Left. Lenin rejected both the defense of Russia and the cry for peace.

As the autumn of 1914, he had insisted that "from the standpoint of the working class and of the laboring masses from the lesser evil would be the defeat of the Tsarist Monarchy"; the war necessity be turned into a civil war of the proletarian soldiers against their own governments, and if a proletarian victory should emerge from this in Russia, then their duty would be to wage a

revolutionary war for the liberation of the masses during Europe. Therefore, Lenin remained the enfant terrible of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, although at this point in the war his following in Russia was since some since 10,000 and his necessity have seemed no more than the leader of an extremist wing of a bankrupt institution. Lenin, however, then executed the protests of Petrograd which set off the 1917 Russian Revolution.

Economic and Social Transforms

An elementary theory of property, whispered through several peasants, was that land should belong to those who job on it. At the similar time, peasant life and civilization was changing constantly. Transform was facilitated through the physical movement of growing numbers of peasant villagers who migrated to and from industrial and urban environments, but also through the introduction of municipality civilization into the village by material goods, the press, and term of mouth. Workers also had good causes for discontent: overcrowded housing with often deplorable sanitary circumstances, extensive hours at job (on the eve of the war a 10-hour workday six days a week was the standard and several were working 11–12 hours a day through 1916), consistent risk of injury and death from extremely poor safety and sanitary circumstances, harsh discipline (not only rules and fines, but foremen's fists), and inadequate wages (made worse after 1914 through steep war-time increases in the cost of livelihood).

At the similar time, urban industrial life was full of benefits; however these could be presently since dangerous, from the point of view of social and political continuity, since the hardships. There were several encouragements to anticipate more from life. Acquiring new skills gave several workers a sense of self-respect and confidence, heightening expectations and desires. Livelihood in municipalities, workers encountered material goods such since they had never seen while in the village. Mainly significant, livelihood in municipalities, they were discovered to new thoughts in relation to the social and political order. The social reasons of the Russian Revolution largely came from centuries of oppression of the lower classes through the Tsarist regime, and Nicholas's failures in World War I. While rural agrarian peasants had been emancipated from serfdom in 1861, they still resented paying redemption payments to the state, and demanded collective tender of the land they worked.

The problem was further compounded through the failure of Sergei Witte's land reforms of the early 20th century. Rising peasant disturbances and sometimes actual revolts occurred, with the goal of securing ownership of the land they worked. Russia consisted largely of poor cultivation peasants, with 1.5% of the population owning 25% of the land. The rapid industrialization of Russia also resulted in urban overcrowding and poor circumstances for urban industrial workers. Flanked by 1890 and 1910, the population of the capital, Saint Petersburg, swelled from 1,033,600 to 1,905,600, with Moscow experiencing same development. This created a new 'proletariat' which, due to being

crowded jointly in the municipalities, was much more likely to protest and go on strike than the peasantry had been in previous times.

In one 1904 survey, it was established that a standard of sixteen people shared each apartment in Saint Petersburg, with six people per room. There was also no running water, and piles of human waste were a threat to the health of the workers. The poor circumstances only aggravated the situation, with the number of strikes and incidents of public disorder rapidly rising in the years shortly before World War I. Because of late industrialization, Russia's workers were highly concentrated. Through 1914 40% of Russian workers were employed in factories of +1,000 workers (32% in 1901). 42% worked in 100-1,000 worker enterprises, 18% in 1-100 worker businesses (in the USA, 1914, the figures were 18, 47 and 35 respectively). World War I only added to the chaos.

Conscription swept up the unwilling in all sections of Russia. The massive demand for factory manufacture of war supplies and workers caused several more labor riots and strikes. Conscription stripped skilled workers from the municipalities, who had to be replaced with unskilled peasants, and then, when famine began to hit due to the poor railway organization, workers abandoned the municipalities in droves to seek for food. Finally, the soldiers themselves, who suffered from a lack of equipment and defense from the elements, began to turn against the Tsar. This was largely because, since the war progressed, several of the officers who were loyal to the Tsar were killed, and were replaced through discontented conscripts from the biggest municipalities, who had small loyalty to the Tsar.

Political Issues

Several parts of the crown had cause to be dissatisfied with the existing autocracy. Nicholas II was a deeply conservative ruler and maintained a strict authoritarian organization. Individuals and community in common were expected to illustrate self-restraint, devotion to society, deference to the social hierarchy and a sense of duty to the country. Religious faith helped bind all of these tenets jointly since a source of comfort and reassurance in the side of hard circumstances and since a means of political power exercised by the clergy.

Possibly more than any other contemporary monarch, Nicholas II attached his fate and the future of his dynasty to the notion of the ruler since a saintly and infallible father to his people. This idealized vision of the Romanov monarchy blinded him to the actual state of his country. With a firm belief that his authority to rule was granted through Divine Right, Nicholas assumed that the Russian people were devoted to him with unquestioning loyalty. This ironclad belief rendered Nicholas unwilling to allow the progressive reforms that might have alleviated the suffering of the Russian people. Even after the 1905 revolution spurred the Tsar to decree limited civil rights and democratic representation, he worked to limit even these liberties in order to preserve the ultimate power of the crown. Despite consistent oppression, the desire of the people for democratic participation in government decisions was strong.

As the Age of Enlightenment, Russian intellectuals had promoted Enlightenment ideals such as the dignity of the individual and the rectitude of democratic representation. These ideals were championed mainly vociferously through Russia's liberals, although populists, Marxists, and anarchists also claimed to support democratic reforms. A growing opposition movement had begun to challenge the Romanov monarchy openly well before the turmoil of World War I. Dissatisfaction with Russian autocracy culminated in the massive national upheaval that followed the Bloody Sunday massacre of January 1905, in which hundreds of unarmed protesters were shot through the Tsar's troops. Workers responded to the massacre with a crippling common strike, forcing Nicholas to put forth the October Manifesto, which recognized a democratically elected parliament (the State Duma). The Tsar undermined this promise of reform but a year later with Article 87 of the 1906 Fundamental State Laws, and subsequently dismissed the first two Dumas when they proved uncooperative.

Unfulfilled hopes of democracy fueled revolutionary thoughts and violent outbursts targeted at the monarchy. One of the Tsar's principal rationales for risking war in 1914 was his desire to restore the prestige that Russia had lost amid the debacles of the Russo-Japanese war. Nicholas also sought to foster a greater sense of national unity with a war against a general and ancient enemy. The Russian Empire was an agglomeration of diverse ethnicities that had shown significant signs of disunity in the years before the First World War. Nicholas whispered in secret that the shared peril and tribulation of a foreign war would mitigate the social unrest in excess of the persistent issues of poverty, inequality, and inhuman working circumstances. Instead of restoring Russia's political and military standing, World War I led to the horrifying slaughter of Russian troops and military defeats that undermined both the monarchy and community in common to the point of collapse.

World War I

The outbreak of war in August 1914 initially served to quiet the prevalent social and political protests, focusing hostilities against a general external enemy, but this patriotic unity did not last extensive. Since the war dragged on inconclusively, war-weariness gradually took its toll. More significant, however, was a deeper fragility: although several ordinary Russians joined anti-German demonstrations in the first some weeks of the war, the mainly widespread reaction seems to have been skepticism and fatalism. Hostility toward the Kaiser and the desire to defend their land and their lives did not necessarily translate into enthusiasm for the Tsar or the government.

Russia's first biggest battle of the war was a disaster: in the 1914 Battle of Tannenberg, in excess of 30,000 Russian troops were killed or wounded and 90,000 captured, while Germany suffered presently 20,000 casualties. However, Austro-Hungarian forces allied to Germany were driven back deep into the Galicia area through the end of the year. In the autumn of 1915, Nicholas had taken direct command of the army, personally overseeing Russia's largest theatre of war and leaving his ambitious but incapable wife Alexandra in charge of the government. Statements of corruption and

incompetence in the Imperial government began to emerge, and the growing power of Grigori Rasputin in the Imperial family was widely resented. In the eyes of Lynch, a revisionist historian who focuses on the role of the people, Rasputin was a "fatal disease" to the Tsarist regime. In 1915, events took a critical turn for the worse when Germany shifted its focus of attack to the Eastern front. The larger German army — bigger led, bigger trained and bigger supplied — was terrifyingly effective against the ill-equipped Russian forces, driving the Russians out of Galicia, since well since Russian Poland, throughout the Gorlice–Tarnów Offensive campaign. Through the end of October 1916, Russia had lost flanked by 1,600,000 and 1,800,000 soldiers, with an additional 2,000,000 prisoners of war and 1,000,000 missing, all creation up a total of almost 5,000,000 men. These staggering losses played a definite role in the mutinies and revolts that began to happen. In 1916, statements of fraternizing with the enemy started to circulate. Soldiers went hungry, and lacked shoes, munitions, and even weapons. Rampant discontent lowered morale, which was further undermined through a series of military defeats. Casualty rates were the mainly vivid sign of this disaster.

Already, through the end of 1914, only five months into the war, approximately 390,000 Russian men had lost their lives and almost 1,000,000 were injured. Distant sooner than expected, barely trained recruits had to be described up for active duty, a procedure repeated during the war since staggering losses sustained to mount. The officer class also saw extra ordinary transforms, especially within the lower echelons, which were quickly filled with soldiers growing up by the ranks. These men, generally of peasant or working-class backgrounds, were to play a big role in the politicization of the troops in 1917. The massive losses on the battlefields were not limited to men. The army quickly ran short of rifles and ammunition (since well since uniforms and food), and, through mid-1915, men were being sent to the front bearing no arms. It was hoped that they could equip themselves with the arms that they recovered from fallen soldiers, of both faces, on the battlefields.

With patently good cause, the soldiers did not feel that they were being treated since human beings, or even since precious soldiers, but rather since raw materials to be squandered for the purposes of the rich and powerful. Through the spring of 1915, the army was in steady retreat, which was not always orderly; desertion, plunder and chaotic flight were not uncommon. Through 1916, however, the situation had improved in several compliments. Russian troops stopped retreating, and there were even few modest successes in the offensives that were staged that year, albeit at great loss of life. Also, the problem of shortages was mainly solved through a biggest attempt to increase domestic manufacture. Nevertheless, through the end of 1916, morale in the middle of soldiers was even worse than it had been throughout the great retreat of 1915. The fortunes of war may have improved, but the information of the war, still draining absent strength and lives from the country and its several individuals and families, remained an oppressive inevitability. The crisis in morale (since was argued through Allan Wildman, a leading historian of the Russian army in war and revolution) "was rooted

fundamentally in the feeling of utter despair that the slaughter would ever end and that anything resembling victory could be achieved." The war devastated not only soldiers.

Through the end of 1915, there were manifold signs that the economy was breaking down under the heightened strain of wartime demand. The largest troubles were food shortages and growing prices. Inflation dragged incomes down at an alarmingly rapid rate, and shortages made it hard to buy even what one could afford. These shortages were a problem especially in the capital, St. Petersburg, where aloofness from supplies and poor transportation networks made matters particularly bad. Shops closed early or entirely for lack of bread, sugar, meat and other provisions, and rows lengthened massively for what remained. It became increasingly hard both to afford and actually buy food. Not surprisingly, strikes increased steadily from the transitional of 1915, and therefore did crime; but, for the mainly section, people suffered and endured, scouring the municipality for food.

Working class women in St. Petersburg reportedly spent in relation to the forty hours a week in food rows, begging, turning to prostitution or crime, tearing down wooden fences to stay stoves heated for warmth, grumbling in relation to the rich, and wondering when and how this would all approach to an end. Government officials responsible for public order worried in relation to the how extensive people's patience would last. A statement through the St. Petersburg branch of the security police, the Okhrana, in October 1916, warned bluntly of "the possibility in the close to future of riots through the lower classes of the empire enraged through the burdens of daily subsistence." Nicholas was blamed for all of these crises, and what small support he had left began to crumble.

Since discontent grew, the State Duma issued a warning to Nicholas in November 1916. It stated that, inevitably, a terrible disaster would grip the country unless a constitutional shape of government was put in lay. In typical fashion, however, Nicholas ignored them, and Russia's Tsarist regime collapsed some months later throughout the February Revolution of 1917. One year later, the Tsar and his whole family were executed. Ultimately, Nicholas's inept handling of his country and the war destroyed the Tsar and ended up costing him both his reign and his life.

February Revolution

At the beginning of February, Petrograd workers began many strikes and demonstrations. On March 7, workers at Putilov, Petrograd's main industrial plant, announced a strike. The next day, a series of meetings and rallies were held for International Women's Day, which gradually turned into economic and political gatherings. Demonstrations were organized to demand bread, and these were supported through the industrial working force who measured them a cause for continuing the strikes. The women workers marched to surrounding factories bringing out in excess of 50,000 workers on strike. Through March 10, virtually every industrial enterprise in Petrograd had been shut down, jointly with several commercial and service enterprises.

Students, white-collar workers and teachers joined the workers in the streets and at public meetings. To quell the riots, the Tsar looked to the army. At least 180,000 troops were accessible in the capital,

but mainly were either untrained or injured. Historian Ian Beckett suggests approximately 12,000 could be regarded since reliable, but even these proved reluctant to move in on the crowd, as it included therefore several women. It was for this cause that when, on March 11, the Tsar ordered the army to suppress the rioting through force, troops began to mutiny. Although some actively joined the rioting, several officers were either shot or went into hiding; the skill of the garrison to hold back the protests was all but nullified, representations of the Tsarist regime were rapidly torn down approximately the municipality, and governmental power in the capital collapsed – not helped through the information that Nicholas had prorogued the Duma that morning, leaving it with no legal power to act.

The response of the Duma, urged on through the liberal bloc, was to set up a Temporary Committee to restore law and order; meanwhile, the socialist parties set up the Petrograd Soviet to symbolize workers and soldiers. The remaining loyal units switched allegiance the next day. The Tsar took a train back towards Petrograd, which was stopped on March 14 through a cluster of disloyal troops. When the Tsar finally reached his destination, the Army Chiefs and his remaining ministers (those who had not fled under pretense of an authority-cut) suggested in unison that he abdicate the throne. He did therefore on March 15, on behalf of himself, and then, having taken advice, on behalf of his son, the Tsarevich.

Nicholas nominated his brother, the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich, to succeed him. But the Grand Duke realised that he would have small support since ruler, therefore he declined the crown on March 16, stating that he would take it only if that was the consensus of democratic activity. Six days later, Nicholas, no longer Tsar and addressed with contempt through the sentries since "Nicholas Romanov", was reunited with his family at the Alexander Palace at Tsarskoye Selo. He was placed under house arrest with his family through the Provisional Government. The immediate effect of the February Revolution was a widespread atmosphere of elation and excitement in Petrograd. On 16 March, a provisional government was announced. The center-left was well represented, and the government was initially chaired through a liberal aristocrat, Prince Georgy Yevgenievich Lvov, a member of the Constitutional Democratic Party (KD). The socialists had shaped their rival body, the Petrograd Soviet (or workers' council) four days earlier. The Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional Government competed for authority in excess of Russia.

Flanked by February and during October: "Dual Authority" (Dvoevlastie)

The effective authority of the Provisional Government was challenged through the power of an institution that claimed to symbolize the will of workers and soldiers and could, in information, rally and manage these clusters throughout the early months of the revolution — the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies. The model for the soviet was workers' councils that had been recognized in scores of Russian municipalities throughout the 1905 revolution. In February 1917, striking workers elected deputies to symbolize them and socialist activists began organizing a citywide council to

unite these deputies with representatives of the socialist parties. On 27 February, socialist Duma deputies, largely Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, took the lead in organizing a citywide council.

The Petrograd Soviet met in the Tauride Palace, the similar structure where the new government was taking form. The leaders of the Petrograd Soviet whispered that they represented scrupulous classes of the population, not the entire nation. They also whispered Russia was not ready for socialism. Therefore they saw their role since limited to pressuring hesitant "bourgeoisie" to rule and to introduce long democratic reforms in Russia (the replacement of the monarchy through a republic, guaranteed civil rights, a democratic police and army, abolition of religious and ethnic discrimination, preparation of elections to a constituent assembly, and therefore on). They met in the similar structure since the emerging Provisional Government not to compete with the Duma Committee for state authority but to best exert pressure on the new government, to act, in other terms, since a popular democratic lobby. The connection flanked by these two biggest powers was intricate from the beginning and would form the politics of 1917.

The representatives of the Provisional Government agreed to "take into explanation the opinions of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies," however they were also determined to prevent "interference in the actions of the government," which would make "an unacceptable situation of dual authority." In information, this was precisely what was being created, however this "dual authority" (dvoevlastie) was the result less of the actions or attitudes of the leaders of these two institutions than of actions outside their manage, especially the ongoing social movement taking lay on the streets of Russia's municipalities, in factories and shops, in barracks and in the trenches, and in the villages. A series of political crises in the connection flanked by population and government and flanked by the Provisional government and the soviets (which urbanized into a nationwide movement with a national leadership, The All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets (VTsIK)) undermined the power of the Provisional Government but also of the moderate socialist leaders of the Soviet. Although the Soviet leadership initially refused to participate in the "bourgeois" Provisional Government, Alexander Kerensky, a young and popular lawyer and a member of the Socialist Revolutionary Party (SRP), agreed to join the new cabinet, and became an increasingly central figure in the government, eventually taking leadership of the Provisional Government. Since minister of war and later Prime Minister, Kerensky promoted freedom of speech, released thousands of political prisoners, did his extremely best to continue the war attempt and even organized another offensive (which, however, was no more successful than its precursors). Nevertheless, Kerensky still faced many great challenges, highlighted through the soldiers, urban workers and peasants, who claimed that they had gained nothing through the revolution:

- Other political clusters were trying to undermine him.
- Heavy military losses were being suffered on the front.

- The soldiers were dissatisfied, demoralized and had started to defect. (On arrival back in Russia, these soldiers were either imprisoned or sent straight back into the front.)
- There was enormous discontent with Russia's involvement in the war, and several were calling for an end to it.
- There were great shortages of food and supplies, which was hard to remedy because of the wartime economic circumstances.

The political cluster that proved mainly troublesome for Kerensky, and would eventually overthrow him, was the Bolshevik Party, led through Vladimir Lenin. Lenin had been in exile in neutral Switzerland and, due to democratization of politics after the February Revolution, which legalized formerly banned political parties, he perceived the opportunity for his Marxist revolution. Although return to Russia had become a possibility, the war made it logistically hard. Eventually, German officials arranged for Lenin to pass by their territory, hoping that his behaviors would weaken Russia or even — if the Bolsheviks came to authority — lead to Russia's withdrawal from the war.

Lenin and his associates, however, had to agree to travel to Russia in a sealed train: Germany would not take the chance that he would foment revolution in Germany. After passing by the front, he arrived in Petrograd in April 1917. With Lenin's arrival, the popularity of the Bolsheviks increased steadily. In excess of the course of the spring, public dissatisfaction with the Provisional Government and the war, in scrupulous in the middle of workers, soldiers and peasants pushed these clusters to radical parties. Despite growing support for the Bolsheviks, buoyed through maxims that described mainly famously for "all authority to the Soviets," the party held extremely small real authority in the moderate dominated Petrograd Soviet. In information, historians such since Sheila Fitzpatrick have asserted that Lenin's exhortations for the Soviet Council to take authority were designed to arouse indignation both with the Provisional Government, whose policies were viewed since conservative, and the Soviet itself, which was viewed since subservient to the conservative government. Through mainly historians' descriptions, Lenin and his followers were unprepared for how their groundswell of support, especially in the middle of influential worker and soldier clusters, would translate into real authority in the summer of 1917.

On 18 June, the Provisional Government launched an attack against Germany that failed miserably. Soon after, the government ordered soldiers to go to the front, reneging on a promise. The soldiers refused to follow the new orders. The arrival of radical Kronstadt sailors — who had tried and executed several officers, including one admiral — further fueled the growing revolutionary atmosphere. The sailors and soldiers, beside with Petrograd workers, took to the streets in violent protest, calling for "all authority to the Soviets." The revolt, however, was disowned through Lenin and the Bolshevik leaders and dissipated within some days. In the aftermath, Lenin fled to Finland under threat of arrest while Trotsky, in the middle of other prominent Bolsheviks, was arrested. The

July Days confirmed the popularity of the anti-war, radical Bolsheviks, but their unpreparedness at the moment of revolt was an embarrassing gaffe that lost them support in the middle of their largest constituent clusters: soldiers and workers.

The Bolshevik failure in the July Days proved temporary. In August, poor or misleading discourse led Alexander Kerensky, the recently appointed Supreme Commander of Russian military forces, to consider that the Petrograd government had been captured through radicals, or was in serious danger thereof. In response, he ordered troops to Petrograd to pacify the municipality. To close his location, Kerensky had to inquire for Bolshevik assistance. He also sought help from the Petrograd Soviet, which described upon armed Red Guards to "defend the revolution." This Kornilov Affair failed mainly due to the attempts of the Bolsheviks, whose power in excess of railroad and telegraph workers proved basic in stopping the movement of troops. With his coup failing, Kornilov surrendered and was relieved of his location. The Bolsheviks' role in stopping the attempted coup immensely strengthened their location.

In early September, the Petrograd Soviet freed all jailed Bolsheviks and Trotsky became chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. Growing numbers of socialists and lower class Russians viewed the government less and less since a force in support of their requires and interests. The Bolsheviks benefited since the only biggest organized opposition party that had refused to compromise with the Provisional Government, and they benefited from growing frustration and even disgust with other parties, such since the Mensheviks and SRs, who stubbornly refused to break with the idea of national unity crossways all classes. In Finland, Lenin had worked on his book *State and Revolution* and sustained to lead his party script newspaper articles and policy decrees. Through October, he returned to Petrograd, aware that the increasingly radical municipality presented him no legal danger and a second opportunity for revolution. The Bolshevik Central Committee drafted a settlement, calling for the dissolution of the Provisional Government in favor of the Petrograd Soviet. The settlement was passed 10–2 (Lev Kamenev and Grigory Zinoviev prominently dissenting) and the October Revolution began.

October Revolution

The October Revolution was led through Vladimir Lenin and was based upon Lenin's script on the thoughts of Karl Marx, a political ideology often recognized since Marxism-Leninism. It marked the beginning of the spread of communism in the 20th century. It was distant less sporadic than the revolution of February and came in relation to the since the result of deliberate scheduling and coordinated action to that end. However Lenin was the leader of the Bolshevik Party, it has been argued that as Lenin was not present throughout the actual takeover of the Winter Palace, it was really Trotsky's institution and direction that led the revolution, merely spurred through the motivation Lenin instigated within his party.

Critics on the Right have extensively argued that the financial and logistical assistance of German intelligence via their key agent, Alexander Parvus was a key component since well, however historians are divided, as there is small proof supporting that claim. On 7 November 1917, Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin led his leftist revolutionaries in a revolt against the ineffective Provisional Government (Russia was still by the Julian calendar at the time, therefore era references illustrate a 25 October date). The October revolution ended the stage of the revolution instigated in February, replacing Russia's short-existed provisional parliamentary government with government through soviets, regional councils elected through bodies of workers and peasants. Liberal and monarchist forces, loosely organized into the White Army, immediately went to war against the Bolsheviks' Red Army, in a series of battles that would become recognized since the Russian Civil War. Soviet membership was initially freely elected, but several members of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, anarchists, and other leftists created opposition to the Bolsheviks by the soviets themselves. When it became clear that the Bolsheviks had small support outside of the industrialized regions of Saint Petersburg and Moscow, they basically barred non-Bolsheviks from membership in the soviets.

This obviously caused size domestic tension with several individuals who described for another series of political reform, revolting, and calling for "a third Russian revolution," a movement that received a considerable amount of support. The mainly notable examples of this anti-Bolshevik mentality were expressed in the Tambov rebellion, 1919–1921, and the Kronstadt rebellion in March 1921. These movements, which made a wide range of demands and lacked effective coordination, were eventually defeated beside with the White Army throughout the Civil War.

Civil War

The Russian Civil War, which broke out in 1918 shortly after the revolution, brought death and suffering to millions of people regardless of their political orientation. The war was fought largely flanked by the Red Army ("Reds"), consisting of the uprising majority led through the Bolshevik minority, and the "Whites" — army officers and Cossacks, the "bourgeoisie", and political clusters ranging from the distant Right to the Socialist Revolutionaries who opposed the drastic restructuring championed through the Bolsheviks following the collapse of the Provisional Government to the soviets (under clear Bolshevik dominance). The Whites had backing from nations such since Great Britain, France, USA and Japan, while the Reds sported internal, domestic support which proved to be much more effective. However the Allied nations, by external interference, provided substantial military aid to the loosely knit anti-Bolshevik forces, they were ultimately defeated. The Bolsheviks firstly assumed authority in Petrograd (contemporary-day Saint Petersburg), expanding their rule outwards, eventually reaching the Easterly Siberian Russian coast 4 years after the war in Vladivostok, an job that is whispered to have ended all significant military campaigns in the nation.

Less than one year later, the last region controlled through the White Army, the Ayano-Maysky District, directly to the north of the Krai containing Vladivostok, was given up when Common

Anatoly Pepelyayev capitulated in 1923. Many revolts were initiated purely through the common public against the Bolsheviks and their army close to the end of the war, notably the Kronstadt Rebellion, a naval mutiny engineered through Soviet Baltic sailors, former Red Army soldiers, and the people of Kronstadt, an armed uprising against the rightfully antagonized Bolshevik economic policies subjected to farmers, including forced seizures of grain crops through the Communists. This all amounted to big-level discontent. When delegates on behalf of the Kronstadt sailors arrived at Petrograd for negotiations, they raised 15 demands primarily pertaining on the Russian right to freedom. The Government firmly denounced the rebellions and labeled the requests since a reminder of the Social Revolutionaries, a political party that was popular in the middle of Soviets before Lenin, but refused to cooperate with the Bolshevik Army. The Government then responded with an armed suppression of these revolts, however suffering 10 thousand mortalities before entering the municipality of Kronstadt, ending the rebellions fairly quickly, causing several of the rebels to flee in political exile. Throughout the Civil War, Nestor Makhno led a Ukrainian anarchist movement; the Black Army allied to the Bolsheviks thrice, one of the powers ending the alliance each time. However, a Bolshevik force under Mikhail Frunze destroyed the Makhnovist movement, when the Makhnovists refused to merge into the Red Army. In addition, the therefore-described "Green Army" (peasants defending their property against the opposing forces) played a secondary role in the war, largely in the Ukraine.

Death of the Imperial Family

In early March, the Provisional Government placed Nicholas and his family under house arrest in the Alexander Palace at Tsarskoe Selo, 15 miles (24 km) south of Petrograd. In August 1917 the Kerensky government evacuated the Romanovs to Tobolsk in the Urals, allegedly to protect them from the growing tide of revolution throughout the Red Terror. After the Bolsheviks came to authority in October 1917, the circumstances of their imprisonment grew stricter and talk of putting Nicholas on trial increased. Since the counter revolutionary White movement gathered force, leading to full-level civil war through the summer, the Romanovs were moved throughout April and May 1918 to Yekaterinburg, a militant Bolshevik stronghold. Throughout the early morning of July 16, at almost 01:30, Nicholas, Alexandra, their children, their physician, and many servants were taken into the basement and killed. The order came directly from Vladimir Lenin and Yakov Sverdlov in Moscow.

That the order came from the top has extensive been whispered, although there is a lack of difficult proof. It has been argued that the execution may have been accepted out on the initiative of regional Bolshevik officials, or that it was an option approved in Moscow should White troops come Yekaterinburg. Radzinsky noted that Lenin's bodyguard personally delivered the telegram ordering the execution and that he was ordered to destroy the proof.

The Russian Revolution and the World

Leon Trotsky said that the goal of socialism in Russia would not be realized without the success of the world revolution. Indeed, a revolutionary wave caused through the Russian Revolution lasted until 1923. Despite initial hopes for success in the German Revolution of 1918–1919, in the short-existed Hungarian Soviet Republic and others like it, no other Marxist movement succeeded in keeping authority in its hands.

This issue is subject to conflicting views on the communist history through several Marxist clusters and parties. Joseph Stalin later rejected this idea, stating that socialism was possible in one country. The confusion concerning Stalin's location on the issue stems from the information that he, after Lenin's death in 1924, successfully used Lenin's argument — the argument that socialism's success requires the workers of other countries in order to occur — to defeat his competitors within the party through accusing them of betraying Lenin and, so, the ideals of the October Revolution.

KNOWLEDGE REVOLUTION: PRINTING AND INFORMATICS

Education

One of the central transformations of the contemporary period has concerned the institution of the methods in which knowledge is transmitted, and also *the* methods in which people's capacities to receive this knowledge have been formed. For this cause, a revise of the growth of contemporary organizations of education is essential for an understanding of the 'knowledge revolution'.

Backdrop: 17th -18th Century Europe

Since European Absolutism urbanized in excess of the course of the 17th and 18th centuries, the state in countries like Prussia, France, and Russia began to perceive the importance of intervening actively in educational matters, often in competition with the Church and other religious bodies, which had hitherto dominated pedagogy. The spread of elementary education crossways community, and especially into the burgeoning transitional classes, was often seen since an efficient method of breeding loyal and obedient citizen-subjects. Sure biggest transforms began to take lay in educational practice and ideology in this era.

First, Latin, which had been the medium for instruction, came to be rivaled and gradually displaced through teaching in the mother words of dissimilar states. This heralded a move towards the identification of the type of education one received with the cultural and political identity one bore. Second, spurred through the thoughts of thinkers like Francis Bacon in England, there was a growing emphasis on training in the exact sciences, which gradually began to rival the Renaissance-inherited focus on logic and rhetoric since subjects fit for school curricula. This new emphasis can be seen since a method of trying to stay education abreast of the accretions of scientific knowledge that

characterized European life from the 16th century onward. The eighteenth-century Enlightenment produced dissimilar schools of idea approximately the question of education.

The empiricist philosopher John Locke argued that human minds were shaped through existed experience and not abstract cause: therefore, children should be given thoroughgoing instruction in proper manners of conduct prior to 'studies'. On a dissimilar track, the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico stressed the role of imagination in the making of human personality. On the foundation of this, he argued for the nourishment of the minds of children by the revise of words, poetry, history and oratory. Few German ideologies argued on the other hand for a severely regimented education for children, which would break their urge to disobey and sin through cautiously disciplining both body and spirit. In dissimilar methods, then, few of the biggest thinkers and intellectual currents of the time tried to approach to grips with the question of how knowledge was to be imparted by education, and what types of knowledge were mainly fit for transmission.

In the late eighteenth century, elementary education spread in absolute words. The school organization was through now a biggest concern of the state in all the biggest European countries, and the ideal - if not the reality- of universal compulsory schooling was recognized. Running hand in hand with the extension of state manages in excess of education was the procedure of *nationalization*: the organizations of education that were now recognized were harnessed to the buildings and requires of the nation-state since never before. In Prussia, Frederick II issued common school regulations crossways the country in 1763, establishing compulsory schooling for children flanked by five and 13 or 14 years of age. In 1787, school management was centralized under a national board of education.

In Russia in the early eighteenth century, Peter the Great tried to organize an educational organization squarely harnessed to require of the state: religious and % classical studying were eschewed, and replaced through training in mathematics, navigation, artillery and engineering. Later, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Tsar Alexander I tried to extend these principles of utility: rural education involved instruction to the peasantry in elements of agriculture since well since vital literacy; urban schooling, on the other hand, was focused on education fit for civil servants - in law, political economy, technology, and commerce. The transmission of knowledge by education, in these cases, was organized not since an end in itself, but since a means through which properly educated and trained subjects could serve the State. The administrative building of education, and the subjects measured relevant for the curriculum, were dictated in big section through the interests of the State.

Education in the 19th Century

Biggest structural transforms in the economy and community underpinned the enormous expansion of education in the nineteenth century. European expansion overseas brought new wealth into the European economy, and continued the rise of business clusters and the transitional class. The

development of industrialization, initially in Britain and later crossways the continent, involved the growth of size labor, concentrated in industrial municipalities. The spread of elementary education to the industrial proletariat became a concern of state and public, and was fuelled also through the demands of democratic and radical agitators and intellectuals, who raised questions in relation to the welfare of the 'general man', attacked privileges, and accentuated the making of citizens who could, by education, fulfill their entitlement to personal development.

The first half of the nineteenth century saw significant development in pedagogical idea. Three figures stand out in this respect. The Swiss reformer Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, at the beginning of this era, propounded the idea that the 'innate character' of the child, rather than the external buildings of the arts and the sciences, should be the foundation of a comprehensive intellectual, moral and physical educational program. Working since he did with the children of the poor, he accentuated the importance of education within the house. Another biggest educational reformer was the German Froebel, who in 1837 began the kindergarten movement, which was characterized through an accent on the importance of play in child education.

Games could tap the innate capacities of children. The kindergartens that spread crossways Europe in the second half of the twentieth century marked a new departure: earlier, institutions for little children (nursery and day-care centers) had merely been places where they could be kept while their parents were at job; with the new organization, however, children could be, in Froebel's terms, subjects for 'psychological training.. .through means of play and jobs.' Johann Friedrich Herbart, a modern of Froebel's who achieved immense posthumous fame, \vas in the middle of the founders of fully urbanized theoretical pedagogy, a organization he urbanized through injecting metaphysics and psychology into the revise of studying procedures. In excess of the course of the nineteenth century, national schooling organizations came to be fully articulated in several countries. External procedures were an impetus to this: the consolidation of national states wedded education to the structure of 'national character, and enabled the management of education through the State; the spread of modern technology fuelled the development of new 'modern schools' that taught modern words and exact sciences.

There was an immense development of vocational schools in this time, and the rising pace of secularization in Europe was marked through the decline of the church (comparative to the state) in educational matters. There was another factor: the development of democratic movement's crossways big sections of Europe, which demanded universal male adult franchise. For the state in England, France and Germany- the three European countries we shall believe at length, and also the three that witnessed biggest and continued democratic agitations in the nineteenth century- education was a means of mobilizing populations, but also, equally, a concession to popular democratic demands.

Germany

Germany witnessed the fastest growth of the buildings of national education in this time. Compulsory school presence was recognized through the second half of the eighteenth century, and in 1794 a law declaring state supremacy in excess of education was passed. In 1807, following the traumatic defeat of the Prussian army at the hands of Napoleon at Jena (1806), there was a new emphasis on cultivating nationalism by strictly state-controlled education of the young, and the remains of ecclesiastical education were snuffed out.

Wilhelm von Humboldt, at the head of a special part of the Ministry of the Interior that controlled education, recognized in 1810 the first comprehensive organization for the state examination of teachers. The classical organization of schooling (the nine-year Gymnasium with its accent on Latin and Greek training) persisted a extensive time, however, and it was not till well after German unification and the establishment of the German Empire (1871) that 'modern' schooling, with its emphasis on the sciences and the mother tongue, came to enjoy same privileges. The real supremacy of the German educational organization was in the field of higher education, which was centered approximately the universities of Berlin, Breslau, Bonn and Munich, institutions that drew in students from all approximately the world. The biggest universities in nineteenth-century Germany, distant in advance of their counter sections in higher education elsewhere, integrated education with the steady accumulation of scientific knowledge that was preceding crossways Europe through introducing scientific training at an advanced stage into the curriculum. Even more significantly, these were the first contemporary educational institutions to combine teaching and research, integrating two radical principles -the elective freedom of the student (to choose his own program of revise) and the freedom of the professor to engage in research and develop his subject.

France

In France, the universal right to education was proclaimed since a revolutionary principle in 1791, in the transitional of the French Revolution. However, when educational buildings - formerly dominated through the Jesuits and other teaching orders - came to be displaced through a new centralizing state tools under Napoleon in the early nineteenth century, the revolutionary egalitarianism of the 1789-1793 era had mainly been eschewed, and Napoleon devised his elaborate organization of educational training largely for the children of the upper classes and growing professional bourgeoisie. A detailed organization of degrees and certificates for several stages of revise was recognized, and requisite grades of proficiency were earmarked for entry into law, medicine, teaching and other professions. In 1854, France was divided into sixteen administrative districts (academies) for educational purposes; these, however, had small autonomy and functioned since arms of the national state tools of education. It was in the 1880s that the biggest transforms in

the educational organization came to be legally defined: universally free and compulsory education was recognized, and religious teaching was abolished in public schools.

England

England followed a slightly dissimilar trajectory. The ideological hegemony of the doctrine of laissez-faire limited, for an extensive time, the drive towards state management of, and responsibility for, education. At the turn of the nineteenth century, education was measured the preserve of private enterprise, and much unstructured and unsystematic philanthropy was involved in the growth of elementary education. Voluntary schools were set up all in excess of the country - in the middle of the earliest were the Sunday schools from the 1780s, which largely dealt in Bible reading - and were accompanied through philanthropic educational institutions such as the Community for Bettering the Circumstances of the Poor, which was set up in 1796. Institutions financed voluntarily, however, could not cope with the task of providing comprehensive elementary education.

It was in 1870 that, partly spurred on through the reproaches of Matthew Arnold (who served since inspector of elementary schools from 1851 and 1866), Parliament passed an Elementary Education Act. In 1880, elementary education, administered through regional educational authorities or 'school boards', was made compulsory during England and Wales, and in 1891 fees were abolished in approximately all elementary schools. Secondary education, however, sustained to be left to voluntary and private enterprise, and the 'public school' organization (which was highly expensive and anything but public, despite the name) sustained to be thoroughly elitist in its nature and values. Despite the slowness with which England and France achieved the primary education, literacy proceeded extremely quickly by the nineteenth century in both these countries, since indeed it did in Germany. The German Reich was 88 per cent literate in 1871, at the time of unification. France and England were less urbanized in this regard, but through the 1890s, 90 per cent literacy had been approximately consistently reached in Western Europe. There were, of course, persistent local disparities within countries, and outside of the heartland of the literacy drives progress on this front was much more halting.

In Russia, where sporadic drives towards a democratic organization of education were frequently halted through reactionary rollbacks, in 1900 almost 70 per cent of the male population and 90 per cent of the female population remained illiterate. Outside Europe, too, tumultuous transformations in educational organizations were beginning to be articulated. In the United States, in the second quarter of the nineteenth century - again, significantly, index-connected to the development of radical democratic sentiment and the celebration of the 'general man' - the general school was recognized, since an educational building run on public finances, and open to every child. This was, given the federal building of the United States, not recognized at one go, but gradually, in state after state, beginning with Massachusetts in 1837. Before extensive, few general schools, acceding to demands

for advanced public education, introduced courses beyond the elementary stage, and the 'high school' therefore came to be recognized. In the course of the nineteenth century, higher education in the United States was also reshaped, since colleges surged in number, lost their formerly religious character and became graduate schools of research.

European get in touch with Asia, in the shape of colonialism, also introduced few significant transforms in existing educational buildings. Since an instance of this - however not necessarily a representative one - we shall believe India, the focal point of the British Empire, which witnessed few significant shifts in educational organizations and patterns under colonial manage. However, colonial education in India did not mean an easy displacement of indigenous patterns of education through English education. Matters were much more intricate. In common, colonial policy in the early nineteenth century uneasily avoided intervention in education. Educational initiatives were started through Christian missionaries, who, however, were never easily integrated into the mechanisms of colonial manage. Missionaries, printing books in the Indian vernaculars, stimulated the growth of Indian words. From 1813, few limited public expenditure on education was recognized, but the East India Company's government spent this on the teaching of classical Sanskrit and Arabic, giving rise to what came to be recognized since an 'Orientalist' policy of education.

The earliest demands for instruction in English - which was beginning to be established and experienced since a language of authority in the colonial context - came from *Indian* reformers like Rammohan Roy in the early nineteenth century. It was not till the 1830s that an aggressive body of government officials, who came to be recognized since the 'Anglicists', demanded that Oriental studying be replaced through Western knowledge in the priorities of the State, and had their method. In 1857, universities were recognized in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, and resulted in an expansion of college education. However, there were gaping loopholes in the educational buildings recognized under the aegis of colonial rule.

First, and mainly importantly, the close to-complete neglect of primary education kept the massive majority of the country illiterate - a state of affairs that persisted into post-Independence times. Second, the unplanned development of private colleges and universities led to a significant development in numbers of people who, however educated, lacked access to appropriate employment in a colonial administrative building that was stacked against them - Indians, for example, could not enter the higher rungs of the administrative service. This was one of the several factors that fuelled discontent with colonial rule, and from the late nineteenth century, one of the more interesting markers of nationalist discontent was the growth of educational institutions beside 'national' rows, such since the D.A.V. College in Lahore or the Central Hindu College in Varanasi.

Education in the 20th Century

By the course of the twentieth century, education retained and intensified its role since a catalyst of social transform, since a marker of inequalities and differentials, since a benchmark of state policy and accomplishments, and since a facilitator of the circulation of several types of knowledge. Structural procedures and dramatic measures in the twentieth century, since in its precursors, formed the trajectory of educational institutions and practices, and molded the nature of their impact. There was, first of all, the dislocation caused through the two world wars.

To believe the connection flanked by war and education, however, one necessity probe slightly deeper. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, European armies stood armed against one another, in a tense and unstable standoff, since rivalries - mainly fuelled through competing colonial ambitions - escalated flanked by dissimilar states. Policies of conscription were introduced, and there was a marked militarization of community. This was, ironically possibly, one of the engines that drove the escalation and spread of education. In communities continually preparing for war, the state had to be ready to invest in military and technological training, and this invariably involved a sure degree of education.

The world wars also in the extensive run, weakened the authority of the big European powers. The biggest consequence of this, of course, was the staggering rise of the United States and the Soviet Union since superpowers. However, another consequence of this, since procedures of decolonization escalated after 1945, was that education since a nationalist agenda took on a new meaning in the context of newly liberated countries, trying to set up enduring and stable political and economic buildings. Education in the Third World came to be seen since an instrument of national regeneration. Industrial and scientific growth in the West described into being new types of training in new types of technological knowledge. Old skills rapidly became obsolete since scientific technology uniformly revolutionized itself, and new organizations of knowledge were created, which necessitated education.

Researchers, skilled workers, and high-stage professionals were - and continue to be - constantly produced through this kin4 of education. The similar is true of academic knowledge. It was in the twentieth century that the university appeared since a biggest centre of both knowledge manufacture and consumption, in several sections of the world. Size universities and open universities pioneered the concept of adult education, which is something that has expanded greatly in the postwar world. Economics prosperity of the type big sections of North America and Europe enjoyed after the Second World War brought in relation to the a tremendous demand for secondary and higher education, and also produced the means to fulfill this demand. Flanked by 1950 and 1970 - a era often termed the 'Golden Age' of western capitalism - the number of universities in several countries doubled or trebled, and education, both size and dedicated, was enabled on a much superior level.

In the Third World, too, universities catered to superior and superior numbers of students. Buildings of size education were recognized at higher since well since primary stages. If we seem briefly at the experience of revolutionary Communist rule in the twentieth century, the level of transformation in the field of education becomes a bit clearer. Western capitalist countries had more or less achieved size literacy - and in several cases secure to-universal literacy - through the twentieth century. The similar was not true of Russia, under Tsarist despotism, and China, which suffered from the combination of a decaying monarchy, Western imperialist designs, and immense political turbulence in the first half of the twentieth century. Both countries were stabilized, and brought into row with technical and educational growths in the rest of the world, under Communist rule which in both cases began through stirring genuine hopes for expanded popular sovereignty and social egalitarianism, and ended up since revolutionary despotisms.

The Russian Empire experienced its revolution flanked by 1917 and 1923, and China came under Communist rule in 1949. Both revolutionary governments launched huge programs of social reconstruction, and education was at the heart of this. Manual labor and productive job were accentuated in the educational organizations of both States, and there was tremendous emphasis on vital literacy skills and primary education. Enormous advances were made in both these meadows in extremely short time. The logic of revolutionary dictatorship seemed to demand this.

On the one hand, there was require to stay citizens from questioning the regime that ruled them, and to this end education deployed sophisticated propaganda machines (since, it has to be said, did several educational organizations in several democratic countries). On the other hand, there was a consistent pressure to give citizens access to good - sometimes excellent - averages of vital education, which was measured basic to socialist construction. In essence, Russia, China (and, interestingly, virtually all the left-wing dictatorships of the twentieth century) achieved in the course of an era of decades in the twentieth century what the West had achieved some generations previously: a population with very widespread literacy and vital education, free and compulsory for all. The attainments in this regard were extra ordinary : to this day, primary education in mainly surviving socialist regimes is administered with care and efficiency. Theories of education in the twentieth century have taken several shapes, increasingly informed through a reliance on the findings and ways of other disciplines, such since the social sciences, and, more directly, psychology.

The progressive education movement of the early twentieth century, pioneered through the educational reformer John Dewey, was based mainly in experimental American schools, and tried to break down the traditional stiffness of school buildings and allow the child to explore her latent possibilities. Another pedagogic movement of the early twentieth century was characterized through the child-centered come, which argued that the school should be fitted to require of the child and not vice versa. Maria Montessori, one of the early twentieth-century exponents of this come, viewed

educational reform since a means of countering the suppression of children's personalities through adults

Revolution And The Term: Printing, Publishing, Reading

To comprehend the nature of the transformation brought in the contemporary world through the connected practices of printing, publishing, and reading, we require imagining a world without newspapers, books and bookstores, publishing houses and printing presses. We would be imagining a world, in other terms, without the foundations of modern discourses, which till the twentieth century was entirely dominated through the printed term. When learning the successive revolutions in the world of the 'print media' in modern times, it is necessary to believe not only the technological transformations in the field, which made the circulation of knowledge and entertainment of several types possible, but also the reception of such media, in the shape of reading. Keeping this in mind, we can briefly survey the radical transforms in the world of the printed term in the last some centuries.

The details of the purely technological characteristics of the printing revolutions as the fifteenth century require not inhabit us. It is generally held that Johannes Gutenberg invented the first modern printing press, sometime flanked by 1440 and 1450. Block printing had already been practiced in Europe as the beginning of the fifteenth century, but Gutenberg introduced an entirely new craft of printing, involving movable metal kind, ink, paper and press. Through the end of the century, this new innovation had been accepted by big sections of Europe, mainly through German printers. Texts could now circulate on a level hitherto unimaginable: earlier, copying a manuscript had been the only method to reproduce a text.

Printing reduced the cost per copy of a book drastically, and greatly shortened the time needed to produce a book. The logical corollary of this was the manufacture of books in superior numbers. Each book could now reach greater numbers of readers than before. There were significant improvements in printing technology in the following centuries. Notable in the middle of these are the construction of the first all-metal press in England in 1795, the application of steam authority to the printing procedure in the early nineteenth century (which joined jointly the several operations of the procedure of printing in a single cycle), the growth of mechanical typesetting and typesetting, greater sophistication in the reproduction of illustrations by the nineteenth century, and the perfection of color printing in the twentieth century. These and other inventions constituted a group that we can characterize since the industrialization of printing.

By the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, after Gutenberg's invention, printing presses spread all crossways Europe, and printing was at the heart of few of the bitterest political struggles and mainly dramatic social transformations of the time. The church, the state, universities, and religious radicals all deployed printing technology since a means of social discourse and propaganda throughout the

religious ferment of the Reformation in Europe. There were many continued efforts to regulate and censor the spread of printed material and the action of presses on the section of church and state, and, on the other face, the exploit of cheaply printed literature to spread radical thoughts. In the mid-seventeenth century, the heyday of cheap print, the English Revolution, which produced the only republican experiment in British history, witnessed the dissemination of radical tracts through religious and social reformers: printing, here, was in the eye of the storm of a revolutionary era. This was a pattern that was to replicate itself later since well: throughout both the French and the Russian Revolutions, for example, the circulation of cheap printed condemnations of the royal family played a biggest section in the unseating of monarchic regimes. Print became, in excess of the course of time, a potent political weapon.

Flanked by the 15th and the 18th century, several of the aspects of modern publishing practice and book circulation came to be recognized. Despite efforts at censorship, sometimes successful, through virtually all the European nation-states, the book deal flourished in these centuries. Advertisements for books in the shape of handbills or broadsheets began to be printed from the 1460s. Publishers' lists and catalogues began approximately at the similar time. Books were distributed beside deal circuits, and at deal fairs such since that at Frankfurt in Germany. Frankfurt became the centre of much European publishing, and a type of clearing-house for new publications: a state of affairs that lasted till 1759, when imperial interference caused the centre of the deal to shift to Leipzig. In excess of the course of these three centuries, the functions of publisher, bookseller, and printer gradually came to be separated from one another.

Through the nineteenth century, the publisher's dominance in the procedure of book manufacture and sharing was recognized. The industrialization of printing in the nineteenth century radically reduced publishing costs. Paper, which had shaped more than 20 per cent of the cost of a book till 1740, dropped in value till it constituted only 7 per cent in 19 10. Cloth cases began to replace leather bindings after 1 820. Crossways Europe and America in this era, the book deal expanded in tandem with the rise in population and the development of an educated public. The number of new books expanded enormously. In Britain, roughly 100 new titles were printed per year till 1750; this rose to 600 through 1825 and in excess of 6000 through the turn of the twentieth century.

Since education expanded, popular series at low prices began to be published, an early forerunner being Bell's *The Poets of Great Britain*, which emerged in 1777-83. Cassell's *National Library Series* (209 volumes, 1886-1 890) was the cheapest of these editions, costing three pence for a paper binding and six pence for a cloth binding. In the 20th century, book publishing became a big industry, embracing a number of big concerns, few of which employed staffs of 1000 and more. Specialization became a marked characteristic of publishing houses, especially in the field of educational books, which commanded an enormous market with the increase in literacy rates and the rise of higher education. Companies like Macmillan in Britain and America, and Methuen in

London, began with specifically educational requires in mind. Sections of the colonized world also gradually appeared since markets with a close readership: India, for example, witnessed not only the size entry of titles published in England, but also the setting up of branches of British publishing houses, and the growth of a diversified indigenous publishing world. The experience of two world wars and the Depression of 1929 rocked the publishing industry in the West at many junctures, since book stocks were destroyed, purchasing authority shrank, and the price of paper periodically rose.

In such a situation, finding mean of cheaper circulation to keep afloat seemed a logical step to take. The British publisher Allen Lane pioneered the paperback movement in response to this, and thereby a much wider readership than before was tapped. Literature of several types could spread much quicker within literate populations. In the postwar era, publishing expanded rapidly again, and book circulation establish new means of intensification, such since the rapid development of translations. The paperback revolution sustained, creating millions of new readers crossways the world, dominated through the Penguin Publishing House. Paperbacks were -and continue to be - sold in not only bookshops, but also newsstands, drugstores, and railway stations. Academic publications - editions of jobs of scholarship in several disciplines, for the benefit of the growing numbers of university students crossways the world - also began to be published, initially in the United States in the 1950s, and then in several other sections of the world with big student populations.

This was publishing's response to the development of knowledge in several meadows in the arts and the sciences by the twentieth century, and the emergence of the student and scholarly society since a fertile market for books to do with their subjects. University presses also grew in the postwar era, since a means of disseminating knowledge and research findings in several dedicated meadows without being too tied down to the more acute demands of profit expansion. To understand the implications of the revolution in printing and publishing, one necessity believe the equally revolutionary methods in which readerships and reading practices were transformed from the eighteenth century onwards. Prior to the eighteenth century, the book in Europe had generally been seen since a shape of social discipline, imposed through the Church. Now, since new types of printed matter - mainly dramatically possibly the novel - penetrated the subjective lives of people, the book acquired an emancipator function, and came to be seen since a vehicle for individual intellectual development and social opportunity. The mechanically reproduced text could be read distant more easily than any manuscript: the imagined life and world of the book, so, could attract in readers distant more effectively. And mainly importantly, of course, the expanded number of books meant that readers could be drawn into the book in big numbers: individual jobs, then, could exercise a significant social impact. Lending libraries and reading communities grew: a new world of social intercourse therefore urbanized approximately the practice of reading. By the eighteenth century, regular reading remained limited to a little part of the European population, largely parts of the growing bourgeoisie. In the nineteenth century, however, since the reading public of the Western

world achieved literacy on a size level, an enormous and inchoate world of new readers appeared. Women, children and industrial workers constituted the bulk of the reading population that appeared in this time, and books were written and circulated keeping their tastes - real or supposed - in mind. Cookery manuals, magazines, and a big number of cheap novels were published keeping women specifically in mind. Novels were measured appropriate for women partly because, unlike the male world of the newspaper, they dealt with a world of the private sphere, inner life and personal connections - a realm measured fit for the feminine character, with its supposed thralldom to imagination and fancy. Female readership came to constitute a separate market through the late nineteenth century. The Bible, novels like Robinson Crusoe, and rising numbers of fairy tales and fantasies were measured appropriate reading matter for children. Transitional-class reformers laid much stress on the literary education of working-class men, who were afforded greater opportunities for reading than before through the reduction of the working day. Classical and educational literature was measured appropriate and edifying for the literate proletariat. However, the attendance of radical and socialist literature on the shelves of workers' libraries suggests that there lived moves towards an independent working-class literary civilization. In the twentieth century, readership expanded further, with the advance of literacy in several sections of the world.

Reading has approach to be supplanted, however, through other types of leisure: cinema, rather than the book, is possibly the definitive cultural shape of the century. This does not mean a death to reading, but it does possibly signal a slow decline. Potentially new shapes of reading have urbanized with the development of electronic texts in recent times, which are considerably dissimilar from the printed book. It is yet to be seen if this will herald another revolution in reading.

The Advent of Contemporary Newspapers

Some histories can give us since rich a sense of the texture of the 'knowledge revolution' since the history of the contemporary newspaper. Modern life in the literate world without access to news is unthinkable. We are therefore accustomed to being, in lesser or greater degree, well-known with few manner of fact from dissimilar sections of the world that we tend to forget that this is a relatively recent growth, and is closely connected to transforms in the nature of international, national and local discourse. By the twentieth century, massive numbers of people have been accustomed to receiving the news 'since it happens' by the media of radio, television and more recently the Internet.

However, the initial transformation in the nature of fact generation and the making of 'news' happened by the newspaper. The emergence of news, since a given quantity of fact that big numbers of people have regular access to by determinate media, is possibly the mainly significant dimension of the knowledge revolution in contemporary times. And newspapers stood, for several generations, in the centre of this momentous transform. Believe few of the characteristics of a news-producing and consuming world. Such a world is, in an obvious sense, integrated since never before. This was a

procedure that naturally took time, but the trajectory was constant: from the time newspapers and news manufacture became a biggest industry, rising numbers of people had access to fact in relation to the sections of the world they would never see in their lifetime, and several sections of the world they may not even have heard of. In our own time, we are used to frequently articulated worries in relation to the future of the world, in relation to the nuclear holocaust and environmental degradation, in relation to the political rivalries that threaten human subsistence.

Would these anxieties be conceivable in a world without widespread access to *news* from vastly dissimilar areas and contexts? The spread of news, then, created circumstances for expanded awareness in relation to the world outside local and national boundaries for massive numbers of people. At the similar time, it also created circumstances for very - sometimes explosively - sharpened awareness of 'national' questions and issues, since well since of national identity. The assumption that people require to know first of all what is happening inside their own nation is an assumption that helps in constructing that nation within popular imagination. The information that we since Indian citizens are likelier to know in relation to the minor corruption scandal in Indian political life than in relation to the flood in Bangladesh or an African famine is not 'natural', it is section of a reality *constructed* for us through the priorities that our sources of fact set for themselves. A national newspaper has determined coordinates: it is going to be distributed in the middle of people within a given geographical territory, and it is generally going to treat measures that occur within the legroom of the nation-state with much greater care and attention than it will measures outside it, even if enough fact is accessible in relation to the latter. The rise of national consciousness crossways the world has been historically paralleled through the rise of newspapers since massive profitable concerns. Till the turn of the nineteenth century and the advent of the Industrial Revolution, news coverage was sporadic.

The first rudimentary newsletters, passing fact flanked by traders, had appeared in the Transitional Ages. The seventeenth century saw the development of the first semi-independent newspapers in Britain, America, and on the European continent, however these were frequently subject to enormous censorship. This in itself demonstrates that, even at an early level of development, the authority of 'news' to form public opinion was established through the powers-that-be. In North America in the late eighteenth century, the press became a powerful social force, being the chief propagandist of the new republic of the United States after the Revolution of 1776. Clandestinely published newssheets were an agent in the making of public opinion and political clash crossways big sections of Europe and North America in this era. Through 1800, educated citizens in the United States and mainly of Europe could anticipate a sure degree of access to independent news coverage - a revolutionary breakthrough in itself, in the methods in which people related to the world approximately them. The period of the Industrial Revolution, however, produced circumstances that supported an unimaginable expansion of the scope of news dissemination.

Section of this had to do with the revolution in printing techniques and growths in transport and discourses. Till well into the nineteenth century, news had to mainly spread through road, or - in the case of international news -through sea, and the transmission of fact was slow. One can speculate that 'news' crossways a sufficiently extensive aloofness in those days would not have, in several cases, been of any real significance since a guide to activity. Imagine, for example, news of a landslide or an earthquake in remote areas in the eighteenth century. Through the time news of this reached people who were in a location to intervene, it would generally have been too late. In contrast, news in modern times is definitely a shaping force: it not only statements actions and measures, but also propels them and determines their course. The speeding up of discourse in the nineteenth century, by the invention of the telephone or the telegraph, made it possible for news to be gathered instantaneously. In 1815, an event in Brussels took four days to statement in London.

Within some decades, items had changed therefore much that it could be accounted immediately. In 1851, one of the legendary accomplishments in the history of news occurred, when Paul Julius Reuter began by the telegraph to supply foreign news to national presses by telegrams, and thereby created the modern news agency. Newspaper correspondents also had transformed responsibilities and powers in the period of instant discourse. Journalism - in the shape of on-the-mark newsgathering - became a biggest, and increasingly valued, full-time job. The buildings of modern journalism and the institution of the contemporary press were therefore being set into form. All this enabled the efficient gathering of news, and its transmission from correspondent to news agency to editorial desk. But what of the next level in the manufacture of 'news' -the conversion of this fact to readable matter, accessible to thousands of readers? In the late nineteenth century, this too was revolutionized.

The invention of the Lino-kind machine -which began to be used in 1886 - cut down radically on the time taken to produce the newspaper. This machine was at the centre of a group of technical innovations, which also involved the application of electricity to the printing industry, and the making of machines that could print and also cut, fold and bind newspapers of any mass jointly. Since we can see, the late-nineteenth century newspaper partook of the mainly dramatic and exciting scientific and technical advances of the time, and deployed them in its service, Since railways, steamships and telegraphs slashed distances flanked by and within nations in the late nineteenth century, size-produced newspapers became accessible to all literate or even semi-literate parts of community: industrial workers, for example, rapidly became the biggest consumers of the daily paper. Through the end of the century, the circulation figures of few popular newspapers had touched the million spot, which indicates the intensity and level of news consumption. Newspapers began to take diverse shapes in the content they bore in this era. The London Times, which was an influential supporter of Parliamentary reform in Britain, proclaimed the ideal of journalistic objectivity, and the right to criticize governments, a task it took on at the time of the Crimean War, for example.

The New York Tribune's continued opposition to slavery was another example of a newspaper assuming democratic political values since averages for its own practice. Other newspapers branched out in dissimilar directions, and reflected dissimilar preoccupations. For the New York Sun, for example, 'human-interest stories' without any scrupulous political consequence were seen since a lucrative investment. Cheaply produced and very sensationalist newspapers - a prototype of which remnants the Sun in London, the proverbial 'tabloid' - also acquired a size readership. Newspapers also witnessed significant development in colonial contexts. Colonial governments naturally exercised particularly vigilant manage in excess of the press, especially its political publications. Demands for a freer press, however, became a live issue in colonized countries since it had in their metropolises.

In India, The Times of India and The Hindu appeared since biggest English-language newspapers, with high averages of journalism. Several other newspapers - the Dhyanyaya in Maharashtra, to take a random instance - published pages in both the vernacular and in English. There was, by the late nineteenth century, an extra ordinary development of vernacular newspapers. Educated Indians in the colonial government's service painstakingly translated these, therefore that reportage offensive or threatening to the government could be scrutinized and, if necessary, censored. An openly nationalist press appeared in the late nineteenth century, and, by complicated levels, moved to the heart of the thrash about against colonialism in the twentieth century. The press retained its importance after Independence, and the number of newspapers and their circulation both expanded. In the late nineteenth century, then, newspapers crossways the world had become an industry with a size market.

Their earlier identification with a narrowly literary world was now snapped, and they entered the realm, and - in multiple methods - the logic of large business. Since the press came to need more and more continued investment, advertising revenue became increasingly significant in the composition of newspaper finances. A short story will show this. William Randolph Hearst, who was the major New York press baron at the turn of the century, had initially been something of a campaigner against political corruption. His rise to authority, however, was based mainly on his decision to shelve his earlier ethics, and concentrate single-mindedly on what made news, and also what made news sell. Hearst was the figure who inspired Orson Welles' great film Citizen Kane, which explores the relentless logic of the corruption and authority that result from such manipulation of news and popular sentiment. In 1898, Hearst's Morning Journal was publishing exaggerated and hysteric stories in relation to the political tensions flanked by the United States and Spain in excess of Cuba. Hearst is accounted to have cabled an illustrator for his paper in Cuba, asking for pictures of atrocities. The illustrator responded that there were no atrocities to show. Hearst apparently replied 'You furnish the pictures and I'll furnish the war'. This narrative shows two items. Hearst's report, whether true or not, reflects an assumption that several subsequent press barons - since also several

political regimes - have made: manage in excess of the news can form the methods in which people think and behave, in a world dominated through the size media. This is something that has often been exaggerated.

Dictatorships, despite manage in excess of the news and people's access to it, have frequently proved unable to convince their subjects of their legitimacy by media manipulation. People have, in big numbers and communal bodies, acted in methods contrary to the expectations of newspaper magnates and governments. But there remain serious grounds for anxiety, given the continually enhanced reach and scope of the media, especially when conjoined with governmental projects of manages. The popular Hollywood satire *Wag the Dog*, made in the late 1990s, narrates a story of an U.S. management's bid to retain authority through creating and circulating news of a phoney war.

Such anxiety may often look paranoid, but also points to something extremely real, because measures like this, for all their fictive and fantastic quality, are actually well within the realm of possibility. Press barons structure newspaper chains - not all of whom were necessarily since unscrupulous since Hearst - dominated the landscape of American newspaper ownership in the early section of the twentieth century. The logic of size news manufacture that had fuelled the rise of newspapers since large business remained, but the ownership pattern itself gradually changed, in both America and Europe. The older press baron had combined the functions of editor and administration executive.

In excess of the course of the twentieth century, the latter came to predominate in excess of the former. The world of the newspaper in the twentieth century has also been formed through the fierce competition that describes the corporate world since an entire. The newspaper industry has been characterized through fierce struggles for greater circulation, one concern trying to top another's share in the news market. In this context, takeovers of smaller concerns through superior news enterprises have been frequent. A modern instance of this is the massive international media empire built up through the Australian entrepreneur Richard Murdoch.

Radio and Television Broadcasting

Newspapers have retained, through and big, their size circulation and reach, their social force and relevance. However, in excess of the course of the twentieth century they were gradually supplanted since the mainly advanced disseminators of knowledge and fact through what we call the *audio-visual media*: radio ad television. Through creation it possible to transmit measures *since they happened* to several sections of the world, broadcasting dissolved distances of legroom and time, creating a *virtual* legroom -the radio set or the television screen - where measures could be *simultaneously* accounted in several corners of the globe. In an extremely real sense, the world shrank by the intervention of the size media, both printed and audio-visual, but especially the latter.

The first recognized radio program was broadcast in Massachusetts in the U.S.A on Christmas Eve, 1906. It was after the Second World War, however, that radio broadcasting really took off, since a

shape of news transmission and - possibly even more vitally in the extensive run - since a source of popular entertainment, by the airing of music, drama, and therefore on. David Sarnoff, later of the Radio Corporation of America and the National Broadcasting Corporation, was the first to suggest the possibility of a radio receiver in every house, in 1916. This alerted experimenters in radio to the commercial possibilities of the shape. The production and sale of radio getting equipment offered great possibilities for profit creation, and radio -like the newspaper before it and television after - entered into a symbiotic connection with advertising, which began to give a substantial portion of its revenues, and in return used airtime on radio stations since an advertising medium.

In the early 1920s, the business of constructing and selling radio receivers boomed, and concomitantly therefore did the business of radio broadcast, since more and more broadcasting stations were set up. Initially pioneered in England and the United States, radio spread very rapidly. Through the end of 1923, there were radio stations recognized in Canada, France, the Soviet Union, Belgium, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Spain, Denmark and Australia. Shortly afterwards, Asian countries began to join the world of radio discourse. Organized radio broadcasting began in Japan in 1925, and the Indian Broadcasting Company had stations in Bombay and Calcutta in 1927. Initially urbanized for its commercial possibilities, radio also offered immense scope for public educational and awareness programs. National governments, alerted to this, encouraged the development of what came to be recognized since public-service broadcasting.

The prototype for this was - and remnants - the British Broadcasting Corporation, set up since a public corporation in 1927. The BBC was made answerable to Parliament, but day-to-day management was left in the hands of the Board of Governors. This was a model that convinced several other countries. Politicians soon realized the enormous potential of radio to form public opinion and deployed this in qualitatively new types of political campaigns, where the radio played an increasingly significant role. In the 1920s, the Republican Party in the United States spent in excess of 20 per cent of its campaign finances on radio broadcasting. The 1932 presidential contest flanked by Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt saw an unprecedented deployment of radio propaganda on both faces.

In an even more concentrated shape, Hitler's exploit of public radio was central to his success and popularity in Germany. Throughout the Second World War, radio became a channel for political mobilization on an unprecedented level. The wartime rhetoric of Hitler, Stalin, and Churchill is legendary; it had the social impact it did because of the expanded reach of radio. Citizens were made more aware of their connection to their national government by radio broadcasting in both wartime and peacetime; simultaneously, radio was used - since print had been - to mould scrupulous types of citizens, obedient and loyal to the State. The requisite degree of pliancy, however, was not simple to achieve, for the expansion of news networks -and the rising access several radio listeners had to overseas networks since the century advanced - made it possible for radio to generate extremely

dissimilar types of responses to government policy. One method or another, however, political consciousness and awareness was intensified in the period of broadcasting, since nation-states were knitted into coherent political units much more effectively than before. Socially, broadcasting in the West responded to few biggest transforms in the connection flanked by the private legroom of the family or individual house, and the world outside, transforms implicit in the growth of industrial capitalism that fructified in the early twentieth century, Comparative improvement in wages and working circumstances, transforms in the length of the working day, and the limited expansion of leisure time, combined to produce an emphasis on the improvement of the little family house.

At the similar time, to uphold the self-sufficiency of the house, it was significant to have access to regular and quick access to news from the 'outside' world - in relation to the employment, prices, weather, and wars, to take random instances. The growth of popular aesthetic tastes and interests also led to a desire for entertainment that could be accessed at house. The growth of sound broadcasting in the 1920s served exactly this purpose, creation news and entertainment available within the house. Television broadcasting, which became a technological feasibility from the early 1930s, drew upon the early experience of radio transmission, and also upon other techno-cultural innovations of the nineteenth and twentieth century. These included the exploit of electricity, the growth of telegraphy, photography, and the early development of cinema, with its invention of techniques of filming and projection that allowed images to be captured and transmitted in motion, rather than photographic stillness. Television created a unified virtual legroom, where people sitting in their houses could watch images collated and produced from all in excess of the world.

Since television urbanized, and on-the-mark news broadcasting and reportage grew, it became possible for the circulation of fact to take on a radically new shape. For the first time, news was tangible, if only in virtual words: the TV screen relayed images of actual measures, attaching sides and shapes (since the radio had attached voices and sounds) to persons, measures, and procedures that people had really only been able to imagine earlier. The live telecasting of sport is a prime example of this growth, for it fuses jointly the history of fact and entertainment. For mainly people, TV and radio - but especially TV - finally provided a substitute for the live sports measures that mainly of them would never have a chance of watching in the flesh. An eerily comparable growth is the telecasting of war: the Gulf War of the early 1990s was the first war where big-level military activity was telecast live in excess of substantial periods of war. These two examples show a general truth in relation to the television - it enables the deeper involvement, and (in sometimes troubling methods) the vicarious participation of viewers in the measures they witness. Early television broadcasting was pioneered in Britain, the United States being slower off the spot.

The BBC in London began its television service in 1936, and the NBC in New York began telecasting in 1939. This pattern of recognized radio networks entering the field of television broadcasting, was taken up through several other companies, especially in the United States. In the

1950s, radio was rapidly overtaken through television in popular appeal. Television was dominated through the Anglo-American world in its early decades of development. Other countries did not develop comparable television networks till well after the Second World War, in the 1950s. Thereafter, the development of television crossways enormous sections of the world has been exponential.

The Third World was awakened to the possibilities of television in the postwar era, in section because of the boom in populations. In India, for example, the expansion of television has been connected to the development in the numbers of transitional-class consumers, however TV actually taps audience's crossways diverse social strata. State manage in excess of telecasting was relaxed in the 1990s, with the advent of privatization and economic liberalization, one of the dimensions of which was the development of cable TV networks, which are now approximately universally accessible to transitional-class houses. Radio and television broadcasting, in excess of the decades, have in several methods wrought revolutionary transformations in the circulation and consumption of both news and entertainment. The volume of fact accessible to the viewer of TV or to the radio listener is immeasurably greater than earlier recipients of news. Potentially, TV and radio also democratize knowledge.

The literacy required to access a newspaper is not needed to listen to the radio or to watch TV. In third world countries, in scrupulous, high rates of illiteracy have meant a great reliance on broadcasting (especially radio, TV being a more expensive medium) for fact. Broadcasting has been, from the outset, intricately connected with large business, but several programs on both TV and radio have also been noted for their aesthetic value. The performance of drama and comedy on radio and TV channels, the manufacture of documentaries for both media, and the creation of films for television, are examples of this. Few television comedies in scrupulous- the late- 1960s British series *Monty Python's Flying Circus*, for example - have been significant reports of twentieth century civilization in their own right. The screening of films on TV, which has gone hand in hand with the international decline in cinema hall audiences, has connected cinema and television jointly closely, as the former is now often viewed by the medium of the latter, and the latter borrows several of its shapes wd much of its aesthetic from the former.

With all of this, the dimensions of personal leisure have changed dramatically, for people crossways the world. Extremely often, radio and television are referred to since belonging to the world of 'size discourse'. In purely quantitative words, this is true - these are shapes of discourse that reach much superior numbers of people than any other. But the word is also misleading, for radio and television do not reach people since masses, but since atomized consumers, individuals and families. The image of a person sitting in front of a TV set for hours on end points to this cultural dimension of broadcasting - massive numbers of people are targeted through radio and television, but they receive programs since private viewers. In this respect, television is the polar opposite of the cinema hall,

which thrives on collectivity. Of course, there are frequently occasions when people crowd approximately a radio set or a TV placed in a public lay and watch or listens since a congregation - throughout cricket matches broadcast live in India, for example.

Be that since it may, the mainly significant social consequences of broadcasting are almost certainly to be establishing in the methods in which it has convinced family and personal life, the methods in which watching a film, for example, can be integrated with eating, or cooking, or washing clothes, or even fitted in flanked by naps. Technical innovation in the field of broadcasting has been geared towards the privatization and personalization of reception. The rapid growth of the pocket radio after World War 11 is an example of this. Portable radios had been in vogue for a while before this, but this new innovation made it possible to listen to the radio entirely on one's own, to create it section of one's personal legroom, since it were.

TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION: COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDICAL

Authority Technology and Steam

An outstanding characteristic of the Industrial Revolution was the advance in authority technology. At the beginning of this era, the biggest sources of authority accessible were animate power and the authority of wind and water, the only exception being the atmospheric steam engines that had been installed for pumping purposes, largely in coal mines. The exploit of steam authority was exceptional and remained therefore for mainly industrial purposes until well into the 19th century. Steam did not basically replace other sources of authority: it transformed them.

The similar sort of scientific enquiry that led to the growth of the steam engine was also applied to the traditional sources of inanimate power, with the result that both waterwheels and windmills were improved in design and efficiency. Numerous engineers contributed to the refinement of waterwheel construction, and through the transitional of the 19th century new designs increased the speed of the waterwheel and prepared the method for the emergence of the water turbine. The revolution in discourses had a great trade to do with the growth of steam-driven authority and locomotion. Scientists, such since Robert Boyle of England (who worked on atmospheric pressure), Otto von Guericke (the vacuum), and Denis Papin (pressure vessels), urbanized the science of steam authority. Technologists Thomas Savery and Thomas Newcomen were pioneers of steam engines. Savery's tools condensed steam in a vessel, to make an incomplete vacuum.

The first commercially successful steam engine, was invented through Newcomen. Newcomen's engines were heavy fuel consumers, useful largely in the British coalfields where they kept deep mines clear of water and fulfilled a pressing require of 18th century British industry. Water authority and wind authority would now gradually be replaced through a mechanism with tremendous potential. Its mainly significant application, the steam railway engine, would (in tandem with contemporary metallurgy) change the foundation of transport and discourses the world in excess of.

Steam became the feature authority source of the British Industrial Revolution. Small growth took lay in the Newcomen atmospheric engine until James Watt patented a distinct condenser in 1769, but from that point onward the steam engine underwent continuous improvements.

Watt's condenser separated the two actions of heating the cylinder with hot steam and cooling it to condense the steam for every stroke of the engine. Through keeping the cylinder permanently hot and the condenser permanently cold, a great economy could be affected. The Birmingham industrialist Matthew Boulton, helped convert the idea into a commercial success. Flanked by 1775 and 1800, the Boulton and Watt partnership produced few 500 engines, which despite their high cost were eagerly acquired through the tin-mining industrialists of Cornwall and other authority users who needed a reliable source of power. Boulton and Watt introduced several significant refinements, through converting the engine from a single-acting into a double-acting machine that could be applied to rotary motion. The rotary activity engine was adopted through British textile manufacturer Sir Richard Arkwright for exploit in a cotton mill, several other industries followed in exploring the possibilities of steam authority, and it soon became widely used.

The Cornish engineer Richard Trevithick introduced higher steam pressures in 1802, and the American engineer Oliver Evans built the first high-pressure steam engine in the United States at the similar time. High-pressure steam engines became popular in America. Trevithick made the first successful steam locomotive for a tram in South Wales in 1804. (The age of the railways had to wait for the permanent method and locomotives). Another consequence of high-pressure steam was the practice of compounding, of by the steam twice or more at descending pressures before it was finally condensed or exhausted.

The technique was first applied through Arthur Woolf, a Cornish mining engineer. A demand for authority to generate electricity stimulated new thinking in relation to the steam engine in the 1880s. The problem was that of achieving a sufficiently high rotational speed for the dynamos. Full success in achieving a high-speed engine depended on the steam turbine, a biggest technical innovation invented through Sir Charles Parsons in 1884. Through passing steam by the blades of a series of rotors of gradually rising mass (to allow for the expansion of the steam) the power of the steam was converted to extremely rapid circular motion, which was ideal for generating electricity.

This way still gives a biggest source of electric authority. Even the mainly contemporary nuclear authority plants exploit steam turbines because technology has not yet solved the problem of transforming nuclear power directly into electricity. In marine propulsion, too, the steam turbine remnants an significant source of authority despite competition from the internal-combustion engine

REVIEW QUESTIONS

- Examine the main features of modern political culture which emerged in France during the revolutionary phase.

- Why did the Socialist Revolution take place in Russia?
- Write a note on the legacy of the Russian Revolution
- In what concrete ways is the growth of knowledge related to technological growth?
- Examine some of the major technological innovations made in the 20th century.

CHAPTER 8

Violence and Repression

STRUCTURE

- Learning Objectives
- Modern warfare
- Total war
- Violence by non-stop actors
- Review Questions
-

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After reading this chapter, you will get acquainted with the:

- Define the distinctive features of the modern armies in the colonies.
- Explain the total war.
- Point out the similarities and dissimilarities of Irregular Warfare in the Ancient and Modern eras.

MODERN WARFARE

Conceptualizing Contemporary War

Karl Von Clausewitz (1780-1831) was an untypical Prussian military officer because he was a scholar in uniform. He proved to be a philosopher in his own right. Contemporary scholars have placed him on the similar pedestal since Karl Marx, Adam Smith etc. Clausewitz fought against Napoleonic France and then distilled his experience in script. His philosophical treatise titled *Vom Kriege (On War)* was published in 1832 through his widow Maria Von Clausewitz. Clausewitz's analysis of warfare turned out to be one of the best if not the best ever produced in history. For Clausewitz, war is organized violence unleashed through the state. He divided war into Limited War and Real or Absolute War. For him, eighteenth century European warfare since practiced through Louis XIV and Frederick the Great represented Limited War. In contrast, Napoleon Bonaparte, whom he admiringly described the 'God of War', tried to break out of the paradigm of Limited Warfare.

For Clausewitz, Napoleonic Warfare exhibited seeds of Absolute War that would reach fruition in close to future. Clausewitz's prophecy proved true but he did not live to witness Absolute Wars of 1914-18 and 1939-45. Therefore, what we mean through Contemporary War is Clausewitz's early shapes of Real or Absolute War. Therefore, Contemporary War is the level flanked by Limited War of the eighteenth century and Total War of the twentieth century. Limited War is also referred to

since Dynastic War because the several monarchies fought against each other for limited gains beside the frontiers at the expense of other dynasties. Louis XIV fought for extending the French frontier on the left bank of Rhine. In contrast, Absolute War in Clausewitz's paradigm means war untrammelled through any obstruction. The objective is to unleash organized violence wholeheartedly for absolute destruction of the enemy.

This in turn required mobilization of all accessible possessions of the state for total defeat of the enemy. The aim in such clash is to annihilate the enemy's *schwerpunkt* (centre of gravity). For Clausewitz, *schwerpunkt* referred to the enemy's army which could only be destroyed through *Kesselschlacht* (large bloody battles). The French Revolution ushered in the idea of destruction of the enemy's government. Hence, the beginning of French Revolution i.e. 1789 could be taken since the beginning of Contemporary War. This procedure reached its logical culmination under Adolf Hitler's *der totale krieg* (Total War) when the objective was complete destruction of enemy's community through wholesale mobilization of the *volk* (general people).

Mobilizing Military Manpower

From this moment until our enemies shall have been driven from the territory of the Republic, all Frenchmen are permanently requisitioned for the service of the armies. Young men shall go to battle; married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; women shall create tents and clothing and serve in hospitals. Decree of the French National Convention authorizing *levee en masse*, 23 August 1793:

- God is on the face of heavier battalions.— Napoleon Bonaparte

Rising mass of the armies was a feature of Contemporary War. Flanked by Napoleon Bonaparte and Common Schlieffen, the mass of the armies registered a linear development. Under Louis XIV (1643-1715), the French Army numbered 200,000. The opposing British Army under Marlborough comprised in relation to the 100,000 personnel. In 1786, when Frederick died, the mass of the Prussian Army was 160,000 men. As the objectives of Dynastic Warfare were limited, little armies were adequate. Alternately, little mass of the forces under their disposal also prevented the monarchs from conducting lengthy war for unlimited gains.

Actually, the monarchs were afraid of arming the landless peasants and the urban proletariat. The monarchical courts feared that size arming of the lower order might result in revolution against the *ancien regime* (the old French regime before the revolution in 1789). Hence, the core of the armies was collected of nobility who constituted the officer corps and their armed retainers functioning since soldiers. Throughout emergencies extra men were hired since mercenaries. They were of several nationalities that preferred the deal of soldiering due to pecuniary motives. Mainly of these

soldiers were unenthusiastic to die for the monarchs' ambitions. However, the French Revolution changed the 'side of war'.

The French Revolution with its cry of *la patrie en danger* and the consequent *levy en masse* in 1793 cleared the path for superior armies. The National Convention decided to conscript all single Frenchmen aged between 18 and 25. This also enabled the Napoleonic government to rally manpower on a hitherto unimaginable level. In 1812, when Napoleon invaded Russia with 600,000 men, his *Grande Armee* numbered one million soldiers. However, for total mobilization of both the males and the females, the West had to wait till the Third Reich's conflict with USSR throughout 1941-45. Modernization of organized violence resulted in the rise in scope, intensity and lethality of warfare. Dynastic conflicts occurred within a confined geographical legroom. But, under Napoleon, thanks to greater number of soldiers accessible, war acquired a continental character.

The theatre of Napoleonic warfare embraced entire Europe: from Moscow in the east up to Lisbon in the west; and from Denmark in the north till Sicily in the south. Therefore, in words of geographical spread, Napoleonic Warfare was the prelude to Total War of 1939-45 which occurred on a truly global level. Rising sizes of the armies and their deployment on a continental level also resulted in the battles becoming more bloody and lengthier. Battles in the age of Limited War lasted for a maximum of in relation to the twelve hours. Combat in case of Dynastic War stopped throughout night and campaigning ceased throughout winter. But, under Napoleon, fighting sustained during the year. In 1813, the Battle of Leipzig was fought between Napoleonic France versus Russia, Prussia and Austria-Hungary. The fighting lasted for three days. Fighting sustained even throughout the night.

In this single battle, Napoleon deployed 190,000 soldiers while the anti-Napoleon block responded with 300,000 men. The point to be noted is that the strength of the army deployed for a single battle throughout the age of Contemporary War was better than the total mass of the army maintained through a country throughout the age of Limited War. One consequence of the growing mass of the armies was raising casualties. In 1809, at the Battle of Wagram against Austria-Hungary, Napoleon concentrated 160,000 soldiers. Due to Napoleon's policy of sacrificing 30,000 men every month, France between 1789 and 1815 lost 1.7 million men. Throughout the American Civil War, the Confederates mobilized half a million warriors. In relation to the 622,000 soldiers died throughout the American Civil War. As, the 'Butcher's Bill' sustained to increase with the passage of time, the percentage of national population dying in war went up. In France throughout the eighteenth century, 27 people out of 1000 died due to warfare. The number for nineteenth century was 30. Ironically, militarization of the community also accelerated democratization. Frederick the Great of Prussia even conscripted enemy prisoners for meeting manpower shortage in the army.

In the pre-contemporary period, the armies were cosmopolitan institutions. Changing faces did not offend national identities. National identities, however, became rigid in the nineteenth century,

throughout the course of the Contemporary Wars. The causative factor behind nationalization of war was conscription of the nation's males, since it was necessary for size mobilization. Therefore, national armies replaced mercenary militias. The notion of 'every citizen a soldier' was first introduced in the 1790s through the revolutionary dictatorship of France. In continuation of this policy, throughout 1883, the German military theorist Colmar Von der Goltz coined the word '*Das Volk in Waffen*' (nation in arms). While the French Revolution resorted to mobilization on a big level for meeting the growing demand of Contemporary Warfare, this procedure also increased the political consciousness of the general size. Therefore the slogans of 'Liberty, Fraternity and Equality', not only generated the cannon fodder for size warfare but also created '*homo politicus*'. When the states conscripted citizens, they were told to fight in order to uphold the sovereignty of their fatherland cum motherland. While citizens were under the obligation to give their lives for the state, the citizen soldiers in return also demanded political rights.

For subsistence, Napoleonic France's opponents were forced to increase their armies through recruiting serfs who were given civic rights. Therefore, the nineteenth century witnessed continuous expansion of adult franchise in West Europe. However, the West had to wait for the two World Wars for total franchise. Size mobilization also opened the gates to talents. Contemporary War witnessed the replacement of the landed gentry with the educated transitional class in the officer cadre. Till 1798, entry into the officer corps was a birthright for the younger sons of the declining landed gentry. They used to purchase the officers' commissions from the monarchs. However, the French Revolution opened the officer cadre to merit. In Napoleon's Army, even general soldiers with exceptional talents were promoted to officer ranks. Several Marshals of Napoleon were of general origin. Marshal Ney and Murat were sons of barrel maker and innkeeper respectively. Hence, the cliché, that in Napoleon's Army every general soldier accepted a Marshal's baton in his knapsack. The possibility of upward mobility motivated the French soldiers to fight bigger. In response, the opponents of Napoleon like the Prussians, Austrians and the Russians were forced to plebianize their officer cadre.

Through 1910, in relation to the 40 per cent of the officers below the rank of Colonel in the Russian Army were drawn from the peasantry and lower transitional class. A contradiction urbanized flanked by these non-noble modernizers who wanted a high tech army and the traditional aristocratic elements who accentuated the role of cavalry. However, history put its weight behind the modernizers. Waging Contemporary War required rising technological knowledge. Engineering techniques, bridge construction and scientific knowledge for gun laying, etc forced the Western armies to enlist University educated sons of the urban bourgeoisie in lay of the polo playing aristocratic scions in the officer corps. Militarism could be categorized since excessive veneration for the army in the middle of the transitional class. Officers' commissions became the badges of mainly prestigious job in nineteenth century Europe.

The Marriage Flanked by Technology and War

One aspect of modernization of war was also industrialization of war. A dialectical connection lived flanked by the development of contemporary war and industrialization of West Europe. Contemporary warfare in a method meant more killing in a shorter time. This in turn necessitated newer technology especially through the bourgeois officer corps. Continuous technical advancements made the acquisition of a lethal arsenal possible. This in turn facilitated Contemporary War. The history of Krupps (a German military firm) exhibited that innovation in technology was accelerated due to the soldiers' demands for more guns of bigger quality. And these large firms invested lot of human possessions and capital for research and growth. The intricate credit network emerging in the West aided these firms.

Besides Krupp, the Remington Gun Factory in New York also made possible manufacture of weapons in size for arming big armies. Remington urbanized assembly row techniques of manufacture based on the principle of interchangeable sections introduced early in the century through Eli Whitney. This marked the beginning of the military-industrial intricate. The 19th century witnessed continuous improvement in weapons of size murder. Matchlocks were fired with the aid of lighted matches. Hence, they could not be fired throughout rainfall. The exploit of flints removed this defect. However, flintlocks used to misfire at every seventh shot. The introduction of percussion caps reduced misfires to fewer than one in two hundred rounds. Again, the introduction of the cylindroconoidal bullet made practicable the replacement of the inaccurate short-ranged smoothbore musket accepted through Napoleonic infantry through the highly accurate longer ranged rifle. This transition occurred flanked by 1850 and 1860. The grooved barrel of the rifle imparted a spin to the bullet which enabled the latter to achieve accuracy, range and penetrative authority greater than the ball fired from a smoothbore musket. The rifle first appeared in the middle of the huntsmen of Rhineland. From there it spread in the middle of the huntsmen of North America.

The rifle could hit target even at 1000 yards and it remained the vital infantry weapon till World War I. Then the smokeless powder of the 1860s allowed clear vision for repeated firing. While cavalry was the decisive arm in pre-contemporary warfare, artillery became the definitive arm in Napoleonic warfare. Napoleon concentrated his guns in *grande batterie* in order to blast a hole in the middle of the row of his opponent. Explosive ammunition (shrapnel and high explosive shell) replaced solid iron balls, which made artillery more lethal. They reported for 50 per cent of the casualties inflicted on the opponents. This trend sustained in the post-Napoleonic Europe. Throughout 1871, the Prussians used rifled steel ordnance like Large Bertha. Such monsters were able to reduce a municipality like Metz into rubble within some hours. Steel cannons became general with the advent of Bessemer procedure. After 1881, Siemens Martin Open Hearth procedure raised steel manufacture. Flanked by 1856 to 1870, the price of steel dropped through 50 per cent. In 1863, the

first steel ship and locomotive came into subsistence. Size manufacture of steel weapons required a massive industrial infrastructure.

Military prowess became dependent on economic muscle. This was reflected in the victory of the industrialized north in excess of the agrarian south in the American Civil War. US steel output in 1900 was 10 million tones and that of Germany in relation to the 8 million. In the similar year, British manufacture of steel was only 4.9 million. This reflected British military authority falling behind. The state took up the responsibility of clothing, feeding and arming the citizens. This was the beginning of Hobbes' *Leviathan*. For supplying 750,000 soldiers, revolutionary France had introduced price and wage manage since well since press censorship all in excess of the country. Compared to the scope of this scheme, Sultan Alauddin Khalji's effort in medieval India to regulate market price of Delhi for paying his 120,000 troopers was paltry indeed. *Generalfeldmarschal* Helmuth Von Moltke of Prussia, the winner of Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars introduced the Common Staff organization. The Common Staff became the nervous organization for conducting conflicts. While the Minister of War presented the budget in the Parliament, scheduling and execution including operational manage of war devolved on the Common Staff. Instead of the monarch or the Prime Minister, the Chief of the Common Staff assisted through staff officers controlled forces in the field. Introduction of electronic discourses in the shape of telegraph replaced horses since means of command and manage. Such advances in extensive-range discourses enabled the Chief of the Common Staff in the capital to retain secure get in touch with the far field commanders. It was a step in the emergence of the centralizing polities. Special institutions like *Ecole Normale* in France and *Kriegsakademie* in Berlin, were set up for training the staff officers. The officers were bound through a code of conduct. In case of any breach of this code, the military personnel unlike the civilians were judged through special military courts. In return the state offered the officers a structured career with requisite pay and privileges. Dedicated theoretical knowledge was imparted to them in order to create the officer cadre professional. Officers devoted their lives for understanding and conducting warfare.

They became 'specialists of violence'. The staff officers were specially trained in survey and cartography which in turn were necessary for structure roads and railways. Railways were especially required for deployment of size armies quickly and cheaply. In 1871 long railroads enabled Prussia to concentrate more soldiers than France at a quicker notice therefore enabling her to defeat Napoleon III. Contemporary War in the sea witnessed the replacement of the wooden ships with ironclads. Short recoil carriage and high explosive shell became the chief component of naval artillery. The first conflict flanked by the ironclads occurred at Lissa in the Adriatic on 20 July 1866 flanked by the Austrian and the Italian fleets. Through 1840s the Western navies experimented with steam propulsion which gradually replaced sail driven wooden ships. Steam authority enabled the ships to become heavier. Hence, for defense against enemy naval gunnery broadsides, it was possible

to cover the body of the ships with armour plates. Britain the major colonial authority first produced the iron hulled warship with watertight compartments and boilers. Then a Swedish engineer named John Erickson of the US Navy came up with revolving armoured turrets and air ventilation below the decks. This supremacy in ships enabled the Western powers to project authority in excess of extensive aloofness and to acquire colonies.

Contemporary War in the Colonies

Whatever happens we have got the Maxim gun and they have not.— Hilaire Belloc Few techniques of Contemporary Warfare were imported in the non-European World through the colonizing powers. The indigenous polities when faced with contemporary military techniques of the colonial powers were forced to change their own states and communities. Therefore activity-reaction dialectic set in resulting in spiraling cost and rising level of warfare. Britain possessed the main colonial empire. The British used to remark arrogantly that the sun never set in their empire. And within it, India was the 'jewel in the crown'. For policing the subcontinent and to defend India from a probable Russian invasion, the British raised a 158,000 strong army from the Indians. Before the advent of the British no other authority maintained such a massive standing army in the subcontinent. For example, Ranjit Singh, the ruler of Punjab perceived threat from the British Indian Army. Therefore, in the 1830s, he attempted to replace the cavalry raised through the *jagirdars* with a Western modelled infantry force with the help of French military officers.

The Khalsa Army was collected of 35,000 permanent soldiers. And the permanent contingent of the Mughal Empire recognized since the *ahadis* numbered only 10,000. The British officered Indian Army also recognized since the Sepoy Army was not unique to colonial India. For Congo, the Belgian Government maintained *Force Publique* of 20,000 men. The Army of Netherlands' East Indies numbered 25,000 men. The functions of the colonial armies were internal security, guarding the frontiers of the colonies and also to acquire new colonies. All the colonial powers used indigenous military manpower because each 'native' soldier was four times cheaper than a white soldier. In the tropical climate, a European fell sick quickly due to heat and sun. Throughout emergencies importing white soldiers from the metropole (mother country) to the colonies was not only costly but also time consuming. Also, the regional soldiers were more adaptable to the terrain for deployment. The Dutch establish out that the European soldiers were unable to adapt successfully for jungle warfare in the Indonesian archipelago.

Finally, the policy of integrating few colonial manpower in the colonial military machines, argued the imperialist officers, also prevented the in the vicinity ambitious elements from rebelling against the colonial management. Besides the maintenance of a permanent army, another feature of Contemporary Warfare was growing cost of warfare. The Khalsa Kingdom extracted 50 per cent of the gross produce from the agriculturists. And 80 per cent of the *darbar's* income was used for

maintaining the Westernized Sikh Army. The principal expenditure of the British Government in India was maintenance of the army. In relation to the 42 per cent of the government's income was spent on the army. Again, rising interaction flanked by warfare and community was a cardinal characteristic of Contemporary Warfare. The Sepoy Army was collected of extensive service Indian volunteers. Every year in relation to the 15000 Indian peasants were recruited in this force.

Therefore, the Sepoy Army constituted the major government employer in colonial India. In independent India, railways have overtaken the army since the major government employer. Recruitment of the sepoys (infantry) and sowars (cavalry) had huge impact on the fabric of colonial community. From the Classical antiquity, European political and military thinkers like Vegetius, Niccolao Machiavelli whispered that farmers were the best soldiering material. And in nineteenth century Europe, the modernizing regimes depended on the semi-literate peasants for filling the vacancies in the armies. This was because the farmers compared to the urban under employed and the unemployed were regarded since 'sterile' and 'docile'. This stream of idea also convinced the British in India. However, the British refused to recruit landless laborers, sharecroppers, etc. This was because being malnourished they possessed inferior physique. Moreover, the army officers assumed that it was bigger to collaborate with men of property who would have a stake in the continuation of the colonial regime unlike the property less persons.

However, the rich farmers were not eager to join the army since they earned more from cultivation compared to the soldiers' pay. But, military service became extremely popular with the little farmers. Especially younger sons of farmers with in relation to the 60 acres of land and four bullocks preferred to join the army. Their military income complemented the ancestral income from the land. Moreover throughout litigations, the families of the soldiers got extra defense from the *sarkar*. For popularizing military service further, the army introduced the organization of *furlough* (paid leave). Throughout harvest time, when extra hands were required in the family farms, the soldiers were granted *furlough* in order to help out their families. Likewise in Indonesia, those clusters that were unable to engage in sugarcane and rice farming used to join the Dutch colonial forces. In order to differentiate the colonial collaborators from the colonial community, the imperial powers granted those joining the colonial army's special favors. Both in Africa and in Asia, the soldiers before the advent of the colonial powers were paid either in type (a share of the crops) or with land grants.

The European maritime powers for the first time introduced the scheme of regular pay in cash, gratuity and pension facilities. All these attracted the 'natives' towards their white employers. The societies joining the colonial armies were given the status of 'martial race'. The Dutch colonial authorities marked the Ambonese, a cluster of Indonesia since a martial race because they were loyal to the House of Orange and had also carried Christianity. They were granted extra pay, more pensions and bigger food. Gradually generation after generation, the Ambonese used to join the Dutch colonial army and urbanized a self-image of being a warrior society. In India, the British

ascribed the status of martial race to the Gurkhas and the Sikhs. In excess of growth of Punjab was the byproduct of British dependence on the Sikhs from 1880 onwards. In order to pamper the Sikh farmers of central Punjab, the Raj pumped money to construct canals and railways in Punjab. And these two boons of contemporary culture not only enabled Punjab to become the breadbasket of India but also enabled the Sikh farmers to sell their grain to the world market.

Grain was transported through rail cars from Punjab to Karachi and Bombay. From these two ports, the grain was taken to Europe in cargo ships. Both in the Sepoy Army and in the British officered Kings African Rifles, for ensuring loyalty of the martial races, their sons were also provided occupations of soldiers, drummers etc. Presently like the French Revolution where the army was made a platform for upward mobility, service in the Sepoy Army also offered vertical mobility to selected Indian societies. Military service in colonial India not only resulted in pecuniary advantages but also rise in ritual status. The Bhumihars of Bihar through serving in the Sepoy Army got the status of Brahmins. The Dalits of Maharashtra continuously petitioned the British Government in India to allow them to join the Sepoy Army. In order to prevent any mutiny in the middle of the martial races, the imperial powers followed the policy of *divide et impera* (divide and rule). Segregation of the several martial clusters was a cardinal aspect of divide and rule policy. In India, the British intended to exploit the Gurkha regiments in case of any uprising in the middle of the Sikhs and vice versa.

In a same vein the US Army recruited several clusters in the Philippines and encouraged their distinctive language and traditions to prevent any homogeneity in the middle of the military personnel. The mainly favored martial races were generally illiterate peasants because of the imperial belief that literacy might encourage rebellious tendencies. Further, to prevent the 'natives' from gaining any know how in relation to the higher administration of Contemporary Warfare, the officer corps of all the colonial armies were reserved for white males. Mainly of the medical innovations in the nineteenth century were activated through require to ensure the health of the European soldiers in the extra-European theatre. Compared to the Russians, cholera caused eight times more casualties in the middle of the French soldiers throughout the Crimean War. During the first half of the nineteenth century, more than 30 per cent of the European soldiers in India were hospitalized at any given moment due to sexually transmitted diseases like syphilis, gonorrhoea, etc. Besides venereal diseases, drunkenness was another vice of the European soldiery in the colonies. Intense boredom forced the white troops to take recourse to drink. The country spirits like arrack accessible in the Indian *bazars* were especially ruinous to the health of the white troops.

In India, the army's medical corps accepted out a campaign against cholera, the major killer of European soldiery. Invention of quinine gave victory to the white military manpower against the ravages caused through malaria. Throughout campaigns the African and Asian soldiers of the colonial armies moved with their wives and children. Women were tolerated because they provided

essential logistical back ups in the colonial theatres. In the cantonments they looked after the plantations and the gardens which provided vegetables for the soldiers. Again such females also functioned since unpaid nurses. In India, the Madrassi and the Gurkha soldiers were allowed to stay wives because the soldiers' families were imperial hostages that guaranteed good activities on section of the soldiers. The British officers also encouraged the sepoys to bring their families within the rows because it enabled the military to ensure complete isolation of their personnel from disruptive powers of the community. The British officers commanding both African and Indian soldiers establish out that soldiers behaved well in attendance of their wives. Lashing was general for indiscipline. And the soldiers hated being lashed in front of their women.

Again, attendance of the families not only kept the soldiers sober but also reduced any risk of desertion. The Western maritime powers realized that if the soldiers' families were infected with diseases then sooner or later it would also adversely affect the military personnel. To retain their military manpower in good form, the imperialists were forced to introduce contemporary medical events in the colonies. Therefore, the soldiers' families in the cantonments received free medical care especially against colds, chicken pox, etc. Both the African and Indian women residing within the rows were frequently treated for venereal diseases. Further, the soldiers and their family members were given instructions in personal hygiene. From the 1880s, the colonial armies acquired firepower superiority in their struggles against the Afro-Asians. This was because the former were equipped with three elements of Contemporary War: rifled steel artillery, breech loading rifles and machine guns. Repeating rifles certainly aided British expansion in Africa. Throughout 1874, Common Garnet Wolseley defeated the Ashanti tribe, thanks to the firepower generated through the Snider rifles and 7 pounder guns. However, the techniques of Contemporary War were not omnipotent against all colonial opponents.

Weaknesses of Contemporary Warfare

Afghanistan was a classic case that proved the limitations of Contemporary War in the non-European world. Afghanistan was not a nation state with a capital but a decentralized tribal building. Hence, the Clausewitzian notion of victory- capturing the enemy's capital after the destruction of the enemy's army in a pitched battle was inapplicable. In Afghan community due to the prevalence of the blood price for murder and the operation of the *Pukhtunwali* code, every male was armed and a potential soldier. In late nineteenth century, the Pathans could rally 400,000 males armed with 230,000 rifles beside the northwest frontier of British India. Instead of offering a set-piece battle, the Afghans accepted out a grulling guerrilla war. Due to the road less mountainous terrain, heavy artillery could not accompany the British Indian military columns. The Afghan sharpshooters with their *jezails* (extensive range house made rifles) perched on the *sangars* (stone fortifications) at the mountain tops and taking every advantage of the ground, inflicted horrible casualties on the imperial columns.

Again, in words of cross-country mobility, the Pathan *lashkars* (war bands) were more mobile than the Raj's soldiers. Likewise in 1904, the Nama people in Southwest Africa mannered guerrilla war against the Germans. As the Namas were widely dispersed, the German commander Von Trotha was unable to carry out concentric operations and decision through battle. In a method, frontier commitments hampered the colonial armies because of their extremely modernization. Due to lack of forage for the horses and bullocks, horse artillery and field guns could not be used in Afghanistan and in the jungle clad swampy interiors of Africa. Then mortars did not have much lethal effect against the stone fortifications.

Heavy howitzers (used for high angled fire in order to destroy the personnel inside the fortifications) could not be hauled in excess of the ravines and mountain crevices. Rapid deployment of lightly armed mobile units was the only solution. This resulted in secure quarter combat with little arms resulting in extremely heavy human casualties, an information which the British Empire establish costly. Elimination of the distinction flanked by the combatants and the non-combatants was a characteristic of Contemporary War. This was also apparent in the pacification operations mannered through the colonizers against the colonized. Both in Africa and Asia, the imperial military formations deliberately destroyed the livestock, grain and villages in order to destroy the colonized's 'will to resist'. In East and Southwest Africa, the Germans deliberately starved rebel clusters for pacifying them. Von Trotha's *Schutztruppe* (German colonial force) accepted out scorched earth policy. It was the prelude to what the Nazis would do in Russia flanked by 1943-45. For pacifying Philippines, the US Army not only relocated whole societies but also put them in concentration camps. It was an indication of genocide that in the close to future became a crucial component of *der totale krieg*.

TOTAL WAR

The Concept of Total War and its Novelty

What is total war? Warfare till the end of the 19th century was still mannered flanked by professional armies, and was relatively brief. Separately from the Crimean war of 1854- 56, there were no biggest wars flanked by the great powers for a century (1815 till 1914). In contrast, the clash that began in 1914 involved all the biggest powers, and crucially, the whole possessions of community and economy. Although it was the French Revolution that created the first civilian army, it is only in the 20th century that the outcomes of war were decided not presently through military strength but through the waiting authority of whole economies. War aims were not confined to militarily defeating rival armies, but encompassed the economic and political destruction of whole countries. On the one hand governments exhorted their citizens to participate in the war, and on the other, belligerent states enlarged target regions to include industrial centers and civilian populations, with the aim of destroying public morale. The mainly glaring instance of this was the exploit of atomic

bombs through the USA on Japan in 1945. But it was apparent from the First World War, when German submarine (U-boat) warfare against commercial allied shipping was clearly meant to cripple the economy and starve the British population.

The scheme almost succeeded, for in April 1917 the British government had only 6 weeks supply of food-grain left in the country. Total war inaugurated civilian massacre since an instrument of military strategy. Nuclear weapons were a logical extension of an already prevalent feature in contemporary warfare, and their capability for infinite destruction has added a new term to the vocabulary of clash, viz., exterminism. The nineteenth century period of imperialism resulted in the fusion of geo-political and economic goals. This era had made clear to statesmen and ruling elites that the pursuit of empire was simultaneously the foundation for and the means of global dominance and the out-stripping of competitors. The tendency of capitalist imperialism to expand in excess of national boundaries, the pre-eminent location of Great Britain, the belated unification of Germany and its emergence since a biggest industrial authority in central Europe and since Britain's chief competitor, the colonial ambitions of Japanese industry in alliance with an entrenched military caste – these were the strategic trends that disturbed the reigning peace flanked by the great powers while they occupied in colonial conquest and dominion in Africa and Asia. Total war exemplified the dangerous imperial drives of the dominant economies of the capitalist world, in an age when democracy was still anathema to mainly ruling elites. The concept of war changed dramatically flanked by the French Revolution and the world wars of the 20th century.

The novelty lies in how contemporary wars are fought, to what end, and how possessions are mobilized through the belligerents. The outcome of contemporary war is decided not presently through the strength of the armed forces, but also through the waiting authority of the economy. In addition, total war is war without limit that can end only in the 'unconditional surrender' of the enemy. The aim is not presently the defeat of the rival army but the economic and political destruction of the rival country. The targeting of civilians went face through face with citizen's participation in the war. This idea went back to the French Revolution when the first civilian army came into operation. The mobilization of size national feelings, the 'unknown democratization of war', gave birth to the new phenomenon of 'people's wars'.

The Mobilization of Possessions

Once the procedure had been set in motion, it acquired a momentum of its own, driven through political, psycho-social since well since institutional procedures that emerged unstoppable. Tsarist Russia's involvement ended in revolution, and left a deep impression. It was the trauma undergone through Russia in the First World War which motivated the whole Soviet polity to rally its material preparedness for the onslaught that was to approach in the second. Students of Stalinist industrialization are aware of the severe human cost of this preparation. The Great War, in Hobsbawm's terms, 'brutalized both warfare and politics, if one could be mannered without counting

the human or any other costs, why not the other?’ Although massive numbers of survivors became pacifists, there were also those whose experiences of violence and savagery drove them into the ranks of ultra-nationalist right-wing politics. The German Freikorps were one instance of this, and the German Workers Party of Drexler, which was a precursor of Hitler’s National Socialists, another. The phenomenon of total war was accompanied through the politics of totalitarianism (and we may not forget that authoritarian politics establish resonances in the countries of the liberal capitalist West since well).

The Nazis forged an unchallenged manage in excess of national possessions, and even adapted the Soviet concept of economic scheduling, with a Four Year Plan of their own. This was an ironic reversal of the situation in the months following the Russian Revolution, when the Bolsheviks borrowed heavily from the ways of the German war economy throughout the Great War. Through 1938, German re-armament consumed 52 per cent of government expenditure and 17 per cent of GNP, more than the UK, France and the USA combined. Because of the severe strain this put upon the economy, ‘there was a huge temptation on Hitler’s side to resort to war in order to obviate such economic difficulties’. It is significant that Germany’s conquest of Austria in 1938 resulted in the acquisition of \$200 million in gold and foreign swap reserves. Total war meant that the whole nation was mobilized for war, not merely the active combatants. The outcome of the war reflected the capability of the economy to produce for it. This was the case with the First World War, wherein dissimilar sectors were reorganized for the war attempt, and belligerent governments took manage of economic life on an unprecedented level, in order to close regular supplies of munitions, ordnance and manpower.

To fulfill huge financial demands throughout the First World War, governments increased the public debt, and printed more paper money. Britain resorted to heavy borrowing on American markets, and high income taxes. Laissez faire economic doctrine and democratic rights were soon eclipsed since military commanders were given powers in excess of civic management, including food rationing. Walther Rathenau set up special state corporations dealing in sure strategic commodities, and under the therefore-described Hindenburg Program, basic machinery were transferred from less to more significant industries. Sure factories were shut down. Cartels appeared and the co-operation flanked by state and large business in national economic administration was solidified. This set a precedent for the future, and crystallized authoritarian trends in the polity. The French economy, which suffered from the loss of significant economic zones to the Germans, was obliged to recuperate its losses with heavy state inputs, leading to a huge growth of heavy industry. Historian James Joll remarks that it was the First World War that ‘really completed the industrial revolution in France’.

The numbers of workers in French military arsenals grew from 50,000 to 1.6 million. Peasant constituted 41 per cent of conscripted soldiers - women and children were left with biggest agricultural tasks. Whereas the Russian incapacity to produce for war in 1914-1918 led to rout, a

quarter-century later, it was precisely the USSR's gigantic resource foundation that once mobilized, gave it the edge in excess of Germany in the Second World War. Soviet five year plans after 1937 were intended to build suspicious capability, and in the era flanked by September 1939 (when war broke out in Europe) and June 1941, (when Hitler attacked the USSR), Soviet authorities evacuated whole industries eastwards, to the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia. 3500 new industrial units were built throughout the war. Flanked by 1942 and 45, manufacture stages of Soviet armaments factories had risen five or six times, and the USSR was producing (on annual standard), 30,000 tanks and fighting vehicles, 40,000 aircraft, 120,000 artillery pieces, and 5 million rifles - stages unthinkable in the first war. In 1942, 52 per cent of Soviet national income was devoted to military spending. International arms manufacture statistics for the Second World War showed what total war meant in an industrial age. Almost 70,000 tanks were produced in 1944 alone through the USA, Britain, Germany and the USSR.

The Allies produced 167,654 aircraft that year. These figures demonstrate the level of economic mobilization. Therefore the American economy showed an approximate 50 per cent increase in physical output since well since productive plant. Its annual development rate was more than 15 per cent, higher than at any level in its history before or as. Defence related manufacture went from 2 per cent of total output in 1939 to 40 per cent in 1943. Scientific possessions were also mobilized through the belligerents in an unprecedented manner. Consistent improvements were made in discourses, aeronautical engineering, tank armour and design, rocketry, explosives and machine apparatus. The mainly stark symbol of this destructive imagination at job is the growth of the atomic bomb, a weapon that was simultaneously being sought through the militaries of Germany since well since the USA, and whose exploit signified the advent of massacre and terror since instruments of military policy.

Total war lent impetus to the search for military applications of atomic theory, and each face feared the possibility of prior attainments through the other. Britain, Canada and finally the USA put jointly an international team of scientists, supported through the maximum official backing, to develop an atomic weapon before Hitler could do therefore. The German attempt fell short, not least because of the exodus of brilliant scientists in the 1930's fleeing from Nazi persecution. They did however succeed in developing the first pilot-less aircraft and rockets, which were used against Britain in 1944. After the war, few of the mainly talented German scientists such since Werner von Braun were employed through the American legroom and military programs. The capability to build weapons of size destruction had over spilled the boundaries of the nation-states organization.

Populations at War

Working people's lives were deeply affected through phenomenon of total war and the preparation for it. Total War led to manpower mobilization, the drafting of women into the labour force, and since a through-product in Britain after the first war, women's suffrage and the full-level growth of

size politics. Britain introduced compulsory military service in 1916, and women were required in rising numbers to job in offices and factories. The Nazi regime began to describe the German economy since a 'war economy' through the late 1930's, with the aim of preparing for total war. The Nazis' militarist adaptation of Keynesian state intervention drastically reduced unemployment figures, and increased national manufacture through 102 per cent through 1937.

In a secret Defense Law passed on May 21 1935, Hjalmar Schacht was appointed the economic Plenipotentiary for the War Economy, whose occupation included camouflaging violations of the Versailles Treaty. Business was subjected to heavy taxes, 'special contributions' and compulsory membership of the Reich Economic Chamber. Heavy industry, especially the armaments sector, made good profits. Wage bills declined and strikes ceased. But the crucial role of the working population and of the economic infrastructure meant that non-combatants became targets of terror campaigns intended to demoralize the whole civilian population. This strategic goal, combined with the impersonality of technical warfare made genocide the brutal new information of contemporary warfare.

Civilians now became direct targets. The obvious instances approach from World War II with the blitz, genocide, carpet bombing, the atom bomb, and size population transfers; but they had begun in the Great War of 1914-18. The Turkish government's massacre of few 1.5 million Armenians in 1915 (which also created 320,000 Armenian refugees), is the first contemporary effort to eliminate a whole population. The starvation blockade of the German nation through the Allies was another. Size demographic transforms were due to the exodus of refugees or through compulsory exchanges of populations. Therefore throughout the First World War, 1.3 million Greeks moved from Turkey to Greece, and 400,000 Turks moved in the other direction. Up to 2 million Russians fled the ravages of the Russian civil war of 1918-20.

The Great War and its aftermath produced flanked by 4 to 5 million refugees. Without a doubt, the Second World War was the greatest catastrophe in human history. Estimates of human war losses modify flanked by 40 to 55 million people, both soldiers and non-combatants. 35 million were wounded and 3 million missing. The USSR suffered the mainly in human words - losing in relation to the 20 million lives. In February 1945, 50,000 German civilians were killed in the Anglo-American bombardment of Dresden in one night alone.

A single air raid on Tokyo in March 1945 resulted in 80,000 deaths and a quarter of the municipality destroyed. In words of displacement, it has been estimated that in relation to the 40 million people had been uprooted in Europe alone. Size transfers took lay in territories crossways Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Balkans. The detection that the Nazis had created camps for the industrialization of murder that had killed up to 6 million European Jews, left a permanent shadow in excess of the human conscience. It gave an impetus to the making of Israel that attracted 1.2 million Jews fleeing from Europe and resulted in the forced displacement of 1.3 million Palestinians. The

Korean War, a direct outcome of the Second World War, left 5 million refugees. The decolonization of India and Partition left up to 2 million dead and 15 million displaced. The Second World War was the epitome of total war.

VIOLENCE BY NON-STATE ACTORS

Compulsions behind the Genesis of Terrorism

Terrain is a significant factor behind the continuation of insurgencies. For instance in Northeast and Northwest India, the tribes from British Raj to Swaraj have been able to combat the government. This is because the physical geography aids the insurgents' 'hit and run' expeditions. The mountains are cut through deep valleys and narrow ravines. The higher slopes are sheltered with pine and oak trees. All these facilitate ambush through little parties of the guerrillas on the slow moving columns of the security forces.

The Kukis of Northeast India are of itinerant habits. Therefore, they constantly transform their locations of habitation. Since they have no permanent resolution, they have nothing to lose through moving out from one region to another region. This made the Kukis a mobile enemy. And the swampy jungle tracks deny mobility to the road bound military convoys. Both the Kukis and the Nagas are well-known for constructing stout stockades with timber, concealed breastworks and abattis. From this hidden strongpoint's these tribes have been able to inflict considerable casualties in the middle of the security forces of the state. While in British times they were armed with bows and arrows, now they possess self loading rifles.

And this factor has made the tribal guerrillas more lethal. Guerrillas operate in the hilly ravines and swamps not only because of the advantages the terrain offers to them but also for the information that deficit economic zones breed the guerrillas. From the beginning of history, the bleak Afghan plateau did not offer adequate economic incentives. Big level profitable agriculture has never been possible in hilly landscape cut through steep ravines. Therefore, it was necessary for the tribesmen to indulge in pillage and plunder of the rich agriculturists settled in the plains of Punjab. Lack of peaceful employment opportunities also encourages the people of Afghanistan to take up soldiering since a vocation. As the army has never been able to accommodate all of them, the profession of being armed mercenaries is a must and not a luxury for them. In addition to economy, civilization has a role to play. Terrorism is often the product of failure of the nation state or a state with several nationalities like India and the ex- Soviet Union, to integrate the ethnic minorities occupying the peripheral area with the majority populace. Continuous subversion in Assam, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh is because of the conflict flanked by Hindi-Sanskritic civilization of the core of India (north Indian heartland) and the tribal civilization of the northeast.

The civilization gap heightens the discourse gap flanked by the people. Religion often obstructs integration of the minorities with the majority populace. In Han China, pan-Islamic ties encourage

the Uighurs who is Muslim, to yearn for a distinct state with the Muslims occupying the post-Soviet Central Asian states. Insurgents sustain themselves when they receive foreign support. And foreign countries eagerly support the insurgencies because supporting terrorism against enemy states has become a low cost option. Without facing the horrendous manpower loss and financial drain that characterize the regular warfare, a state through supplying the insurgents with arms and money could stay the security forces of the enemy state thoroughly engaged. Kazakhstan is afraid of her large brother China. Therefore, the former is encouraging Uighur Institution of Freedom. In the 1950s, the Nagas under the leadership of Phizo Angami, who had been an Axis client, demanded independence of Nagaland. He organized a 3,000 strong guerrilla force recognized since the Naga House Guards. This institution received financial and military help from China. Guerrillas have to be motivated to fight and die. While the military personnel are motivated by symbolic honours (medals, awards etc) and monetary rewards, the guerrilla leaders mostly take refuge to ideology. If not xenophobic nationalism then religion has been used for mobilizing the size. The advent of a self proclaimed *messiah* and pan Islamic loyalty was the causative factors behind several Islamic guerrilla movements from the 19th century onwards.

The 'messiah' portrays such thrash about since a *Jehad* (Holy War). However, the Marxist guerrilla leaders instead of relying on the *religious leaders* depend on political indoctrination with the aid of grass root stage cells. They place down a framework of improvement of the peasant's social and economic circumstances. The Greek historian Thucydides points out the importance of money in waging war. While Thucydides is referring to conventional campaigns, his insight is also applicable in conducting guerrilla warfare. The guerrillas acquire money either from their foreign sponsors since well since from the international mafia institutions. The *jehadis* of Afghanistan who fought the Soviets are now operating in Kashmir and are financed from the drug money acquired through selling poppy to the international underworld cartels.

Irregular Warfare in the Wider World

Guerrilla Warfare is since old since human culture. The Old Testament records night ambushes through the irregulars. David led a guerrilla thrash about against the monarch Saul. Interestingly, David's ranks were filled due to economic distress in Saul's Kingdom. Therefore, extensive before the Marxist theorists connected economic use with Guerrilla War, this causality was already a recognized practice in the ancient Close to East. Counter-insurgency operations of the ancient world have sure similarities with contemporary day anti-guerrilla operations. In 200 BC, the Syrian Seleucids conquered Israel. The Israeli guerrilla leaders were able to set up a bond with the villagers through caring for the old and disabled. Moreover, the guerrillas promised land to the tillers. Several centuries before Mao, the Israeli guerrillas realized that they needed the villagers (sea) for defense against the Seleucid *Phalanx* (regular infantry).

For defense against the imperialists, the guerrillas armed the villagers. Therefore the guerrillas were transformed from being a marauding group raiding villages from the surrounding hills into a genuine armed people's movement. In 160 BC, the Seleucid monarch Antiochus IV sent Greek settlers to take in excess of the land. This program was somewhat same to the 20th century Peking's come of curbing insurgency in Tibet. The Tibetans are of a dissimilar ethnic stock from the Han Chinese. Peking's policy is to send Han Chinese settlers in Tibet in order to transform the ethnic landscape of the 'roof of the world'. Multiethnic empires have been essentially susceptible to insurgencies. Following Clausewitz's footsteps, the British Empire throughout the First World War used Irregular Warfare since a subsidiary thrash about against the Turks. While Common Allenby mannered a regular warfare against the Ottoman Empire, T.E. Lawrence encouraged and commanded the Arabs to overthrow the Turkish power. Lawrence's sideshows in the desert of Palestine diverted Turkish military pressure from the largest front therefore aiding Allenby's advance.

Throughout the Cold War period, two greatest Guerrilla Wars occurred in Vietnam flanked by 1950-71 and in Afghanistan throughout the 1980s. The Afghan experience of Soviet Union could be termed since Moscow's Vietnam. The two superpowers were humiliated through the stateless armed clusters. The American Army and the Red Army even after deploying 536,000 and 115,000 troops respectively failed to crush the guerrillas. In addition throughout 1979, Soviet Union deployed 50,000 elite troops to annihilate the Afghan insurgents. In the ensuing combat, the Americans suffered 46,000 battle deaths in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan lost 15,000. In Vietnam, Chinese and Soviet financial and military supplies kept Vo Nguyen Giap's North Vietnamese Army fighting the Americans. Likewise, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provided stinger missiles and billions of dollars for sustaining the *mujahideens* against the crack troops of Moscow. For example in 1988, US military aid to Afghanistan amounted to \$ 600 million.

The American aid to the Afghan guerrillas flowed by Pakistan. History turned a full circle after the Soviet collapse when, the American pampered Afghan *mujahideens* turned against their erstwhile sponsors. The bombing at the World Trade Center in 2001 was the culmination of Osama Bin Laden controlled *Al-Qaeda's* (literal meaning The Foundation) war with the American 'infidels'. Initially USA used a novel weapon in attempting to eliminate the terrorist foundations deep inside Afghanistan. The US Navy following the doctrine of 'dominating the littoral in depth' tried to destroy the terrorist hideouts with cruise missiles fired hundreds of kilometers absent from the land from ships operating in the Arabian Sea. The next stage involved a gigantic air-land operation recognized since Operation Enduring Freedom which started in November 2001. Nevertheless several guerrillas escaped into south Pakistan and then into Kashmir.

Low Intensity Warfare in British India

The insurgency in Kashmir was a section of the tribal problem involving Pakistan and Afghanistan. The roots could be traced back to nineteenth century. The imperialists faced a multitude of irregular

opponents from Sudan in the west and Northeast India in the east throughout this era. Charles Callwell, a British military theorist in the first decade of the 20th century, attempted to explain Irregular Warfare in the following terms:

- Little War.... includes the expeditions against savages and semi-civilized races through disciplined soldiers, it includes campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellions and guerrilla warfare in all sections of the world where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in open field, and it therefore obviously covers operations varying in their scope and in their circumstances.

Northwest India remained the sore mark of Britain's Indian Empire. Several kinds of Pathan tribes like the Afridis, Mohmands, Orakzais, etc were continuously occupied in insurgencies. Frontier tribesmen proved to be dangerous guerrilla warriors. Captain L.J. Shadwell, who fought against the Pathan tribes in Tirah throughout 1897 wrote:

- A frontier tribesman can live for days on the grain he carries with him and other savages on a some dates; consequently no must exists for them to cover a row of discourses. Therefore nimble of foot, too, are they in their grass shoes, and therefore conversant with every goat-track in their mountains, that they can retreat in any direction. This extraordinary mobility enables them to attack from any direction quite unexpectedly, and to disperse and disappear since rapidly since they came. For this cause the rear of a European force is since much discovered to attack since its fronts or flanks.

Unlike the guerrillas, the imperial soldiers of Britain were dependent on a host of supplies that had to be transported to the front from the rear. Therefore, supply depots and foundation camps had to be recognized. This gave the guerrillas the opportunity to cut the imperial rows of discourses. To guard the extensive rows of discourses, the British were forced to set up guard posts all beside which stretched back distant to the rear. This in turn tied up lot of troops who could not be used in the front for 'Combing Operations' against the guerrillas. Troops or convoys moving in the dusk were vulnerable to ambushes. In night fighting, the tribesmen had an edge in excess of the British troops and the British led sepoys. This was because they were accustomed to see bigger in the moonlight. As they knew the terrain, even in pitch dark they could come by the ravines and passes to concentrate and subsequently launch attacks on the slogging imperial columns. The mainly favourite tactics of the Pathans was to fire their *jezails* (extensive barrelled muskets) behind the *sangars* (fortifications made of stones). Imperial counter-fire was stopped through the stone fortifications. The tribesmen were able to pick up their victims easily because each Pathan male was an excellent marksman. For him, the rifle was the joy of his life. From his childhood, he learned to handle

firearms. Moreover, continuous blood feuds due to the operation of the *Pukhtunwali* code forced the Pathans to become versatile in the exploit of their weapons for subsistence.

Again several Pathans used to join the Sepoy Army for acquiring musketry instructions. After the completion of their training, the Pathans deserted from the Sepoy Army with their rifles. When the imperial column got demoralized, the Pathans armed with swords and spears rushed down from the slopes. And in secure quarter combat, muskets of the sepoys were useless. Northeast India which after 1947 became the six sister states of the Republic of India also proved troublesome for the Raj.

Occasionally the Sepoy Army made forays into the territories of the tribesmen. When throughout the last decade of the 19th century, the Lushai tribe proved to be troublesome, their villages were burnt. One feature of such pacification events was strict political manage exercised through the Political Mediators in excess of the conduct of operations through the military commanders. This was necessary to prevent infliction of undue violence in excess of the civilians. Manage through the political mediators was the prelude to present day District Magistrates controlling Aid to Civil Operations. Throughout 1917-19, when the Kuki tribe of Manipur rebelled, 3,000 personnel of the Assam Rifles and the Burma Military Police were concentrated under the overall direction of the Political Mediators. Besides military operations, the aim was to win in excess of the Kuki chiefs.

Counter-Insurgency Program of the Indian State

At present at least five crores of Indians live under army rule. This is partly due to the violent behaviors of the non-state actors. The post-colonial state inherited many colonial legacies. The chief in the middle of them is the insurgencies in the margin. The fundamentalist clergy, arms running and foreign aid continued the Guerilla War of the tribesmen of the Indus frontier. Under the Raj, the clandestine operators from the Persian Gulf area imported arms. To check the arms deal, the Royal Indian Marine (predecessor of Royal Indian Navy) used to conduct maritime patrolling of the Gulf area in order to deter and if possible capture the smugglers. After 1947, many arms producing factories appeared in the North-West Frontier Province (hereafter NWFP) of Pakistan. Arms smuggling by Iran and Central Asia aided through the Pakistan Army, also continued the guerrillas.

Presently after independence, the Pakistan Army armed and directed the tribesmen of the NWFP to invade India. They were designated since *Azad* Kashmir forces. They were led through several Pakistan army officers who were supposed to be on leave. Once armed and trained, the tribesmen were encouraged through the religious zealots to fight for liberating the land of the Muslims. From the 1980s, Common Zia-ul-Haq, the military ruler of Pakistan, encouraged the development of *madrassas* in NWFP. The Peoples Liberation Army, a militant institution of Manipur receives training and equipment from the Chinese military foundations in Lhasa. The government of India raised many paramilitary formations to combat terrorism. One of them was the Assam Rifles which was initially raised through the British for guarding the northeast frontier of India from the 'wild

tribes'. It had twenty-one battalions and mainly of them were deployed for maintaining 'law and order' in the six northeastern states.

Compared to the police, the paramilitary forces were armed with not only heavy but also sophisticated weapons. For instance, the Assam Rifles from the mid 1950s were equipped with sten guns, bren guns, and 2 inch mortars. While the police of West Bengal even now retain .303 Lee Enfield rifles, the Assam Rifle personnel had rejected such obsolete weapons in favor of Self Loading 7.62 mm rifles method back in 1968. However, unlike the army, the paramilitary forces lack artillery and armoured fighting vehicles which are necessary for conducting conventional warfare with the regular troops of the enemy states. Paramilitary forces are deployed when the police fail to curb the insurgents' behaviors. Naga insurgency is the oldest separatist movement in the northeast. The Naga leaders argued that they are not Indians but brought to India due to the British conquest. In 1946, the Naga National Council demanded an independent state.

The Naga leaders told the departing British that India should remain since the 'guardian' authority for ten years and then the Nagas should decide in relation to the their future course of activity. The state of Nagaland was carved out from Assam in 1960. The Naga insurgents from the mid 1950s onwards used to attack the railway row and the railway staff. The BSF guarded the Indo-Burma border to prevent any insurgents escaping and also to check any infiltration back into India. In common the regular police manned the rows of discourses. It fell upon the Assam Rifles to conduct 'Combing Operations'. In addition, the Para military forces also send columns and organized flag marches in order to restore confidence of the people of the disturbed regions. Both British-India and independent India have used air authority to bring the insurgents under manage.

The Royal Air Force (henceforth RAF) frequently bombed the tribes beside the Indus. On 28 August of 1960, the Indian Air Force (hereafter IAF) strafed the insurgents who laid siege to the Assam Rifles' post at Purr. Moreover the IAF also dropped supplies for the defenders. The Assam Rifles was used to guard the rail installations. In 1966, when the police fled against the violent behaviors of the Mizo National Front, both BSF and Assam Rifles units were deployed. Flanked by 9 and 13 March, the IAF strafed the Mizo insurgents. The IAF was used in 1999 at Kargil for evicting the intruders supported through Pakistan's Northern Light Infantry. But the IAF like its predecessor RAF establish out that amidst snow blizzards and rocky terrain, hitting the little bands of elusive guerrillas was next to impossible.

The Kashmiri militants were strengthened with a leavening of Afghan *mujahideens*. The latter had downed many Russian helicopter gunships when the Red Air Force tried to bomb them in the bleak Afghan plateau in the 1980s. These *mujahideens* with the Pakistan supplied stinger missiles severely damaged many flying machines of the IAF. In a method, airpower has been impotent in checking insurgencies. From the 1980s, the Inter Service Intelligence of Pakistan has become more active. Flanked by 1985 and 1995, 20,000 guerrillas were trained and infiltrated into the Kashmir Valley.

Before 1993, the ISI was spending Pakistani Rs 100 million (US \$ 3.3 million) every month on the militancy in Kashmir. The ISI is maintaining foundations in Bangladesh for aiding the rebellious clusters of northeast militants. Again Bangladesh dislikes 'hegemonic' India's activities.

Therefore, Dacca turns a blind eye when insurgent clusters like the Mizo National Front and the United Liberation Front of Assam (hereafter ULFA) set up foundations on the Chittagong Hill Tracts in order to escape the 'Cordon and Search Operations' of India's security agencies. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Pakistan trained *mujahideens* were sent to Kashmir for launching a *Jihad* there. Being veterans of the Afghan War, they provided a lethal addition of combat effectiveness to the insurgents combating the Indian state in Kashmir. Again in pursuit of the policy of 'tit for tat', after 1993, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) started supporting the insurgents of Sind. The latter are encouraged to demand independence from the Punjabi dominated Pakistan. In addition to such violent response, successive Indian governments have also attempted to restore normalcy in the disturbed regions through devolution of authority by autonomous councils and *panchayats* and making of occupations. This brings the rebel leaders within the democratic political procedure.

Besides coercion, absorption of the terrorists in the largest stream remnants a significant plank of India government's counter-insurgency policy. One of the causative factors behind the rise of terrorism in the middle of the young generation is lack of employment. Therefore, the government always tries to make occupations wooing the militants back to the mainstream. From the 1960s, several ex-militant Nagas were absorbed in the Border Security Force. Since section of the state's '*divide et impera*' (divide and rule), they were used with much success against their erstwhile brothers in arms. Since section of the occupation making program, after 1960, a Naga Regiment was also raised through the Indian Army. Another aspect of the divide and rule policy on section of the government is to play the several insurgent clusters against each other. The army and other state agencies train and equip the Kukis who are recognized since the members of the Kuki National Army.

This institution attacked the Naga supporters of National Socialist Council of Nagaland in Manipur. Ethnic affinities often attract India into the vortex of insurgencies occurring in the neighboring countries. In Sri Lanka in relation to the one million Tamils are measured to be alienated from the thirteen million Sinhalese. The former in the 1980s organized a militant wing named since the Liberation Tigers of Tamil *Eelam* (hereafter LTTE) for conducting guerrilla thrash about against the security forces of Lanka. Due to public pressure from the people of Tamil Nadu, Delhi could not turn a blind eye to the sufferings of the Tamil minority in Lanka. And when Sri Lanka threatened to turn to USA for support, Delhi was afraid that Colombo might become a client state of Washington. Therefore, in 1987, India sent the Indian Peace Keeping Force for combating the LTTE. The LTTE eliminated the moderate *Eelam* People's Revolutionary Liberation Front and demands *Eelam* (a

distinct homeland) for the Tamils. The LTTE has been innovative in conducting maritime guerrilla warfare. The speedboats of the LTTE have been harassing the Sinhalese fishing boats.

REVIEW QUESTIONS

- What do you understand from limited war, modern war and total war?
- How did technology revolutionize the modern warfare?
- What is the concept of total war? Mark out its roots historically.
- Explain the colonial legacy as regards low-intensity threats in the post-colonial state.

CHAPTER 9

Dilemmas of Development

STRUCTURE

- Learning Objectives
- Demography
- Ecology
- Consumerism
- Review Questions

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After reading this chapter you will be able to:

- Discuss Malthusian theory of demographic change.
- Describe the process of European colonization of new lands.
- Understand the consumerism

DEMOGRAPHY

Theories of Demographic Transform

To understand and lay in perspective the discussions on the demographic variable in contemporary history, we require seeing at the two guiding theories of the discipline of demography- the corpus of Malthus' scripts on demographic dynamics and the continued hold of the "demographic transition theory" as the Second World War. The third view, however equally relevant but not section of mainstream demographic discussions, is that put forward through Karl Marx in response to Malthus' speculations.

Malthusian Theory of Demographic Transform

The Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834) is popularly measured to be the founding father of contemporary demography. His 1798 job, *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, which went by six editions, still gives the largest theoretical frame for contemporary demographic research. Malthus' largest contribution was to enunciate a homeostatic, cyclical view of population movements. The high stage of human fecundity made it possible for fertility to outstrip food manufacture bringing in relation to the starvation and enhanced mortality in its wake. This crisis ensured the return of equilibrium and the beginning of a new cycle. This vicious cycle was generally prevented through the operation of preventive and positive checks. The "preventive" check in the shape of postponed or averted marriages in the "civilized" European section of the world generally

allowed these areas to escape crisis. The other circuit to equilibrium, generally established outside Christian Europe was the therefore-described “positive” check that took the shape of war, disease, sterility from sexually transmitted diseases, polygamy and vices including infanticide, abortion and contraception.

However this was the largest demographic content of the original Malthusian model, it also contained an extremely significant element of ruling class anxiety in relation to the debilitating power that the rapidly proliferating poor would have on community. The common Malthusian model of homeostatic population-economy equilibrium by the operation of preventive and positive was to have universal applicability. But it was the class component of the model that made it politically significant. Malthus whispered that mortality had been unchanging for centuries, but in class communities, the poor experienced higher mortality and were the first casualty of an existence crisis. This ignorant and wretched part of community did not respect preventive checks since they went ahead and had children despite minimal existence. Within the logic of this model the Elizabethan Poor Laws then through transferring section of the social surplus to this improvident class encouraged their reckless multiplication. This, in turn, increased the demand for food and raised the price of food for the transitional class, thereby raising their mortality.

Therefore the Poor Laws instead of bettering the condition of the wretched merely increased their population and spread death to the more industrious and worthier parts of community. One direct policy outcome of this row of reasoning was the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 where outdoor relief was substituted through urban workhouses. While Adam Smith’s thesis of free deal appealed to the natural man. For Malthus, contraception was vile and unchristian- a view shared through mainly Englishmen of the day. In the absence of contraception the only respectable method to manage was the preventive check. Despite being widely held since the progenitor of demography, Malthus was neither the first to postulate a potential strain flanked by population development and food possessions nor was he responsible in any method for the growth of the technological apparatus of demography. What then were the causes for his popularity? However this question can never be answered in full, one biggest cause is that Malthus was the first to clearly and comprehensively enunciate the fears and anxieties of English intelligentsia of social revolution and assert a civilization gap flanked by the peoples of the metropolis and the colonies in clearly demographic words.

Further, in the transitional of the nineteenth century it cautiously saw contraception since vile and clearly carried a divine design. Being written in the mainly common words, Malthusian concepts could be used to understand demographic phenomena in widely dissimilar contexts- from Poor Laws in England, to population development in the New World and to famines in India. Malthus progressively became more concerned with the absence on the preventive check in the uncivilized world. However, anticipating latter day infusionists he did hope that the “diffusion of education and knowledge” in the future would bring these people to delay marriage.

Demographic Transition Theory

This brings us to the second enduring shibboleth of demography- the therefore-described “demographic transition theory”. In the post War era, eugenics and the earlier politics of status quo took a severe beating. The resurgence of the Left, the horrors of Nazi race politics and advances in scientific theory were responsible for the quick demise of pre-War eugenicist arguments. The new governments now accentuated welfare. After the War, demography was taken extremely seriously through government policy makers. In France the INED was created to collect data and examine population trends. In Germany, however, after the terrible excesses of the Nazis, the state decided to remain neutral in matters of population and family.

Early American demographic anxieties concerned immigration and immigrants. According to the thinker, this job was “largely descriptive and of small extensive-run significance.” Mainly of the academics associated with demography in the U.S. were section-time demographers drawn mainly from the disciplines of sociology and statistics. The therefore-described transition theory that has had such an enduring hold in excess of generations of demographers was first presented in 1929 through Warren S.Thompson, one of America’s leading demographers. However, this prototype failed to recruit several followers. Towards the end of the Second World War in 1944, the “demographic transition theory” was published apart through Frank W. Notestein and Kingsley Davis to become the guiding “theory” of demographic transform. Classical “transition theory” since it was first formulated rested on a tripartite division of human demographic experience.

In the first stage both mortality and fertility were high resulting in small or no population development. In the second stage mortality fell sharply while fertility sustained to remain high, leading to a sharp increase in population. In the third and final stage, fertility falls sharply and population goes into secular decline since fertility falls faster than mortality. This model of demographic transform was clearly evolutionary and functionalist in nature. Fertility decline was seen to be necessarily consequent upon industrialization and modernization. Transition theory was invested with applicability independent of lay and time. Unlike its subsequent reincarnation in the 1950s, the transition theory of 1944 vintage clearly saw demographic transform since a dependent variable with social, economic and cultural growths since the largest explanatory factors. Unlike the early theoreticians of demographic transform, Notestein saw all nations in the world capable of growth. Predatory colonialism was seen since the culprit for delayed transition in countries such since India. The context was clearly held to be significant. Demographic transform was seen to be a cumulative result of social and cultural and institutional transform. The dissemination of contraceptive techniques was recognized since significant in controlling fertility.

However, its effectiveness was always dependant on “the social setting; hence new patterns of activities are to be recognized principally through the alteration of that setting.” Within legroom of

presently in relation to the half a decade, Notestein and subsequently Davis, the twin popular progenitors of the transition theory revised their recently pronounced model of demographic transform extremely significantly. In a statement in 1949 he wrote, “.. Fertility manage is not a substitute for other ameliorative attempt; instead, it is a means that will assist in creation ameliorative attempt successful- indeed it may turn out to be a necessary condition for such a success.” The “transition theory” in its original shape saw falling fertility since a consequence of industrialization. The greater the stage of fertility, the quicker was the required pace of industrialization. The Soviet model, based on “totalitarian ways” was idea to be bigger at attaining higher rates of capital formation and therefore potentially more attractive to newly independent Third World countries. Slower industrialization held the risk of increased poverty leading to Communism. The immediate goal of American demographers was to convince Third World leadership that population manages was both possible and necessary. The subject region of American demography now shifted to the Third World and therefore did the emphasis from academic demography to population studies focused on family scheduling. Fertility manage in the Third World now became one of those unusual meadows with a multiplicity of willing and rich sponsors. This singular emphasis on fertility manages since the panacea for the ills of the Third World was soon questioned in words of its motives and politics. Growth since a basic necessary condition for population manages was stressed and through the 1970s “revisionists” started questioning the inverse connection flanked by population development and growth.

Today in the United States there is no one overwhelming issue comparable to the old enthusiasm in excess of Third World fertility manage. The questions asked are much more diverse in nature. The transition theory based mainly on Parsonian functional structuralism and its subsequent sociological paradigms of “Westernisation” and “modernization” has sustained to be single mainly significant theory for demographers. Sociologists and anthropologists have extensive stopped taking Westernization and modernization seriously. Historical demography has clearly contradicted the empirical foundation of the transition schema. First we discover that in nineteenth century France, fertility began on its course of secular decline much before industrialization or any biggest stage of economic growth. This should have been apparent to the formulators of the theory of demographic transition since this phenomenon was well documented. The big level Princeton based European Fertility Project, intended specifically to test the theory, and was unequivocal in their finding that economic development showed no clear connection with falling fertility. Despite being at variance with the historical record, classical middle theory maintained that fertility would decline only since a consequence of the cumulative interaction of lowered mortality, growing individualism, socially mobile urban clusters, the decline of family and fatalism. These preferred circumstances could only result from wide-ranging industrialization and modernization. The demographic transition it was whispered had universal applicability. Any historical era or geographical point could be placed and

located on this demographic-economic level. Dudley Kirk, who was involved with the elaboration of the transition theory at Princeton commented, “In regard to demographic matters the dissimilar countries of the world may be measured since on single continuum of growth...” This implied that historical specificities and contextual variations had no bearing on the working out of demographic transition.

However a historical and confident in its universal applicability and relevance, the classical adaptation of the transition theory did however privilege the social, cultural and economic in excess of the demographic. Demographic transform was clearly a dependent variable in this equation, with modernization since the sole account. Demography was seen since firmly embedded in community. This reminds one of Malthusian thinking on the subject since well since Marx’s view that every mode of manufacture had its special laws of population. In clear opposition to Malthus and Marx, the transition theory omitted class variations and local specificities. To plot demographic transition or the later concept of fertility transition one has to have a foundation era and community to begin with and a dissimilar one at the end of that procedure. The moment one leaves the neat periodization and sure correlations of the demographic transition theory, and takes note of historical contingencies and complexities, it becomes clear that there is no one homogenous starting specimen that can be designated since “traditional” and its replacement through a “contemporary” community. Further, as the demographic transition theory is based on incomplete account and not any abstract analytical construct, any empirical observation that runs contrary to the stated trajectory becomes evidence of significant weakness.

Further, when the authors of the “theory” themselves mutate it out of recognition, any remaining confidence evaporates rapidly. Finally, in its mutated second birth the theory lacks causal direction. Other than the must to contraceptive, the demographic transition helps us extremely small in characterizing demographic regimes, fixing determinants or predicting transform. Despite the theory not getting a formal burial from demographers, it has been noted that the word demographic transition theory has increasingly been replaced through “fertility transition” which however is plagued through the similar theoretical and methodological weaknesses since the original word. As these two guiding “theories”- Malthusianism and “demographic transition” have clearly been indicted for failing to correspond with recognized history and analytical rigor, alternative methods of conceptualizing demographic transform have become an urgent require.

Marx Understands of Demographic Transform

Karl Marx’s views on the subject of demography- economy linkages assume significance here. With tremendous perspicacity, Karl Marx in his discussion of the growth of capital, noted that “The law of capitalist manufacture, that is at the bottom of the pretended “natural law of population,” reduces itself basically to this: The correlation flanked by accumulation of capital and rate of wages is

nothing else than the correlation flanked by the unpaid labour transformed into capital, and the additional paid labour necessary for the setting in motion of this additional capital. It is so in no method a relation flanked by two magnitudes, on the one hand, the magnitude of the capital; on the other, the number of the laboring population; it is rather, at bottom, only the relation flanked by the unpaid and the paid labour of the similar laboring population. If the quantity of unpaid labour supplied through the working-class, and accumulated through the capitalist class, increases therefore rapidly that its conversion into capital needs an extraordinary addition of paid labour, then wages rise, and, all other conditions remaining equal, the unpaid labour diminishes in proportion. But since soon since this diminution touches the point at which the surplus-labour that nourishes capital is no longer supplied in normal quantity, a reaction sets in: a smaller section of revenue is capitalized' accumulation lags, and the movement of rise in wages receives a check.

The rise of wages so is confined within limits that not only leave intact the foundations of the capitalistic organization, but also close its reproduction on a progressive level. The law of capitalistic accumulation, metamorphosed through economists into pretended law of Nature, in reality merely states that the extremely nature of accumulation excludes every diminution in the degree of use of labour, and every rise in the price of labour, which could seriously imperil the continual reproduction, on an ever-enlarging level, of the capitalistic relation.” Marx then went on to note that, “The laboring population so produces, beside with the accumulation of capital produced through it, the means through which it itself is made relatively superfluous, is turned into a comparative surplus-population; and it does this to an always rising extent. This is a law of population peculiar to the capitalist mode of manufacture; and in information every special historic mode of manufacture has its own special laws of population, historically valid within its limits and only in therefore distant since man has not interfered with them.” Therefore it is in *Capital* that we first discover the argument that socially acceptable stages of population are not independent of the capitalist manufacture procedure, but are in information, a function of the latter. Marx, however, attached a rider to this formulation—that this dynamic or “law” of population was peculiar to the capitalist organization and that other manners of manufacture had their own laws of population.

Demographic Transform: Dissimilar Trajectories

While sure general trends can be discerned in the extremely extensive word crossways national and local population histories, these commonalities disappear when we begin to seem demographic growths in the medium and short word. Consequently what we then have is not one single universal story of world population history but a variety of dissimilar trajectories with dissimilar determinants of demographic transform. Western Europe, East Asia and the Indian subcontinent may be taken since representative of several dissimilar trends to understand demographic transform in the contemporary world.

Europe

The historical demography of Europe is significant to any discussion of the demographic variable in the world context, since it was here in the eighteenth century that population first showed rapid increase followed through a continued decline. The population of north-west Europe increased from flanked by 60 to 64 million in 1750 to in relation to the 116 million in 1850 growing at an annual compound rate of approximately 0.6 per cent. Flanked by the French Revolution and the First World War, mortality sharply declined with the availability of new possessions and favorable epidemiological transforms, creating circumstances where population could perhaps increase.

Further, throughout the eighteenth century plague and associated epidemics such since typhus, smallpox, malaria, venereal diseases lost much of their lethal efficacy. Population increased sharply at first but was then limited through nuptiality checks. Next, it resulted in big overseas migration and a continued decline in fertility. It led to the huge movement of Europeans overseas and also to the demographic transition. This demographic transformation is one of the mainly significant transformations that Europe witnessed in the last millennium. In twentieth century western Europe devastating wars further exacerbated the effects of fertility decline, finally resulting in an ageing age building and development rates that will turn negative in the future.

China

Western observers, including Malthus, saw China since a country that was hopelessly caught in the trap of overpopulation and poverty. High population densities, low per capita consumption of food and power and consequently low anthropometrical indices characterized China in the eighteenth century. Describing the economic context of demographic transform in China, Malthus wrote, "In few countries, population seems to have been forced; that is, the people have been habituated through degrees to live on the negligible possible quantity of food. There necessity has been periods in such countries when population increased permanently, without an increase in the means of object. China looks to answer to this account. If the descriptions we have of it are to be trusted, the lower classes of Chinese people are accustomed to livelihood on the negligible possible quantity of food and are glad to consume putrid offal's that European laborers would rather starve than eat." Despite this low stage of livelihood averages, Malthusian positive checks did not prevent an increase in Chinese population. China's population grew virtually exponentially flanked by 1700 and 1800 rising from 175 million to 400 million in the similar era. Flanked by 1800 and 1950 the population increased more gradually to almost 600 million. This was followed through a sharp acceleration to in excess of 1.2 billion at present. Studies of Chinese historical demography by new sources such since imperial genealogies have now conclusively shown that mortality in the eighteenth century was same to and even lower than Western Europe. Despite a sharp increase in population in the nineteenth and

early twentieth centuries, mortality stages decreased, in a rather fashion. Public health events have been credited for this increase in life expectancy.

This is not to say that there were sharp peaks marked through crisis mortality. These famines were some and not severe sufficient to arrest population development in the extensive-word. Famine mortality, including the severe 1958-61 famine, was more the product of administrative and political mishandling than of population mass. From the transitional of the twentieth century China's mortality started falling at a rate strange in world history. Infant mortality registered a fall of 300 per cent flanked by 1950 and the present. Male life expectancy likewise increased rapidly from 42.2 years in 1953-54 to 61.6 years in the era 1964-82. Once again increased state intervention, in the shape of superior investments in public health, was responsible for this marked fall in mortality.

Therefore China with its low average of livelihood instead of proving the Malthusian positive check clearly illustrates that the Malthusian economy-mortality connection did not have a universal applicability. It necessity also be noted here China has also exhibited extremely high stages of female infanticide and extremely high stages of sex-selective mortality both amongst the nobility and commoners. This brings us to fertility. Once again, recent research into Chinese historical demography has shown that fertility in traditional China was quite moderate despite an absence of contraception. Nuptiality, one of the mainly significant proximate determinants of fertility, was extremely dissimilar from marriage patterns elsewhere in Asia and in Europe.

While there was early and universal female marriage in China, this was not the case with males. Males married much later and crossways a longer age span. Richer males married earlier than poorer men crossways social clusters. This social differential in the pattern of marriage observed as the eighteenth century has persisted to the present day. The recent economic reforms and attendant increases in inequity have further raised the proportion of poor single men up to the age of thirty to 30 per cent from 25 per cent in the 1980s. Three mechanisms of fertility manage – late beginning, birth spacing and early stopping –effectively controlled Chinese marital fertility.

India

The population of India grew gradually from 1871 to 1921 mainly because of the mortality check despite high fertility. In the post 1921 years up to the 1980s fertility remained high but mortality declined leading to rapid population development and resulting in an extremely young age population. Women fared badly in words of mortality comparative to men during our era. The sex ratio at birth generally falls flanked by 1040 to 1070, internationally. In other terms 104 to 107 male babies are born for every 100 female babies. On the other hand male mortality is also generally higher than female mortality in the older age clusters.

Despite this, India has exhibited a continuous decrease in the proportion of women. This is explained through lower life expectancy at birth for females. This all-India trend however does not hold good

for several sections of India, since we shall see in our discussion of local trends. India's age sharing has remained extraordinarily stable with a big and virtually consistent proportion of young people. In a closed population such as that of India's, the big proportion of children points to high stages of fertility. The age sharing also suggests a high dependency ratio. Further, the youthfulness of the population also ensured a sustained population momentum that would last beyond the onset of fertility decline.

Demography: Community Linkages

In this part we attempt to understand few of the connections flanked by demographic and social and economic transform. In the Malthusian scheme of items, unregulated demographic development was sure to result in crisis and a return to equilibrium flanked by food supply and demand. For Malthus this vicious cycle of rapid procreation and resulting death could only be prevented through the preventive check or the safety valve of migration. This section of Malthus' formulation provided a foundation to a big number of writers in the post- War era that feared an imminent population explosion resulting in widespread scarcity. The United Nations in its publication entitled, *The Determinants and Consequences of Population Development* (1953) observed, "Especially throughout the last decade a number of authors have recalled the Malthusian principle of population and expressed the fear that the present population of the earth is drawing close to the maximum that its possessions can support." Demographers, economists and statesmen took this warning seriously. Coale and Hoover in their job on India saw rapid population development since the reason for the country's poverty. Population increase resulted in a progressively superior share of the manufacture being used for consumption, leading to a fall in savings and investment.

The government of India seems to have taken the thesis of overpopulation since being an obstacle to growth seriously. India was the first country to begin a comprehensive program of family limitation in 1950s. However, there were dissenting voices. Simon Kuznets' big-level revise establish no association empirically flanked by population development and growth. Approximately the similar time, Boserup provided theoretical arguments and empirical evidence to argue that critical stage of population pressure was necessary for technical growth to take lay in agriculture. Others saw population pressure since forcing the growth of new institutions that were essential for economic development. Recent research now clearly tells us that the Malthusian specter of population outstripping possessions is not true historically at the global stage. According to the thinker, flanked by 1500 and 1820 while the world's population grew at an annual rate of 0.29 per cent, the gross domestic product increased through 0.33 per cent. Malthus hypothesized the operation of the preventive check since the preferred circuit to equilibrium.

However, history once again tells us that the Malthusian preventive check was in operation in a wide range of communities and not limited to "civilized" Western Europe. Again, we discover that other

mechanisms such as widowhood, infanticide, abortion and a number of events were resorted to in areas where the nuptiality check was away to regulate population. There is also no proof to suggest that the preventive check was a conscious decision to limit fertility and population development. Therefore, what we do discover is that a range of communities characterized through varying stages of economic growth resorted to few shape or the other of fertility regulation. High mortality and especially infant mortality was clearly inversely correlated with fertility by “replacement” and “hoarding”. In a demographic regime marked through high and volatile stages of mortality, parents or the community would tend to replace dead children and produce more than the desired family mass given the high incidence of mortality. While the interrelations flanked by the proximate determinants of population development are fairly well understood, the population-economy connection continues to pose an enduring conundrum. Malthus saw the overpopulation resulting in poverty and famines.

On the other hand according to the theory of demographic transition, modernization resulted in first lowered mortality and rapid population development followed through continued fertility decline and slowing down of population development. While growth or contemporary economic development resulting in mortality and then fertility decline in excess of the extensive run seems logical, this has not always been borne out through accessible historical proof. France experienced low fertility stages well before the beginnings of contemporary economic development. The Princeton based European Fertility Survey that was intended to test this assertion of the “transition theory” once again failed to discover any statistically significant connection flanked by economic growth and fertility decline. However, the failure to discover such a connection may be related to the choice of economic indices that were accessible to the Princeton researchers. At a more global level, taking more sensitive indices of economic growth such as the Human Growth Index rather than aggregated events such as per capita income or GDP, recent research discovers that fertility transition occurred only in countries with a HDI of 0.6 or more. Mortality decline is a necessary condition for continued fertility decline. Therefore it is not surprising that only when the population since an entire is freed from the threat of mortality hikes will it exercise the option of family limitation. The uneven nature of fertility decline flanked by the urbanized and developing countries has created another contradiction. With the West having experienced fertility decline for more than a century now, its population is rapidly ageing and the proportion of men and women in the working ages is receiving smaller. What this implies in economic words is that these countries now have to import labour.

Since North-South disparities have sharply increased in the recent past, employment and wages have decreased in the developing world. This has resulted in the West facing a virtual tide of occupation seeking immigrants trying to enter these richer countries. The cruel contradiction of globalization has been that while the West wants all factor markets to be liberalized, it fights shy of opening up to

labour. A related dilemma of growth that has a bearing on migration is the nature of economic growth in the globalized world. The recessionary trends that have marked corporate globalization have greatly increased unemployment since well since underemployment. Job is also rapidly shifting from the organized to the unorganized sector accompanied through the attendant evils of poor working circumstances and low wages especially in Asia. All this further increases North–South disparities and sets up circumstances encouraging a poor workforce to move in search of bigger employment opportunities, which then draws severe restrictions. Demographic transforms are path-dependent. We discover that areas and countries that underwent the mortality transition early also began on their course of continued fertility decline much before traditionally high mortality areas.

The path-dependence also extends to other characteristics of demographic transform. Patriarchal China and the northern Indian sub-continent have traditionally been characterized through pronounced son preference. With the beginning of fertility decline and the reduction in the desired family mass, we discover new technologies, such as pre-natal diagnostic testing being employed to destroy female fetuses resulting in alarmingly skewed sex ratios. Finally, in several of the countries of the developing world, in a context of rising social disparities, demographic arguments are erroneously marshaled to hold sure societies responsible for the ills of community. Efforts have been made to biologically reduce their reproduction or more brutally through outright physical extermination- Nazi Germany being the mainly revolting, but through no means the only case in point.

ECOLOGY

How Europe Perceived the new Lands

In information, these transforms had begun even prior to the Industrial Revolution. Even since the Europeans moved out of their homelands, fired through a new spirit of adventure or because of a sudden population increase, since occurred approximately the 1750s, or because of religious persecution at home or in order to create profit by deal, they triggered off several ecological transforms in the new lands they entered. Their attitudes towards the new areas they occupied were varied. Few saw the lush green tropical regions since the lost Eden. The French navigator, Louise Antoine de Bougainville arrived in Tahiti in the South Pacific in 1768 and idea that he had been transported into the Garden of Eden. The natural abundance of the tropics seemed to contrast with the frugality of nature in Europe.

Another kind of reaction, at the other extreme, was of hostility towards the existing flora and fauna. The marshes and swamps were seen since breeding grounds of disease and necessity are cleared. A third kind of reaction was of interest in the exploitability of these natural possessions and their commercial value. Here, nature was seen since inexhaustible and staying to be put to “productive” exploit. If, in the procedure of tapping natural possessions, much of the existing natural vegetation

and animals were destroyed, that could not be helped. The larger forces of Europe were merely prevailing in excess of the inferiorities of the rest of the world. It was an assertion of Darwin's theory of the subsistence of the fittest.

The Importing of new Plant and Animal Species

When the settlers came to the New World, (North and South America), Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and other lesser-recognized sections of the world, they brought with them the plants and animals they were well-known with. These plants and animals shaped a significant section of their diet. For example, the Europeans brought in the pig to several colonies, because it was a rich and convenient source of food. But soon the species multiplied therefore rapidly that it became a menace, competing with human beings for the land and its possessions. The new animals also needed sure types of fodders and grasses for their sustenance. These grasses were often imported from the house countries and would spread like wild fire. Existing grasses and weeds were wiped out since a result. Alfred Crosby in his *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900*, explains how, beside with other regular plants, a big variety of weeds also establish their method crossways the seas into the new lands.

In the case of Australia, the onslaught of European plants and weeds began in 1778 when the first expedition sailed from Britain to Botany Bay. Mainly of the northern sections of Australia since well since its interior were too hot and arid for European seeds and grasses. Therefore it was in the southern coasts and Tasmania that Europe's flora took root. They wiped out other indigenous plants in this area. Like the weeds and the pigs, rabbits could also be uncontrollable. In 1859 few rabbit species were released in southeast Australia. They multiplied in such alarming numbers that they began competing with the sheep for grasses and herbs. It was much the similar story in New Zealand, which had been annexed through the British in 1840. Here, as there were no big native predators, all the Old World livestock that had been introduced – i.e. horses, goats, pigs and sheep – multiplied extremely rapidly and soon outstripped the human population. What made the New Zealand story even more distressing was the information that the flora and fauna here was very unique, as they had evolved in isolation for few 80 million years. Sir Cecil Rhodes, the British colonialist who made a fortune mining diamonds, introduced the Himalayan Tahr, an extensive-haired mountain goat to South Africa in the 1920s. It was measured an exotic specie and few three or four specimens were brought for a zoo at the foundation of the Table Mountains. The goats, however, escaped from the zoo and multiplied. Soon they had recognized a colony and began to run riot, threatening the natural habitat of the area.

These goats are now measured such a menace that the South African National Parks power has taken a decision to eliminate these animals. But that decision has triggered a controversy and a cluster of animal lovers in Cape City have now shaped a support cluster described Friends of the Tahr (FOTT)

to rehabilitate this close to-extinct species. Therefore there were two kinds of ecological transforms: the designed and the unintended. Both had extremely distant-reaching consequences and generally upset the ecological balance of the areas where they emerged. Even the designed transforms ended up having unintentional repercussions. And these repercussions could affect not only plant and animal species but also whole races of humans. And this in turn could have significant political consequences.

The Wiping out of the Indigenous Peoples

Presently since the introduction of new animal and plant species sometimes resulted in the wiping out of the indigenous species, therefore too the coming of Europeans to the New World could mean the extermination of big parts of the existing population in that area.

In Central and South America, for example, the Aztecs and the Incas were suddenly discovered to the smallpox virus when the Spaniards arrived in the second decade of the sixteenth century. As they had no immunity to this disease, it spread rapidly and caused massive loss of lives. This led to political collapse and demoralization, since a result of which it became possible for some hundred Spanish adventurers led through Hernan Cortes, to defeat the 5-million strong empire of Montezuma in the Mexico area. Since for the Incas of Peru, the reigning Inca since well since his son and heir fell victim to smallpox and as there was no clear successor, the Spanish conqueror Francisco Pizarro was able to use the ensuing disunity to conquer the region with ease.

Were Human Beings Directly Responsible or Only Indirectly?

The superior question that is raised through scripts like those of Alfred Crosby is the extent to which human beings can be held responsible for ecological disasters. The title of Crosby's book - *Ecological Imperialism – The Biological Expansion of Europe* is significant. It looks to suggest that the ecological impact of imperialism was not man-made but due to the biological transforms that occurred when men and women moved into the new regions. Diseases like smallpox, measles, typhus and influenza were of general occurrence in Europe in any case and they only establish a more congenial habitation in the new regions that the Europeans traveled to. Critics of the Crosby kind of account such since David Arnold in his book *The Problem of Nature*, say that it underplays the destructive aspect of human actions. Arnold argues that in the case of the Aztecs and the Incas, the other policies of the Spaniards i.e. of massacres, of forced labour in mines and plantations and the destruction of indigenous agriculture were also contributory to a significant population decline even before the arrival of smallpox in 1519.

The European conquerors also weakened the native population through appropriating their food reserves. As mainly of these regions had an existence economy, i.e. the people produced presently sufficient to meet their own immediate food necessities, their precarious nutritional balance broke

down. They now became more susceptible to illnesses and subsequent death. There is no doubt that biggest ecological transforms were being triggered off in the regions engaged through the imperialists. Even if they were unintended, they suited imperial interests. The wiping out of indigenous plant and animal species and the killing off of native populations all fitted into a pattern and rendered easier the tasks of accommodating the surplus population of Europe and of creating a existence foundation for them.

The Impact on Existing Ecosystems

As mainly of the colonies had been acquired to fulfill requires of industrialization, especially the growing demand for raw materials, the ecosystems of these regions were bound to be affected. All sections of the earth have their own natural ecosystems. These could be extremely little, like an easy pond, or a whole rain forest or a desert – it could even be the entire earth. Ecosystems have been compared to machines that run on and on automatically, checking themselves when they get too hot, speeding up when they get too slow and therefore on. However, when outside forces disturb these ecosystems, the equilibrium is affected and the whole organization could collapse. Environmental historians like Donald Worster, in *The Ends of the Earth*, tell us that for an extensive time the mainly dramatic environmental alterations came from the huge conversion of natural ecosystems into croplands. Immense tracts of forests and grasslands were cleared and brought under farming. The bio-complexity of these areas was lost. Species of plants and animals began to disappear at an alarming rate.

Since Worster puts it: “First it was one species every year, then one every day, soon it will be one every hour, one every half hour, one every 15 minutes.” There were plants on which man had depended for food, for medicines, for structure materials and therefore much else for centuries. They now disappeared without a trace. Not only was the natural procedure of development suspended, it was even reversed. Let us take up few instances of the effects of contemporary capitalist growth on the colonies.

Coal Mining

Throughout the era of the industrial revolution coal was the biggest source of power. Since the industrial revolution gathered momentum, the demand for coal went up dramatically. Where was this coal to be obtained from? There were sections of Europe, which were rich in coal like Poland and southern Russia, and mining was accepted out here. But another biggest source of coal was the Appalachian mountains of the United States. Here, the way of strip mining was used to extract coal. Vegetation was obviously removed to enable the mining to take lay and once that happened, there were biggest landslides.

These landslides destroyed neighboring farmlands and even roads. River organizations were also affected since sedimentation increased and the flowing capability of streams and rivers was reduced. Separately from all these were the pollution – sulphuric wastes were generated and these entered the water organization. It is estimated that in the Appalachian area, the waste from the mines polluted few 16,000 kilometers of waterways. These were the effects of coal mining on the areas from which it was extracted. What in relation to the spaces where coal was being used since a source of fuel? The burning of coal releases carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, which seriously affects the ozone layer. Since is well recognized, it is the ozone layer that protects the earth from the harmful ultraviolet rays of the sun. When the ozone layer gets depleted it can reason a variety of health troubles.

Changing The Side of Nature: The New England Instance

New England was that section of North-Eastern America approximately present-day Massachusetts, which was colonized through Britain in the seventeenth century. The impetus for this colonization came from the Puritan movement for religious reform in England. In the first quarter of the seventeenth century the Puritans faced discrimination from the regional Anglican Church in England. As 3,000 miles of ocean separated them from England, they would be free to govern this new land since they wished, with no interference from the house church. This was how the English resolution of New England came into being.

Through the early 1640s more than 20,000 Englishmen had made the pilgrimage to New England. The rates of population development were also rather high. This area had many types of furred animals, which were not recognized in Europe. There was the ocelot – a medium-sized cat with a striped deep yellow or orange coat; the coyote – a wolf-like wild dog and the bobcat – a little cat with a spotted reddish brown coat. The skins of these animals began to become popular for fur coats in Europe and since they entered the European fur market, the big-level destruction of these animals began. It is estimated that beaver skins comprised in excess of half of England's total fur imports flanked by 1700 and 1775. Soon, beavers vanished from New England, their original habitat. Beavers are also builders of natural dams, and when the beavers disappeared, other species such since otters and muskrats were either flooded or frozen out.

Several diversities of ducks and other birds that used to breed in beaver ponds also became extinct. The ponds themselves shrank into marshes and finally became meadows. Even superior animals like the moose (a big-antlered deer establish in North America) and other diversities of deer were affected through the disappearance of beaver ponds because they used to escape from flies through standing in the cool water. Tree stumps that were cut down through beavers for structure ponds used to sprout tender stalks and leaves on which deer, rabbits and hare fed. Through 1800 mainly game animals had dwindled in the New England region and through the mid-nineteenth century they had vanished. These included the white-tailed deer and the buffalo. The moose and the caribou

disappeared a small later – i.e. through the beginning of the twentieth century. But the Puritan settlers welcomed all this and rejoiced when the shrieks of the wild panther were replaced through the sound of Sunday church hymns and the busy hums of machines.

Turning Forests into Cultivable Land – The Case of Northern India

Mainly colonial states derived a big amount of their revenue from agriculture. Hence it was in the State's interests to expand the region of farming. For this it was necessary to clear forestlands. In British India an 1894 document, which codified Governmental land exploit policy, clearly stated that there should be no hesitation in sacrificing forests where the demand for arable land could only be fulfilled in this method. Ironically, at the similar time, Wilhelm Schlich, who was the Head of the Indian Forest Department, was waxing eloquent on how forests reduced the temperature of air and soil, regulated climate, increased rainfall, helped reduce violent floods and prevented occurrence of land slips, avalanches and siltation of rivers. He went on to add – all this in his *Manual of Forestry* — that forests also assisted in the manufacture of oxygen and ozone and therefore helped to improve the health of the country! But to get back to our story of the Ganga Jamuna Doab. This area, in present day Uttar Pradesh, is the region lying flanked by the Ganga and the Yamuna rivers. From the foothills of the Himalayas the two rivers flow similarity to each other for in relation to the 500 kms, separated through 80-120 kms of land. Since they move eastwards the two rivers run closer to each other until they finally merge at Allahabad. The Doab area was one of the mainly fertile areas of Northern India The English East India Company acquired manage in excess of this area in 1801 and what followed thereafter was a series of blows to the sensitive ecological organization of the Doab. There was a dense forest belt flanked by Bulandshahr and Kanpur, incorporating the districts of Aligarh, Etah, Mainpuri and Kanpur, at the beginning of the 19th century. The predominant tree species of this area was the *dhak – butea monosperma*, — more popularly recognized since the Flame of the Forest. As the soil here was rather saline, the only vegetation that could survive and thrive was the dhak tree. But the new conquerors decided to bring these regions under cash crop farming – indigo, cotton and sugarcane. Besides the revenue stimulus for bringing the land under the plough, an additional argument advanced was that the clearing of the forests would help to manage crime. In this section of northern India there were many bands of dacoits who were whispered to be seeking refuge in these jungles. Through the 1840s, a substantial portion of the *dhak* jungle had disappeared and through the 1880s there were hardly any trees left outside the properties of the big landlord. What happened to this area when these forests were cut down? Climatic transforms began to happen.

Through the 1840s there was a visible rise in temperature and the intensity of the loo or hot wind that blew in the summers increased. It loosened the surface of the now unprotected soil which was then washed absent in the monsoon rains. The subsoil lost its water retaining capability and ponds and

lakes began to arid up. All this led to the severe drought of 1837-38, which came since the climax of a succession of arid years. The number of cases of malaria increased dramatically due to the stagnant water in dehydrated out riverbeds and lakes. With the disappearance of the *dhak* tree, the soil also became more saline and in due course of time, the meadows became less and less productive. Through the 1820s, this procedure had gone therefore distant that whole villages had to be abandoned. Moreover, due to intensive farming, which left small time for fallow periods, the productive capability of the soil was also greatly reduced. The Doab story, therefore, is one of causing ecological damage to fulfill requires of growth. But extremely soon, growth was itself the victim of this assault on nature and agricultural productivity, which distant from being increased, was actually reduced. Since a result the entire policy for this area had to be reviewed.

The Coming of the Railways

The contemporary world is generally associated with faster and more efficient means of transport like steam navigation and the railways. From the 1840s an ever-expanding network of railway rows began to crisscross the European continent and shortly thereafter spread to those sections of Asia, Africa and Latin America, which were in the hands of the imperialist powers. In India it has been estimated that the total length of rail track increased from in relation to the 5,000 kilometers in 1870 to 20,000 kilometers in 1890 and thereafter, in every decade, in relation to the 10,000 kilometers of rail track were being laid. Railways were a very effective means of maintaining administrative manage in excess of distant-flung and hitherto inaccessible regions. They also helped to transport raw materials and finished products from the rural hinterlands to the ports with greater ease. The sight of a steam engine hurtling down the countryside was awe-inspiring and magnificent. It came to be associated with the might of empire and technical advancement. But what implications did the coming of the railways have for the natural habitation? Railway tracks are generally laid on beams of wood, which are described sleepers.

In recent times metal sleepers have replaced wooden sleepers but during the nineteenth century, when the railway network was expanding rapidly, wooden sleepers were in exploit. It is estimated that each mile of newly laid track required 1760 sleepers. The *sal* and *deodar* trees of northern India and the teak of southern India were establish to give ideal wood for the sleepers as they were strong sufficient and resistant to termites and fungal decay. A standard tree could give flanked by five to ten sleepers. This meant that thousands of trees would be cut down for railway construction and sometimes entire forests would be devastated. In few cases more trees would be cut than could be easily transported out of the forest through unscrupulous contractors.

These would be left to rot in the forests and contribute to forest fires and further destruction. In the early years of railway construction forests were ransacked indiscriminately. But extremely soon the colonial state realized that such ways would be disastrous in the extensive run and therefore it began

enacting legislation which would enable them to control forests in such a method that they were assured of extensive word supplies of wood. Forests began to be reserved but this meant that even people who had been by the forests for centuries for firewood, fodder, honey, fruits, roots and numerous other produces, were now prohibited from entering these forests.

The Growth of an Ecological Awareness

Man knew the disadvantages and hazards of overexploiting nature from early times. In Ancient Greece, where big regions of countryside were turned into a barren waste throughout the Peloponnesian War (431-421 BC), Theophrastus of Erasia, who was Aristotle's biographer and botanical gardener, urbanized a theory in which he connected deforestation with the decline of rainfall in Greece. Coming to more recent times, in Germany, there was a shortage of wood after the Seven Years War of 1756-63. The government of the time realized that the woodlands would have to be preserved and hence decided to exercise state manage in excess of the forests. But here there was a twist to the tale.

The forest was now to serve requires of the national economy – especially its industrial requires. The superior, national interest was projected since being more significant than regional, local requires. In the procedure the idea urbanized that forests had to be preserved from man, i.e., there was an effort to restrict the rights of traditional forest users. This caused resentment in the middle of the regional people and there were several protests in excess of access to forest possessions. Therefore, presently since traditional artisans were protesting against the displacement caused through industrialization, therefore too the forest dwellers felt threatened through the new forest laws and state takeover of forests in the countries of Europe and later other sections of the world. This tussle continues even today. State takeover of forests and the harnessing of forest possessions for industrial growth had its effect on the nature of the forest. Often, mixed forests had to give method to monoculture stands of species like pines, which were more appropriate for construction and industrial requires. Not only were the necessities of the regional occupants overlooked but the extremely health of the forest was compromised in the procedure. The natural biodiversity that lived until then was destroyed.

Therefore we can say that however the importance of the forest was realized it was still regarded since an exploitable resource, to be customized and distorted to serve the interests of the “nation”. Who constituted the “nation”? The less powerful, traditional clusters were being steadily marginalized through the industrial growth of the era. But these other clusters did not remain silent, since Ramchandra Guha tells us in his book *Environmentalism: A Global History*. In the United Kingdom a big number of public associations appeared in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The Scottish Rights of Method Community, shaped in 1843, designed to protect walking regions approximately the municipality of Edinburgh. The Commons Preservation Community, begun in 1865, wanted to prevent the encroachment of municipalities on woodland and heath. For the defense

of unusual birds, beautiful plants and threatened landscapes, there was the Selbourne League, shaped in 1885 and named after Gilbert White of Selbourne, a well-known eighteenth century naturalist.

There was also the Coal Smoke Abatement Community, started in 1898 since an independent pressure cluster to create the government enforce pollution manage laws on erring factories. Mainly because of all these attempts, Guha tells us, it has been possible to save “at least few sections of England from the contaminating effects of urban-industrial culture.” But the colonial state in India was not fettered through such pressure clusters and efforts at conservation could only emerge from within the state tools itself. This is not to say that Indians did not realize the ill effects of industrialization. Even however the Industrial Revolution had mainly left India untouched in the colonial era, and there were nationalists who saw industrial growth since the require of the hour, Mahatma Gandhi was opposed to such a path of growth. In his *Hind Swaraj*, published in 1909, he saw industrialization since being destructive of nature. Few twenty years later he wrote:

- God forbid that India should ever take to industrialization after the manner of the West. The economic imperialism of a single tiny island kingdom is today keeping the world in chains. If a whole nation of 300 million took to same economic use, it would strip the world bare like locusts.

Few of his followers like Mira Ben and Sarla Behn were extremely active in the habitation defense campaign. Mira Ben’s Pashulok Ashram, located flanked by Hardwar and Rishikesh, was witness to few of the mainly devastating floods from the upper reaches of the Ganga which not only swept absent bushes and trees but also cattle and human beings beside with their dwellings. She realized that this fury of nature had its origin in the wanton destruction of forests in the mountains. She also realized that the solution to the problem place not in the planting of trees like the pine, but in more ecologically suitable trees like the oak. The Himalayas had also become ecologically unstable because of the replacement of mixed forests through monoculture. Since more and more women and men came to be convinced through her thoughts since well since those of Sarla Behn, who had set up an ashram for educating hill women in Kausani, Almora district, the powerful Chipko movement took root.

CONSUMERISM

The Character of Commercialization and “Consumption” under Industrial Capitalism

This part trades with two biggest characteristics of the troubles presented through consumption and the several definitions of “consumerism” in contemporary Europe. Firstly, what were the biggest characteristics of the context in which these troubles came to be posed? Secondly, how have these troubles been treated at dissimilar times?

Early Days

Manufacture and consumption of a variety of goods of everyday exploit was well recognized in Europe and other consumer communities in Asia and Africa through the mid 18th century. In addition, in Europe, a variety of exotic goods – often brought from China (largely porcelain) and India (spices, and cotton goods) - were luxury products in high demand in the middle of the aristocracy. Several historians have indicated that throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, manufacturers, endowed with sophisticated industrial technology, used the great renown of luxury goods in the middle of classes outside the aristocracy, and rushed to meet regional demand with big level manufacture of goods on the foreign pattern that were produced in the vicinity. Such devices, jointly with secure attention to machine manufacture of vital metal goods (buttons, cutlery etc.) appealed to transitional classes and stimulated their inclination to buy. The Units on Industrial Capitalism have indicated that the subsequent significance of these transforms in consumption for the “revolution” in economic life in Europe throughout the 18th and 19th centuries varied considerably from country to country. If “house demand” was significant in the method textiles, and iron and steel played the role of “leading sectors” in the Industrial Revolution in Britain, low stages of income and social variations made “demand” less significant since a motor of transform in France, Germany and Russia.

Here, concentrations of capital (in investment banks) and the initiatives of the state played a biggest role in what transpired, with the state often acting since the prime consumer (since in the case of Tsarist and Soviet Russia). However, once initial transforms had occurred in the character of the local economy, use of “demand” and “consumption” in everyday life became essential to the further growth of European communities. The procedure came gradually, and in fits and starts. In Britain, from the mid 18th century, since indicated through the examples of Manchester textile manufacturers, in the enterprises of Matthew Boulton (associated with metal goods) and Josiah Wedgwood (associated with the pottery production) continued and cautious surveys of markets were normal and manufacture for them through little manufactories working on strict principles of the division of labour, was the rule. Hence, one account of the Boulton business would stress regular travel through its owners to set up the contours of the market. And it would also stress several initiatives taken to set up the reputation of the firm’s products:

- Scarcely a day passed but Boulton received letters of introduction of merchants and gentlemen from every quarter and since their house was only emerging from obscurity, Boulton was desirous of promoting its reputation with all in his authority and so paid a scrupulous attention to all their customers both foreign or domestic and to all their relationships whatsoever in therefore much that his house at Soho for several years seemed like an inn for the entertainment of strangers.

Well aware that such notables would be emulated through the gentry and transitional classes of their communities, the Boultons attempted to present their goods to several markets by this circuit to set up a taste for such products. Elsewhere in Britain, in order to extend the range of such products, crafts were fitted into a putting out organization that gave the trader or merchant preference – allowing them to understand patterns of demand and taking initiatives to exploit prevailing patterns of consumption to greatest effect. Meanwhile, in approximately all biggest states of contemporary Europe, the era upto 1870s was dominated through little-level producers who gradually moved absent from a location since craftsmen dealing in excellence goods. In France and Germany, following the economic expansion of the 1850s and 1860s, craftsmen targeted a big market. Since Shulamit Volkov has pointed out, carpenters restricted their range of products, in order to produce more that had a regular demand. The similar came to be true of shoemakers. Technology was applied to achieve economies of level.

Only in food processing was this transformation not to be noticed until the 1890s – when refrigeration gradually came to permit the similar in this quarter. The increased output was presented to the buyer by a range of circuits. In Britain, potential consumers were targeted through manufacturers, but they were normally approached through the nomadic trader, who provided the less well endowed buyer with credit (payment was made on an “instalment plan”). These drapers worked jointly in communities and associations in order to protect their interests against defaulters: the Highland Community of London (shaped 1778), and English Guardian communities such since the London Community of Guardians for the Defense of deal against Swindlers and Sharpers (shaped in 1776). In the middle of laboring classes, minimum stages of consumption were ensured through associative activity in the middle of sure deals to ensure that sickness and unemployment could be tided in excess of. This was especially therefore in the middle of several unions and communities - the Boilermakers, the Amalgamated Engineers and the London Compositors for example. In the middle of these and others, Friendly Collecting Communities lived, since did Industrial Assurance Companies.

All of them were protected through law and took subscriptions to give assistance to their members in times of distress. The large unions (e.g. Amalgamated Engineers) provided pensions to members through the beginning of the 20th century. Such institutions and initiatives clearly improved the spending capability of the working class, while, elsewhere at this stage, the usual run of Christmas Clubs, Goose Clubs etc. encouraged saving for the great extravagance on a special occasion. Structure Communities and Freehold Communities enabled the household with the little income to plan the purchase of land or a house. The mid 19th century in France and Germany also witnessed the “democratization” of demand on the British pattern.

This followed from the high agricultural prices of the time and the overall increase in employment. In Germany, the trend persisted well after 1871, sponsored through the high stages of public and

municipal action paid for through French reparations after the war of 1870. Craft enterprises became focused and streamlined to take advantage of this phenomenon. The transform in employment and resolution patterns already indicated in the Units on demographic trends and industrial capitalism made the sharing of consumer goods easier. The concentration of populations in municipalities and little cities (in the Midlands and North of England, the Paris Basin in France, and the Rhine country in Germany) provided more ready and regular demand for manufactured goods than dispersed societies of the countryside.

The Late 19th Century and After

The late nineteenth century saw the persistence of several of these institutions and habits. In Britain, for example, nomadic traders sustained to be of importance well into the 20th century. Recognized numbers increased from 9459 in 1831 to 69, 347 in 1911. From the 1850s, however, three biggest transforms are noticeable in this pattern. Firstly, consumption was not strictly the preserve of firms and individuals. Regional government and the state also became regular consumers. This urbanized an old habit – purchase for the administrative and military establishment.

Municipal construction, and the growth of amenities (gas sharing, parks and gardens, bridges, institutions to give medical treatment and education) became significantly marked. Equally, however, capacities for individual consumption received a boost. Initiatives were taken to give opportunities to subjects/citizens for savings, and significant differences were noticeable in trading practice to tempt the consumer with little income. In Britain, savings schemes included the Post Office Trustee Savings Banks, with their “House Safes”, and a range of other Savings Banks. Through the time of the inter-war era, mortgage banks (such since the Abbey Road) had also made their spot. At another stage, the urban habitation became the target of a new organization of trading and sharing – by the “department store”. The best instance of this was Fortnum and Mason’s of London and the Bon Marche in Paris. These department stores, in few cases, began to shape branches in several cities, and “chains” of stores appeared in the commercial network. The shops run through Jesse Boot that dealt in pharmaceutical products were an instance in Britain.

This “chain” began in the pre-1914 era and persists to the present day. Woolworth is another such chain which exists in the US and Britain. In post-1945 France, the Monoprix and Uniprix chains are the equivalent. The significance of these shops was that they displayed a big range of goods (while the average store dedicated in two or three biggest kinds of goods) – encouraging a common redefinition of requires and wants in the middle of those who passed by them. The store also paid attention to attractive presentation. This had already been achieved by advertisement and discussions in newspapers and by the little billboard. But the big legroom given in excess of to specific ranges of products in department stores increased the impact of the profile. Association of excellence with the name of the store also drew in customers who were also otherwise bewildered through the variety of

the market and the problem of shoddy produce. The desire of the state to take advantage of the interest in consumer products for its own purposes also led to investments in specific goods in France under the Third Republic and Germany under National Socialism. From the 1920s, the radio and, from the 1950s, the television both added a new dimension to such behaviors and to the advertising of products.

Symbols of “Consumption”

The availability of a massive number of goods and commodities in the market lay was often celebrated. Manufacturers not only pointed to the merits of their products, but also to the extraordinary organization of manufacture that went into those products – an organization of manufacture that not only made them fashionable but miracles of contemporary science. Bolton’s and Wedge woods uniformly labored this aspect of their output. Other views of consumption urbanized from perspectives associated with the idea – widespread in the middle of intellectuals at this time – that industrial capitalism broke down “societies”, and created individuals who faced the world alone, or since members of “community”. In such “community”, individuals were more open to the suggestions of the market than was the case when they were members of “societies” where they followed “customs” and “rituals”, and where individuals were less self-conscious. Big or medium-sized cities saw the breakdown of societies and the making of a world of individuals whom the market manipulated to think of requires and wants that they had hitherto never conceived.

Advertisement through producers and traders were intended to tempt individuals into a preoccupation with buying and consumption. Few of this may have been admitted through several who approved of the transforms of the time, but they did not see it with foreboding or worry. In the early days of industrial capitalism, optimistic since ever, Adam Smith argued:

- “Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all manufacture and the interest of the producer ought to be attended to only therefore distant since may be necessary for that of the consumer”.

He also noted, however, since David Miller has pointed out, that ‘the human propensity to consume was the consequence of a fascination for “baubles and trinkets”, a passion for accumulating substances of “frivolous utility” and “a vehicle for deception with false promises that wealth will bring happiness”. Smith described for caution and discretion:

- “Money will at best “stay off the summer shower”, “but not the winter storm”, leaving humans more discovered than before to anxiety, fear and sorrow, disease, danger and death”.

The new atmosphere of acquisition and consumption attracted disapproval and warnings elsewhere. In the 18th century itself, condemnation of exotic luxury things was often apparent. Adam Anderson, in his *Historical and Chronological Deduction of the Origin of Commerce*, in the 1760s, decried

goods that were not clearly “useful and excellent for the Ease, Conveniency or Elegance of Life”. Luxury, consumption and acquisitiveness were condemned through Wesleyans, Quakers and other Non-Conformist Protestants in England, who measured such activities sinful. Critics associated with the Romantic Movement – including biggest figures such as William Ruskin – argued that the obsession with the market worked against what was “natural”. The German poet Schiller expressed same sentiments when he described for the recognition through man of what was ideal in him rather than be diverted through the superficial demands and averages of community. Early socialists of the 19th century expressed same sentiments: in France (Prudhon and Fourier) and in Britain figures such as William Morris, who stressed the virtues of individual creativity and expression, and made craft industry a fashion, repudiated the virtues of machine-made goods.

More fundamentally, Karl Marx, creation the distinction flanked by “exploit value” and “market value”, argued that consumption merely refined the procedure of use by which manufacturer’s extracted surplus from the working class. Looking closely at the world of acquisition and consumption in Europe and the United States, Thorstein Veblen, the American essayist, spoke of the appearance of a prosperous leisured class that indulged in conspicuous consumption, and also of an acquisitive community where consumption was not molded through necessities but through somewhat witless emulation and imitation. Veblen disapprovingly argued that consumption was the product of the wish to impress and to improve social status. Several came to argue at the end of the twentieth century that rampant consumption motivated through such inclinations rather than discretion, bred a respect for goods and jobs that smacked of a lack of serious idea and refinement. This was the hallmark of what was described “size civilization”, which was measured (through figures since dissimilar in their opinions since Adorno, one of the principal philosophers of Frankfurt School and F.R. Leavis and significant English literary critic) to have had a disastrous impact on community. On the other hand, following Smith’s more optimistic assessments of consumption and its character in the 19th century, followers of the “marginal utility” school of economic idea were worried that people would not consume sufficient to ensure economic and social continuity.

This was a notion that was echoed in the job of J.M. Keynes in the era flanked by 1918 and 1939. Commentators such as Simmel argued that fashion was not, contrary to Veblen, merely the consequence of the desire to set up status since much since a means of establishing one’s own identity in a world in which individuals did not wish to wholly set themselves separately from others. In his somewhat hard language, he would word it since a phenomenon that:

- “symbolizes nothing more than one of the several shapes of life through the aid of which we seek to combine in uniform spheres of action the tendency towards social equalization with the desire for individual differentiation and transform”.

Mainly recently, French philosopher Jean Baudrillard has taken issue with the perspectives of Marxists and others who have stressed the distinctions flanked by “exploit value” and the value created through the market – stating that “exploit” is seldom free of a market civilization of sorts. They also have pointed to how consumers often trade independently and since clusters with the products that are recommended to them – transforming them, and finding a value for them that is wholly outside the value that advertisement suggests. Baudrillard still warns however, of troubles, given the method commerce has approach to surround the consumer by media blitz and social manipulation. Since David Miller has pointed out, he is bigger recognized today:

- ‘For his argument that the huge spread of consumer goods since acts of symbolism has reached such a stage that where goods once stood for persons and connections, they now approach to replace them. Such is the authority of commerce to produce social maps based on distinctions flanked by goods that actual consumers are now relegated to the role of merely fitting themselves into such maps through buying the suitable signs of their ‘lifestyles’.

Material Civilization

Whatever the merits of these points of view, in recent comment and research, a number of writers concerned with “material civilization”, “material politics” and “consumption” have pointed out that the experience of consumer community in contemporary times has been varied and cannot easily be straitjacketed into the framework of the opinions sheltered through these debates. The come of producers and buyers to manufactured things took on dissimilar forms in excess of time. True, the subjection of crafts to the putting out organization placed the focus of the manufacture organization squarely on the trader who had an interest in the product primarily from the point of view of salability. Hence what was measured exotic or rare (since in the case of Chinese/Indian imports) decisively convinced patterns of manufacture. Meanwhile, inventive producers – St. Gobain the glass makers, Boultons, the metal workers, and Wedge woods of the ceramics’ industry – followed the market also, but they also tried to make a demand for specific products that they understood they could create.

The critics of the consumption that was bred under the conditions point out those buyers were convinced through the utility of goods, but also through the status they conferred. In the 20th century, advertisement made the associations of a product still more significant than before. And what transpired became a problem of few mass and level. Consumers came to be faced with a bewildering choice of goods not only when it came to everyday requires and necessities but also when they dealt with occasions such since birth, marriage and death (christening robes, bridal wear, coffins) and the method they took their leisure (sports gear, theatre equipment etc.) But the power of the manufacturer/trader should not be overstressed. Since the strength of nomadic deals in Britain

and France indicate, persuasion that took into explanation personal taste still sustained to be extremely significant.

Studies of 18th century France at the time of the Ancient Regime and the Revolution also indicate the impediments consumers encountered, since politics often sought to direct and regulate the attendance of manufactured things.

The Rise of the Consumer Movement and Material Politics

In information, those who were worried in relation to the method manufacturers and the market could attract the consumer into a net that ensnared him in dissimilar methods – both creation him buy goods he did not really “want” and also providing him with shoddy goods – quickly sought to set up bodies that would prevent this. In the 19th century itself, in France, shoddy goods led to recourse to law, and also to judgments that were hostile to manufacturers. In Britain, the era from the mid-19th century witnessed a rash of legislation to prevent deception of the buyer: the Sale of Food and Drugs Act (1875), the Sale of Goods Act (1893), a series of Weights and Events Acts (1878-1936), and, dealing with purchase on the foundation of section payment, the Hire and Purchase Act (1938).

Movements at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries to protect consumers have been recognized with several personalities: Percy Redfern and Beatrice Webb in Britain, Charles Gide and Jean Prudhommeaux in France, Louis de Brouchere in Belgium. And Percy Redfern’s sense of items is general to mainly of these activists in one method or another: “We the size of general men and women in all countries also compose the world’s market. To sell to us is the ultimate aim of the world’s business. Hence, it is we since consumers who stand in central relation to all the economics of the world, like a king in his kingdom. Since producers, we go each unto a scrupulous factory, farm or mine, but since consumers we are set through nature then to give leadership, aim and purpose to the entire economic world. That we are not kings but serfs in the size is due to our failure to think and act jointly since consumers and realize our true location and authority.” The job of these activists and their latter-day followers, coping with the aid of TV, has led to a fresh wave of consumer-defense legislation in Britain.

This followed the formation of the Molony Committee on Consumer Defense in 1962, which led in 1963 to the formation of the Consumer Council. The legislation that followed intensified consumer defense in the market lay: the Deals Account Act (1968), the Fair Trading Act (1973), the Restrictive Deals Practices Act (1977) and the Consumer Safety Act (1978). Same behaviors and legislation has figured in France and Germany approximately clusters that came jointly approximately the Council of Consumer Clusters (Germany) and the National Consumption Institute (France).

REVIEW QUESTIONS

- How is demographic change important to an understanding of world history?
- What are different historical contexts which have led to different demographic patterns in areas like Europe, India and Asia?
- What is the linkage between the process of industrialization and ecological damage? Discuss briefly.
- What are the ways in which the term consumerism is understood?

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